Due Process Notice in Wyoming Probation Revocations Is Limited to Adjudicatory “Claimed Violations,” Not Dispositional Sentencing Information
1. Introduction
In Robert James Bustos v. The State of Wyoming, 2026 WY 34 (Mar. 12, 2026),
the Wyoming Supreme Court considered whether the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to notice
is violated when, during the dispositional phase of a probation revocation hearing, the State urges prison
based in part on conduct not specifically alleged in the petition to revoke.
Parties: Robert James Bustos (Appellant/Defendant) and the State of Wyoming (Appellee/Plaintiff).
Background: Mr. Bustos received a suspended prison sentence and supervised probation after a guilty plea
to delivery of methamphetamine (second or subsequent offense). The State later petitioned to revoke probation,
alleging he violated conditions requiring compliance with probation rules and completion of required treatment,
based on his leaving Level 3.5 inpatient treatment at Southwest Counseling before completion.
Key issue: Whether due process was violated because the State, at disposition, relied on additional alleged
misconduct (drug use, missed appointments, fleeing the probation office, new charges, etc.) that was not listed as
separate violations in the revocation petition.
2. Summary of the Opinion
The Court affirmed the revocation and imposition of the underlying prison sentence. Applying plain error
review (because Mr. Bustos did not object below), the Court held that while due process requires written notice of the
claimed violations that will be used to prove the probation breach in the adjudicatory phase, it does
not require notice of additional misconduct the State may discuss in the dispositional phase to inform
the court’s sentencing choice after a violation has been found. Because the district court based its violation finding
on the charged allegation (failure to complete required treatment) and the other conduct was used only to argue disposition,
there was no violation of a “clear and unequivocal rule of law.”
3. Analysis
3.1. Precedents Cited
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Fredrick v. State, 2024 WY 121:
Used for two propositions: (1) the general standards of review in revocation cases (abuse of discretion and de novo for
constitutional issues), and (2) the two-phase structure and burden in the adjudicatory phase (preponderance).
It frames the procedural architecture that separates “violation proof” from “sentencing consequence.”
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Ridinger v. State, 2021 WY 4:
Supplies the decision’s plain error framework when a constitutional argument is not preserved.
The Court imports Ridinger’s three-prong test and uses it to deny relief at prong two (no clear rule violated).
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Young v. State, 2016 WY 70 and Town v. State, 2015 WY 78:
Provide the cautionary standard for reversal under plain error—reversal is reserved for mistakes so obvious the judge
should have corrected them without objection—supporting the Court’s reluctance to find reversible error absent a clear rule.
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Sinning v. State, 2007 WY 193:
Establishes that probation revocation proceedings are governed by W.R.Cr.P. 39 and recognizes the
two-part hearing structure, reinforcing that revocation proceedings are procedurally distinctive.
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Farthing v. State, 2021 WY 114:
Cited for the proposition that once a violation is found, the court moves to a dispositional phase to decide punishment.
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Mapp v. State, 929 P.2d 1222:
Underlies the court’s explanation of what disposition entails: consideration of the original reasons for probation and
the circumstances of the violation—broad, sentencing-like inquiry that naturally admits wider information than the petition’s allegations.
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Gailey v. State, 882 P.2d 888:
Recognizes due process protections in revocation proceedings and—critically—supports the distinction that notice is aimed at
the adjudicatory “charges,” not the dispositional discussion.
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Shaw v. State, 998 P.2d 965:
Stated as the source for the rule that due process requires written notice of claimed probation violations.
The Court treats Shaw’s notice requirement as satisfied because the petition identified the treatment-termination violation.
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Sweets v. State, 2003 WY 64:
The controlling precedent on the precise question presented. The Court quotes Sweets’ rule that
“notice pertains to the charges regarding a violation of the conditions of probation, not to matters discussed during a dispositional phase.”
Sweets supplies the “clear rule” that defeats Mr. Bustos’ argument.
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Hammell v. State, 2025 WY 4, Robinson v. State, 2016 WY 90, and Miller v. State, 2015 WY 72:
Appearing in the footnote, these cases clarify the typical sequencing and substance of willfulness findings:
ordinarily, revocation is justified only for willful violations (or threats to public safety), and willfulness is addressed in disposition.
