Eleventh Circuit: Social Security Appellants Forfeit Issues Not Raised with Particularity in District Court; Listings 1.21 and 8.08 Require Specific Medical Proof

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from the denial of Victor Gerard Guyton, II’s claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Proceeding pro se, Guyton challenged an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) findings at two critical points in the Social Security Administration’s five-step disability framework:

• Step Three (Listings): whether his physical impairments met or medically equaled a listed impairment (which would compel a finding of disability without further analysis); and
• Step Five (Other Work): whether—despite being unable to perform past relevant work—he could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.

Guyton’s claimed limitations largely stemmed from injuries sustained in a March 2021 accident (a left shoulder injury and burn/road-rash-type injuries). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge’s order upholding the ALJ, holding (1) Guyton forfeited his appellate issues by failing to raise them with adequate specificity in district court and, alternatively, (2) substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s Step Three and Step Five determinations.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court’s decision has two layers:

1. Forfeiture: The panel held Guyton forfeited the issues he pressed on appeal because he did not present them with sufficient particularity in the district court.
2. Merits (alternative holding):
   • Step Three: Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Guyton’s impairments did not meet or equal any listing—specifically rejecting arguments under Listing §§ 1.21 and 8.08 for lack of required medical showings.
   • Step Five: Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Guyton could perform other medium-exertion jobs (bagger and machine operator), and the ALJ permissibly discounted Guyton’s subjective symptom testimony as inconsistent with conservative treatment and exam findings.

The court also declined to address arguments raised for the first time in the reply brief.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Issue preservation / forfeiture and appellate practice

• Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004)
  The court relied on this general appellate rule: issues not raised in district court are not considered for the first time on appeal. Here, it supplied the doctrinal foundation for deeming Guyton’s arguments forfeited.
• Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 2004)
  Crawford applied the same preservation principle specifically in the Social Security context. By citing it, the panel underscored that Social Security claimants—like other civil litigants—must present their claims and theories adequately at the district court stage.
• Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008)
  Timson provided the rule that arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply brief are not addressed. The panel used it to reject new listing theories introduced on reply (e.g., Listing § 1.18).

Scope and standard of review in Social Security appeals

• Walker v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 987 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2021)
  Walker framed the posture of review: when the Appeals Council denies review, the ALJ’s decision is the Commissioner’s final decision; appellate review is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the decision and whether correct legal standards were applied, with legal conclusions reviewed de novo.
• Buckwalter v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315 (11th Cir. 2021)
  Buckwalter supplied the structure of the five-step analysis and reiterated the deference embedded in “substantial evidence” review: the court affirms if supported by substantial evidence even if evidence could also support a contrary result.
• Bowen v. City of N.Y., 476 U.S. 467 (1986)
  Cited for the proposition that DIB and SSI disability analyses are “essentially the same,” allowing a unified analysis.

Step Three (Listings): burdens and medical equivalence

• Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227 (11th Cir. 1991)
  Barron was cited for the claimant’s burden at Step Three. The court used this to emphasize that Guyton had to produce medical evidence satisfying the criteria of Listing §§ 1.21 or 8.08 (or medical equivalence).
• Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2002)
  Wilson provided definitions of “meet” (specific listing criteria + duration) and “equal” (findings at least equal in severity and duration). It also supplied the pain/symptom standard later used at Step Five.
• Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990)
  Zebley reinforced that medical equivalence requires findings equal in severity to all criteria of the most similar listing—not a “close enough” showing. This supported rejecting Guyton’s listing arguments where elements were missing (e.g., “continuing surgical management” or functional inability to maintain upright posture).
• Hutchison v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1461 (11th Cir. 1986)
  Hutchison supported the procedural point that an ALJ need not “mechanically recite” every piece of evidence when concluding a listing is not met/equaled. The panel used this to validate the ALJ’s step-three articulation as sufficient.

Step Five (other work), DOT/VE evidence, RFC

• Washington v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2018)
  Washington was cited for the step-five inquiry’s reliance on the DOT and vocational expert (VE) testimony to determine whether significant numbers of jobs exist that a claimant can perform despite impairments.
• Malak v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 131 F.4th 1280 (11th Cir. 2025)
  Malak was cited for a core RFC concept: RFC represents the most a claimant can do physically and mentally despite limitations, and it interacts with age, education, and work experience at Step Five.
• Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97 (2019)
  Biestek supported the proposition that VE testimony can constitute substantial evidence even without supporting data attached, strengthening the ALJ’s reliance on VE testimony identifying medium jobs (bagger and machine operator).

Subjective symptoms (pain) and credibility findings

• Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2002)
  Wilson supplied the Eleventh Circuit’s pain standard and the requirement that if the ALJ rejects subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ must articulate “explicit and adequate reasons.”
• Mitchell v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780 (11th Cir. 2014)
  Mitchell was cited for deference to ALJ credibility determinations when clearly articulated and supported by substantial evidence, reinforcing the panel’s refusal to reweigh the ALJ’s symptom evaluation.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Forfeiture as an independent basis for affirmance

The court first disposed of the appeal procedurally: Guyton did not press the specific Step Three (Listings) and Step Five (other work) arguments with sufficient particularity in district court, so those issues were forfeited on appeal. This reflects a strict but conventional appellate posture: district court litigation is the forum for developing and sharpening arguments; appellate review is not a “second first chance.”

