Eleventh Amendment Dismissals Must Be Without Prejudice and Do Not Bar Individual-Capacity § 1983 First Amendment Retaliation Claims

1. Introduction

Arthur M. Love, a former Maryland state employee, sued the State of Maryland and seven state officials (including Steven McAdams, Executive Director of the Governor’s Office), asserting that he was terminated in retaliation for speech—specifically, private social media posts in a Facebook group discussing the Kenosha unrest and Kyle Rittenhouse’s asserted self-defense justification. Love brought federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, plus a state constitutional free-speech claim (Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights) and wrongful discharge theories.

The appeal centered on: (i) the reach of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and Maryland’s waiver rules under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (MTCA), (ii) whether Love adequately pleaded claims against the officials in their individual capacities, and (iii) whether Love plausibly alleged conspiracy and malice/gross negligence sufficient to overcome various immunities.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit largely affirmed dismissal, but made two significant procedural corrections:

• Official-capacity/state dismissals: The court affirmed dismissal of federal statutory civil-rights claims against the State and officials in their official capacities as barred by sovereign immunity, and clarified that these jurisdictional dismissals must be without prejudice.
• Individual-capacity § 1983 claim against McAdams: The district court erred by dismissing the § 1983 First Amendment claim against McAdams on sovereign-immunity grounds. Sovereign immunity does not bar individual-capacity § 1983 suits. The panel therefore vacated dismissal of that single claim and remanded for further proceedings (without deciding Pickering-Connick balancing in the first instance).

All other individual-capacity claims were affirmed as dismissed: most defendants were dismissed for collective, non-individualized pleading; McAdams was dismissed on the state-law claims due to MTCA personnel immunity (no plausible malice or gross negligence alleged) and on §§ 1985/1986 for failure to plead a conspiracy and class-based discriminatory animus.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Result)

1) Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and “persons” under § 1983

• Biggs v. N.C. Dep't Pub. Safety & Edelman v. Jordan: Anchored the rule that states and state agencies are immune from private suits in federal court absent valid abrogation or waiver. The panel used these authorities to affirm dismissal of federal claims against Maryland and official-capacity defendants.
• Martin v. Wood: Reinforced that sovereign immunity extends to state officials when sued in their official capacities (because such suits are, in effect, suits against the State).
• Ellis v. Univ. of Kansas Med. Ctr. and Fincher v. Fla. Dep't of Labor: Supported the conclusion that Congress has not abrogated sovereign immunity for §§ 1985 and 1986 (and, via Biggs, for § 1983).
• Hafer v. Melo: Did the pivotal work on the remanded issue: it confirms sovereign immunity does not bar individual-capacity suits under § 1983 and clarifies the “person” requirement. The panel relied on Hafer to hold that the district court’s sovereign-immunity dismissal of the individual-capacity § 1983 claim against McAdams was erroneous.

2) Maryland waiver doctrine under the MTCA (and its federal-court limit)

• Williams v. Morgan State Univ. and Estate v. Leysath: Supported the conclusion that Maryland has not waived sovereign immunity for federal statutory civil-rights claims (including § 1983) in federal court.
• Proctor v. WMATA: Provided the key waiver limitation: MTCA waives immunity only “in a court of the State” and does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court. This drove dismissal of Love’s state constitutional and wrongful discharge claims to the extent they were brought against the State/official-capacity defendants in federal court.
• Newell v. Runnels: Used to situate Article 40 retaliation claims as generally co-extensive with First Amendment protections—important context, though not outcome-determinative given the forum/waiver barrier.

3) Pleading individual capacity and plausibility

• Biggs v. Meadows: Guided the inquiry into whether a complaint sues officials in their individual capacities—examining indicia like requests for punitive damages and assertion of qualified immunity. The panel used this to correct the district court’s error in concluding Love had not brought individual-capacity claims at all.
• Rockville Cars, LLC v. City of Rockville, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., and Francis v. Giacomelli: Supplied the governing Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility framework and the rejection of conclusory “threadbare recitals.”
• Langford v. Joyner: Reinforced that “collective allegations” against “Defendants” without defendant-by-defendant facts fail. This supported dismissal of claims against all individual defendants other than McAdams.