Although not dispositive here (the timing issue was not raised), their presence signals an important procedural norm for future litigants.
3.2. Legal Reasoning
The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps:
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Procedural framing (Rule 39 and two phases):
Under W.R.Cr.P. 39, the petition must identify the conditions allegedly violated and facts establishing the violation.
If a violation is found in the adjudicatory phase, the court enters the dispositional phase to decide the consequence.
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Scope of due process notice:
Relying on Sweets v. State (and its cited authorities), the Court treats the constitutional notice requirement as limited to the
“claimed violations” used to prove the breach. By contrast, disposition is akin to sentencing: it properly considers broader conduct,
the original rationale for probation, and the probationer’s overall performance.
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Application to the record and plain error:
The petition alleged failure to complete required inpatient treatment; the district court’s violation finding rested on that allegation alone.
The additional conduct was referenced to argue that reinstating probation would be inappropriate and that the underlying prison sentence should be imposed.
Because Wyoming law expressly allows broader dispositional considerations without petition notice, Mr. Bustos could not show a violation of a clear rule,
defeating plain error at prong two.
The opinion thus crystallizes a boundary: the petition must give notice of what will be litigated as a violation,
but it need not catalogue everything the State may argue as sentencing information once a violation is established.
3.3. Impact
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Clarifies litigation expectations in revocations:
Defense counsel should anticipate that, once any charged violation is proven, the dispositional phase may include a wide range of
performance-related facts (drug use, absconding-like conduct, new charges, noncompliance patterns), even if not pleaded as separate violations.
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Reinforces petition drafting standards (and their limit):
Prosecutors must still plead the violation(s) they intend to use to establish revocation eligibility in the adjudicatory phase.
But they may argue broader circumstances at disposition without amending the petition—so long as the court’s violation finding is anchored
to the noticed allegation(s).
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Preservation matters:
The decision is filtered through plain error because no objection was made. Future defendants seeking to limit dispositional proof
will face the additional hurdle of preserving objections and articulating a legal basis beyond the Sweets/Gailey line of cases.
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Signals a procedural caution on willfulness timing:
The footnote highlights that revocation is “normally” made in disposition upon a willfulness finding
(Hammell v. State; Robinson v. State; Miller v. State).
While not outcome-changing here, it flags an issue that could become a reversible error in a case where timing is properly raised and prejudicial.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Probation revocation “adjudicatory phase”
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The “proof” phase. The court decides whether the probationer actually violated a specific probation condition alleged in the petition,
using a preponderance of the evidence standard (more likely than not).
- Probation revocation “dispositional phase”
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The “consequence” phase. If a violation is found, the court decides what to do about it—continue probation, modify conditions, impose jail,
or impose the suspended prison sentence. This phase resembles sentencing and considers broader context.
- Due process “notice” in revocation proceedings
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The constitutional requirement that the probationer receive written notice of the specific claimed violations that will be used to prove a violation.
Under Sweets v. State, that notice requirement does not extend to all topics that might be argued at disposition.
- Plain error
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A limited appellate safety valve used when the defendant did not object in the trial court.
The appellant must show a clear record, violation of a clear rule, and prejudice. Failure on any prong defeats the claim.
- Willfulness
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In Wyoming, revocation for non-monetary conditions is ordinarily justified only if the violation was willful (or threatens public safety).
Willfulness is typically addressed in disposition, not in the adjudicatory determination that a violation occurred.
5. Conclusion
2026 WY 34 reinforces a key Wyoming probation-revocation principle: the Fourteenth Amendment requires written notice of the
claimed violations the State will use to establish a probation breach, but it does not require the petition to provide notice of all
additional misconduct the State may present at the dispositional phase to argue for a particular sanction. Anchored in
Sweets v. State and the Rule 39 two-phase framework, the decision permits broad dispositional argument once a noticed violation is proven,
while implicitly cautioning that the timing and articulation of willfulness findings—though not litigated here—remain an important structural requirement.