“Driving” as a Term of Art Under Iowa Code ch. 673, and the High Evidentiary Bar for the Recklessness Exception

Case: Janey Shafer v. Frank Santana (Supreme Court of Iowa, June 12, 2026)
Disposition: Court of Appeals vacated; district court summary judgment (dismissal) affirmed.

1. Introduction

This case arises from a catastrophic farm injury involving a team of draft horses harnessed to a nonmotorized, horse-drawn sickle mower. Frank Santana was mowing; Janey Shafer was filming. After mowing, Santana dismounted and asked Shafer to hold the horses while he raised/secured the sickle bar. The sickle bar dropped, the horses spooked, and Shafer fell; the mower’s wheel ran over her and dragged her. Shafer suffered permanent spinal cord injury and paralysis.

Shafer sued Santana for personal injury damages. Santana invoked statutory immunity under Iowa’s Domesticated Animal Activities Act, Iowa Code ch. 673. The key legal issues were:

  • Scope issue: Whether Santana’s conduct fell within a covered “domesticated animal activity,” specifically “driving a domesticated animal” under Iowa Code § 673.1(3)(a), even though the horses were briefly stopped while he attempted to secure the sickle bar.
  • Exception issue: If immunity applied, whether Shafer generated a jury question under the recklessness exception in Iowa Code § 673.2(1).

The Iowa Court of Appeals agreed immunity applied but held a fact question existed on recklessness. On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court agreed immunity applied and held the recklessness record was insufficient as a matter of law.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed summary judgment for Santana. It held:

  • Immunity applied: Santana was engaged in “driving” within the meaning of Iowa Code ch. 673 because the horses remained harnessed to the sickle mower and the stop to secure the sickle bar was part of the driving activity.
  • No recklessness exception: Even considering Shafer’s expert materials, the record lacked evidence that Santana acted with the required awareness and disregard of a known (or obviously known) risk and that harm was “highly probable.” The evidence sounded in ordinary negligence, not recklessness.

Accordingly, the court vacated the court of appeals decision and affirmed dismissal.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Standards on summary judgment and appellate review

  • Brodie v. Foxhoven, 21 N.W.3d 380, 383 n.2 (Iowa 2025): Used for the familiar summary-judgment lens—facts are recited in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
  • Baker v. Shields, 767 N.W.2d 404, 406 (Iowa 2009): Confirmed the court’s review is for correction of errors at law.
  • Crippen v. City of Cedar Rapids, 618 N.W.2d 562, 565 (Iowa 2000) (en banc): Cited for the proposition that granting summary judgment despite a genuine issue of material fact is legal error.

B. Statutory interpretation methodology

  • State v. Hensley, 911 N.W.2d 678, 682 (2018): Emphasized legislative intent and reading the statute as a whole, not in isolation.
  • Oyens Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank, 808 N.W.2d 186, 193 (Iowa 2011): Reinforced holistic reading and consideration of statutory purpose.
  • Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 606 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Iowa 2000): Cited (via Oyens) for looking to both language and purpose.
  • State v. Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 2017): If unambiguous, the inquiry ends (plain meaning baseline).

C. Immunity statutes and the policy role of summary judgment

  • Nelson v. Lindaman, 867 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015): Important procedural point—summary judgment is central in immunity cases because immunity aims to avoid costly litigation; letting immune claims reach trial defeats the legislative design.

D. Defining “driving” as an equine term of art; activity continuity

  • Smith v. Lane, 832 N.E.2d 947, 953 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005): The Iowa Supreme Court relied on this definition of “driving” as a term of art—controlling the movement of an equine harnessed to a nonmotorized vehicle. The Iowa court used Smith to reject a purely generic dictionary approach and to treat “driving” as embedded in equine practice.
  • Snider v. Fort Madison Rodeo Corp., No. 00-2065, 2002 WL 570890, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002): Used for an analogous “whole activity” view—domesticated animal activity during a parade should be seen in its entirety to meet chapter 673’s design, rather than segmented into micro-moments.
  • Adams v. Hare, 536 S.E.2d 284, 286–88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000): Persuasive authority supporting that preparatory/ancillary steps (brushing/blanketing a horse before a show) can fall within an “equine activity,” resisting hypertechnical time-slicing.
  • Hellen v. Hellen, 831 N.W.2d 430, 434–35 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013): Persuasive authority rejecting the notion that “riding” requires being on the horse at the exact moment of injury; supports functional, continuous interpretation of covered activities.

