EAJA “Any Civil Action” Unambiguously Covers § 2241 Habeas Challenges to Civil Immigration Detention

I. Introduction

In Adolph Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Correctional Center (consolidated with Adewumi Abioye v. Warden Moshannon Valley Processing Center), the Third Circuit confronted a threshold sovereign-immunity question with major practical consequences: whether the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), authorizes attorney’s-fee awards to prevailing immigration detainees who succeed on federal habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging prolonged detention without an individualized bond hearing.

Both Adolph “Lee” Michelin (a Jamaican citizen) and Adewumi Abioye (a Nigerian citizen) were detained for many months at the Moshannon Valley facility without bond hearings. Each filed a § 2241 habeas petition in the Western District of Pennsylvania alleging a Fifth Amendment Due Process violation. Each prevailed and obtained a bond hearing leading to release on bond. Each then sought EAJA fees; each District Court awarded fees after finding the Government’s position was not “substantially justified.” The Government appealed, arguing (1) EAJA does not reach habeas proceedings and therefore does not waive sovereign immunity to fee awards here, and (2) in Abioye’s case the Government’s position was substantially justified.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed both fee awards. It held:

  • Core holding (precedential): A § 2241 petition challenging civil immigration detention is an EAJA “any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort).” The text is unambiguous, so EAJA waives federal sovereign immunity to attorney’s-fee awards in these habeas cases.
  • Abioye-specific holding: The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Government’s position not substantially justified given Abioye’s >16 months of detention without a bond hearing and the Third Circuit’s due-process framework for prolonged § 1226(c) detention.

The court’s reasoning is notably textual and historically grounded: it treats habeas as a civil action “since before our Nation’s Founding,” and it gives dispositive force to the statutory phrase “any civil action” coupled with EAJA’s express tort carveout.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Habeas as a civil action: common-law roots and Supreme Court continuity

The opinion opens with an extended historical account drawn from 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1772), using Blackstone’s civil/public wrongs framework to situate habeas as a civil remedy vindicating the civil right of “personal liberty.” That history is then linked to early U.S. case law confirming the same civil/criminal distinction:

  • Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88 and Bradlie v. Md. Ins. Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 378 are used to show early federal courts distinguished “civil proceedings” enforcing private rights from “criminal proceedings” imposing punishment.
  • Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 and Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556 are cited for the proposition that habeas is plainly a civil action and a remedy enforcing the civil right of liberty.
  • Modern confirmation appears in Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504 (“Habeas proceedings … are civil in nature.”), with additional reinforcement from Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118 and Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (cited in a footnote regarding the enduring authority of the “Great Writ”).

The court also relies on Supreme Court statements near EAJA’s enactment, especially Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257 (“well settled that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding”) and Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (“Habeas corpus is a civil action.”), to lock in the “plain meaning” of “civil action” in 1980.

2. Sovereign-immunity methodology: ambiguity-first, canon-second

The Government invoked the sovereign-immunity clear-statement rule. The court accepted the governing framework but applied it in a distinctly modern “sequence”:

  • FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (sovereign immunity baseline).
  • Kirtz v. Trans Union LLC, 46 F.4th 159 and Dep't of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42 (waivers must be unequivocal in text; clarity evaluated “on its own terms”).
  • FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, and United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (ambiguity construed in favor of immunity).
  • United States v. Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360 and Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369 (sovereign-immunity canon applies only after ordinary interpretive tools are exhausted).
  • Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571 (no need to resort to sovereign-immunity canon if ambiguity is eliminated).
  • Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129 is pivotal: EAJA’s fee provision is a waiver of sovereign immunity, and the Court there refused to expand EAJA beyond its text despite policy fit—an approach the Third Circuit uses to justify its own refusal to rely on legislative history or purpose to create (or defeat) a waiver.

3. Text and context canons: “any,” express exceptions, and coherence with the U.S. Code

The court’s textual analysis leans on familiar interpretive rules:

  • Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (“cardinal canon” that statutes mean what they say).
  • Hayes v. Harvey, 903 F.3d 32 (no isolation reading; interpret in context).
  • Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (“any civil action” has “unmistakable” reach).
  • Bufkin v. Collins, 604 U.S. 369 and TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (avoid surplusage; “any” must do work).
  • United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (express exceptions imply no other unstated exceptions).
  • W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (interpret to fit comfortably into the corpus juris) and related coherence-based references (Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin, 599 U.S. 382; Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204; Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)).