4) Public-employee speech doctrine

• McCaffrey v. Chapman: Framed the rule that the First Amendment generally prohibits retaliation for protected speech, but that the Pickering-Connick balancing limits protection where government efficiency interests outweigh speech interests.
• Connick v. Myers and Pickering v. Board of Education: Identified as the doctrinal source of the balancing test. The panel expressly declined to apply the balancing in the first instance on appeal, instead remanding.

5) MTCA personnel immunity and the malice/gross negligence exceptions

• Nero v. Mosby: Provided the operative framework: state personnel are immune for acts within scope absent malice or gross negligence, and conclusory allegations cannot overcome that immunity.
• Lee v. Cline: Supplied Maryland’s definition of “actual malice” (evil motive, intent to injure, knowing wrongdoing).
• Cooper v. Rodriguez and Barbre v. Pope: Defined “gross negligence” as reckless/utter indifference beyond simple negligence.
• Boyer v. Maryland: Offered a comparative benchmark for insufficient gross-negligence allegations; Love’s allegations were found even more conclusory.

6) §§ 1985(3) and 1986 conspiracy pleading and “class-based animus”

• Strickland v. United States: Set out the elements of § 1985(3) and emphasized the need for concrete facts (not conclusory conspiracy allegations).
• Griffin v. Breckenridge: Supplied the requirement of “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.”
• Buschi v. Kirven (quoting United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott): Constrained the scope of “class” under § 1985(3) and helped defeat Love’s attempt to recast “viewpoint discrimination” as class-based animus.

7) Jurisdictional dismissals must be without prejudice

• S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC: Required the modification: when claims are dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (including on sovereign-immunity grounds), dismissal must be without prejudice.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) A clean separation between (i) jurisdictional bars and (ii) merits/pleading failures

The panel treated Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity as a jurisdictional limitation: it deprives federal courts of power to adjudicate claims against the State and official-capacity defendants, absent waiver/abrogation. That jurisdictional framing explains two outcomes:

• Why dismissal of those claims was mandatory; and
• Why the Fourth Circuit modified the judgment to make those dismissals without prejudice under S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC.

2) The district court’s “individual capacity” mistake—harmless as to most defendants, consequential as to McAdams

The district court concluded Love failed to allege actions outside scope and treated the case as not properly bringing individual-capacity claims. The Fourth Circuit corrected that: Love expressly sued defendants in official and individual capacities, sought punitive damages (not available in official-capacity suits), and the defense raised qualified immunity—classic Biggs v. Meadows indicators.

Even so, the correction only changed the outcome for McAdams’s § 1983 claim. For the other officials, the panel affirmed dismissal because Love pleaded no individualized factual content tying each person to actionable conduct—an Iqbal/Langford v. Joyner failure.

3) Why the § 1983 First Amendment claim against McAdams was remanded

The district court did not perform (and explicitly declined to perform) Pickering-Connick balancing, having dismissed on sovereign-immunity grounds. Because sovereign immunity does not apply to McAdams in his individual capacity (Hafer v. Melo), the panel vacated and remanded so the district court can address the claim under the proper substantive framework, including:

• whether Love spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern;
• whether the government employer’s efficiency/disruption interests outweigh the speech interests; and
• causation and any qualified-immunity defenses, once the constitutional contours are analyzed.

4) Why the state-law claims against McAdams individually were barred by MTCA personnel immunity

Under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b) (incorporated by State Gov't § 12-105), state personnel are immune for torts within the scope of duties unless the plaintiff plausibly pleads malice or gross negligence. The panel held Love’s allegations were conclusory:

• No malice: McAdams’s alleged reassurance followed by termination (“about face”) did not support an inference of “hate” or deliberate intent to injure as required by Lee v. Cline and Nero v. Mosby.
• No gross negligence: Love pleaded no facts about McAdams’s state of mind or reckless indifference. Given that First Amendment/Article 40 retaliation in the public employment context requires balancing, inferring “knowing violation” would require facts about disruption, governmental interests, and understanding of unlawfulness—none were pleaded. The court analogized to Boyer v. Maryland, where even more concrete allegations were still insufficient.

