Eleventh Circuit Affirms MDLEA Convictions Without U.S. Nexus and Upholds Upward Variance Based on Specific Deterrence

Introduction

In United States v. Winston Pinnock (11th Cir. Apr. 16, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Winston Pinnock’s convictions and 120-month total sentence for maritime cocaine trafficking offenses prosecuted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 46 U.S.C. § 70501 et seq. Pinnock raised two issues on appeal: (1) constitutional challenges to the MDLEA as applied to conduct allegedly lacking a U.S. connection (including an argument involving conduct in another country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ)); and (2) a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, particularly the district court’s upward variance and alleged failure to credit mitigating evidence.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel resolved the appeal in two steps:

  • Convictions: The court summarily affirmed the MDLEA convictions because Pinnock’s constitutional arguments were concededly foreclosed by binding Eleventh Circuit precedent applying the prior-panel-precedent rule.
  • Sentence: The court held the 120-month sentence was substantively reasonable. It concluded the district court adequately considered the advisory Guidelines, permissibly varied upward based on specific deterrence, was not required to discuss every mitigating point expressly, and did not create an unwarranted disparity merely because co-defendants received different sentences. The sentence’s substantial distance from the statutory maximum (life) further supported reasonableness.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) MDLEA constitutionality, nexus, and extraterritorial authority

Pinnock argued (i) Congress exceeded its Article I power because his conduct lacked a U.S. connection; (ii) due process required a “nexus” to the United States; and (iii) Congress lacked Article I authority over conduct in another nation’s EEZ. The panel did not reanalyze these questions because it treated them as settled by repeated prior published decisions rejecting materially similar challenges:

  • United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 269 (2025)
  • United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2706 (2025)
  • United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020)
  • United States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2018)
  • United States v. Hernandez, 864 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2017)
  • United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2017)
  • United States v. Wilchombe, 838 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2016)
  • United States v. Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2006)

The mechanism enforcing those outcomes was the circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule as articulated in United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-6281, 2026 WL 135685 (Jan. 20, 2026) (mem.): absent Supreme Court or en banc intervention, later panels must follow earlier published holdings. The panel also cited United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 1997), to justify affirming without extended discussion when issues do not warrant more analysis—effectively underscoring that the MDLEA issues were “closed” in this circuit.

2) Substantive reasonableness, variances, and appellate review standards

The sentencing portion of the opinion is essentially an application of established Eleventh Circuit reasonableness review:

  • United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): abuse-of-discretion framework; “ballpark of permissible outcomes”; and the three principal ways to find substantive unreasonableness (ignoring a key factor, weighing an irrelevant factor heavily, or clear error of judgment in balancing).
  • United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015) (Opinion of E. Carnes, J.): deference to the sentencing court and the “ballpark” concept.
  • United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008): defendant bears the burden to show unreasonableness in light of the record and § 3553(a) factors.
  • United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): articulation of substantive reasonableness review and the idea that courts must give “real weight” to the Guidelines (though not a fixed amount).
  • United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Hayes, 762 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2014): examples where extreme variances suggested insufficient consideration of the Guidelines.
  • United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2011): requirement to calculate correctly and consult the Guidelines.
  • United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2006) and United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266 (11th Cir. 2025): district court has discretion to weigh factors differently; no across-the-board prescription for deference to the Guidelines.
  • United States v. Martin, No. 23-12139, 2025 WL 88687 (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2025) (unpublished): used as a comparator, but distinguished based on the magnitude of the variance.
  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): principle that major departures require more significant justification than minor ones.
  • United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262 (11th Cir. 2023): a court may rely on factors already accounted for in the Guidelines when imposing a variance.
  • United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007), United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000 (11th Cir. 2012): a court need not discuss each mitigating point and need not assign the weight the defendant prefers; acknowledgment of considering § 3553(a) and arguments is often enough.
  • United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2015), United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2009), United States v. Mateo-Espejo, 426 F.3d 508 (1st Cir. 2005), and United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2015): co-defendant disparities typically do not warrant relief; disparity analysis requires “apples to apples” comparators with materially similar characteristics.
  • United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2021), United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633 (11th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Sotelo, 130 F.4th 1229 (11th Cir. 2025): a sentence well below the statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness.

