Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms Categorical Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) Under Prior-Panel Precedent Post-Bruen and Rahimi

Introduction

In United States v. Steve Telusme (11th Cir. Feb. 19, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit summarily affirmed Steve Telusme’s convictions for (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e), and (2) possessing cocaine and fentanyl with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).

Telusme raised two constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1): a Second Amendment as-applied challenge (arguing his criminal history did not show firearm misuse or dangerousness) and Commerce Clause challenges (facial and as-applied). He also attempted to frame an intra-circuit conflict, contending that United States v. Dubois (Dubois II) and United States v. Rozier could not be reconciled with the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision in NRA v. Bondi and the panel decision in Florida Commissioner of Agriculture v. Attorney General, both of which apply the New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen methodology.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit granted the government’s motion for summary affirmance. It held that:

  • Telusme’s Second Amendment challenge is foreclosed by binding Eleventh Circuit precedent—specifically United States v. Rozier, as reaffirmed in United States v. Dubois (Dubois II)—which treats felons as categorically disqualified from Second Amendment protections with respect to firearm possession under § 922(g)(1).
  • Telusme’s Commerce Clause challenges are likewise foreclosed by United States v. McAllister and its progeny; the “in or affecting commerce” element defeats a facial challenge, and a “minimal nexus” is satisfied where the firearm or ammunition previously traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Summary affirmance and standard of review

  • Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis supplied the standard for summary disposition: where one party is “clearly right as a matter of law,” leaving “no substantial question” as to outcome, or where the appeal is frivolous. The court used this procedural tool to resolve Telusme’s appeal without full briefing/argument on the merits because existing precedent controlled.
  • United States v. Jimenez-Shilon was cited for de novo review of constitutional challenges, reinforcing that although review is searching, it is still constrained by binding precedent.

2) The prior panel precedent rule (the engine of the decision)

  • United States v. Archer stated the governing rule: a prior panel holding binds later panels unless overruled by the Supreme Court or by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc.
  • United States v. Gillis and United States v. Lightsey sharpened what “abrogation” requires: a later Supreme Court/en banc decision must be “clearly on point” and “directly conflict” with the prior holding; it must “demolish and eviscerate” the prior precedent’s “fundamental props.” This demanding standard was decisive in rejecting the claim that Bruen, United States v. Rahimi, NRA v. Bondi, or Florida Commissioner of Agriculture v. Attorney General had displaced Rozier.

3) Second Amendment framework and felon-disarmament doctrine

  • District of Columbia v. Heller established the individual-right reading of the Second Amendment and, crucially for this line of cases, included the statement that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” describing such restrictions as “presumptively lawful.” The Eleventh Circuit treats this language as foundational support for felon-in-possession laws.
  • United States v. Rozier is the controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that restrictions on firearm possession by felons “under any and all circumstances,” such as § 922(g)(1), do not offend the Second Amendment. In Telusme, Rozier supplies the categorical rule that makes the appellant’s individual facts (non-violent history, claimed lack of dangerousness) legally immaterial.
  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen rejected means-end scrutiny and announced the two-step approach: if the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct, the government must justify the regulation as consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Telusme relied on Bruen to argue for an as-applied historical analysis, but the panel held that it could not revisit Rozier under the prior-panel rule.
  • United States v. Rahimi upheld § 922(g)(8) against a facial Second Amendment challenge and clarified how to apply Bruen’s “historical tradition” inquiry, emphasizing “principles that underpin our regulatory tradition” and “relevantly similar” historical analogues. The Eleventh Circuit also emphasized Rahimi’s reiteration that felon prohibitions remain “presumptively lawful,” treating it as reinforcing—not undermining—the Rozier line.
  • United States v. Dubois (Dubois I) held that Bruen did not abrogate Rozier; it was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Rahimi.
  • United States v. Dubois (Dubois II) reinstated Dubois I and again held that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated Rozier; Telusme’s Second Amendment claim was therefore “squarely foreclosed.” Dubois II is the immediate “post-Rahimi” Eleventh Circuit reaffirmation of the categorical felon-disarmament rule.
  • NRA v. Bondi (en banc) applied Bruen to uphold Florida’s restrictions on firearms purchases by 18-to-20-year-olds. Telusme argued Bondi required Bruen analysis for as-applied challenges and conflicted with Rozier/Dubois II. The panel rejected that framing: Bondi did not involve felon disarmament and expressly did not decide the scope of “the people” for Second Amendment purposes.
  • Florida Commissioner of Agriculture v. Attorney General revived as-applied challenges by medical marijuana users to § 922(d)(3) and (g)(3). Telusme invoked it to argue the circuit had moved to fact-specific analysis under Bruen. The panel distinguished it as involving non-felons and, importantly, noted that Florida Commissioner expressly acknowledged felons as a class that “can categorically be disarmed.”

