Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms Rozier: § 922(g)(1) Challenges Barred Post-Bruen and Rahimi Under the Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule

1. Introduction

This appeal arose after Travion Cortez Vanhorn was stopped for a seatbelt violation. During the stop, officers detected a strong odor of marijuana, learned Vanhorn had outstanding misdemeanor warrants, and Vanhorn volunteered that he had marijuana on his person, a scale in the vehicle, and a firearm under the driver’s seat. A search recovered marijuana, paraphernalia, and a firearm. Because Vanhorn had prior felony convictions (including unlawful distribution of a controlled substance), he was charged under the federal felon-in-possession law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Vanhorn moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to him. After denial of the motion, he pleaded guilty and received a 30-month sentence followed by three years of supervised release.

The central appellate question was narrow but consequential: whether intervening Supreme Court decisions—New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi—had abrogated Eleventh Circuit precedent upholding § 922(g)(1), such that the district court should have dismissed the indictment.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held that Vanhorn’s Second Amendment challenges were foreclosed by binding circuit precedent, chiefly United States v. Rozier, which upheld § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality. The panel further relied on United States v. Dubois (Dubois II), which had already concluded that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated Rozier.

Applying the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule, the court concluded it lacked authority to disregard Rozier absent a clearly on-point Supreme Court decision or an en banc Eleventh Circuit decision directly conflicting with it. Because Bruen and Rahimi did not expressly address § 922(g)(1) or “demolish” Rozier’s fundamental rationale, the panel treated Rozier as controlling and affirmed the conviction.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion is largely a stare decisis and abrogation analysis. Its precedents fall into two groups: (i) Second Amendment doctrine supporting felon disarmament and (ii) Eleventh Circuit rules on when a panel may treat earlier circuit precedent as overruled.

A. Second Amendment and “presumptively lawful” felon-disarmament

• District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): The opinion uses Heller for the proposition that the Supreme Court described felon-in-possession prohibitions as “longstanding” and “presumptively lawful,” emphasizing Heller’s assurance that “nothing in [this] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” This language undergirds the Eleventh Circuit’s continued acceptance of categorical felon-disarmament measures.
• United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010): This is the decisive merits precedent. Rozier interpreted Heller as “suggest[ing] that statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment,” and held that § 922(g)(1) is a constitutional means of restricting firearm possession for certain classes of persons (felons).
• United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010): Cited in Rozier (and referenced here) to reinforce the “presumptively lawful longstanding prohibition” framing for felon possession bans.

B. Post-Bruen/Rahimi framework and the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of it

• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): The opinion summarizes Bruen’s test: (1) ask whether the regulated conduct falls within the Second Amendment’s plain text; and if so (2) the regulation must be justified as consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition delimiting the right. The panel’s key point is not to apply this test anew to § 922(g)(1), but to note that Bruen did not address § 922(g)(1) and therefore did not abrogate Rozier.
• United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): The opinion describes Rahimi as reaffirming the Bruen approach and clarifying that a historical analogue need not be a “dead ringer” or “historical twin.” Critically, Rahimi addressed § 922(g)(8) (firearms possession while subject to a domestic violence restraining order), not § 922(g)(1); thus, the panel held it does not directly conflict with Rozier.
• United States v. Dubois (Dubois II), 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025): This is the panel’s bridge between the older merits precedent (Rozier) and the newer Supreme Court methodology (Bruen/Rahimi). Dubois II held that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated Rozier; it also stated that “Rahimi reinforced—not undermined—Rozier.” The Vanhorn panel effectively treats Dubois II as settling the abrogation question within the circuit.