5) Why §§ 1985(3) and 1986 failed

Love’s § 1985(3) theory failed on two independent grounds:

• Conspiracy not plausibly pleaded: Speculation that defendants “must have met” was not “concrete supporting facts” under Strickland v. United States.
• No class-based invidious animus: Love alleged “viewpoint discrimination” as the class-based animus, but the court invoked the limiting principles of Griffin v. Breckenridge and Buschi v. Kirven (quoting United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott) to reject expanding § 1985(3) beyond the narrow categories recognized in precedent.

Because § 1986 is derivative, its dismissal followed automatically once § 1985 failed (Strickland).

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is practically significant in several recurring litigation patterns:

• Procedural hygiene in sovereign-immunity cases: Reinforces that Eleventh Amendment dismissals are jurisdictional and therefore must be entered without prejudice. This matters for claim preclusion and for plaintiffs who may refile in a proper forum (e.g., state court where waiver exists).
• Pleading clarity on capacity: Emphasizes that courts should look beyond labels to damages sought and defenses raised (Biggs v. Meadows), and that defendants-by-defendant factual pleading is essential (Langford v. Joyner).
• Public-employee social media speech litigation: Signals that termination for private social media posts may present a viable § 1983 claim against the decisionmaker in an individual capacity, but the constitutionality will turn on Pickering-Connick balancing—often a fact-sensitive inquiry.
• High bar to plead around MTCA personnel immunity: Confirms that alleging “malicious” or “grossly negligent” conduct in conclusory terms will not defeat immunity; plaintiffs need detailed facts supporting state of mind and improper motivation.
• Constraining civil-rights conspiracy claims: Reaffirms the Fourth Circuit’s skepticism of conclusory § 1985 allegations and the limited scope of “class-based animus,” discouraging attempts to constitutionalize employment disputes via conspiracy statutes.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Sovereign immunity (Eleventh Amendment): A state generally cannot be sued for money damages in federal court by private citizens unless it consents (waives immunity) or Congress validly removes that immunity.
• Official vs. individual capacity: An official-capacity claim is essentially against the State itself; an individual-capacity claim seeks to hold the official personally liable. Sovereign immunity blocks many official-capacity damages claims, but not individual-capacity § 1983 suits.
• MTCA waiver vs. MTCA personnel immunity: The MTCA can waive the State’s immunity for some tort suits—but typically only in Maryland state courts. Separately, the MTCA also protects state employees from personal liability unless they acted with malice or gross negligence.
• Pickering-Connick balancing: Even if a public employee speaks as a citizen, courts weigh the employee’s speech interests against the government employer’s interest in efficient, disruption-free operations.
• Pleading “plausibility” (Rule 12(b)(6)): Complaints must allege concrete facts that make liability plausible, not merely possible. Group allegations against “Defendants” without specifics usually fail.
• § 1985(3) “class-based animus”: Not every kind of unfair treatment qualifies. The statute targets conspiracies driven by invidious discrimination against protected “classes” as defined narrowly in precedent; mere disagreement with a viewpoint is generally not enough.

5. Conclusion

Arthur Love v. Larry Hogan clarifies (1) that Eleventh Amendment/sovereign-immunity dismissals are jurisdictional and must be entered without prejudice, and (2) that sovereign immunity does not bar an individual-capacity § 1983 claim against a state official alleged to have terminated an employee for protected speech. The court simultaneously underscores modern pleading demands: plaintiffs must allege individualized facts for each defendant, must plead concrete facts to support conspiracy and class-based animus under § 1985(3), and must plead more than labels to overcome MTCA personnel immunity. The remand leaves the central constitutional question—whether Love’s termination passes Pickering-Connick balancing—for the district court to address on a proper record.