Date: Feb 15, 2026

Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Title IX Accrual and Tolling in Alabama: Internal Proceedings Don’t Extend Limitations; Spoliation Requires Bad Faith; No New Claims via Summary-Judgment Briefing

1. Introduction

In Russell Johnson v. Tuskegee University (11th Cir. Feb. 13, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), Dr. Russell Johnson, a Ph.D. student at Tuskegee University’s College of Veterinary Medicine, sued Tuskegee and several university officials after a series of disputes arising from alleged assault/harassment by a fellow student and Johnson’s ensuing Title IX complaints. A key factual flashpoint occurred when two dissertation advisors resigned as Johnson’s advisors on April 29, 2022, which Johnson alleged was Title IX retaliation.

The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, holding (among other things) that Johnson’s Title IX theories were time-barred, spoliation sanctions were unwarranted for the non-production of a recorded Zoom meeting, and Johnson could not use summary-judgment briefing to effectively add a new breach-of-contract theory. On appeal, Johnson challenged those rulings.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, emphasizing three practical procedural guardrails: (i) Title IX claims in Alabama borrow a two-year limitations period and accrue when the plaintiff learns of the operative injury; (ii) Alabama’s continuing-tort concept does not revive Title IX claims where later internal actions are not “tortious acts” by the defendant; and (iii) spoliation sanctions require bad faith—routine deletion under retention settings, absent foreseeability of litigation and absent a showing of adverse content, will not suffice. The court also reaffirmed that new claims cannot be injected via summary-judgment briefing.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Title IX limitations: Applying Alabama’s two-year personal injury statute, the court held all Title IX claims accrued before June 14, 2022 (two years before suit) and were therefore time-barred.
No tolling via “continuing violation”: The court applied Alabama tolling principles and concluded no “continuing tort” extended the limitations period because the later Title IX decision and Johnson’s own complaint were not tortious acts by Tuskegee.
Retaliation evidence argument avoided: Even if evidentiary issues existed, the retaliation claim failed as time-barred; the court affirmed on an alternative ground under its “affirm for any reason supported by the record” doctrine.
Spoliation sanctions denied: No abuse of discretion where the Zoom recording was deleted by automatic settings and there was no showing of bad faith or foreseeability of litigation at the time of deletion.
No amendment by briefing: The court rejected Johnson’s attempt to pivot from a student-handbook contract theory to a research-proposal breach theory through summary-judgment briefing, citing notice and pleading principles.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Summary judgment and appellate review framing

Jarrard v. Sheriff of Polk Cnty. (quoting Sutton v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP): supplied the standard of review—de novo review of summary judgment, with inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant—and the Rule 56(a) requirement of no genuine dispute of material fact.
Lage v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC: enabled the panel to affirm on any ground supported by the record, allowing affirmance of the retaliation claim solely on limitations grounds even though the district court relied on a different rationale.

B. Borrowing limitations periods and tolling rules for Title IX

M.H.D. v. Westminster Schs. (quoting Reed v. United Transp. Union): established the methodology for Title IX limitations—borrow “the most closely analogous” state limitations period. In Alabama, that analogue is the personal-injury statute (two years).
M.H.D. v. Westminster Schs. and Rubin v. O'Koren: supported the proposition that where a federal statute lacks a limitations period, the court also looks to state law for tolling principles. The opinion notes Bonner v. City of Prichard to confirm Rubin v. O'Koren remains binding (as former Fifth Circuit precedent).
Ex parte Abbott Lab'ys (quoting Cont'l Cas. Ins. Co. v. McDonald): provided the Alabama “continuing tort” rule—limitations runs from the last tortious act. The panel used these cases to reject Johnson’s argument that later internal Title IX proceedings extended the limitations window.
Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (quoting United States v. Clarke), abrogated on other grounds by Merck & Co. v. Reynolds: cited for the de novo standard of review over limitations interpretation and application. The abrogation note signals doctrinal care, but did not affect the point for which Tello was used here.

C. Spoliation sanctions

Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.: supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard of review for spoliation rulings.
Tesoriero v. Carnival Corp. (quoting Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.): defined spoliation as destruction of meaningful evidence and anchored the analysis on culpability.
Tesoriero v. Carnival Corp. (citing ML Healthcare Servs., LLC v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc.): emphasized bad faith as a key factor for sanctions.
Tesoriero v. Carnival Corp. (quoting Guzman v. Jones): defined bad faith as destruction to hide adverse evidence. The panel used this to conclude automatic deletion without notice of litigation, and without a showing the recording would be adverse to Tuskegee, did not warrant sanctions.

D. Pleading, notice, and “no amendment by briefing”

Sams v. United Food & Com. Workers Int'l Union: supplied the foundational notice principle—defendants are entitled to notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests.
Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co. (citing Shanahan v. City of Chicago), and Hurlbert v. St. Mary's Health Care Sys., Inc.: reinforced the rule that plaintiffs may not amend complaints through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment. The panel applied these cases to reject Johnson’s late shift from a student-handbook contract theory to a research-proposal contract theory.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Limitations and accrual: identifying the operative injury dates

The court’s limitations analysis proceeded in two steps: (1) select the limitations period (Alabama’s two-year personal-injury period under Ala. Code § 6-2-38(a), via M.H.D. v. Westminster Schs.), and (2) determine when each Title IX theory accrued.

Deliberate indifference claim: accrued when the Title IX Hearing Board found no Title IX violation (March 31, 2022).
Failure-to-comply/procedural claim: accrued when Johnson learned Tuskegee failed to provide him the evidence (April 6, 2022).
Retaliation claim: accrued when the alleged retaliatory act occurred—his advisors’ resignations (April 29, 2022).

