Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms: (1) the 10% Absolute-Disparity Benchmark Governs Fair-Cross-Section/JSSA Challenges, (2) Limited Strike Statistics May Not Create a Batson Inference, and (3) Rozier/Dubois II Foreclose Second Amendment Attacks on § 922(g)(1)

Case: United States v. Steven Todd Roseboro (opinion text also refers to “Courtney Roseboro”)
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Non-Argument Calendar; Per Curiam; Not for Publication)
Date: May 5, 2026
Disposition: Affirmed

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a federal prosecution in the Middle District of Alabama. The defendant, Steven Todd Roseboro, was convicted of (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and (2) committing an offense while on release under 18 U.S.C. § 3147.

On appeal, Roseboro challenged: (i) the racial composition of the jury venire under the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement and the Jury Selection and Service Act (“JSSA”); (ii) the government’s peremptory strikes under Batson; (iii) the sufficiency of the evidence of “possession” of the firearm/ammunition; and (iv) the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment after Bruen and Rahimi.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected each claim, largely by applying firmly established circuit standards (notably the 10% absolute-disparity benchmark for fair-cross-section claims, deference at Batson step one, the constructive-possession framework for § 922(g)(1), and the circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule for Second Amendment challenges).

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

1) Standards of review and the prior-precedent constraint

• United States v. Grisham (de novo review of constitutional jury-selection challenges; also the 10% absolute-disparity benchmark).
• United States v. Robertson (clear-error review of Batson rulings).
• United States v. Allen-Brown (errors of law in Batson reviewed de novo; deference to prima facie finding).
• United States v. Davis (de novo sufficiency review).
• United States v. Dubois (Dubois II) (de novo review of statute constitutionality; post-Rahimi reaffirmation that Rozier remains binding).
• United States v. Hughes, United States v. Turner (plain-error framework for new-on-appeal constitutional arguments).
• United States v. Gillis, Smith v. GTE Corp. (the prior-panel-precedent rule; no exception for perceived analytical defects).

These “gatekeeping” precedents matter because they determine how hard it is for an appellant to win: deference to a trial court’s step-one Batson call, and the prior-panel-precedent rule effectively ending the Second Amendment claim at the threshold.

2) Fair-cross-section doctrine (Sixth Amendment) and its JSSA parallel

• United States v. Green (no requirement that the petit jury “mirror” the community).
• Duren v. Missouri (three-part fair-cross-section test: distinctive group; unfair/unreasonable representation; systemic exclusion).
• United States v. Carmichael (failure of any Duren prong defeats claim; same analysis for JSSA fair-cross-section challenges; defines JSSA foundational principles).
• United States v. Henderson (JSSA remedies require “substantial failure to comply”; substantial failures significantly affect the composition of an average jury).

Applying Duren v. Missouri through the Eleventh Circuit’s absolute-disparity lens from United States v. Grisham, the panel treated the case as essentially over at prong two: Roseboro’s expert reported absolute disparities of 4.68% (district) and 4.32% (division), far below 10%. Under United States v. Carmichael, that failure meant the court need not address systemic exclusion.

On the statutory side, the court leaned on United States v. Carmichael and United States v. Henderson to hold that alleged process criticisms (excluding inactive voters, using older census data, and not tracking jurors at the divisional level) did not amount to a “substantial” JSSA violation, especially absent evidence of a significant impact beyond Roseboro’s own jury.

3) Peremptory strikes and Batson step one

• Batson v. Kentucky (burden-shifting framework; prima facie inference may arise from strike patterns or discriminatory questions/statements).
• United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez (numbers alone are often insufficient; they gain meaning with context like venire composition, other strikes, and comparative voir dire answers).
• Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Lowder (substantial disparities or striking all/almost all members of a race can support an inference).
• United States v. Campa (no prima facie case where the government did not use all peremptories and the seated jury included Black jurors).

The court’s reasoning is a straightforward extension of United States v. Campa: although the government struck 2 of 3 Black venirepersons and used 2 of its 4 used strikes against Black people, it left one Black juror seated and did not use all 6 of its strikes. Under United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, the court required additional contextual cues of discriminatory purpose, and there were none (no problematic questions or statements).

