Date: Apr 29, 2026

EEZ as “High Seas” and Silence as Statelessness Under the MDLEA

I. Introduction

In United States v. Tony Rafael Henriquez (consolidated with appeals by Jose Antonio Acosta-Pinedo and Julio Javier Liriano-Mercado), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) convictions for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine while aboard a vessel “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” The interdiction occurred in waters the defendants characterized as Colombia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and the defendants mounted a multi-pronged attack: (1) constitutional limits under the Felonies Clause if the conduct occurred in an EEZ rather than “high seas”; (2) failure of the government to prove statutory jurisdiction because the vessel was not “without nationality” under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B); (3) alleged jurisdictional defect because the Netherlands participated in enforcement; and (4) due-process challenges (vagueness, absence of “reverse Miranda” warnings, and lack of a nexus to the United States).

II. Summary of the Opinion

Felonies Clause / EEZ: Relying on United States v. Alfonso, the court held that “high seas” includes EEZs, so applying the MDLEA in Colombia’s EEZ did not exceed Congress’s power under Article I, § 8, cl. 10.
Statutory jurisdiction (stateless vessel): The district court’s factual finding—on limited remand—that Liriano-Mercado, identified as master, remained silent when asked to make a claim of nationality was not clearly erroneous. Under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B), that failure rendered the vessel “without nationality,” establishing MDLEA jurisdiction.
Foreign participation: The Netherlands’ involvement did not negate jurisdiction, particularly where U.S. Coast Guard officers assumed tactical control and conducted the boarding.
Due process: (a) Vagueness was foreclosed by United States v. Gruezo; (b) “reverse Miranda” claims were barred by United States v. Noriega and, as-applied, waived by guilty pleas; and (c) no U.S. nexus was required under United States v. Canario-Vilomar.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. United States v. Alfonso

Alfonso supplied the decisive constitutional premise: for purposes of Congress’s Felonies Clause authority and MDLEA enforcement, the Eleventh Circuit treats the “high seas” as including EEZs. The panel in Henriquez did not re-litigate the international-law taxonomy of EEZs; instead, it treated Alfonso as controlling circuit law and “adhere[d]” to it, thereby rejecting the defendants’ attempt to cabin the MDLEA to waters beyond EEZs.

2. Class v. United States

Class was cited for the procedural rule that a guilty plea does not inherently bar a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction. This mattered because at least some of the defendants had pleaded guilty, yet still raised constitutional objections to the MDLEA’s application.

3. United States v. Gruezo

Gruezo anchored two core holdings. First, it provided the framework for MDLEA statutory jurisdiction, including the “without nationality” pathway and the standard of review (de novo for jurisdiction, clear error for jurisdiction-related factfinding). Second, it foreclosed the due-process vagueness attack by holding the MDLEA provides adequate notice that failure to make a claim of nationality or registry upon request can render a vessel stateless for MDLEA jurisdiction.

4. United States v. Iguaran

The defendants invoked Iguaran to argue that the Eleventh Circuit should not have ordered the limited remand that generated the factual findings about the nationality inquiry. The panel treated the remand decision as already resolved in the same appellate proceeding and declined to revisit it, effectively insulating the remand mechanism from collateral attack at this stage.

5. United States v. Hurtado and United States v. Canario-Vilomar

These cases were used to normalize multinational interdiction operations as “commonplace” in MDLEA practice, undermining the argument that foreign participation (here, the Netherlands) somehow divests U.S. courts of jurisdiction. Separately, Canario-Vilomar was the controlling authority for the proposition that no nexus to the United States is required because the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach is supported by “universal and protective principles.”

6. United States v. Noriega

Noriega was invoked to reject the “reverse Miranda” theory. The court treated the argument as foreclosed to the extent it was a facial constitutional attack, and waived by guilty pleas to the extent it was an as-applied challenge.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Constitutional power under the Felonies Clause

The court framed the MDLEA as an exercise of Congress’s Felonies Clause power (Article I, § 8, cl. 10) and then treated the key constitutional question as geographic: whether conduct in a foreign EEZ falls within “high seas.” By following Alfonso, the court resolved the constitutional issue categorically—EEZs qualify—thereby validating MDLEA prosecutions in EEZ waters without requiring a case-by-case inquiry into the coastal state’s rights or the interdicting state’s specific jurisdictional theory under international law.