Because Johnson filed suit on June 14, 2024, any Title IX claim needed to accrue on or after June 14, 2022. All three accrued before that date, making them time-barred.

B. Tolling/continuing violation: why internal Title IX processes did not “continue” the tort

Johnson argued the limitations period should be tolled because the “violation” continued through August 2022 (when the Title IX office issued a decision on retaliation). The court treated this as a continuing-tort argument under Alabama law, citing Ex parte Abbott Lab'ys and Cont'l Cas. Ins. Co. v. McDonald.

The panel’s key move was distinguishing between (i) the underlying allegedly wrongful acts by Tuskegee (ending, at the latest, with the April 29, 2022 resignations) and (ii) later internal administrative steps. The August 2022 Title IX decision favored Johnson, and Johnson’s own complaint was not an act by Tuskegee. Because neither was a tortious act by the defendant, there was no later “last tortious act” to reset the clock. Thus, tolling failed.

C. Retaliation evidence: alternative affirmance moots evidentiary disputes

Johnson asserted the district court ignored evidence of retaliation. The Eleventh Circuit did not reach that dispute because the retaliation claim was time-barred regardless. Relying on Lage v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, the panel affirmed on the record-supported limitations ground.

D. Spoliation: retention settings and the centrality of bad faith

The Zoom recording could not be produced because Tuskegee’s account settings automatically deleted recordings after sixty days. The district court found no duty-to-preserve breach because deletion occurred before litigation was foreseeable; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the absence of bad faith.

Under Tesoriero v. Carnival Corp. and related authority, sanctions generally require evidence that the party destroyed materials to hide adverse evidence. The panel emphasized two factual gaps for Johnson: (1) no showing Tuskegee had notice of litigation such that deletion could be viewed as strategic, and (2) no explanation why the recording would be adverse to Tuskegee. Without bad faith, spoliation sanctions were properly denied.

E. No amendment through summary-judgment briefing

Johnson’s complaint framed breach of contract around policies in the student handbook. In opposing summary judgment, he attempted to shift to a different contract theory—breach of his “research proposal” and failure to confer a doctorate. Citing Sams v. United Food & Com. Workers Int'l Union, Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., and Hurlbert v. St. Mary's Health Care Sys., Inc., the panel held the district court was not required to treat briefing as an implicit amendment. Notice and orderly pleading controlled.

3.3. Impact

Title IX plaintiffs in Alabama (and similarly situated jurisdictions) must calendar early. The opinion underscores that Title IX claims can accrue at discrete decision points—adverse findings, discovery of procedural omissions, or the alleged retaliatory act itself—and that internal university timelines will not necessarily extend federal filing time.
Internal grievance outcomes don’t automatically preserve timeliness. Even if institutional processes continue (or issue later rulings), the operative “tortious act” for limitations purposes may have already occurred. Plaintiffs who wait for the end of administrative proceedings risk losing federal court access.
Spoliation practice: bad faith remains the linchpin. Routine deletion under pre-set retention rules is less likely to draw sanctions absent clear evidence of litigation foreseeability and intent to suppress adverse proof. Practically, parties seeking preservation should send prompt litigation-hold notices where conflict is escalating.
Pleading discipline at summary judgment. The decision reinforces a common but consequential rule: a plaintiff cannot pivot to a new contract (or other) theory in opposition to summary judgment. If discovery reveals a new theory, the proper vehicle is a timely motion to amend—not argument in a brief.
Unpublished but instructive. Although “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion consolidates frequently litigated procedural points (limitations, tolling, spoliation, and pleading) and will likely be cited as persuasive authority in similar fact patterns.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Accrual: The moment a legal claim “starts”—i.e., when the injury occurs (or when the plaintiff learns of the injury), triggering the limitations clock. Here, accrual was pegged to concrete dates like a Board decision, the date Johnson learned of missing evidence, and the advisors’ resignation date.
Statute of limitations (borrowed limitations): Title IX lacks its own limitations period, so courts “borrow” the most analogous state period. In Alabama, that is the two-year period for personal injury.
Tolling: A legal rule that pauses or extends the limitations period under specific conditions. The court applied state tolling principles and found none applied.
Continuing violation / continuing tort: A doctrine that can delay the start of the limitations period until the last wrongful act occurs, but only if there are ongoing wrongful acts by the defendant. The court held that later internal proceedings (especially those favorable to the plaintiff) were not additional “tortious acts.”
Spoliation: Destruction or loss of evidence. Sanctions typically require culpability—often bad faith—meaning evidence was destroyed to prevent its use. Automatic deletion, without more, did not meet that standard here.
Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling where the court decides there is no genuine dispute of material fact requiring a trial and one party wins as a matter of law.
Amending a complaint vs. arguing a new theory: A complaint sets the claims and legal theories. A plaintiff generally must formally amend the complaint (under procedural rules) to add a new claim; a new theory raised only in briefing may be rejected for lack of notice.

5. Conclusion

Russell Johnson v. Tuskegee University is a procedure-centered Title IX decision that delivers a clear set of operational lessons: Title IX claims in Alabama are governed by a two-year borrowed limitations period; accrual is tied to the underlying adverse acts and knowledge dates, not the endpoint of internal processes; Alabama’s continuing-tort concept does not revive claims absent later tortious acts by the defendant; spoliation sanctions demand evidence of bad faith; and plaintiffs cannot re-plead their cases through summary-judgment briefing. Collectively, these holdings push litigants toward early filing decisions, prompt preservation steps, and disciplined pleading practice in Title IX litigation.