To show “any civil action” ordinarily includes habeas unless expressly excluded, the court cites statutory and case examples including:

  • Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (habeas treated as covered by venue transfer for “any civil action” under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
  • German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203 (district court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “all civil actions”).
  • Hilborn v. United States, 163 U.S. 342 and Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (older jurisdictional uses of “all/any civil actions” including habeas).
  • 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), which explicitly treats habeas as a subset of “any civil action, suit or proceeding” but sets a different filing fee—reinforcing that habeas is within the civil bucket even when handled specially.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g), which defines “civil action” to include civil proceedings but expressly excludes “habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement”—evidence that when Congress wants habeas excluded, it says so.

4. “Hybrid” habeas and the limited force of out-of-context carveouts

The Government leaned heavily on cases describing habeas as “unique” or “hybrid” and on instances where “civil action” did not include habeas for particular statutes. The Third Circuit distinguishes rather than denies those authorities:

  • Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487 (service-of-process/venue provision did not apply to habeas), Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (label “civil action” can be “gross and inexact” for some procedural rules), and Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752 (PLRA “civil action” not covering habeas) are read as statute-specific, not as redefining habeas’s civil character.
  • The court notes these decisions relied substantially on legislative history or perceived intent; it cites Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U.S. 427 to emphasize that modern interpretive practice does not elevate legislative history over text, and Dep't of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42 to stress that legislative history cannot supply or defeat a waiver not evident in statutory language.
  • It also reinforces circuit law recognizing habeas as civil (In re Nwanze, 242 F.3d 521; Parrott v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 230 F.3d 615; Henderson v. Frank, 155 F.3d 159) and cites Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174 for the classic statement that habeas is a civil, not criminal, proceeding.

Critically, the court treats “hybrid” as at most a descriptor for habeas reviewing criminal judgments, relying on O'Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499 (4th Cir.) as the archetype. But it finds the “hybrid” rationale inapplicable in civil immigration detention because, per Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (immigration detention is civil) and INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (removal proceedings are civil), there is no criminal “nature” to import into the habeas action.

5. Circuit split treatment

The opinion squarely addresses divergent outcomes:

  • It rejects the Fourth Circuit’s extension of O'Brien v. Moore to immigration habeas in Obando-Segura v. Garland, 999 F.3d 190, faulting its failure to grapple with “any” and the tort exception and its refusal to honor the civil-only character of immigration detention.
  • It rejects the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on the same logic in Barco v. Witte, 65 F.4th 782, again highlighting inadequate attention to statutory context and history.
  • It declines to follow the Second and Ninth Circuits’ purposivist/history-based routes in Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663 and In re Hill, 775 F.2d 1037, expressly preferring text-and-context analysis in the sovereign-immunity setting.
  • It aligns most closely with the Tenth Circuit’s textual decision in Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152 while emphasizing that the Third Circuit reaches the result without resort to statutory purpose.

6. Substantial justification in prolonged detention cases

On Abioye’s fee award, the court applies established EAJA standards and the Third Circuit’s due-process framework for prolonged mandatory detention:

  • EAJA “substantially justified” meaning: Johnson v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552).
  • Government bears burden: Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123.
  • Three-part reasonableness test: Cruz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 630 F.3d 321 (quoting Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670).
  • No automatic fee shift merely because the Government lost: William v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 299.
  • Mandatory detention statute and constitutional baseline: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (facial constitutionality premised on brief duration).
  • Third Circuit as-applied due process test and factors: German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203 (length, likely continuation, reasons for delay, conditions; duration most important); historical underpinning in Demore v. Kim and related authority including Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469 (abrogated in part on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281).
  • Affirmance-on-any-ground principle: Laurel Gardens, LLC v. Mckenna, 948 F.3d 105.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The interpretive centerpiece: “any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort)”

The Third Circuit’s core move is to treat the EAJA phrase as an integrated unit rather than a standalone noun (“civil action”). Even assuming arguendo that “civil action” might sometimes be deployed narrowly in other statutes, “any civil action” and the express carveout “(other than cases sounding in tort)” eliminate any plausible narrowing construction here.

Two textual points do the heavy lifting:

  • “Any” is non-optional: The court refuses to read “any” as surplusage. If habeas is “technically” civil (as the Government conceded), then “any civil action” necessarily includes habeas unless the statute provides an express exclusion.
  • Expressio unius via tort exception: Congress expressly excluded torts. The court treats that as strong evidence Congress did not silently exclude habeas.

2. History and term-of-art reinforce plain meaning

The opinion blends modern textualism with “old soil” interpretive method: when Congress uses a common-law term (“civil action”), it presumptively imports its established legal meaning. The court uses Blackstone and early U.S. cases to show habeas’s longstanding civil identity, then ties that to the statutory moment (EAJA enacted in 1980) using Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corr. of Ill. and Stafford v. Briggs, plus contemporaneous legal dictionaries and the Federal Rules’ background treatment of habeas in relation to civil practice (while carefully disclaiming any holding about the Rules themselves).