C. Prior-panel-precedent rule (when is a prior circuit case no longer binding?)

• United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019): Quoted for the core rule: a panel is bound by prior panel holdings unless overruled by the Supreme Court or by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc.
• United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2009): Quoted (via Gillis) for the requirement that a later Supreme Court/en banc decision must be “clearly on point” and actually abrogate or directly conflict, not merely weaken, the prior panel’s holding.
• United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2008): Used for the proposition that if the Supreme Court never discussed the circuit precedent and did not otherwise comment on the precise issue, the circuit precedent remains binding.
• Del Castillo v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Health, 26 F.4th 1214 (11th Cir. 2022): Cited (via Dubois II) for the “demolish/eviscerate” articulation of what it takes to displace binding circuit authority.
• United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2016): Cited for reaffirming that, absent en banc or Supreme Court abrogation, circuit precedent forecloses contrary arguments in later cases.
• United States v. Fleury, 20 F.4th 1353 (11th Cir. 2021): Cited for the standard of review—constitutionality is reviewed de novo.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s logic proceeds in three steps:

1. Identify controlling circuit merits precedent: Under United States v. Rozier, § 922(g)(1) does not offend the Second Amendment because District of Columbia v. Heller treated felon-disarmament laws as “presumptively lawful longstanding” restrictions.
2. Test whether intervening Supreme Court cases abrogated that precedent: Applying the prior-panel-precedent framework from United States v. Gillis, United States v. Kaley, and United States v. Vega-Castillo, the panel asks whether New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen or United States v. Rahimi is “clearly on point” and directly conflicts with Rozier. The panel answers no: Bruen addressed public-carry licensing for law-abiding citizens, and Rahimi addressed § 922(g)(8), not felon possession.
3. Reinforce that the abrogation question is already answered in-circuit: The panel relies on United States v. Dubois (Dubois II), which held that Bruen and Rahimi did not abrogate Rozier. Therefore, the district court correctly denied dismissal, and the conviction stands.

3.3. Impact

Practically, the decision cements a predictable procedural outcome within the Eleventh Circuit:

• Near-term litigation effect: District courts and panels in the Eleventh Circuit will continue denying facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) on the ground that Rozier remains binding.
• Channeling effect: Defendants seeking to press Bruen-style historical arguments against § 922(g)(1) must aim for (i) en banc reconsideration or (ii) Supreme Court review, because ordinary panels are institutionally constrained.
• Substantive Second Amendment development deferred: The panel does not conduct a full Bruen/Rahimi historical-tradition analysis for felons; instead it treats the matter as settled by precedent until “clearer instruction” arrives (echoing Dubois II).
• Strategic implications: Future § 922(g)(1) litigation in the circuit may shift from merits briefing to preservation of issues for higher review—e.g., building a record and making arguments explicitly aimed at en banc/Supreme Court standards.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Facial vs. as-applied challenge: A facial challenge claims a law is unconstitutional in all (or virtually all) applications. An as-applied challenge claims the law may be valid generally but is unconstitutional when applied to a specific person or circumstance (here, Vanhorn’s circumstances and criminal history).
• Prior-panel-precedent rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, once a panel decides a legal issue, later panels must follow it unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc overrules it. A later Supreme Court decision must be “clearly on point” and directly conflicting; it is not enough that it changes legal methodology in a way that arguably “weakens” the prior case.
• Bruen “text-and-history” test: Courts ask (1) whether the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct (e.g., keeping/bearing arms). If yes, (2) the government must show the regulation fits within the historical tradition that limits the right. The Vanhorn panel did not apply this test to felons because binding circuit precedent already upheld § 922(g)(1) and was not deemed abrogated.
• “Presumptively lawful longstanding prohibition”: Language associated with District of Columbia v. Heller suggesting that certain regulations (including prohibitions on possession by felons) are historically accepted and generally constitutional, absent further clarifying instruction.
• “Historical analogue” not a “dead ringer”: From United States v. Rahimi (and Bruen): a modern law need not match a historical law perfectly; it must be analogous in principle. The panel, however, treated this as insufficient to displace Rozier without a direct Supreme Court ruling on § 922(g)(1).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Travion Cortez Vanhorn is best understood as a reaffirmation of intra-circuit stare decisis rather than a fresh merits adjudication under Bruen and Rahimi. The Eleventh Circuit held that United States v. Rozier—upholding § 922(g)(1) against Second Amendment attack—remains binding because New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi are not “clearly on point” and do not directly conflict with it, a conclusion already articulated in United States v. Dubois (Dubois II).

The key takeaway is institutional: within the Eleventh Circuit, § 922(g)(1) Second Amendment challenges—facial or as-applied—remain foreclosed unless and until the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc squarely revisits felon disarmament under the post-Bruen framework.