Date: Feb 13, 2026

Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms § 922(g)(1) Constitutionality Under Plain-Error Review; Applies § 3C1.2 to Foot Flight with an Unsecured Loaded Firearm; Declines Plain-Error Relief on Juvenile-Points Calculation

I. Introduction

In United States v. Tramon Jamal Stewart (11th Cir. Feb. 11, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed an 87-month sentence imposed after Stewart’s conviction for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Stewart raised three principal issues on appeal:

Constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) under the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied (raised for the first time on appeal).
A challenge to a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2.
A challenge to the assessment of four criminal history points based on two juvenile adjudications, applied under U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1(b) and 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) (also not preserved below).

The court rejected all three challenges, relying heavily on binding circuit precedent for the constitutional issues, and on established guideline case law for the sentencing issues.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Commerce Clause / Second Amendment: Because Stewart raised these constitutional arguments for the first time on appeal, review was for plain error. The panel held the arguments were foreclosed by binding precedent— United States v. Jordan (Commerce Clause) and United States v. Dubois / United States v. Rozier (Second Amendment, even after United States v. Rahimi). Thus, Stewart could not show “plain” error.
§ 3C1.2 Reckless-Endangerment Enhancement: The panel affirmed the enhancement, concluding Stewart did more than merely flee: he fled while armed with an unsecured, loaded firearm, creating a substantial risk of accidental discharge that could injure pursuing officers, consistent with the court’s reasoning in United States v. Matchett.
Juvenile Criminal History Points: Because Stewart did not object below, review was for plain error. The panel found no plain error because Stewart could not point to controlling precedent or explicit guideline text clearly establishing that his juvenile delinquency adjudications (following nolo contendere pleas and confinement) could not be counted under § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of Review and Appellate Constraints

United States v. Bolatete, 977 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir. 2020): The panel used Bolatete to frame the demanding plain-error standard for constitutional challenges raised for the first time on appeal. This mattered because even potentially weighty constitutional claims fail if they are not “plain” in light of existing precedent.
United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc) and United States v. Jews, 74 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2023): The opinion included a doctrinal aside about when courts may rely on guideline commentary after Dupree. While not outcome-determinative here, the panel cited Jews to note that reliance on commentary remains permissible when its validity is not contested—relevant because the definition of “reckless” was drawn from commentary and no party challenged it.
United States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Baptiste, 876 F.3d 1057 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Alicea, 875 F.3d 606 (11th Cir. 2017): These cases structured the criminal-history discussion: Dixon for plain-error review when a defendant fails to object, Baptiste for the proposition that miscalculating criminal history is a significant procedural error, and Alicea to emphasize that guideline calculation errors can still be subject to harmless-error analysis.

2. Commerce Clause and Second Amendment Challenges to § 922(g)(1)

United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2011): Jordan supplied the key Commerce Clause rule: § 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of congressional power because it includes an express jurisdictional element (“in or affecting commerce”), and is constitutional as applied where there is a “minimal nexus”—for example, manufacture in a different state. The panel treated Jordan as binding and dispositive.
United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025) and United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010): Dubois reaffirmed Rozier’s holding that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment, and expressly held that United States v. Rahimi did not abrogate that precedent. The Stewart panel invoked Dubois to foreclose Stewart’s Second Amendment arguments—an illustration of how circuit stare decisis controls even when Supreme Court Second Amendment doctrine is evolving.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024): The panel referenced Rahimi only through Dubois: the Eleventh Circuit’s position is that Rahimi did not clearly undermine Eleventh Circuit precedent upholding felon-in-possession restrictions.

3. § 3C1.2 Reckless Endangerment During Flight

United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc): Cited for de novo review of guideline interpretation and application.
United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2015): This was the central analogy. Matchett upheld § 3C1.2 where a defendant struggled with an officer while a loaded gun was in the defendant’s pocket, creating a “significant chance” of accidental discharge and harm in a residential area. Stewart’s case differed factually (the opinion emphasizes unsecured, loaded gun during flight and risk of dropping/discharge), but the panel treated Matchett as establishing a broad principle: the enhancement applies where conduct during flight creates a substantial risk that could harm officers or third parties, even if harm does not actually occur.
United States v. Wilson, 392 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2004): Wilson supplied two limiting principles the panel addressed explicitly: (i) the risk must be created by the defendant’s conduct (not merely the officers’ pursuit), and (ii) “flight alone” is insufficient. The panel distinguished Stewart’s conduct from “flight alone” because he fled while armed with an unsecured loaded firearm, creating the risk.
United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2006): Cited as an example of one established category of § 3C1.2 cases: high-speed vehicular flight. Its role was taxonomic—demonstrating the enhancement’s settled use beyond gun-on-foot scenarios.
United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2014): Used to support a broad construction of “in the course of fleeing” and to reinforce that conduct potentially harming officers or third parties qualifies.
United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d 1134 (11th Cir. 2004): Cited for deference to district court factual findings (clear-error principles) in the context of sentencing factfinding.

4. Juvenile Adjudications and Federal Characterization of Prior Sentences

United States v. Maupin, 520 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2008): Maupin provided the governing frame that federal law, not state labels, controls whether an offense qualifies as a prior conviction/sentence for federal sentencing. That principle undercut Stewart’s argument insofar as it relied on state-law characterization of juvenile dispositions.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Constitutional Challenges: Foreclosure + Plain Error = No Relief

The panel’s constitutional analysis is primarily procedural and precedential: Stewart raised the Commerce Clause and Second Amendment arguments for the first time on appeal, so he needed to show plain error. But an error is not “plain” when circuit precedent squarely rejects the argument. By invoking United States v. Jordan and United States v. Dubois (reaffirming United States v. Rozier even after United States v. Rahimi), the panel held there could be no “plain” error as a matter of law.

