Domestic Violence and Coercive Manipulation Justify Sole Custody and Protective Relief; Completion of DV Programming May Be Treated as a Future Change in Circumstances

1. Introduction

Matter of Ana J. v Nasar J. (2026 NY Slip Op 02020; 248 AD3d 1399 [3d Dept Apr. 2, 2026]) arose from post-separation litigation between Ana J. (the mother) and Nasar J. (the father) concerning their child (born 2017). Under a 2020 consent order, the parties shared joint legal custody with equal parenting time. In 2023, the mother petitioned to modify custody to sole custody and also filed a family offense petition, alleging physical abuse, coercive/controlling behavior, and emotionally manipulative conduct involving the child. The father denied the allegations, cross-petitioned for sole custody, and challenged the mother’s claims.

After a fact-finding hearing and Lincoln hearings (in camera interviews of the child), Family Court (Tompkins County) granted an order of protection upon finding harassment in the second degree and modified custody to award the mother sole legal and primary physical custody with limited parenting time to the father. The Third Department affirmed in full.

Key issues: (1) whether the proof supported a family offense finding of harassment in the second degree and issuance of an order of protection; and (2) whether the record established a change in circumstances and, if so, whether the child’s best interests required shifting from joint custody/equal time to sole custody with limited parenting time, particularly where domestic violence and coercive manipulation were found.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Order of protection affirmed: The appellate court held the mother proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the father committed harassment in the second degree under Penal Law § 240.26 (incorporated via Family Ct Act § 812), and it deferred to Family Court’s credibility findings.
  • Custody modification affirmed: The court found a sufficient change in circumstances—most notably, the deterioration of parental communication/cooperation plus credible evidence of domestic violence and controlling/coercive conduct—to reexamine best interests. It upheld the award of sole custody to the mother with limited parenting time to the father as supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record.
  • Notable remedial feature: The opinion notes Family Court’s order expressly provided that the father’s completion of specified domestic violence training would constitute a change in circumstances for purposes of a future custody modification petition—signaling a structured pathway for potential future expansion of parenting time if safety-related conditions are met.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

1) Family offense proof standard and appellate deference

  • Matter of Paul Y. v Patricia Z., 190 AD3d 1038 (3d Dept 2021): Cited for the rule that a party seeking an order of protection bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the other parent committed one or more family offenses. The Third Department used this as the baseline framework for evaluating the mother’s proof.
  • Matter of Derek KK. v Jennifer KK., 196 AD3d 765 (3d Dept 2021): Cited both for the general burden principle and as a comparator supporting affirmance where Family Court credits one party’s account over the other’s and the record contains corroboration. Here, the court analogized the mother’s photographs and documentary proof (texts) to the kind of corroborative record that can support a harassment finding.
  • Matter of Samah DD. v Mark VV., 235 AD3d 1116 (3d Dept 2025), lv denied 44 NY3d 901 (2025): Cited for the appellate standard: deference to Family Court’s credibility determinations and factual findings, disturbed only if lacking a sound and substantial basis. This authority underwrote the Third Department’s refusal to reweigh the parties’ competing narratives.
  • Matter of Holly P. v George Q., 240 AD3d 1029 (3d Dept 2025): Reinforced the same deference principle, emphasizing that Family Court’s vantage point in hearing testimony is central in family offense determinations.

