Eleventh Circuit Applies Esteras: No Plain Error Absent Clear Reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A) in Supervised-Release Revocation Sentencing

Introduction

In United States v. Elliot Walker (11th Cir. Mar. 17, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the revocation of Elliot Walker’s supervised release and his 36-month revocation sentence. The appeal presented three recurring supervised-release questions:

  1. whether the district court clearly erred in finding—by a preponderance of the evidence—that Walker possessed fentanyl with intent to distribute;
  2. whether the court improperly relied on hearsay without conducting the required confrontation balancing;
  3. whether the court procedurally erred by relying on an impermissible sentencing factor—retribution under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)—in light of the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Esteras v. United States.

The government’s revocation proof stemmed from a controlled purchase using a cooperating subject (CS), with identity established largely through corroborating circumstantial evidence (phone number, address, vehicle) matching information Walker had provided to probation.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on all issues. It held:

  • Violation finding: The district court did not clearly err in concluding Walker was the fentanyl source and acted with intent to distribute, based on corroborated circumstantial evidence.
  • Hearsay: Although the district court did not expressly conduct a Frazier balancing test on the record, it effectively evaluated reliability and corroboration; alternatively, any error was harmless because the court relied on substantial non-hearsay corroboration.
  • Retribution factor: Under Esteras and plain-error review, there was no “clear or obvious” indication the district court actually relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A); the sentencing explanation reasonably reflected permissible forward-looking goals (deterrence and public protection).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2010): Cited for the revocation standard—supervised release may be revoked upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence. The panel relied on Cunningham to reject arguments implicitly demanding proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1989): Used for the proposition that possession with intent to distribute can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. This supported affirmance where law enforcement lacked “eyes on” the precise hand-to-hand exchange.
  • United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2017): Quoted for the factfinder’s discretion to choose among reasonable inferences. The panel used Williams to uphold the district court’s identity inference from converging details (phone/address/vehicle and the CS’s reaction).
  • United States v. Harrell, 737 F.2d 971 (11th Cir. 1984): Invoked to reject Walker’s theory that the government had to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence (e.g., “Rome” having six brothers). The panel treated this as an improper demand for a higher evidentiary burden.
  • United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994): Central to the hearsay issue. Frazier holds that while the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in revocation, hearsay is not automatic; courts must balance confrontation interests against the government’s reasons for not producing the witness, and errors may be harmless if other evidence overwhelmingly establishes the violation.
  • Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972): Cited for the minimal due process protections in revocation-type proceedings, including confrontation/cross-examination principles that inform revocation hearings.
  • United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025 (11th Cir. 2001): Used to frame admissibility of hearsay where there are sufficient indicia of reliability, explicit credibility findings, and an opportunity to rebut. The panel treated the district court’s discussion of corroboration and credibility as satisfying the functional concerns behind confrontation balancing.
  • United States v. Taylor, 931 F.2d 842 (11th Cir. 1991): Cited for the requirement that a defendant challenging reliance on improper hearsay must show the evidence was materially false or unreliable and that the court explicitly relied on it.
  • Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025): The opinion’s most consequential authority. Esteras held that in revocation sentencing under § 3583(e), a court may not consider § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive aims for the underlying crime; it emphasized forward-looking purposes (deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation). It also described how appellate courts should apply plain-error review where the defendant did not object—affirm unless it is clear or obvious the district court actually relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A), expressly or by unmistakable implication.
  • F.T.C. v. Wash. Data Res., Inc., 704 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2013): Cited in connection with abuse-of-discretion principles where a decision is based on clearly erroneous factual findings.
  • United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022): Cited for abandonment principles; Walker forfeited other reasonableness arguments by not raising them.
  • United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933 (11th Cir. 2016): Mentioned regarding substantive reasonableness review in light of the totality of circumstances and § 3553(a).

Legal Reasoning

1) Proving the Violation by a Preponderance

The panel emphasized the lowered revocation burden: the question was not whether the government could prove a new drug offense beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether it proved a supervised-release violation by a preponderance (Cunningham). It then upheld the district court’s identity finding as a permissible inference from converging circumstantial facts:

  • the CS called a source using a phone number matching Walker’s number on file with probation;
  • the controlled buy location matched Walker’s reported address;
  • investigators saw a white Honda with a Georgia plate associated with Walker in prior investigations, and matching Walker’s probation reports and registration records;
  • the CS exclaimed “That’s him” when the car drove past.

