EAJA Applies to Town Court Clerks When Performing Judicial Filing Functions; Verbal Directives Do Not Substantially Justify Rejection of Filings

Introduction

Case: Matter of Moore v Town of Colonie, 2026 NY Slip Op 04353 (App Div 3d Dept July 9, 2026).
Parties: Petitioners (T. Padric Moore et al.) vs. Respondents/Appellants (Town of Colonie and related town court respondents, including the Clerk of the Colonie Town Justice Court).
Posture: Appeal from an Albany County Supreme Court judgment awarding counsel fees and expenses to petitioners under the Equal Access to Justice Act (CPLR art 86) after petitioners prevailed in an Article 78 mandamus proceeding.

Background: Petitioners attempted to file summary eviction proceedings in the Colonie Town Justice Court. The court clerk rejected the filings without explanation. Petitioners brought a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking mandamus to compel acceptance of their filings. Respondents conceded the rejection but claimed an ethical prohibition based on an advisory opinion of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct, and they sought to seal that advisory opinion (a request Supreme Court denied). After hearing, Supreme Court held the clerk failed to perform a mandatory duty and ordered acceptance of the filings.

Key issues on appeal: (1) whether a town court clerk qualifies as a “state” actor/official for purposes of EAJA fee-shifting (CPLR 8602[g]) when rejecting filings; (2) whether respondents’ position was “substantially justified” (CPLR 8601[a]); (3) whether “special circumstances” made a fee award unjust; and (4) whether the amount of fees and expenses was reasonable and adequately supported.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department affirmed. It held:

  • A town court clerk may be treated as a “state” official under the EAJA on a case-by-case basis; here, rejecting filings in a summary eviction proceeding was an act “part of the judicial process,” so EAJA applied.
  • Respondents were not “substantially justified” because CPLR 2102(c) bars clerks from refusing filings absent statutory/rule-based authority or a court order; a mere verbal directive did not suffice.
  • Alleged good faith did not constitute “special circumstances” making a fee award unjust, particularly given EAJA’s remedial purpose and the clerk’s mandatory statutory duties.
  • Supreme Court acted within its discretion in finding the requested fees reasonable and supported by itemized billing and proof of prevailing rates.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Determining whether a local actor is an “agent of the state” under EAJA

  • Matter of Brown v City of Schenectady, 209 AD3d 128 (3d Dept 2022): The court relied on Brown for the central methodological rule: “Local officials and administrators may be deemed agents of the state” for EAJA purposes, determined “on a case-by-case basis” by examining statutory authority and the nature of the entity/act. Moore applies this framework to a town court clerk, treating the inquiry as functional (what the clerk was doing) rather than purely structural (who signs the paycheck).
  • Matter of Markey v Tietz, 244 AD3d 78 (3d Dept 2025): Markey supplies interpretive guidance: because EAJA is remedial, it is to be “liberally construed,” and courts should not read in limitations not clearly expressed. Moore uses this to reject the categorical argument that town court personnel are outside EAJA because town courts have limited jurisdiction or non-state employment status.

2) Functional “state officer” analysis in the Unified Court System

  • National Westminster Bank, USA v State of New York, 76 NY2d 507 (1990): This is the doctrinal anchor for the “nature of the act” test—an official may be deemed a state officer when performing acts that are “part of the judicial system.” Moore treats the acceptance of pleadings/initiating papers as quintessentially part of the judicial process, placing the clerk’s refusal squarely within National Westminster’s framework.
  • J. Ellrott Excavating Contrs. v State of New York, 247 AD2d 705 (3d Dept 1998): Cited as consistent authority for applying National Westminster’s functional approach. Moore uses it to reinforce that the characterization of the actor turns on the judicial nature of the conduct at issue.

3) “Substantial justification” and fee-shifting discretion under EAJA

  • Matter of New York State Clinical Lab. Assn. v Kaladjian, 85 NY2d 346 (1995): Provides the controlling definition: substantial justification means justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person, with a reasonable basis in law and fact. Moore measures respondents’ rationale against the clear text of CPLR 2102(c), finding no reasonable legal basis for rejection absent proper authority.
  • Matter of Vapor Tech. Assn. v. Cuomo, 203 AD3d 1516 (3d Dept 2022), lv dismissed 39 NY3d 960 (2022): Cited for the appellate standard of review: substantial-justification determinations are committed to the trial court’s discretion. Moore frames its affirmance as “no abuse of discretion,” not a de novo reweighing.
  • Matter of Walker v Martuscello, 248 AD3d 1619 (3d Dept 2026): Used both for the standard of review and as recent Third Department authority sustaining EAJA fee awards where the state’s position lacked substantial justification; Moore also cites Walker to reject “good faith” as “special circumstances” when the conduct conflicts with statutory duty and EAJA’s remedial aims.
  • Matter of Serio v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 215 AD2d 835 (3d Dept 1995): Cited as additional support for affirming EAJA fee awards where the state’s position is not substantially justified; it contributes to the sense that Moore is applying an established EAJA enforcement approach rather than creating an isolated outcome.

4) Reasonableness and proof of attorney’s fees

  • Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bay Ridge Surgi-Center, LLC, 243 AD3d 558 (2d Dept 2025): Supplies the fee-setting principles: the applicant must show hours reasonably expended and prevailing community rates; the trial court has broad discretion. Moore relies on these standards to uphold the fee determination based on itemized time records and rate support.
  • Klein v Wiley, 241 AD3d 808 (2d Dept 2025) and Gertler v Davidoff Hutcher & Citron, LLP, 233 AD3d 846 (2d Dept 2024): These bolster the conclusion that Supreme Court properly exercised discretion in evaluating documentation and market reasonableness, emphasizing deference to trial-level assessment where the record supports the award.

