Eleventh Circuit Enforces Plea Appeal Waiver to Bar Ineffective-Assistance Claims on Direct Appeal When Preserved Only for Collateral Review

Introduction

In United States v. Ike Jackson, Jr. (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit dismissed a defendant’s direct appeal challenging his 200-month sentence for possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl. The sole issue Jackson sought to raise was ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing—specifically, counsel’s failure to object after the district court allegedly made inconsistent comments about whether a below-guidelines sentence was appropriate.

The government moved to dismiss based on a sentence-appeal waiver in Jackson’s plea agreement. Jackson anticipated the waiver issue and argued that enforcement would cause a “miscarriage of justice,” and that sentencing-stage statements by the court (including discussion of appeal rights) should prevent enforcement. The Eleventh Circuit rejected those arguments and enforced the waiver as written.

Summary of the Opinion

The court held that Jackson’s sentence-appeal waiver was valid, knowing, and voluntary, and that it barred his ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal. The plea agreement expressly preserved ineffective-assistance claims only for collateral attack (principally under 28 U.S.C. § 2255), and Jackson’s sentence fell within the guideline range and below the statutory maximum—so none of the waiver’s enumerated exceptions applied.

The court also reaffirmed two related principles: (1) the Eleventh Circuit has not adopted a general “miscarriage of justice” exception to enforcement of valid appeal waivers; and (2) a Supreme Court grant of certiorari in another case does not itself change governing law in the circuit.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008): Cited for the standard of review—validity of a sentence appeal waiver is reviewed de novo. This frames waiver enforcement as a legal determination rather than a discretionary one.
  • United States v. Benitez-Za-pata, 131 F.3d 1444, 1446 (11th Cir. 1997): Cited for de novo review of whether the waiver was entered knowingly and voluntarily, underscoring that voluntariness is assessed from the record of the plea proceedings.
  • United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 1993): The central waiver-enforcement precedent. The opinion relies on Bushert for the rule that a sentence appeal waiver is enforceable if made knowingly and voluntarily, and for the two ways the government can satisfy its burden: (1) the court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver during the plea colloquy, or (2) the record otherwise shows the defendant understood the waiver’s full significance.
  • Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N): Reinforces the procedural requirement that the district court must inform the defendant of the terms of any appeal waiver. The opinion uses this to validate the colloquy as the key safeguard ensuring an informed waiver.
  • United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2020): Supplies the “touchstone” formulation: whether it was clearly conveyed that the defendant was giving up the right to appeal under most circumstances. The court treats this as the practical measure of adequate advisement.
  • United States v. Hardman, 778 F.3d 896, 900 (11th Cir. 2014): Invoked for contract-style interpretation of plea agreements—ordinary meaning and parties’ intent. This supports the panel’s reading that the parties intentionally preserved ineffective-assistance claims only collaterally, not on direct appeal.
  • United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006): Critical to rejecting Jackson’s reliance on the sentencing judge’s later remarks. Bascomb holds that valid appeal waivers “cannot be vitiated or altered” by comments the court makes during sentencing. This prevents end-runs around waivers based on post-plea statements.
  • King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1368 n.3 (11th Cir. 2022): Provides the circuit’s clear statement that it has “never adopted a general ‘miscarriage of justice’ exception” to enforcing valid appeal waivers. The panel uses this to dispose of Jackson’s equity-based argument.
  • United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005): Emphasizes that an appeal waiver covers even “difficult or debatable legal issues or even blatant error.” The panel leverages this to explain that even if the district court’s statements suggested an internal inconsistency, that does not create an appeal right outside the waiver’s exceptions.
  • United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994): Supplies the presumption that statements made during a plea colloquy are true. The court uses this both for competence/clarity-of-mind findings and to validate Jackson’s acceptance of the waiver.
  • Hunter v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 288 (2025): Not a merits precedent, but cited to acknowledge that the Supreme Court granted certiorari on questions involving exceptions to appeal waivers and the effect of judicial advisements about appeal rights. The panel treats it as a live issue nationally, but not a basis to depart from Eleventh Circuit law.
  • In re Bradford, 830 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2016): Provides the rule that a grant of certiorari does not itself change the law and cannot justify relief that would otherwise be denied. This undercuts any argument that Hunter should soften waiver enforcement now.
  • Gissendaner v. Comm'r, Geor-gia Dep't of Corr., 779 F.3d 1275, 1284 (11th Cir. 2015): Reinforces the “duty-bound” obligation to follow existing circuit precedent until the Supreme Court actually changes the law.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Competence and voluntariness were established on the record. The panel first ensured the waiver was the product of a competent, informed plea. It emphasized Jackson’s sworn statements that he could read and write, was not under the influence, and had a clear mind. Despite the PSR’s mention of mental health and substance abuse history, the plea colloquy reflected no impairment, and Jackson did not claim incompetence on appeal. Relying on United States v. Medlock, the panel treated these sworn statements as presumptively true.
  2. The Rule 11 colloquy specifically covered the waiver and its exceptions. Under United States v. Bushert and Rule 11(b)(1)(N), the key question is whether the waiver was clearly explained and understood. The district court reviewed the waiver, confirmed Jackson had reviewed it with counsel, and recited the three direct-appeal exceptions: (1) an above-guidelines sentence as calculated by the court, (2) a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum, or (3) a government appeal. The court likewise explained that collateral review was waived except for ineffective assistance of counsel. Jackson confirmed he understood and agreed. This satisfied Bushert and the Boyd “touchstone.”
  3. Contract principles compelled enforcement of the waiver’s scope. Applying United States v. Hardman, the panel interpreted the plea agreement according to its ordinary meaning and evident intent. The agreement preserved ineffective-assistance claims only as a collateral attack; it did not preserve them for direct appeal. The panel treated that omission as intentional drafting: the parties “intended to preclude” a direct-appeal ineffective-assistance claim while leaving open § 2255 litigation.
  4. No enumerated exception applied to Jackson’s circumstances. The court noted the guideline range was 188–235 months and the sentence was 200 months—within range. The statutory maximum was 40 years—well above 200 months. The government did not appeal. Therefore, the waiver’s direct-appeal exceptions did not trigger.
  5. Equitable and “sentencing-comment” arguments could not override the waiver. Jackson argued enforcement would be a “miscarriage of justice,” but King v. United States foreclosed a general exception of that kind. He also relied on sentencing-stage comments suggesting a below-range sentence might be appropriate and on the court’s remark that counsel would file a notice of appeal if he wished. United States v. Bascomb foreclosed any claim that sentencing remarks alter an otherwise valid waiver. And even if the sentencing rationale involved “blatant error,” United States v. Grinard-Henry teaches that appeal waivers still apply absent an agreed exception.
  6. A Supreme Court certiorari grant did not authorize deviation from circuit law. Although Hunter v. United States could potentially reshape waiver doctrine, In re Bradford and Gissendaner v. Comm'r, Geor-gia Dep't of Corr. required adherence to existing Eleventh Circuit precedent unless and until the Supreme Court issues a decision that changes the law.