3. Immigration detention removes the “hybrid” premise

A major doctrinal clarification is the court’s insistence that “hybrid” habeas concepts arise from habeas’s connection to criminal judgments. In civil immigration detention, that link is absent. By grounding immigration detention as civil in Zadvydas v. Davis and INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the court neutralizes the Government’s reliance on criminal/civil hybridity to manufacture ambiguity.

4. Sovereign immunity canon as a back-end tie-breaker only

The Government tried to move quickly to the sovereign-immunity canon (ambiguities resolved in favor of immunity). The court’s method is disciplined: it first exhausts ordinary interpretive tools and concludes there is no ambiguity left. Only if competing interpretations remain plausible does the canon control. Because the court finds the EAJA text clear, the canon never triggers.

5. Substantial justification: prolonged detention with no hearing after clear circuit guidance

As to Abioye, the court does not adopt a bright-line constitutional duration rule. Instead, it leans on German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility to conclude that, on these facts, it was unreasonable for the Government to resist a bond hearing after more than 16 months of detention, particularly when continued detention was likely due to ongoing appellate proceedings. The court treats duration and likely continuation as decisive, with the remaining factors insufficient to salvage the Government’s position under EAJA’s reasonableness standard.

C. Impact

  • Fee exposure in immigration habeas litigation: The decision authorizes EAJA awards in successful § 2241 challenges to immigration detention in the Third Circuit, increasing the Government’s potential cost when it litigates prolonged detention without hearings.
  • Text-and-context template for waiver questions: The opinion provides a blueprint for analyzing EAJA and other waiver statutes: ordinary interpretive tools first, sovereign-immunity canon last; strong attention to “any” and express exceptions.
  • Sharper distinction between criminal and civil detention habeas: By rejecting “hybrid” reasoning for immigration detention, the Third Circuit narrows the persuasive force of cases like O'Brien v. Moore in civil-detention contexts.
  • Deepening circuit split: The decision entrenches disagreement with Obando-Segura v. Garland (Fourth Circuit) and Barco v. Witte (Fifth Circuit), while aligning with Vacchio v. Ashcroft (Second Circuit), In re Hill (Ninth Circuit), and Daley v. Ceja (Tenth Circuit). That split increases the likelihood of eventual Supreme Court review on EAJA’s application to immigration habeas.
  • Practical incentives for earlier bond hearings: Although not directly ordering policy changes, the decision raises the litigation cost of defending prolonged detention without hearings and may pressure the Government to provide hearings earlier or narrow its opposition where prolonged detention is hard to justify under circuit law.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Habeas corpus (§ 2241): A court procedure allowing a detained person to ask a federal judge to order the custodian to justify the detention. If unlawful, the court can order relief (often a hearing or release).
  • EAJA (fee shifting): A statute allowing prevailing private parties to recover attorney’s fees from the United States in covered civil cases, unless the Government shows its position was “substantially justified” or special circumstances make a fee award unjust.
  • Sovereign immunity and waiver: The federal Government generally cannot be ordered to pay money unless Congress clearly authorizes it. EAJA is such an authorization, but courts require clarity in the statutory text.
  • “Substantially justified”: Not “right,” but “reasonable.” The Government avoids fees if it can show a reasonable basis in fact and law for both its underlying conduct and its litigation stance.
  • Mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c): Requires detention of certain noncitizens with specified criminal convictions during removal proceedings, but prolonged detention without a hearing can raise as-applied due process problems under Third Circuit precedent.
  • Textual “context”: Courts interpret words not in isolation but alongside surrounding words (here, “any” and the tort exception) and in harmony with the broader statutory landscape.

V. Conclusion

This precedential Third Circuit opinion establishes a clear rule: EAJA’s waiver for fees in “any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort)” includes § 2241 habeas petitions challenging civil immigration detention. The court reaches that result by fusing deep historical understanding of habeas as a civil remedy with modern text-and-context statutory interpretation, refusing to create ambiguity where the words “any” and an express tort exception point decisively to breadth.

On the merits of fee entitlement in Abioye’s case, the opinion reinforces that, under Third Circuit due-process doctrine, defending extremely prolonged immigration detention without an individualized bond hearing—especially when further delay is foreseeable—may not be “substantially justified,” exposing the Government to EAJA fee liability.

In closing, the court situates its holding within the constitutional tradition of the Great Writ, echoing Brown v. Davenport (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia, J., dissenting)) that habeas has long been “the instrument by which due process could be insisted upon”—and, after this decision, successful insistence in immigration-detention habeas in the Third Circuit can carry the additional consequence of fee shifting under EAJA.