E. Recklessness: Iowa’s “high bar” and the role/limits of expert opinions

  • Rose v. Oakland Healthcare Management, LLC, 30 N.W.3d 724, 729 (Iowa 2026): Recent reaffirmation that recklessness is a demanding standard, more than negligence, requiring intentional action in disregard of a known/obvious risk and making harm highly probable.
  • Martinez v. State, 986 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Iowa 2023): Quoted in Rose for the proposition that recklessness is more than “the mere unreasonable risk of harm in ordinary negligence.”
  • State v. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d 107, 111 (2001): Recklessness requires an “extreme” departure from ordinary care.
  • Penny v. City of Winterset, 999 N.W.2d 650, 655–56 (Iowa 2023): Critical here. The court used Penny to explain when expert opinions can support a recklessness inference and why they failed in Penny (no “conscious knowledge of a dangerous situation”). The court analogized: the record here similarly lacked evidence that Santana consciously knew of the danger or that it was so obvious knowledge should be imputed.
  • Morris v. Leaf, 534 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Iowa 1995): Quoted (via Penny) for the core recklessness formulation: intentional act, disregard of known/obvious risk, and risk “so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.”
  • Feld v. Borkowski, 790 N.W.2d 72, 80–81 (Iowa 2010): The court contrasted Feld—where an expert affidavit supported an inference of intentional disregard by analyzing an irregular bat release—with this case, where the expert materials did not show Santana’s awareness and disregard of risk.

F. Summary-judgment evidence: unsworn expert reports

  • Provident Life & Accident Ins. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 1000 (5th Cir. 2001): Cited for the general rule that unsworn expert reports are not admissible summary-judgment evidence and may be disregarded.
  • Maytag Corp. v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1064–65 (N.D. Iowa 2006): Cited for the nuance that an unsworn expert report may be considered at summary judgment if the opinions are adopted/reaffirmed in admissible testimony (affidavit or deposition). The court applied this pragmatic approach because Kenoyer testified he would stand by the written opinions at trial and Santana did not challenge form.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. “Driving” under Iowa Code ch. 673 is not a stop-motion snapshot

The court’s first major move was interpretive: it rejected the idea that “driving” should be defined by generic dictionary meaning alone. Instead, it treated “driving” as a term of art rooted in equine practice—controlling equines harnessed to a nonmotorized vehicle (here, the sickle mower).

That framing mattered because Shafer’s argument sought to segment the incident into a moment when the horses were stopped and Santana was handling the sickle bar. The court refused to “parse the equine activity … too thin.” It emphasized continuity: the horses remained harnessed, the stop was part of securing equipment so Santana could continue driving back to the barn, and liability should not hinge on whether the team was briefly stationary.

The court reinforced this with activity-wide reasoning echoed in Snider v. Fort Madison Rodeo Corp., and with persuasive authorities (Adams v. Hare, Hellen v. Hellen) rejecting hypertechnical “exact moment” tests.

B. “Inherent risks” and statutory allocation of loss

Once within the statute, the court located the injury’s mechanism within the statute’s “inherent risks” concept. Iowa Code § 673.1(11)(c) expressly includes “[t]he unpredictable reaction by a domesticated animal to unfamiliar conditions,” including sudden movement and loud noise. The sickle bar drop produced a loud noise; the horses spooked; the resulting chain led to the injury.

The opinion is candid about the policy choice: chapter 673 immunizes negligent owners for injuries flowing from animals’ inherent unpredictability. That policy commitment, the court stressed, must be applied even when it yields a “harsh” outcome.

C. Recklessness: absence of evidence on subjective awareness and high probability

The opinion’s second major move was evidentiary and doctrinal: it set the recklessness bar high and then measured the record against it. Under Rose v. Oakland Healthcare Management, LLC and the line of cases it restates, recklessness requires:

  • an intentional act of unreasonable character;
  • done in disregard of a known risk (or a risk so obvious the actor should be taken to know it); and
  • the act made harm highly probable.

The court accepted that expert opinions can, in appropriate circumstances, support a recklessness inference (Penny v. City of Winterset), and it explained why Feld v. Borkowski is an example where expert analysis plausibly illuminated intentional disregard of a known risk. But here, Kenoyer’s opinions—rust, safety rod issues, horse training deficiencies, whether someone should hold reins, use of blinders—were treated as pointing to unsafe practices and potentially ordinary negligence, not proof of Santana’s conscious awareness and disregard.