4) Constructive possession and sufficiency under § 922(g)(1)

• United States v. Rodriguez, United States v. Hansen, United States v. Farley, United States v. Jiminez, United States v. Godwin (sufficiency principles; view evidence in government’s favor; jury may choose among reasonable constructions; not required to exclude every hypothesis of innocence).
• United States v. Emmanuel (appellate courts do not reweigh witness credibility).
• United States v. Martin, United States v. Mapson (circumstantial evidence can prove elements; inference not speculation).
• United States v. Elysee (elements of § 922(g)(1) as stated by this panel).
• United States v. Ochoa, United States v. Flanders, United States v. Gunn, United States v. Green (actual vs constructive possession; knowledge plus ability/intent to control; mere presence insufficient).
• United States v. Leonard (reversal where backseat passenger lacked ownership/control over vehicle and evidence did not establish constructive possession).

The panel’s sufficiency holding turned on classic constructive-possession indicators recognized in United States v. Green and related cases: proximity plus personal connection plus admissions. Letters with Roseboro’s name in the backpack next to the pistol, and Roseboro’s admission that he packed the backpack (including DJ equipment near the ammunition), allowed the jury to infer: (1) knowledge of the gun/ammo’s presence and (2) intent/ability to exercise control over the backpack contents.

Importantly, the court treated the passenger’s asserted ownership (bill of sale) as not dispositive under United States v. Flanders (constructive possession can be shared), and resolved contradictions between her roadside statements and trial testimony via United States v. Emmanuel (credibility is for the jury).

5) Second Amendment challenges to felon-in-possession after Bruen and Rahimi

• District of Columbia v. Heller (individual right; not unlimited; “longstanding prohibitions” on felons are “presumptively lawful”).
• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen (text-and-history test; rejects means-end scrutiny).
• United States v. Rozier (Eleventh Circuit holds § 922(g)(1) constitutional; felons may be disarmed “under any and all circumstances”).
• United States v. Dubois (Dubois I) (initially holds Bruen did not abrogate Rozier; later vacated).
• United States v. Rahimi (upholds § 922(g)(8); clarifies no “historical twin” needed; reiterates “presumptively lawful” felon prohibitions; tradition allows disarming credible threats).
• United States v. Dubois (Dubois II) (post-Rahimi, reinstates Dubois I and holds Rahimi did not abrogate Rozier).

The decisive point was not an original analysis of Bruen’s historical test, but institutional constraint: United States v. Rozier remains binding in the circuit, and United States v. Dubois (Dubois II) expressly held that neither New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen nor United States v. Rahimi abrogated it. Because Roseboro raised the claim for the first time on appeal, the panel reviewed only for plain error and found none—there cannot be “plain” error where binding precedent forecloses the argument.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Sixth Amendment fair cross-section

The court applied the Duren v. Missouri three-prong test but resolved the claim at prong two using the circuit’s absolute-disparity threshold: if the absolute disparity is 10% or less, prong two is not satisfied (United States v. Grisham). Roseboro’s own expert calculated absolute disparities around 4–5%, so the claim failed regardless of any debate about systemic exclusion. The panel also invoked the prior-panel-precedent rule (United States v. Gillis; Smith v. GTE Corp.) to reject Roseboro’s request to discard the 10% rule on policy grounds.

2) JSSA “substantial failure to comply”

The panel treated JSSA fair-cross-section analysis as coextensive with Sixth Amendment analysis (United States v. Carmichael), and then addressed the other JSSA “foundational principles” (random selection and objective criteria) from United States v. Carmichael. It reasoned that relying on active voters and older census data does not inherently create “room for impermissible discrimination,” and that the “objectivity” principle concerns subjective juror-qualification standards (e.g., “good character”) rather than the mechanics of venire assembly. Finally, under United States v. Henderson, the absence of broader jury-composition data undermined any showing of “substantial” noncompliance.

