Eleventh Circuit: In § 3582(c)(2) Amendment 821 Proceedings, District Courts May Deny Relief Based on § 3553(a) and Consider Evasive/Jettisoning Conduct Without a § 3C1.1 Enhancement

Case: United States v. Luis Carlos Murillo Asprilla (No. 25-12289)
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date: 2026-09-09
Disposition: Affirmed (non-published, per curiam; non-argument calendar)

1. Introduction

This appeal arises from a maritime cocaine-smuggling prosecution in the Middle District of Florida. Luis Carlos Murillo Asprilla pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine while on the high seas aboard a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction (46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 70506(a), (b); 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii)).

After being sentenced below his original advisory Guideline range (97 months, a downward variance from 108–135 months), Murillo Asprilla sought a further reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on retroactive Amendment 821, which introduced U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 and (as applied here) lowered his amended range to 87–108 months. The key issues on appeal were whether the district court (i) made a clearly erroneous factual finding about drug quantity/unrecovered cocaine and (ii) improperly weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors by prioritizing offense seriousness over post-sentencing rehabilitation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of § 3582(c)(2) relief. The panel held that the district court did not clearly err when it described the case as involving resistance to interdiction and the jettisoning of contraband, leaving “only 187 kilos of cocaine” recovered; that description tracked the uncontested PSR facts and did not amount to an erroneous finding that the offense involved more cocaine than recovered or that the Guidelines would have been higher if more had been recovered.

The court also rejected the argument that referencing “obstruction” effectively imposed an obstruction penalty without applying U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. It reiterated that, in evaluating § 3553(a), a district court may consider relevant offense conduct even if it did not result in a formal Guidelines enhancement.

Finally, the panel held that the district court acted within its discretion in weighing § 3553(a), acknowledging Murillo Asprilla’s positive prison conduct but concluding that the seriousness of the conduct—large drug load, attempted flight, Coast Guard use of force, and jettisoning—counseled against a reduction below 97 months.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2017):
    Used for the governing standard of review—denial of a § 3582(c)(2) reduction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. This frames the appellate posture as deferential.
  • United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 2021):
    Supplies the Eleventh Circuit’s articulation of what constitutes an abuse of discretion (wrong legal standard, improper procedure, clearly erroneous factual findings, or clear error of judgment). This precedent supports the court’s step-by-step rejection of Murillo Asprilla’s “clear error” and “misweighing” theories.
  • United States v. Philossaint, 141 F.4th 1334 (11th Cir. 2025):
    Provides the “clear error” definition (“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”). The opinion uses this to conclude that the district court’s factual characterization (benefit from resistance/jettisoning; only 187 kg recovered) was permissible given uncontested PSR facts.
  • United States v. Turner, 626 F.3d 566 (11th Cir. 2010):
    Central to the opinion’s key doctrinal point: in applying § 3553(a), a court may consider conduct relevant to an enhancement even if the enhancement is not applied. This defeats the argument that using “obstruction” language was a Guidelines “end-run” around U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
  • United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)):
    Invoked for the “totality of the circumstances” framework and the principle that the sentence must achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes. The panel uses these authorities to validate the district court’s explanation that deterrence, seriousness, and respect for law predominated over rehabilitation in this case.
  • United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234 (11th Cir. 2021):
    Reinforces that the district court need not discuss every § 3553(a) factor or all mitigating evidence, and that weighing is committed to the court’s discretion. This supports affirmance despite the defendant’s claim that the court undervalued prison conduct and coursework.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(a) The opinion’s core procedural lens: discretionary, not mandatory relief.
The panel underscores § 3582(c)(2)’s text: a court “may” reduce a term of imprisonment for an eligible defendant “after considering” § 3553(a). Eligibility via a retroactive Guidelines change (here, Amendment 821) does not entitle a defendant to a reduction. The controlling question becomes whether the district court reasonably exercised discretion under § 3553(a).