2. Statutory jurisdiction via “vessel without nationality” (46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B))

The court’s statutory analysis turned on a factual predicate: whether the “master or individual in charge” failed, upon request, to make a claim of nationality. On limited remand, boarding officers testified that Liriano-Mercado identified himself as master; an officer asked if he wished to make a claim of nationality; and he remained silent. The Coast Guard “case package” corroborated repeated requests and nonresponse. Given the clear-error standard for the district court’s jurisdictional factfinding, the appellate court held the finding was adequately supported and therefore the vessel was stateless under the MDLEA.

Critically, the panel treated silence in the face of a nationality inquiry as a “fail[ure] ... to make a claim,” which is enough to trigger statelessness under § 70502(d)(1)(B). That approach reinforces a practical enforcement rule: when the identified master does not affirmatively claim nationality or registry after being asked, the jurisdictional gateway is satisfied.

3. Multinational interdiction does not negate jurisdiction

The defendants’ “Netherlands enforcement” theory failed on both fact and law. Factually, their own proffers acknowledged Coast Guard tactical control and direct U.S. officer participation in the boarding. Legally, the court emphasized the absence of authority barring allied cooperation and cited MDLEA cases where such cooperation was routine. The holding signals that defendants cannot defeat U.S. jurisdiction merely by pointing to a partner nation’s platform, flag, or presence in the interdiction.

4. Due process: vagueness, warnings, and nexus

The court disposed of due-process objections largely through binding precedent:

Vagueness: Under Gruezo, the MDLEA gives adequate notice that failure to claim nationality upon request can render a vessel stateless for jurisdictional purposes.
“Reverse Miranda”: The panel rejected the claim that officers must warn detainees that silence could expose them to U.S. prosecution; facial attacks were foreclosed by Noriega, and as-applied challenges were waived by guilty pleas.
Nexus: Under Canario-Vilomar, no U.S. nexus is required for MDLEA prosecutions, given universal/protective principles.

C. Impact

EEZ enforcement stability: By reaffirming Alfonso, the opinion strengthens (within the Eleventh Circuit) the government’s position that MDLEA cases are not vulnerable merely because interdictions occur in a foreign EEZ rather than farther offshore.
Operational clarity on statelessness: The decision underscores that a master’s silence after a nationality inquiry is sufficient for § 70502(d)(1)(B), incentivizing clear, contemporaneous documentation (testimony, case packages) of the request-and-nonresponse sequence.
Multinational operations protected: The rejection of the “foreign enforcement” argument reduces litigation risk where U.S. interdictions occur jointly with allies or from allied vessels.
Due-process defenses narrowed: The panel’s reliance on precedent continues the Eleventh Circuit’s trend of treating vagueness, nexus, and warning-based challenges as largely settled against MDLEA defendants, shifting disputes toward factual jurisdiction questions (e.g., what was asked, who was the master, what was said).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A maritime zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state where that state has special rights over natural resources. In this opinion (following Alfonso), the Eleventh Circuit treats the EEZ as part of the “high seas” for MDLEA/Felonies Clause purposes.
Felonies Clause: A constitutional grant allowing Congress to “define and punish ... Felonies committed on the high Seas.” The MDLEA is treated as an exercise of this authority.
“Vessel without nationality” / Stateless vessel: Under the MDLEA, a vessel can be treated as stateless if the master fails to make a claim of nationality or registry when asked by a U.S. officer. Statelessness is a key jurisdictional hook permitting U.S. prosecution.
Limited remand: A procedural device where the appellate court sends the case back to the district court to make specific factual findings (here, about the nationality inquiry) while keeping the appeal pending.
Void for vagueness: A due-process doctrine requiring criminal laws to give fair notice of what conduct is prohibited and to avoid arbitrary enforcement. The Eleventh Circuit has held the MDLEA provides sufficient notice on the nationality-claim framework.
“Reverse Miranda”: A defendant-proposed warning that silence during boarding questioning could have legal consequences. The opinion rejects any constitutional requirement that officers give such a warning in this MDLEA context.
Nexus requirement: A claimed need for a connection between the defendant’s conduct and the United States to justify prosecution. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held no nexus is required for MDLEA offenses.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Tony Rafael Henriquez reinforces a set of settled but operationally significant MDLEA rules: (1) MDLEA enforcement in EEZ waters is constitutionally permissible in this circuit because EEZs are treated as “high seas” (Alfonso); (2) a master’s silence when asked to claim nationality supports a finding that the vessel is stateless under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B) (Gruezo); (3) allied participation in interdictions does not deprive U.S. courts of jurisdiction; and (4) common due-process attacks—vagueness, “reverse Miranda,” and lack of U.S. nexus—remain largely foreclosed by precedent. The opinion thus consolidates the government’s jurisdictional and constitutional footing for MDLEA prosecutions arising from multinational maritime interdictions.