The court treated Walker’s “Rome has six brothers” alternative as a hypothesis that did not defeat a reasonable inference under Williams, and that the government was not required to disprove under Harrell.

2) Intent to Distribute Without Direct Observation of the Hand-to-Hand

The panel relied on controlled-buy features and officer testimony to find intent to distribute (and to support that the CS did not fabricate the purchase): pre-search of the CS, brief contact, immediate post-search recovery of contraband, and lab confirmation of fentanyl. Under Poole, circumstantial proof sufficed.

3) Hearsay, Confrontation, and Harmlessness

Under Frazier and Morrissey, revocation hearings permit hearsay but require attention to minimal due process. Walker argued the court failed to conduct the Frazier balancing test when officers relayed that the CS said he could buy fentanyl from “Rome’s brother.”

The panel’s reasoning had two layers:

  1. Functional compliance: Although not labeled a “Frazier balancing test,” the district court addressed reliability and corroboration, made credibility findings grounded in coinciding officer testimony, and allowed Walker to rebut (consistent with Zlatogur).
  2. Harmless error: Even assuming error, the panel found no reversible prejudice because the record showed the district court did not “explicitly rely” on the hearsay identity phrase as the basis for revocation, instead relying on extensive corroborated evidence (phone/address/vehicle and officer observations) and expressly noting it could not rely on hearsay alone (Taylor; Frazier).

4) Post-Esteras Treatment of § 3553(a)(2)(A) and Plain Error

The third issue is where the opinion most clearly signals a practical rule for litigants: without a contemporaneous objection, Esteras-based claims face strict plain-error review.

Applying Esteras, the panel recognized that § 3583(e) omits § 3553(a)(2)(A), and that retribution for the underlying crime is impermissible in revocation sentencing. But because Walker did not object, the question became whether it was “clear or obvious” the district court actually relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A) “expressly or by unmistakable implication” (Esteras).

The panel concluded the court’s comments about Walker selling deadly fentanyl after a prior methamphetamine sentence were best read as focusing on permissible forward-looking aims—deterrence and protecting the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C))—and, in any event, could relate to sanctioning the breach of supervision (a question Esteras expressly left open in its footnote). Thus, no plain error was shown.

Impact

  • Revocation litigation after Esteras: The decision operationalizes Esteras in the Eleventh Circuit: absent an objection, appellate relief is unlikely unless the record contains an explicit (or unmistakably implicit) § 3553(a)(2)(A) rationale.
  • Record-building at sentencing: Defendants seeking to preserve Esteras issues should object clearly and prompt the court to specify which § 3553(a) factors it is relying upon under § 3583(e).
  • Hearsay practice in revocations: The opinion underscores that even where confrontation balancing is not formally recited, corroboration and credibility findings can save the ruling, and overwhelming non-hearsay corroboration can render any error harmless.
  • Circumstantial identity proof: The case confirms that matching probation-file identifiers (phone/address/vehicle) can be powerful corroboration in controlled-buy revocation proceedings even without direct observation of the transaction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release revocation
A post-incarceration monitoring term can be revoked if the court finds the defendant violated conditions (e.g., committing a new crime). Revocation can result in additional imprisonment.
Preponderance of the evidence
The government must show it is more likely than not that the violation occurred—lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Circumstantial evidence
Proof based on inference from facts (e.g., phone number/address/vehicle matches), rather than direct eyewitness testimony.
Hearsay and confrontation in revocation
Hearsay can be admitted, but due process requires courts to weigh the defendant’s interest in cross-examining the source against the government’s reasons for not producing the witness, and to consider reliability and corroboration.
Plain-error review
When an argument was not raised below, an appellate court generally will not reverse unless the error is clear/obvious and affected the outcome; Esteras adds that reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A) must be evident expressly or by unmistakable implication.
Retribution vs. forward-looking sentencing purposes
Retribution is “just punishment” for past conduct; forward-looking purposes include deterrence (discouraging future crime), incapacitation (protecting the public), and rehabilitation (helping the defendant change). Under Esteras, revocation sentencing under § 3583(e) may not use retribution for the underlying offense.

Conclusion

United States v. Elliot Walker affirms a revocation and 36-month sentence by applying settled revocation burdens, endorsing corroborated circumstantial identity proof, and treating any hearsay-confrontation misstep as harmless where non-hearsay evidence overwhelmingly supports the violation. Most importantly, the opinion illustrates the post-Esteras landscape: § 3553(a)(2)(A) is off-limits in revocation sentencing under § 3583(e), but on plain-error review the defendant must show the district court clearly and actually relied on that impermissible factor.