Disruptive Civil Litigants May Forfeit the Due-Process Right to Be Present at Trial After Warnings (Abuse-of-Discretion Review)

1. Introduction

In Dion K. Humphrey v. Robert K. Reges, Jr. and Mala J. Reges (Alaska June 5, 2026), the Alaska Supreme Court addressed—for the first time—whether a trial court abuses its discretion by removing a disruptive civil litigant from trial.

The dispute arose from adjacent Anchorage lots: Dion Humphrey (self-represented) claimed his neighbors, Robert Reges (an attorney, appearing for himself and his wife) and Mala Reges, built a retaining wall that encroached onto his land. The Regeses denied encroachment and asserted, alternatively, that any minimal intrusion was theirs by adverse possession under AS 09.45.052(a).

The litigation was marked by repeated pretrial motions (including a late jury demand under Civil Rule 38(b)), evidentiary disputes (including hearsay), and escalating courtroom-management interventions culminating in Humphrey’s removal from trial after continuing disruptions—even after the court moved him to remote participation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • New holding (first impression): A trial court does not abuse its discretion by removing a disruptive civil litigant from trial when the litigant—after warnings and lesser measures—continues disorderly conduct that prevents the trial from proceeding and threatens the opposing party’s right to a fair trial.
  • Standard of review: Removal of a disruptive civil litigant is reviewed for abuse of discretion, paralleling the approach used for removal of a disruptive criminal defendant.
  • Attorney’s fees: The Rule 82 award to the prevailing party after trial was not an abuse of discretion.
  • Appellate waiver: Most of Humphrey’s additional claims were waived due to inadequate briefing.
  • Disposition: The superior court’s judgment was affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Core removal/“presence at trial” authorities

  • Douglas v. State: The Alaska Supreme Court used Douglas as the direct template for the standard of review and the trial-court deference rationale: the trial judge is best positioned to assess disruption, likelihood of recurrence, and the need for decorum. Importantly, the court emphasized that even where constitutional interests are at their apex (criminal trial), removal is permissible after warnings—making removal in civil litigation (with lesser constitutional stakes) even more supportable.
  • Illinois v. Allen: The opinion adopted Allen’s core principle that the right to be present can be waived by misconduct where, after warnings, a party insists on behavior so disruptive that proceedings cannot continue. While Allen is criminal, Alaska imported its logic to the civil due-process context.
  • Kulas v. Flores: This Ninth Circuit decision supplied a civil-litigation framework: a court should weigh the plaintiff’s interest in being present against (1) the need for courtroom order and (2) the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The Alaska Supreme Court relied on Kulas to confirm that civil plaintiffs do not have an absolute constitutional right to physical presence and that decorum is a condition of access.
  • Faucher v. Lopez and Helminkski v. Ayerst Laboratories: These federal appellate cases were cited to reinforce the broader proposition that civil presence is not absolute and may yield to trial-management necessities when disruption undermines adjudication.

Due process baseline

  • Ryfeul v. Ryfeul: Cited to link civil trial participation to due process under the Alaska Constitution.
  • Haggblom v. City of Dillingham and Matanuska Maid, Inc. v. State: These cases provided the minimum content of due process—notice and an opportunity to be heard— which the court treated as satisfied even after removal because Humphrey had opportunities to present his case and could submit written closing materials.
  • Wamser v. State: Cited (as in the criminal context) to support the due-process roots of the right to be present.

Abuse of discretion and attorney’s fees

  • Anderson v. Wilson: Provided the abuse-of-discretion definition for attorney’s fee awards: decisions must not be arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or improperly motivated.

Pro se leniency and appellate waiver doctrine

  • Wright v. Anding, Torrence v. Blue, and DeNardo v. Calista Corp.: These cases were cited for the principle that courts construe self-represented filings liberally to avoid unintended waiver, while still requiring meaningful compliance with procedure and intelligible argument.
  • Oels v. Anchorage Police Dep't Emps. Ass'n and Smallwood v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., Inc.: Quoted for the rule that failure to argue a point constitutes abandonment.
  • Mitchell v. Mitchell and Peterson v. Ek: Used to explain when an issue is “raised” on appeal—i.e., when the appellate court can discern the legal argument and the opposing party can respond.
  • Antenor v. State, Dep't of Corr., Gilbert v. Sperbeck, and Petersen v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y.: These cases underscore that even self-represented litigants must provide more than cursory assertions; arguments without authority or legal theory are waived.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The rule announced: civil removal is permissible after warnings and failed lesser measures

The court began from constitutional first principles: Alaska and federal due process prohibit deprivation of property without due process, and due process at minimum means notice and an opportunity to be heard. But it then emphasized a limiting principle: the right to be present at trial is not absolute.

