Dissenting Framework: Revocation of an Acknowledgment of Parentage Under MCL 722.1445(2) Is Governed by MCL 722.1437(1), Extendable via MCL 722.1443(14) Affidavit

Introduction

Shannon Blackman v. Tyler David Millward reached the Michigan Supreme Court on applications for leave to appeal from a published Court of Appeals decision concerning the Revocation of Paternity Act (ROPA), now the Revocation of Parentage Act. The case arises from a child’s birth following criminal sexual conduct committed by defendant against plaintiff while plaintiff was a minor, and the subsequent execution of an acknowledgment of parentage (AOP) shortly after birth.

The central legal issue presented for potential Supreme Court review was whether a mother’s request to revoke an AOP under MCL 722.1445(2) (the “nonconsensual sexual penetration” provision) is subject to any time limitation—and, if so, what mechanism extends that time. Plaintiff sought revocation years after the child’s birth, after defendant (incarcerated) moved to compel parenting time by video call.

The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Welch, dissented from that denial, arguing the Court should grant leave to resolve a recurring statutory-interpretation question affecting survivor-initiated parentage revocations.

Summary of the Opinion (Order and Dissent)

Majority Order

The Court denied both the application for leave to appeal and the cross-application, stating it was “not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed.” The order does not adopt a merits holding on the statutory question.

Justice Thomas’s Dissent (Joined by Justice Welch)

The dissent would have granted leave to clarify: (1) whether there is a limitations period for revocation of an AOP when sought under MCL 722.1445(2), and (2) how any limitations period may be extended.

Justice Thomas would affirm the result allowing plaintiff’s filing, but on different grounds than the Court of Appeals: (a) actions to revoke an AOP remain governed by the limitations period in MCL 722.1437(1), and (b) that period may be extended by an extension request supported by an affidavit under MCL 722.1443 (now MCL 722.1443(14)).

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited

  • Walen v Dep't of Corrections, 443 Mich 240 (1993)
    Cited for the interpretive presumption that the Legislature is aware of existing statutes when enacting new laws. The dissent uses Walen to argue the Legislature’s 2016 addition of MCL 722.1445(2) should be read as fitting into ROPA’s preexisting structure (including time limits and extension procedures), not as silently creating a freestanding, unlimited-time remedy.
  • Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156 (2009)
    Cited for the principle that courts must read statutes as a whole and in light of their purpose. The dissent relies on Bush to criticize the Court of Appeals’ focus on the absence of an explicit limitations period in MCL 722.1445(2), rather than harmonizing it with the Act’s timing provisions.
  • People v Webb, 458 Mich 265 (1998)
    Used for two related canons: statutes should be construed to avoid conflict where possible, and courts should give effect to every word and interpret provisions within the entire legislative scheme. The dissent invokes Webb to contend there is no true conflict between MCL 722.1445(2) and the existing limitations/extension framework—so courts should avoid an interpretation that implicitly displaces MCL 722.1437.
  • Blackman v Millward, ___ Mich App ___ (October 29, 2024) (Docket No. 367240)
    The controlling Court of Appeals decision held that the limitations period in MCL 722.1437(1) does not apply to actions brought under MCL 722.1445(2). The dissent frames this as a structural error: treating MCL 722.1445(2) as independent of ROPA’s otherwise section-specific governance of the available remedies.

2) Legal Reasoning

Justice Thomas’s analysis is a statute-structure argument rooted in how ROPA is organized:

  1. ROPA assigns specific “actions” to specific sections.
    The dissent emphasizes MCL 722.1435(1): “Section 7 governs an action to set aside an acknowledgement of parentage.” In the dissent’s view, if the remedy sought is revocation of an AOP, then the action remains one “governed” by Section 7 even when the substantive entitlement to relief is triggered by MCL 722.1445(2).
  2. Section 7 contains the limitations period for AOP revocations.
    At the time, MCL 722.1437(1) required that an AOP revocation action be filed within 3 years after the child’s birth or within 1 year after the AOP was signed (whichever is later). The dissent treats that time limit as the default for all AOP revocation actions.
  3. ROPA separately provides a global extension mechanism.
    The dissent reads MCL 722.1443 (formerly subsection (12), now MCL 722.1443(14)) as applying to “an action or motion under [ROPA]” without restricting it to particular sections. Thus, even if the Section 7 deadline is missed, a litigant may extend the limitations period via an affidavit showing qualifying reasons such as “duress” or “misconduct.”
  4. No conflict exists that would justify displacing Section 7’s time limits.
    The dissent rejects the idea (attributed to the Court of Appeals) that because MCL 722.1445(2) is later-enacted and specific, it “displaces” general timing provisions. Instead, MCL 722.1445(2) is characterized as a substantive “trigger” requiring one of four remedies, while the procedural “how and when” for the chosen remedy remains supplied by the relevant governing section and the extension statute.
  5. Application to this case.
    The dissent notes plaintiff filed an affidavit that the trial court accepted as showing duress and misconduct, thereby extending the limitations period under MCL 722.1443. On that basis, Justice Thomas would affirm the trial court (and uphold plaintiff’s ability to pursue revocation) while still maintaining that a limitations period exists.

3) Impact

Because the Supreme Court denied leave, the order itself does not resolve the statutory question statewide; practically, the published Court of Appeals decision remains the governing precedent unless and until revisited. Still, the dissent is significant in at least three ways:

  • Signals a live interpretive conflict.
    The dissent crystallizes an alternative statutory reading that future litigants can press, particularly if different panels or trial courts confront the tension between ROPA’s section-specific structure and the unique remedial mandate in MCL 722.1445(2).
  • Frames a procedural roadmap.
    Under the dissent’s approach, survivor-mothers seeking relief after the Section 7 deadline would be well-advised to file a specific MCL 722.1443(14) extension request with a supporting affidavit addressing the statutory grounds (e.g., duress, misconduct).
  • Highlights policy and administration consequences.
    Competing interpretations produce materially different systems: a potentially open-ended filing window (Court of Appeals) versus a time-limited window with a structured escape valve (dissent). The dissent suggests the latter best preserves coherence across ROPA’s remedial scheme and reduces the likelihood of implied repeals.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Acknowledgment of Parentage (AOP)
A legal document that establishes a person as a child’s legal parent without a court trial on parentage. Revoking it can change legal parentage status.
Statute of limitations
A filing deadline. If a claim is filed too late, it can be barred unless an exception or extension applies.
Extension by affidavit under MCL 722.1443(14)
A procedure allowing a party to ask the court to extend the filing deadline by submitting a sworn statement explaining qualifying reasons (e.g., fraud, duress, newly discovered evidence).
Clear and convincing evidence
A heightened proof standard—more than “more likely than not,” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Under MCL 722.1445(2), the mother must meet this standard to show conception resulted from nonconsensual sexual penetration.
Harmonizing statutes / avoiding conflict
An interpretive approach requiring courts to read provisions so they work together if reasonably possible, rather than treating one as silently canceling another.

Conclusion

The Michigan Supreme Court’s denial of leave in Shannon Blackman v. Tyler David Millward leaves unresolved—at the Supreme Court level—whether MCL 722.1445(2) actions to revoke an AOP are time-limited. Justice Thomas’s dissent offers a structured alternative: revocation of an AOP remains subject to MCL 722.1437(1)’s limitations period, but litigants can extend that period through an affidavit-driven request under MCL 722.1443(14). The dissent’s central contribution is its insistence on reading ROPA as an integrated statute—pairing the substantive entitlement to relief for rape survivors with ROPA’s preexisting procedural architecture governing the specific remedy sought.