Division 4 Makes Probate Court the Exclusive Starting Forum for Post-Probate Will Contests (Wills Filed on/after Jan. 1, 2023)

1. Introduction

In Carolyn Glenn v. Alisa J. Caldwell and Bonita J. Caldwell, as personal representatives of the Estate of Bonnie Quinton Caldwell, Jr., deceased; and Dorothy J. Caldwell (Alabama Supreme Court, Mar. 27, 2026), Carolyn Glenn (pro se) filed in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court what she styled as a will contest and related requests, including a claim of equitable adoption/adoption by estoppel and a request for DNA testing. The “proponents” were the decedent’s daughters (as personal representatives) and the surviving spouse.

The central issue became procedural and jurisdictional: for a will admitted to probate in March 2024 (i.e., after Alabama’s 2022 statutory overhaul of will-contest procedure), could Glenn initiate an original, post-probate will contest in circuit court under the older statute (§ 43-8-199), or did the new Division 4 require filing in probate court unless removed?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that because the will was filed for probate (and admitted) in 2024, Division 4 of the Alabama Probate Code governed. Under Division 4, the probate court where the will is offered for probate has “original and general jurisdiction” over will contests, and post-probate contests must be filed in that probate court (unless the matter is properly removed to circuit court). Because Glenn filed an original will contest in circuit court instead, the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

Although the circuit court dismissed the case for failure to provide proof of relationship (a merits-adjacent basis that could operate as an adjudication on the merits), the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court expressed no opinion on whether Glenn could pursue a will contest in probate court.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Evidence/record authenticity in appellate review

  • Poff v. Hayes (citing Kroger Co. v. Puckett and Abingdon Mills v. Grogan): The Court referenced these authorities to explain why uncertified copies of court records could be considered when their authenticity was not disputed and no admissibility objection was preserved. This point supported the Court’s ability to rely on the procedural history reflected in the record.

Who may contest a will (“interested person”)

  • Stevens v. Gary: Quoted for the proposition that a § 43-8-199 contestant must be a “person interested” in the will—i.e., someone with a stake under the will or who would take under intestacy. Glenn’s asserted biological-child/equitable-adoption theories were aimed at establishing such interest, even though the appeal ultimately turned on forum/jurisdiction.
  • C.E.G. v. A.L.A. (quoting C.H.H. v. R.H.): Cited to define “equitable adoption/adoption by estoppel” as a rare doctrine typically used to avoid unfair results under intestacy statutes. This framed (without resolving) Glenn’s asserted route to “interested person” status.

Old two-track will-contest framework (pre-2023) and how it changed

  • Bond v. Pylant (quoting Stevens v. Gary) and Daniel v. Moye: These cases encapsulated the historical Alabama rule: before probate, contest in probate court; after probate (within six months), contest by filing a complaint in circuit court under § 43-8-199. The Court used them to highlight the baseline that Division 4 displaced for wills filed for probate on/after January 1, 2023.

Strict statutory compliance and limited jurisdiction in will contests

  • Kaller v. Rigdon and Jones v. Brewster: The Court reiterated that subject-matter jurisdiction in will contests is purely statutory and limited, and that strict compliance with the will-contest statutes is required to invoke jurisdiction. This principle powered the conclusion that filing an original contest in circuit court (when Division 4 assigned original jurisdiction to probate court) did not invoke circuit-court jurisdiction.

Appellate courts must notice jurisdictional defects on their own motion

  • Jones v. Brewster (citing MPQ, Inc. v. Birmingham Realty Co.): Even though no party raised Division 4’s jurisdictional effect, the Supreme Court emphasized its duty to notice lack of subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu.

Consequences of acting without subject-matter jurisdiction; proper form of dismissal

  • State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive (quoting Beach v. Director of Revenue): Quoted for the rule that a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction may do nothing but dismiss; any other action is void.
  • Washington Mut. Bank, F.A. v. Campbell: Cited to explain that dismissal for failure to prosecute/comply with an order may operate as an adjudication on the merits—problematic where the court had no jurisdiction to reach merits consequences.
  • Ex parte Stewart: Cited for the proposition that dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits, underscoring why the Supreme Court required a jurisdictional (not merits) dismissal.

Probate courts with equity jurisdiction

  • Segrest v. Segrest: Cited in connection with § 43-8-215(d)’s discussion of probate courts that exercise concurrent equity jurisdiction in certain counties, which affects removal mechanics.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The statutory pivot: Act No. 2022-427 and Division 4

The Court treated the case as a straightforward application of the legislature’s 2022 restructuring:

  • Applicability: Division 4 applies to “[w]ills filed for probate on or after January 1, 2023.” (§ 43-8-210(a)(1)). Bonnie’s will was admitted in March 2024, so Division 4 applied.
  • Displacement of old statutes: § 43-8-210(b) provides that §§ 43-8-190 and 43-8-199 “shall not apply” to wills filed for probate on/after Jan. 1, 2023.
  • Priority rule: § 43-8-210(c) makes Division 4 controlling over conflicting provisions.

