Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms: A Sentencing Judge Need Not Address Every Mitigation Argument If the Record Shows § 3553(a) Consideration, and May Rely on Undisputed PSI Facts

Introduction

In United States v. Jesse James Gregg (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 120-month sentence imposed on Jesse James Gregg for knowingly possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. Gregg challenged both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.

The key issues were whether the district court (1) inadequately explained its denial of a requested downward variance, (2) relied on clearly erroneous facts—specifically, a characterization of Gregg’s prior bank-robbery conviction as involving a firearm—and (3) imposed a sentence outside the range of reasonable outcomes under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that Gregg failed to show procedural error—much less plain error—because the record reflected the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and its acknowledgment of Gregg’s mitigation evidence. The panel also concluded the district court did not rely on clearly erroneous facts because the challenged characterization of the prior conviction was supported by undisputed statements in the PSI.

On substantive reasonableness, the panel emphasized that the sentence was within the advisory Guidelines range and at its bottom, and that the district court acted within its discretion by giving greater weight to Gregg’s criminal history and offense circumstances than to his mitigating evidence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2014): The court used Vandergrift to set the standard of review—because Gregg did not preserve certain procedural objections in the district court, appellate review was for plain error.
  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Cited for the overarching framework: appellate review of sentencing uses a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, particularly for substantive reasonableness, considering the totality of the circumstances.
  • United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2010): Reinforces that the defendant bears the burden to establish unreasonableness in light of the facts and the § 3553(a) factors.
  • United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933 (11th Cir. 2016): Supplies the canonical list of what can make a sentence procedurally unreasonable (e.g., miscalculating Guidelines, treating them as mandatory, failing to consider § 3553(a), relying on clearly erroneous facts, inadequate explanation).
  • United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2013): Supports the principle that a sentencing court need not explicitly address each § 3553(a) factor on the record.
  • United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020): Used to emphasize that it is enough if the record reflects consideration of § 3553(a), even without factor-by-factor discussion.
  • United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007): Central to rejecting Gregg’s “failure to address mitigation” argument: a court’s failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not mean it was ignored, particularly where the court indicates it considered the § 3553(a) factors. (The opinion later misspells this as “Amadeo,” but the cited precedent is United States v. Amedeo.)
  • United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): Provides the rule that the weight assigned to any § 3553(a) factor is within the district court’s discretion, and that a court may attach great weight to one factor over another.
  • United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2011): Defines clear error in factual findings (a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made).
  • United States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d 723 (11th Cir. 2012): Clarifies that reliance on clearly erroneous facts occurs when the misinformation was an important factor in selecting the sentence.
  • United States v. Polar, 369 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004): Supports that sentencing facts may be based on undisputed statements in the PSI, among other sources.
  • United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Provides the Eleventh Circuit’s formulation for substantive unreasonableness—failure to weigh proper factors, reliance on improper factors, or clear error of judgment in balancing factors.
  • United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2018): Emphasizes due deference to the district court’s weighing of sentencing factors.
  • United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008): Notes that a sentence grounded solely on one factor may be unreasonable, framing the outer boundary of permissible weighting.
  • United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009): Supports the expectation that a within-Guidelines sentence is ordinarily reasonable.

Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural reasonableness: explanation of sentence and denial of variance

The panel applied Eleventh Circuit law that a sentencing judge is not required to recite each § 3553(a) factor or separately rebut each mitigating point. The court focused on what the district court did: it stated it reviewed the PSI, the plea agreement, objections and response, and the submitted letters and pictures; it listened to counsel’s mitigation argument and Gregg’s allocution; and it expressly stated it considered the § 3553(a) factors.

Importantly, the district court also made an on-the-record comment showing it had considered Gregg’s family-related mitigation and efforts to move on from past conduct, but found those efforts “not successfully” sustained. Under United States v. Amedeo and United States v. Cabezas-Montano, that kind of record is sufficient to defeat a claim that the court ignored mitigation or failed to explain the sentence.

2) Procedural reasonableness: alleged reliance on erroneous facts

Gregg claimed the district court wrongly stated he had been convicted of “a bank robbery with a firearm.” The panel rejected this as a clear-error argument because the PSI—apparently undisputed on this point—stated that Gregg was found guilty of “one count of bank robbery with a firearm,” and described conduct including telling the teller he had a gun and pulling a firearm from his waistband.

Even if Gregg believed a separate firearm charge had been acquitted, the panel stressed that the count of conviction itself charged robbery “with a firearm,” and thus the district court’s description was supported by the sentencing record. Under United States v. Polar and United States v. Barrington, reliance on undisputed PSI facts is permissible, and the appellate court lacked a firm conviction that a mistake occurred.

3) Substantive reasonableness

Applying the deferential framework of Gall v. United States and the Eleventh Circuit’s test in United States v. Irey, the panel concluded the sentence was reasonable because:

  • The sentence was at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range (a factor that, under United States v. Sarras, supports reasonableness).
  • The district court permissibly assigned greater weight to Gregg’s criminal history and offense circumstances, consistent with United States v. Rosales-Bruno.
  • The record indicated aggravating circumstances beyond the base offense: extensive criminal history spanning years, some conduct not scored in criminal history, commission of the instant offense while on supervised release, and attempted obstruction of justice while jailed on the current charge.

The panel also rejected the idea that the district court was required to weigh traumatic upbringing and other mitigation as Gregg requested; under United States v. Amedeo, a court’s choice not to give mitigation the requested weight does not itself make the sentence unreasonable.

Impact

Although unpublished and “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision is instructive as a practical application of entrenched Eleventh Circuit sentencing principles:

  • Variance denials need not be point-by-point: defendants arguing inadequate explanation face a high hurdle where the record shows consideration of submissions, allocution, and an express § 3553(a) reference.
  • PSI facts matter—especially if undisputed: the opinion reinforces that failure to dispute PSI statements can effectively concede the factual foundation used at sentencing.
  • Within-Guidelines sentences remain hard to overturn: a bottom-of-range sentence, coupled with articulated concern about criminal history and public protection, is likely to survive substantive-reasonableness review.
  • Preservation is pivotal: by triggering plain-error review (per United States v. Vandergrift), the absence of specific contemporaneous objections can be outcome-determinative on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural review asks whether the court used the correct process (proper Guidelines calculation, correct facts, consideration of § 3553(a), adequate explanation). Substantive review asks whether the ultimate sentence is reasonable in light of the whole record and § 3553(a).
  • Downward variance: A request for a sentence below the advisory Guidelines range based on § 3553(a) considerations (e.g., history, characteristics, mitigation).
  • PSI (Presentence Investigation Report): A report prepared for sentencing that summarizes offense conduct and criminal history. If facts in the PSI are not disputed, courts may treat them as established for sentencing.
  • Plain error: A demanding appellate standard applied when an issue was not properly preserved below; it generally requires an obvious error affecting substantial rights and the fairness of proceedings.
  • Clearly erroneous facts: A factual finding is clearly erroneous when the appellate court is firmly convinced a mistake occurred; sentencing courts may rely on supported, undisputed record materials.

Conclusion

United States v. Jesse James Gregg reaffirms that, in the Eleventh Circuit, a district court’s sentencing explanation is generally sufficient if the record shows consideration of the parties’ submissions and the § 3553(a) factors, even without a detailed rebuttal of each mitigation argument. It also underscores that sentencing courts may rely on undisputed PSI facts and that within-Guidelines sentences—especially at the bottom of the range—are difficult to overturn absent a clear procedural misstep or an unreasonable balancing of sentencing factors.