2) Custody modification: change in circumstances and best interests framework

  • Matter of Ashley UU. v Ned VV., 235 AD3d 1200 (3d Dept 2025): Cited for the two-step modification rule: (i) change in circumstances since the prior order, and (ii) best interests analysis if the threshold is met.
  • Matter of Christine EE. v David FF., 235 AD3d 1156 (3d Dept 2025): Cited to reinforce the same two-step modification structure and the necessity of demonstrating a post-order change before revisiting best interests.
  • Matter of Michael M. v Makiko M., 238 AD3d 1304 (3d Dept 2025): Used in three distinct ways: (i) the best-interests factor list (home environment, stability, willingness to foster the other parent relationship, fitness, ability to support development); (ii) the “deterioration to no meaningful communication or cooperation” formulation as a change in circumstances; and (iii) reiteration of appellate deference to Family Court’s factual findings.
  • Ricky SS. v Christine SS., 241 AD3d 1009 (3d Dept 2025): Cited to support the factor-based best interests inquiry, particularly the focus on stability and each parent’s willingness to promote a positive relationship with the other parent.
  • Matter of Kyle I. v Kandice K., 232 AD3d 1074 (3d Dept 2024): Cited for the “sound and substantial basis” review standard in custody matters—anchoring the appellate court’s limited role.
  • Matter of Debra YY. v Michael XX., 234 AD3d 1021 (3d Dept 2025), and Matter of Richard CC. v Lacey DD., 230 AD3d 1389 (3d Dept 2024): Cited as examples where the breakdown in parental cooperation/communication was sufficient to establish a change in circumstances warranting a new best-interests review. The Third Department treated the parties’ inability to co-parent effectively as a recognized, recurring trigger for modification review.

3) Domestic violence as a best-interests consideration

  • Matter of Justin K. v Jutonynea L., 221 AD3d 1335 (3d Dept 2023): Cited for the proposition—consistent with Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1) (a)—that domestic violence proven by a preponderance is properly considered in best-interests determinations and may undermine a parent’s ability to foster a safe, healthy co-parenting dynamic.
  • Matter of Stephanie R. v Walter Q., 203 AD3d 1440 (3d Dept 2022): Similarly cited to confirm that domestic violence is not collateral; it is centrally relevant to parenting capacity and the child’s welfare.

4) Affirmance of sole custody/limited parenting time on a developed record

  • Matter of Michelle L. v Steven M., 227 AD3d 1159 (3d Dept 2024), and Matter of Joshua XX. v Stefania YY., 218 AD3d 893 (3d Dept 2023): Cited as support for affirming sole custody determinations where the record demonstrates safety concerns, impaired co-parenting, and/or conduct that harms the child’s emotional well-being, with due deference to Family Court’s credibility findings.
  • Matter of Denise VV. v Ian VV., 205 AD3d 1090 (3d Dept 2022): Cited (with a note that it is “not determinative”) for the proposition that the attorney for the child’s position may be considered as an additional contextual factor, while not controlling the outcome.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Harassment in the second degree and the order of protection

The court applied the statutory definition of harassment in the second degree, emphasizing two relevant routes under Penal Law § 240.26: (1) subjecting another person to physical contact (or attempting/threatening the same), and (3) engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts that alarm or seriously annoy and serve no legitimate purpose. With Family Ct Act § 812 supplying Family Court’s jurisdictional basis over family offenses, the question was whether, under the preponderance standard, the mother’s proof was more likely true than not.

The Third Department’s affirmance turned on credibility and corroboration: the mother described physical abuse, surveillance/monitoring in the home without consent, financial restrictions, and a specific incident where the father struck her in front of the child; she supported key points with photographs and documentary evidence. The father’s denials (and claimed inability to recall) did not persuade Family Court, and the appellate court found a sound and substantial basis to uphold those factual determinations.

2) Change in circumstances justifying a fresh best-interests inquiry

The prior order was a consent-based joint custody arrangement with equal parenting time. The court found the threshold “change in circumstances” satisfied by evidence that the co-parenting relationship deteriorated to the point of no meaningful communication or cooperation. The record also showed functional imbalance and conflict: despite equal time on paper, the mother handled medical and educational responsibilities, and the parties’ interactions reflected ongoing control and hostility.

Importantly, the opinion does not treat “deteriorated communication” as a mere interpersonal inconvenience; rather, it is framed as a legally significant breakdown that undermines joint decision-making and the stability a joint custody plan requires.

3) Best interests: stability, parental fitness, and protection from coercive dynamics

In affirming sole custody to the mother with limited parenting time to the father, the Third Department focused on:

  • Safety and domestic violence: Domestic violence against the mother (proven by a preponderance) was properly weighed under Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1) (a), not only as past misconduct but as a predictor of whether the father could co-parent safely and support the child’s emotional security.
  • Coercive/controlling conduct and disparagement pressures: The court credited testimony that the father engaged in controlling behavior and verbal abuse and found he attempted to create discord between the child and mother. A particularly consequential factual finding was the court’s interpretation of video evidence: it concluded there was “no other rational explanation” for the child’s disparaging statements except that the child felt pressure to please the father by disparaging the mother. This converts “parental conflict” into a child-centered harm—emotional manipulation that threatens healthy development.
  • Parental judgment and credibility: Family Court discredited the father’s allegations that the mother abused or neglected the child, noting he did not report the purported concerns and minimized them as “not that serious.” The appellate court treated this as relevant to credibility and parental fitness.
  • Stability and practical caregiving: The mother’s established role in managing the child’s medical/educational needs and her employment stability weighed toward continuity of care.