B. Step Three: why Listings §§ 1.21 and 8.08 were not met/equaled

On the merits, the court focused on the mismatch between the listing elements and the medical record.

• Listing § 1.21 (soft tissue injury/abnormality under continuing surgical management):
  The decisive missing element was “continuing surgical management.” The record reflected conservative care (physical therapy and non-surgical treatment) and “well healed” burns. Because the listing’s text requires a specific treatment trajectory (ongoing surgical management), the lack of surgery/ongoing surgical care prevented meeting or equaling § 1.21.
• Listing § 8.08 (burns):
  The missing element was functional severity: evidence that the burns caused inability to stand from sitting or maintain an upright posture while standing or walking. Instead, the record showed the burns were “well healed” and Guyton ambulated independently with normal gait.

The court also addressed (and rejected) a late-raised Listing § 1.18 theory in a footnote, explaining that an arm sling is not the type of assistive device required by that listing (which contemplates devices like canes/crutches/walkers requiring upper-extremity use in a defined way).

C. Step Five: substantial evidence supported “other work” and symptom discounting

At Step Five, the court upheld two key aspects of the ALJ’s analysis:

• DOT classification undermined Guyton’s “sedentary” premise:
  Guyton argued the agency failed to establish he could do medium work because his past trucking job was sedentary. The court rejected the factual premise: the DOT classifies commercial truck driver as medium. Even apart from that, the ALJ relied on the record and VE testimony to identify other medium jobs.
• Symptom evaluation was adequately explained and supported:
  Applying Wilson and Mitchell, the court concluded the ALJ gave explicit, adequate reasons to discount Guyton’s testimony that he could not sit, stand, or walk at all during an eight-hour day. The ALJ’s reasons included conservative/routine treatment, absence of surgery, improved/healed burn findings, normal or full range of motion and strength in later exams, ability to perform gait and squat maneuvers without difficulty, and self-report that pain was well controlled with over-the-counter medication. The ALJ also noted inconsistency between claimed inability to sit/walk and Guyton’s demonstrated ability to travel to and sit through the hearing.

3.3 Impact

• Heightened importance of district-court issue framing (especially for pro se claimants):
  The forfeiture holding signals that generalized objections or vague briefing at the district court level may be fatal on appeal. Future claimants (and advocates) should ensure that each challenged step (e.g., Step Three listing theory, Step Five DOT/VE issue, symptom evaluation) is distinctly argued with supporting record citations.
• Listings litigation remains element-by-element:
  The opinion reinforces that Step Three rises and falls on the precise listing criteria. “Similar” impairments or serious injuries are insufficient without proof of each required element (here, “continuing surgical management” for § 1.21 and postural/ambulation incapacity for § 8.08).
• Conservative treatment and normal objective findings continue to be potent symptom-evidence:
  The court treated the combination of conservative treatment and later normal exams as substantial evidence supporting an ALJ’s finding that subjective allegations were overstated—an approach likely to recur in musculoskeletal injury cases.
• VE testimony remains a durable evidentiary basis under substantial evidence review:
  By citing Biestek, the court reiterated that VE testimony can suffice even without appended data, making it difficult to overturn Step Five findings absent a developed challenge (e.g., conflicts, methodological flaws, or DOT inconsistency raised and preserved).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Meet” vs. “Equal” a Listing:
  Meet means the medical evidence matches the listing’s specific checklisted criteria. Equal means the medical findings are just as severe as the listing’s criteria—effectively a full substitute for the same level of severity.
• “Substantial evidence”:
  A deferential standard: the court asks whether a reasonable person could reach the ALJ’s conclusion based on the evidence. The court does not decide the case anew or choose the “best” view of the record.
• RFC (Residual Functional Capacity):
  A functional snapshot of what the claimant can still do (lifting, standing, walking, concentrating, etc.) despite impairments. It is used to decide past work (Step Four) and other work (Step Five).
• Step Five “burden shift”:
  After a claimant shows inability to do past relevant work, the Commissioner must show other jobs exist in significant numbers that the claimant can do, often through VE testimony and DOT job information.
• Forfeiture (issue preservation):
  If a litigant does not clearly raise an argument in the district court, the appellate court typically will not consider it later.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of benefits on both procedural and evidentiary grounds. Procedurally, the opinion underscores a strict preservation rule in Social Security appeals: arguments not asserted with sufficient particularity in the district court are forfeited. Substantively, the court reinforced an element-by-element approach to Listings analysis—rejecting Listing §§ 1.21 and 8.08 theories for lack of required medical proof—and reaffirmed the substantial-evidence resilience of VE-based Step Five findings and ALJ credibility determinations grounded in conservative treatment and objective exam results. In the broader Social Security landscape, the decision functions as a cautionary template: precise issue framing, record development keyed to listing elements, and timely challenges to VE/DOT foundations are essential to meaningful appellate review.