(b) Jurisdictional allocation: probate court as the starting forum

Under § 43-8-213(2), the probate court where the will is offered has “original and general jurisdiction” over will contests “in accordance with Section 43-8-215,” unless the proceeding has been removed to circuit court under § 43-8-216.

Section 43-8-215(a) then directs that a will contest (even after probate, within 180 days) is filed “in the court where it is offered for probate,” or, only if removed and pending in circuit court, then in that circuit court. Section 43-8-215(d) establishes the removal mechanism and timing constraints.

(c) Strict compliance and the jurisdictional defect here

Because Glenn did not remove a probate-court will contest to circuit court, but instead tried to begin an original will contest in circuit court (tracking the pre-2023 § 43-8-199 model), she did not comply with the controlling statutory pathway. Under Jones v. Brewster and Kaller v. Rigdon, that noncompliance is jurisdictional, not merely procedural. Therefore, the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction from the outset.

(d) Remedy: correct the basis of dismissal

The circuit court’s “failure to provide proof of relationship” dismissal risked merits consequences (as discussed in Washington Mut. Bank, F.A. v. Campbell). But a jurisdictional dismissal is non-merits (Ex parte Stewart), and when jurisdiction is absent the only valid act is dismissal (State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive). Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and required entry of a dismissal explicitly for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

3.3. Impact

  • Bright-line forum rule for post-2023 wills: The decision operationalizes Division 4 by making clear that an original post-probate will contest for wills filed on/after Jan. 1, 2023 must begin in probate court, not circuit court.
  • Removal is the route to circuit court: Circuit-court involvement is now generally derivative—through removal under § 43-8-216 (referenced in §§ 43-8-213 and 43-8-215)—not through an original circuit-court filing.
  • Jurisdiction policed on appeal even if unraised: The Court reinforces that appellate courts will raise and decide subject-matter jurisdiction defects ex mero motu, increasing the risk that incorrectly filed contests will be undone later.
  • Proper disposition matters: Trial courts must ensure dismissals are jurisdictional where appropriate; otherwise, parties may face improper “on-the-merits” consequences from a court that lacked power to decide anything beyond dismissal.
  • Practical effect for litigants: Pro se and represented litigants must recalibrate: the “six months in circuit court” concept associated with § 43-8-199 is not available for post-2023 wills. The timeline is now framed in Division 4 (notably the 180-day window in § 43-8-215(a)).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Subject-matter jurisdiction: A court’s legal power to hear a type of case. If it’s missing, the court cannot decide the dispute at all; its orders (other than dismissal) are void.
  • Will contest (pre-probate vs post-probate): Historically, Alabama allowed a probate-court contest before probate and a circuit-court contest after probate. Division 4 changed that for post-2023 wills by routing contests into probate court as the starting point.
  • Removal (in this context): Not “appeal,” and not the probate court “transferring” a matter informally. It is a statutorily authorized move of a will contest from probate court to circuit court under the conditions and timing in § 43-8-215(d) and § 43-8-216.
  • “Interested person”: Someone with a legally recognized stake in whether the will stands—typically an heir under intestacy or a beneficiary whose interest is affected.
  • Equitable adoption/adoption by estoppel: A narrow doctrine that can, in limited circumstances, treat someone as a child for inheritance-related purposes to prevent unfairness—often relevant to intestacy rights.
  • Letters testamentary vs letters of administration: Letters testamentary appoint an executor under a will; letters of administration appoint an administrator when there is no executor (or no will, or other qualifying circumstances).
  • Dismissal “on the merits” vs for lack of jurisdiction: A merits dismissal can bar refiling; a jurisdictional dismissal generally does not decide who is right and does not carry preclusive effect on the underlying claim.

5. Conclusion

This opinion supplies a critical, practice-directing rule under Alabama’s post-2022 will-contest regime: for wills filed for probate on or after January 1, 2023, an original post-probate will contest cannot be initiated in circuit court as under former § 43-8-199 practice. Instead, Division 4 places original and general jurisdiction in the probate court where the will is offered, with circuit-court involvement available only via statutory removal. The Supreme Court’s remedy—requiring a dismissal specifically for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction—also underscores that courts must label and enter the correct type of dismissal when jurisdiction is absent, preserving the non-merits nature of such dispositions.