A key factual gap drove the outcome: Santana was never deposed, leaving the record “devoid” of evidence about his knowledge of the specific risks. Without testimony or other evidence showing Santana appreciated and disregarded a known danger, Shafer had to rely on the “obviousness” route. The court declined to impute knowledge because the asserted risks were not the kind that are necessarily obvious to an ordinary person in the moment, and because the harm resulted from a “complicated chain of interwoven events,” including the concession that the cause of the bar’s fall was “unknown.”

The court also treated the “highly probable harm” element as unmet. Even if the setup was “dangerous and unsafe,” the record did not show injury was so likely that the conduct crossed the line into recklessness, especially given that Shafer had held the horses earlier that afternoon without incident.

3.3 Impact

A. Clarifying the scope of “driving” (and discouraging micro-segmentation)

The most concrete doctrinal clarification is that “driving” in Iowa Code § 673.1(3)(a) is a term of art covering the integrated activity of controlling equines harnessed to a nonmotorized vehicle, including reasonable pauses and equipment-related steps while still harnessed. Future litigants should expect courts to reject attempts to avoid immunity by pinpointing a brief pause (stopping, adjusting tack/implements, securing equipment) as outside the protected activity.

B. Recklessness exception: evidentiary demands at summary judgment

The opinion reinforces that the recklessness exception in Iowa Code § 673.2(1) will not be satisfied by:

  • expert testimony that conduct was “dangerous,” “unsafe,” ill-advised, or contrary to best practices, without evidence the defendant knew (or must have known) of the risk;
  • proof of inexperience or lack of training (which the court characterized as aligning with ordinary negligence);
  • speculation or uncertainty about what triggered the animal reaction (here, the bar’s fall for “unknown reason”).

Practically, the decision signals that plaintiffs seeking to pierce chapter 673 immunity will often need discovery that speaks directly to knowledge (training history, prior incidents, warnings, admissions, established practices known to defendant) and to the probability of harm—not merely the possibility of harm.

C. Procedural reminder: form of expert submissions

Although not outcome-determinative here, the court’s footnote—grounded in Provident Life & Accident Ins. v. Goel and Maytag Corp. v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc.—underscores that unsworn expert reports are generally not competent summary-judgment evidence unless adopted in admissible testimony. This can shape how parties assemble (or attack) immunity records early.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Statutory immunity (Iowa Code § 673.2): A legislative rule that blocks liability for certain injuries tied to the inherent risks of domesticated animal activities. If it applies, the case can end even if someone was negligent, unless an exception is proven.
  • “Inherent risks” (Iowa Code § 673.1(11)): Risks that are built into animal activities—especially animals’ unpredictable reactions to noise, movement, or unfamiliar conditions. The statute treats these risks as assumed by participants/spectators, shifting losses away from owners absent an exception.
  • Term of art: A phrase that has a specialized meaning within a particular field. Here, “driving” is used in the equine sense (controlling harnessed horses pulling a vehicle/implement), not merely “operating” in a broad everyday sense.
  • Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling where the court decides there is no genuine dispute of material fact requiring a jury. Immunity cases often turn on summary judgment because immunity is meant to avoid the burdens of trial (Nelson v. Lindaman).
  • Recklessness (Iowa law): More than negligence. It requires an intentional act done with conscious disregard of a known (or obvious) risk, where serious harm is highly likely—not merely possible (Rose v. Oakland Healthcare Management, LLC; Morris v. Leaf).
  • Role of expert opinions: Experts can help establish what happened and what risks were involved, but they do not automatically establish recklessness. The record must still support the defendant’s awareness/disregard and high probability of harm (Penny v. City of Winterset; contrast Feld v. Borkowski).

5. Conclusion

Janey Shafer v. Frank Santana strengthens Iowa’s domesticated-animal immunity framework in two key ways. First, it clarifies that “driving” under Iowa Code ch. 673 is a specialized, continuous equine activity that includes pauses and equipment-securement steps while animals remain harnessed. Second, it reaffirms that the chapter 673 recklessness exception is narrow: plaintiffs must present evidence of conscious (or imputable) awareness of a substantial risk and that harm was highly probable—proof of unsafe practice or inexperience alone will not suffice.

The opinion also illustrates the legislature’s loss-allocation choice embedded in chapter 673: even severe injuries may be uncompensable in tort when they arise from the inherent unpredictability of domesticated animals during covered activities, absent proof meeting a stringent exception.