Borrowing from Illinois v. Allen and Alaska’s own Douglas v. State, the court treated persistent, warned-about disruption as a form of waiver by conduct. It then reinforced, using Kulas v. Flores, that civil litigants’ interests are entitled to less protection than criminal defendants’ interests.

(b) The judge’s graduated response mattered

A key feature of the court’s analysis was the superior court’s escalating, incremental approach:

  • Repeated admonitions and explanations of procedure;
  • Warnings that continued interruptions would trigger increased controls;
  • Moving participation to videoconference and muting when necessary;
  • Only after continued misconduct—despite warnings—ordering complete removal.

The Alaska Supreme Court highlighted that removal occurred only after the court “exhausted all other options” and after Humphrey’s conduct made it impossible to proceed and impaired the Regeses’ right to a fair trial.

(c) Due process was preserved through alternative means to be heard

The court also relied on the fact that Humphrey’s removal did not end his participation in the case entirely. The superior court allowed him to submit written final arguments and proposed findings/conclusions, and he had already presented testimony and arguments earlier in the proceeding. This supported the conclusion that the “opportunity to be heard” component of due process, while constrained, was not eliminated.

(d) Attorney’s fees under Rule 82 and waiver of other issues

The court summarily upheld attorney’s fees because the superior court awarded the amount prescribed by Alaska R. Civ. P. 82(b)(2) for a prevailing party after trial—an archetypal discretionary determination.

As to Humphrey’s other complaints (jury trial denial, evidentiary rulings about the email author, adverse possession, alleged bias), the court applied Alaska’s established waiver doctrine: an appellant must present intelligible legal theories supported by authority. Liberal construction does not supply missing arguments.

3.3. Impact

(a) Courtroom-management precedent in Alaska civil trials

The opinion establishes an Alaska civil-trial rule of practical importance: judges may remove a party whose disruptive behavior prevents trial from proceeding, provided the record shows warnings and reasonable efforts short of removal. Trial courts can cite this case when imposing escalating controls (remote participation, muting, security presence) and ultimately exclusion.

(b) Fair-trial parity: protection for the opposing party

The court expressly framed removal as protecting not only “order,” but also the opposing party’s right to a fair trial. This is significant because it positions disruptive conduct as a form of prejudice to the adversary, not merely disrespect to the bench.

(c) Litigation incentives and pro se boundaries

The decision reinforces that self-representation does not include a license to ignore rules or derail proceedings. It also strengthens appellate gatekeeping: self-represented appellants must still brief issues with enough legal content for meaningful review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Due process: The constitutional requirement that the government (including courts) use fair procedures before taking someone’s property rights—at minimum, giving notice and a real chance to present one’s side.
  • Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard; the trial judge’s decision stands unless it was arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or improperly motivated.
  • Waiver/abandonment on appeal: If an appellant does not develop an argument (facts + legal theory + authority), the appellate court treats the issue as given up.
  • Hearsay: An out-of-court statement offered for its truth; generally inadmissible unless an exception applies. (Here, the email about “overage” was excluded as hearsay.)
  • Offer of proof: A way to put on the record what a witness would say when the court will not admit the testimony, so an appellate court can assess prejudice later.
  • Adverse possession (AS 09.45.052(a)): A doctrine that can transfer ownership when someone openly and continuously occupies another’s land for the statutory period under required conditions.
  • Prescriptive easement: Similar to adverse possession but typically grants a right of use (not ownership) after long, qualifying use; here, the superior court granted a prescriptive easement appurtenant for the portion under the wall/fence.
  • Civil Rule 38(b) jury demand deadline: A party must request a jury trial within the rule’s deadline (here, “not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading”), or the right is forfeited.
  • Rule 82 attorney’s fees: Alaska’s prevailing-party fee rule; after trial, the schedule in Rule 82(b)(2) often drives the presumptive award.

5. Conclusion

This decision squarely holds that, in Alaska civil litigation, a party’s due-process interest in being present at trial can be lost through persistent, warned-about disruption, and that a trial judge’s decision to remove the party is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The opinion also underscores two practical lessons: (1) trial courts should build a record of warnings and incremental measures before exclusion; and (2) on appeal, even self-represented litigants must present coherent, authority-supported arguments or risk waiver.