3) Batson step one (prima facie inference)

The court’s key move was to contextualize the strike numbers: although 2 of 3 Black venirepersons were struck, the government left a Black juror seated and did not exhaust its peremptories. Under United States v. Campa, those facts tend to rebut an inference of discriminatory purpose at step one. Because Roseboro offered no additional indicia (discriminatory questioning/statements), the trial court’s no-prima-facie determination was affirmed with deference (United States v. Allen-Brown).

4) Constructive possession and sufficiency

The panel framed the case as constructive possession and identified evidence supporting both required components: (i) knowledge and (ii) ability and intent to control (United States v. Green). The personal letters in the backpack and Roseboro’s admission that he packed it created a reasonable inference of knowledge, while his role as the driver and packer supported inference of intent and future control of the backpack’s contents. Conflicting testimony by the passenger was left to the jury (United States v. Emmanuel), and the ownership documentation did not preclude shared possession (United States v. Flanders).

5) Second Amendment

The panel did not undertake a fresh Bruen historical-tradition inquiry because circuit law is settled: United States v. Rozier upholds § 922(g)(1), and United States v. Dubois (Dubois II) reaffirmed its continued force post-United States v. Rahimi. Under plain-error review, binding precedent defeats the claim.

C. Impact

• Fair-cross-section/JSSA challenges remain difficult in the Eleventh Circuit without >10% absolute disparity. The opinion reinforces that even well-developed critiques of source lists (active voter lists) or data vintage will not substitute for meeting the circuit’s quantitative prong-two benchmark.
• Step-one Batson challenges require more than “two of three.” Where the government leaves a minority juror seated and does not exhaust strikes, defendants should expect courts to demand additional context (comparative juror analysis, voir dire statements, broader pattern evidence).
• Constructive possession can be proven through “personal-effects linkage” plus admissions. Letters bearing the defendant’s name and admissions to packing/controlling a container can supply both knowledge and intent-to-control, even when another occupant claims ownership of the firearm.
• Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) remain foreclosed in this circuit absent en banc or Supreme Court change. The opinion underscores the practical consequence of the prior-panel-precedent rule: litigants must preserve arguments and, even then, face binding adverse precedent until higher-court intervention.
• Precedential weight caveat: Because the decision is “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” it is not intended to create new binding circuit law, but it is a clear signal of how existing doctrines will be applied in routine cases.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Fair cross-section” (Sixth Amendment): The jury pool (venire), not necessarily the final seated jury, must be reasonably representative of the community.
• Duren’s three prongs: You must show (1) a distinctive group, (2) underrepresentation, and (3) systemic exclusion. Missing any one prong defeats the claim.
• Absolute disparity: The difference between a group’s percentage in the eligible population and its percentage in the jury pool. In the Eleventh Circuit, ≤10% generally fails prong two.
• JSSA “substantial failure to comply”: The statute provides remedies only for significant departures that meaningfully affect jury composition, not technical imperfections.
• Batson step one (prima facie case): Before the prosecutor must explain strikes, the defendant must show enough facts to support an inference of discrimination—numbers may help, but context is usually required.
• Constructive possession: You can “possess” an item without holding it if you know it is there and you have the ability and intent to control it (alone or jointly).
• Plain error: A demanding appellate standard for issues not raised in the trial court; an error cannot be “plain” if binding precedent says the trial court’s approach was correct.
• Prior-panel-precedent rule: Later panels must follow earlier panel holdings unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc clearly overrules them.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Steven Todd Roseboro is best understood as a rigorous application of entrenched circuit doctrines rather than a doctrinal innovation. It reaffirms that (1) fair-cross-section and JSSA challenges typically fail in this circuit without an absolute disparity exceeding 10%, (2) limited strike statistics—especially where the government leaves a minority juror seated and does not exhaust peremptories—may not establish a Batson inference, (3) constructive possession under § 922(g)(1) may be inferred from personal linkage to the container and admissions of packing/control despite a co-occupant’s ownership claim, and (4) Second Amendment attacks on § 922(g)(1) remain foreclosed by Rozier as reaffirmed in Dubois II, particularly under plain-error review.