Impact

While designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision is a useful signal of how the Eleventh Circuit is applying its waiver jurisprudence in routine criminal appeals:

  • Direct-appeal ineffective-assistance claims can be barred by plea-waiver drafting. This opinion underscores that when a plea agreement preserves ineffective assistance only for collateral review, the defendant cannot repackage the issue for direct appeal. Defendants and counsel should expect the Eleventh Circuit to enforce that allocation strictly.
  • Sentencing-stage advisements rarely rescue an appeal barred by waiver. By leaning on Bascomb, the panel reinforces that later judicial remarks about appeal rights generally do not undo a waiver accepted during the plea colloquy. Litigants should focus on the plea colloquy and the written waiver, not later sentencing dialogue.
  • No “miscarriage of justice” safety valve (in this circuit) absent new Supreme Court law. The reaffirmation of King keeps Eleventh Circuit waiver enforcement comparatively rigid, limiting case-by-case equitable arguments.
  • Certiorari-watch is not a litigation strategy in the Eleventh Circuit. By invoking In re Bradford, the panel cautions that pending Supreme Court review (here, Hunter v. United States) will not soften circuit enforcement in the interim.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Sentence appeal waiver
A term in a plea agreement where the defendant gives up (waives) the right to appeal the sentence, usually with limited listed exceptions (for example, an above-guidelines sentence).
Knowing and voluntary
A waiver is enforceable only if the defendant understood what rights were being given up and chose to do so freely. Courts typically confirm this during the Rule 11 plea colloquy.
Plea colloquy (Rule 11 hearing)
The in-court question-and-answer proceeding where the judge ensures the plea is informed and voluntary, including explaining any appeal waiver.
Direct appeal vs. collateral attack
A direct appeal challenges the conviction or sentence in the immediate appellate process. A collateral attack (often a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255) is a later proceeding that can raise issues—commonly ineffective assistance—often requiring evidence outside the original record.
Certiorari grant
When the Supreme Court agrees to review a case. As the opinion stresses, a grant alone does not change existing law; only the Supreme Court’s final decision might.

Conclusion

United States v. Ike Jackson, Jr. reiterates a strict Eleventh Circuit rule: a knowing and voluntary sentence-appeal waiver is enforced according to its text, and where the plea agreement preserves ineffective-assistance claims only for collateral review, the defendant may not pursue that claim on direct appeal. The decision also reinforces that neither alleged sentencing-stage inconsistencies nor generalized “miscarriage of justice” arguments (nor even an intervening certiorari grant) typically provide a path around a valid waiver in this circuit.