4) Conditioning future modification on completion of domestic violence programming

Although presented as a “note,” the opinion highlights a structurally important feature: Family Court’s order stated that the father’s completion of certain domestic violence training would itself constitute a change in circumstances for a potential future modification petition. This approach does two things at once: (i) it preserves the current protective/stability-based custody arrangement; and (ii) it creates a defined rehabilitative benchmark that can reopen the custody inquiry without relitigating whether circumstances changed.

The Third Department did not criticize this mechanism, implicitly approving the use of treatment-linked pathways to revisit parenting time where domestic violence and coercive behaviors drive the custody outcome.

C. Impact

  • Reinforcement of domestic violence’s centrality in custody: The decision continues the Third Department’s pattern of treating domestic violence (proven by a preponderance) as directly relevant to the best-interests calculus, including the abusive parent’s capacity to foster the child’s relationship with the other parent.
  • Coercive “pressure” on a child as a best-interests harm: The court’s acceptance of Family Court’s inference—that a child’s disparaging statements may reflect parental pressure rather than independent views—signals that emotional manipulation/loyalty conflicts can justify limiting parenting time, especially when tied to broader coercive control or domestic violence.
  • Practical guidance for litigants and courts: Documentary corroboration (photos, texts) meaningfully supports family offense findings; credibility determinations remain decisive on appeal due to the “sound and substantial basis” standard.
  • Program-completion as a built-in “change in circumstances” trigger: By noting (without disapproval) the order’s provision that completing domestic violence training constitutes a change in circumstances, the opinion may encourage Family Courts to craft custody orders that combine protection with a clear rehabilitative route—reducing future threshold litigation and focusing later proceedings on best interests and demonstrated behavioral change.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Family offense (Family Ct Act § 812): Certain acts (including Penal Law offenses like harassment) committed within qualifying family/household relationships can be litigated in Family Court, which may issue orders of protection.
  • Harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26): A violation-level offense that can be established by physical contact (or attempts/threats) or by a repeated course of alarming/seriously annoying conduct serving no legitimate purpose, undertaken with intent to harass/annoy/alarm.
  • Preponderance of the evidence: The civil burden of proof—more likely true than not (i.e., tipping the scale even slightly).
  • Lincoln hearing: An in camera interview of the child by the judge (outside the parents’ presence) to gather information relevant to custody/best interests while limiting the child’s exposure to parental conflict.
  • Change in circumstances: The required threshold for modifying an existing custody order; it prevents constant relitigation and ensures stability unless something material has changed.
  • Best interests of the child: A multi-factor evaluation focusing on the child’s welfare (stability, safety, caregiving capacity, emotional development, and whether a parent supports the child’s relationship with the other parent).
  • Sound and substantial basis (appellate review): A deferential standard; if the trial court’s findings are reasonably supported by the record, the appellate court will not substitute its own view of credibility or reweigh evidence.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Ana J. v Nasar J. confirms that credible evidence of domestic violence, coercive control, and emotionally manipulative conduct affecting a child can support both (1) a family offense finding with an order of protection and (2) a custody modification from joint custody/equal parenting time to sole custody with limited parenting time. The Third Department’s analysis is driven by deference to Family Court’s credibility assessments, careful application of the change-in-circumstances threshold, and a best-interests evaluation that treats domestic violence and child-directed pressure as central harms, not peripheral disputes.

The opinion’s additional note—approvingly recounting that completion of domestic violence training was designated as a future change in circumstances—highlights a pragmatic model for custody orders in domestic-violence-implicated cases: immediate protection and stability paired with a clear rehabilitative condition that can later reopen the custody inquiry in a structured, child-focused way.