5) Appealability in Article 78 proceedings (threshold point)

  • Matter of Boyd v Cumbo, 210 AD3d 762 (3d Dept 2022), lv denied 39 NY3d 905 (2023): Cited (in footnote) for the rule that no appeal lies as of right from a nonfinal order in an Article 78 proceeding.
  • Matter of Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v Autorama Enters., Inc., 205 AD3d 1116 (3d Dept 2022): Cited to confirm that a final judgment in an Article 78 proceeding is appealable as of right; this shores up jurisdiction to review the EAJA fee judgment.

Legal Reasoning

1) EAJA coverage: the clerk’s act is treated as an act of the “state”

The court rejects a categorical exclusion of town court clerks from EAJA. Instead, it uses a functional analysis rooted in the Unified Court System (NY Const, art VI, § 1[a]) and EAJA’s broad definition of “State” (CPLR 8602[g]). The decisive factor is “the nature of the act which is the subject of the suit.”

Here, the act was refusing to accept filings commencing a summary eviction proceeding—conduct “unquestionably” part of the judicial process under National Westminster Bank, USA v State of New York. Because the clerk’s challenged conduct was integral to court functioning (filing/processing initiating papers), the clerk is treated as acting in a state-official capacity for EAJA purposes, enabling fee recovery against the “state” side of the litigation.

2) Substantial justification: CPLR 2102(c) creates a clear filing duty that was violated

Under CPLR 8601(a), fees must be awarded to a prevailing party unless the state’s position was substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust. Applying Matter of New York State Clinical Lab. Assn. v Kaladjian, the court asks whether respondents’ position had a reasonable basis in law and fact.

The court treats CPLR 2102(c) as dispositive: “A clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any paper presented” except where directed by statute, by rules promulgated by the chief administrator of the courts, or by court order. The record showed only a verbal directive—insufficient under the statute’s enumerated exceptions. Therefore, even if the clerk believed she was following instructions, the legal basis for refusing the filings was not objectively reasonable, defeating “substantial justification.”

3) “Special circumstances”: good faith does not neutralize EAJA’s remedial design when a mandatory duty is breached

Respondents argued the clerk’s good faith reliance on direction from superiors (and/or ethical concerns) should make fees unjust. The court rejects this as incompatible with EAJA’s remedial purpose and the non-discretionary nature of the clerk’s filing obligation under CPLR 2102(c). In effect, Moore treats “special circumstances” as a narrow safety valve that does not excuse straightforward noncompliance with explicit statutory duties governing access to the courts.

4) Reasonableness of the amount: compliance with CPLR 8601(b)

The court affirms the fee calculation because petitioners met CPLR 8601(b)’s documentation requirements: prevailing-party facts, amount sought, and itemized time and rates for each professional. It defers to Supreme Court’s discretion in assessing community rate reasonableness and the necessity of the work performed, consistent with Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bay Ridge Surgi-Center, LLC.

Impact

  • Expanded practical EAJA exposure for town-justice-court operations: Although town court staff are often locally funded, Moore reinforces that EAJA liability can attach where the challenged conduct is a core judicial function (here, accepting filings). Municipalities and town courts should anticipate EAJA fee applications when litigants must sue to enforce ministerial filing duties.
  • Strengthened “access-to-filing” enforcement: The decision operationalizes CPLR 2102(c) as a hard constraint: absent a statute, a chief administrator rule, or a court order, clerks cannot refuse filings. Informal practices, verbal directives, or generalized ethical unease are unlikely to constitute “substantial justification.”
  • Guidance for administrators and supervising judges: If a court believes filings must be rejected for legally cognizable reasons, Moore incentivizes obtaining a qualifying directive (e.g., a court order or applicable rule authority) rather than relying on informal channels, to reduce EAJA risk.
  • Fee-litigation discipline: By affirming an award supported by detailed billing and rate support, Moore underscores that well-documented EAJA applications are likely to succeed when the underlying position lacks objective legal support.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • CPLR Article 78 (mandamus): A special proceeding used to challenge government action. “Mandamus to compel” is used to force a government official to perform a duty that the law requires (a ministerial duty), as opposed to a discretionary choice.
  • EAJA (CPLR Article 86): A New York fee-shifting statute requiring courts to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing non-state party in civil litigation against the state, unless the state’s position was “substantially justified” or special circumstances make fees unjust.
  • “Substantially justified”: Not “subjectively sincere,” but objectively reasonable—there must be a reasonable basis in both law and fact.
  • “Special circumstances”: A narrow exception allowing denial of fees even when the challenger prevails, intended for unusual situations where awarding fees would be unfair; Moore indicates it does not cover good-faith noncompliance with a clear statutory filing duty.
  • CPLR 2102(c): A rule protecting the filing process: clerks generally must accept papers for filing and may refuse only when an identified legal authority permits refusal (statute, chief administrator rule, or court order).
  • Unified Court System: New York’s Constitution places various courts (including town courts) within a unified judicial system, supporting treatment of certain town-court functions as “state” judicial acts for particular legal analyses.

Conclusion

Matter of Moore v Town of Colonie cements two practical rules in New York practice: (1) for EAJA purposes, a town court clerk may be deemed a state official when performing acts integral to the judicial process—especially the acceptance of filings; and (2) rejecting filings is rarely defensible under EAJA where CPLR 2102(c) is not satisfied, because informal or verbal directives do not create a legally reasonable basis. The decision strengthens statutory protections for access to the courts and signals that fee-shifting will follow when litigants must resort to Article 78 to enforce non-discretionary filing duties.