Legal Reasoning

1) Convictions: the MDLEA issues are treated as settled law in the Eleventh Circuit

The opinion’s convictions analysis is procedural and institutional rather than merits-based: Pinnock’s arguments are acknowledged, then rejected because they are foreclosed by binding precedent. The court’s reliance on United States v. Dubois reflects a central feature of federal appellate practice: intermediate appellate panels generally cannot revisit legal holdings already established in published decisions, even if a defendant offers new framing (e.g., the EEZ emphasis) unless higher authority has undermined the earlier cases.

2) Sentence: “substantive reasonableness” as deference plus guardrails

The panel’s sentencing analysis applies a deferential abuse-of-discretion model. The key moves were:

  • Guidelines consideration was adequate: Pinnock argued the court gave no “real weight” to the Guidelines. The panel rejected that characterization because the district court (a) focused on the PSI, (b) confirmed there were no objections to the Guidelines calculations, and (c) explicitly recognized it was varying from the Guidelines range. Under the cited cases, that is enough to show consultation and consideration, even if the court ultimately assigns another factor greater weight.
  • The upward variance was justified by a permissible § 3553(a) factor—specific deterrence: The district court explained the variance in terms of deterrence, which is explicitly listed in § 3553(a)(2)(B). The panel also treated as non-problematic the court’s reliance on criminal history/offense seriousness considerations even if aspects overlapped with the Guidelines calculation, citing United States v. Oudomsine.
  • Mitigation need not be discussed point-by-point: The panel relied on United States v. Amedeo and related cases to hold that the lack of a detailed mitigation discussion does not establish the court “ignored” mitigation, particularly where the court stated it reviewed the sentencing memorandum, the Guidelines, and the statutory purposes.
  • Co-defendant disparity arguments face an “apples-to-apples” barrier: The panel treated disparities among co-defendants as generally insufficient and emphasized that the defendant must show meaningful similarity (same relevant characteristics) under United States v. Docampo and United States v. Azmat.
  • Statutory maximum comparison supports reasonableness: With a statutory maximum of life (21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii)), the 120-month sentence was “well below” that ceiling, reinforcing the panel’s view that the sentence remained within a permissible range.

Impact

Although unpublished and “not for publication,” the decision is instructive in three practical ways within the Eleventh Circuit:

  • MDLEA constitutional challenges remain functionally unavailable at the panel level absent Supreme Court or en banc action. The opinion reinforces that defendants should expect summary affirmance where arguments mirror those rejected in the circuit’s published MDLEA cases.
  • Upward variances anchored in “specific deterrence” are likely to be affirmed where the district court states that rationale and shows awareness of the Guidelines range, even if mitigation is not discussed in detail.
  • Co-defendant disparity arguments must be comparator-driven and fact-specific; generalized claims of unfairness without a showing of materially similar circumstances are unlikely to succeed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • MDLEA (Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act): A federal statute allowing the U.S. to prosecute certain drug trafficking on the high seas and other maritime contexts, often involving non-U.S. defendants and conduct outside U.S. territory.
  • Nexus requirement: The idea that due process might require a connection (“nexus”) between the defendant’s conduct and the United States before U.S. prosecution is fair. The Eleventh Circuit’s cited MDLEA precedents reject a nexus requirement for the prosecutions at issue.
  • Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A maritime zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state where that state has certain resource rights. It is not the same as full territorial sovereignty; legal arguments often turn on what jurisdiction (coastal state vs. flag state vs. other states) exists for different conduct.
  • Prior-panel-precedent rule: A rule of intra-circuit stare decisis: a later appellate panel must follow earlier published panel decisions unless overruled by the Supreme Court or by the circuit sitting en banc.
  • Substantive reasonableness: Appellate review of whether the length of the sentence is reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), not whether the procedure was perfect. Review is highly deferential; reversal generally requires a clear abuse of discretion.
  • Guidelines “variance”: A sentence outside the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range based on the § 3553(a) factors (as opposed to a “departure,” which is a Guidelines-based adjustment concept).
  • Specific deterrence: Deterring this defendant from reoffending (as distinct from general deterrence, which aims to deter others).

Conclusion

United States v. Winston Pinnock primarily reinforces two settled Eleventh Circuit themes: (1) MDLEA constitutional challenges premised on lack of U.S. nexus or extraterritorial concerns are foreclosed by binding circuit precedent and may be disposed of summarily; and (2) on sentencing, an upward variance will be upheld where the district court demonstrates awareness of the Guidelines, ties the variance to a legitimate § 3553(a) goal like specific deterrence, and stays within a range that appellate courts deem “in the ballpark”—especially when the sentence is far below the statutory maximum.