(b) “Only 187 kilos recovered” as a permissible inference, not an erroneous drug-quantity finding.
Murillo Asprilla attempted to reframe the district court’s remarks as an implicit factual finding that the offense involved more cocaine than recovered. The Eleventh Circuit treated the remarks as a commonsense description of interdiction dynamics: the crew fled; the Coast Guard disabled the engine; the crew jettisoned bales; the Coast Guard recovered eight bales totaling ~187 kilograms. Because those facts were uncontested in the PSR, the court held there was no clear error. Importantly, the panel also rejected the claim that the district court assumed a higher base offense level had more cocaine been recovered; the order applied the base offense level corresponding to 150–450 kilograms (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(2)), consistent with the recovered amount.

(c) Considering “obstruction-like” conduct under § 3553(a) without applying U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
The opinion draws a bright practical line between (i) whether the Guidelines require a specific enhancement and (ii) whether the same underlying conduct may inform the statutory sentencing factors. Citing United States v. Turner, the panel held the district court could consider the attempted evasion and destruction of evidence as part of “the nature and circumstances of the offense” under § 3553(a)(1), even if it did not impose an obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. This reasoning is particularly consequential in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings, where courts revisit the sentence in a limited way but still must decide whether a lower guideline range should translate into a lower sentence.

(d) Deference on weighing: rehabilitation acknowledged, but outweighed.
The district court expressly noted the defendant’s good prison conduct, lack of disciplinary violations, and educational courses. Yet it concluded that seriousness and deterrence concerns dominated: a large cocaine load, refusal to stop, Coast Guard use of force to disable the vessel, and jettisoning of contraband. Under United States v. Tinker and United States v. Goldman (and Gall v. United States), the appellate court deferred to that balancing and found no clear error of judgment.

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished, the decision reinforces several practical principles likely to influence § 3582(c)(2) motion practice in the Eleventh Circuit:

  • Amendment 821 eligibility is only step one. Even where U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 lowers the amended range, district courts retain broad discretion to deny reductions based on § 3553(a).
  • Courts may rely on “interdiction conduct” when assessing § 3553(a). Flight, refusal to heave to, endangering law enforcement, and evidence destruction/jettisoning can support denial as aggravating “nature and circumstances,” even absent a formal obstruction enhancement.
  • Factual phrasing matters, but appellate review is forgiving when the PSR is uncontested. Defendants challenging a denial on “clearly erroneous factfinding” face steep odds where the court’s language can be read as a permissible inference from undisputed PSR facts rather than a new drug-quantity finding.
  • Post-sentencing rehabilitation is relevant, not dispositive. The decision signals that good conduct in prison may be acknowledged yet reasonably outweighed by deterrence/seriousness concerns, particularly in large-quantity drug trafficking.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (sentence reduction): A mechanism allowing a court to reduce a previously imposed sentence when the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the applicable Guidelines range. It is discretionary (“may”), not automatic.
  • Amendment 821 and U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1: A retroactive Guidelines change that can reduce offense level by two for certain defendants with zero criminal history points who satisfy additional criteria, thereby lowering the advisory range.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors: Statutory considerations courts must weigh in imposing (and, in this context, reconsidering) a sentence—seriousness, deterrence, respect for law, just punishment, protection of the public, and the defendant’s history/characteristics, among others.
  • “Clearly erroneous” vs. “abuse of discretion”: “Clearly erroneous” is a high bar for challenging factual determinations; “abuse of discretion” is an overall deferential appellate standard that tolerates a range of reasonable choices by the district court.
  • Guidelines enhancements (e.g., U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1) vs. § 3553(a) consideration: A court might not apply a formal enhancement (because elements are not met or for other reasons), yet it may still consider the underlying conduct as part of the broader sentencing assessment under § 3553(a).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Luis Carlos Murillo Asprilla affirms that, even after a retroactive Guidelines change like Amendment 821 reduces the advisory range, a district court may deny a § 3582(c)(2) motion where § 3553(a) factors—particularly seriousness, respect for law, and deterrence—counsel against further leniency. The Eleventh Circuit also makes clear that describing evasive conduct and contraband jettisoning as aggravating “nature and circumstances” does not require a U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 obstruction enhancement, and that appellate courts will not recharacterize reasonable inferences from uncontested PSR facts as “clearly erroneous” new findings.