Notably, the decision does not attempt to reweigh Second Amendment history-and-tradition analysis; instead, it reflects a common appellate posture: unless the Supreme Court gives “clearer instruction” (as quoted in Dubois), circuit panels will treat prior circuit holdings as controlling.

2. § 3C1.2: “Flight Alone” vs. Flight Plus a Firearm-Created Risk

The enhancement requires that the defendant recklessly create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person during flight. Stewart’s attack focused on three themes: (i) the court improperly considered danger to Stewart himself, (ii) the risk of discharge was too speculative, and (iii) the risk ended once he was apprehended.

The panel’s reasoning tracks the guideline elements:

Risk to “another person”: While acknowledging § 3C1.2 is keyed to risk to others, the panel found the district court’s core rationale was risk to pursuing officers created by Stewart’s own conduct—fleeing while armed with an unsecured, loaded gun that could fall and discharge.
Substantial risk can exist without actual harm: Relying on United States v. Matchett, the panel emphasized the enhancement “requires only that there was a substantial risk that something could have gone wrong.” In other words, the absence of an accidental discharge did not negate the substantial-risk finding.
More than “flight alone”: Using United States v. Wilson, the panel characterized Stewart’s conduct as qualitatively more dangerous than mere running, because the manner of flight (armed, unsecured, loaded firearm during evasive movement and physical capture) created the risk.
Temporal link to flight/apprehension: The panel broadly construed “in the course of fleeing,” consistent with United States v. Dougherty, and treated the risk as occurring during the pursuit and apprehension dynamics.

3. Juvenile Points: No “Plain” Rule Against Counting These Adjudications

Stewart argued that his juvenile dispositions were not “adjudications of guilt,” so the four points added under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b) (two points each) were improper. The panel treated the controlling text as:

§ 4A1.1(b): add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least 60 days;
§ 4A1.2(a)(1): defines “prior sentence” as imposed upon “adjudication of guilt” (including nolo contendere);
§ 4A1.2(d)(2)(A): for conduct before age 18, add 2 points for each adult or juvenile sentence to confinement of at least 60 days if release was within five years.

The panel’s key move was not to definitively resolve the doctrinal question Stewart posed (whether § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) incorporates § 4A1.2(a)(1)’s “adjudication of guilt” requirement in a way that excludes certain juvenile delinquency adjudications), but instead to hold that—on plain-error review—Stewart failed because he provided no controlling precedent or explicit guideline language that made the alleged error “plain.” The facts the panel highlighted (nolo contendere pleas, delinquency adjudications, and nearly eight months of custody within the five-year window) supported the conclusion that the sentences fit within § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) at least clearly enough to defeat plain-error relief.

C. Impact

Constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) in the Eleventh Circuit: The decision reinforces that, absent Supreme Court intervention or en banc reconsideration, Commerce Clause and Second Amendment challenges remain exceptionally difficult—especially when raised for the first time on appeal. The practical message is procedural: preserve constitutional arguments in the district court if a defendant hopes to avoid the plain-error barrier.
§ 3C1.2 in foot-flight firearm cases: Stewart extends (in an unpublished but instructive way) the idea from Matchett that a loaded firearm carried during flight can itself supply the “substantial risk” predicate when it is unsecured and could discharge during evasive movement or struggle at capture. Future litigants should expect district courts to scrutinize how the firearm was carried (secured/holstered vs. loose in clothing), and how the flight unfolded (jumping obstacles, physical struggle, proximity to others).
Juvenile adjudications and criminal history scoring: The panel’s refusal to find plain error suggests that challenges to counting juvenile delinquency adjudications may require clearer authority and careful preservation. In practice, defendants should object at sentencing and develop the legal record if they intend to argue that a particular juvenile disposition is not a qualifying “prior sentence.”

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Facial vs. as-applied challenge: A facial challenge argues a law is unconstitutional in all applications. An as-applied challenge argues the law is unconstitutional as applied to the defendant’s particular facts.
Plain-error review: A highly deferential appellate standard used when an issue was not properly raised in the trial court. The defendant must show: (1) error, (2) that is “plain” (clear under current law), and (3) that affected substantial rights; even then, the court reverses only in exceptional circumstances.
Commerce Clause “jurisdictional element” and “minimal nexus”: For § 922(g)(1), the requirement that the firearm be possessed “in or affecting commerce” is the jurisdictional hook. A “minimal nexus” is satisfied by modest interstate facts—commonly, that the firearm was manufactured out of state.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 reckless endangerment during flight: A two-level enhancement when a defendant recklessly creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person while fleeing or resisting. Actual injury is not required; substantial risk is enough.
Nolo contendere: A plea in which the defendant does not admit guilt but accepts conviction/sentencing. The guidelines can treat such pleas as qualifying for criminal-history purposes.
Juvenile adjudication of delinquency: A juvenile-court determination that a minor committed an offense, typically not labeled a “conviction” under state law. Federal sentencing, however, can count juvenile confinement sentences under guideline rules such as § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A).

V. Conclusion

United States v. Tramon Jamal Stewart illustrates three recurring themes in Eleventh Circuit federal sentencing appeals: (1) constitutional attacks on § 922(g)(1) are routinely rejected when foreclosed by binding precedent, particularly under plain-error review; (2) § 3C1.2 applies beyond high-speed chases and can attach to foot flight when the defendant’s manner of carrying a loaded firearm creates a substantial risk to officers or bystanders; and (3) criminal-history challenges involving juvenile dispositions are unlikely to succeed on appeal if not preserved and if the asserted guideline error is not “plain” under settled authority.