4) Commerce Clause validity of § 922(g)(1)

  • United States v. McAllister rejected Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(1). The court held (a) the jurisdictional element (“in or affecting commerce”) defeats facial challenges and (b) an as-applied challenge fails if the government shows a “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce, satisfied by proof the firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce.
  • United States v. Scott, United States v. Wright, and United States v. Jordan were cited as reaffirming McAllister. Telusme conceded these precedents barred his Commerce Clause arguments; the panel applied them straightforwardly.

Legal Reasoning

The opinion is less about first-principles constitutional analysis and more about vertical and horizontal stare decisis within the circuit. The court’s reasoning proceeds in three moves:

  1. Identify controlling circuit law: Rozier holds § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment and categorically excludes felons from the right to possess firearms. Dubois II reaffirms Rozier after Bruen and Rahimi.
  2. Apply the prior panel precedent rule: under Archer, the panel cannot depart from Rozier unless it has been clearly abrogated. Under Gillis and Lightsey, neither Supreme Court developments (Bruen/Rahimi) nor later Eleventh Circuit decisions (Bondi/Florida Commissioner) are “clearly on point” in a way that directly conflicts with and demolishes Rozier.
  3. Dispose of ancillary arguments as legally irrelevant: because the categorical rule controls, Telusme’s proffered evidence about his personal dangerousness and his preferred Bruen-style historical analysis do not matter. Likewise, Commerce Clause challenges are foreclosed by McAllister and the “minimal nexus” shown by the plea proffer (interstate/foreign travel of the firearm and ammunition).

Notably, the panel explicitly rejects the claimed intra-circuit “conflict” by reading Bondi and Florida Commissioner as operating in domains where the Eleventh Circuit has not adopted a categorical exclusion (minors; non-felon “unlawful user” disability), while leaving intact the categorical felon-disarmament doctrine.

Impact

  • Second Amendment litigation in the Eleventh Circuit: The decision underscores that, in this circuit, Bruen/Rahimi-based as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) remain effectively unavailable at the panel level so long as Rozier stands. Defendants seeking individualized “non-dangerous felon” relief must look to en banc review or the Supreme Court.
  • Doctrinal stability via procedural doctrine: Telusme illustrates how the prior-panel precedent rule can maintain older constitutional holdings even amid significant Supreme Court methodological shifts (Bruen) unless the Supreme Court directly addresses the specific statute/holding.
  • Commerce Clause challenges remain closed: The “minimal nexus” approach of McAllister continues to foreclose most Commerce Clause attacks on § 922(g)(1), especially in ordinary cases where the government can show the gun or ammunition crossed state or national lines at any point.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • As-applied vs. facial challenge: A facial challenge argues a law is unconstitutional in all applications; an as-applied challenge argues it is unconstitutional as applied to a particular person or situation. Telusme attempted both (Second Amendment as-applied; Commerce Clause facial and as-applied).
  • Bruen “historical tradition” test: If the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct, the government must show the regulation fits within America’s historical tradition of firearm regulation (often by pointing to relevant historical analogues).
  • “Presumptively lawful”: Language from District of Columbia v. Heller, repeated in United States v. Rahimi, indicating certain regulations—especially felon-in-possession bans—are assumed constitutional absent a strong contrary showing. The Eleventh Circuit treats this as key support for § 922(g)(1).
  • Prior panel precedent rule: A later three-judge panel must follow an earlier panel’s holding unless the Supreme Court or the full court (en banc) clearly overrules it. A shift in analytical method is not enough unless it directly contradicts the earlier holding.
  • Commerce Clause “minimal nexus”: For § 922(g)(1), it is enough that the firearm or ammunition previously traveled in interstate or foreign commerce; the government need not prove the defendant’s possession itself had a substantial economic effect.

Conclusion

United States v. Steve Telusme reinforces a central Eleventh Circuit rule: under United States v. Rozier, as reaffirmed by United States v. Dubois (Dubois II), felons are categorically barred from possessing firearms under § 922(g)(1) for Second Amendment purposes, and panels will not re-open that question through Bruen/Rahimi historical analysis absent clear Supreme Court or en banc abrogation. On the Commerce Clause side, the court reiterates that United States v. McAllister and later cases foreclose both facial and as-applied challenges where the firearm or ammunition has moved in interstate or foreign commerce. The decision’s broader significance lies in its demonstration that, in fast-moving constitutional areas, outcomes may turn as much on intra-circuit stare decisis rules as on the underlying constitutional methodology.