Disqualification from NY Public Matching Funds Is Arbitrary When PCFB Fails to Provide Joint-Filing Forms, Updated Guidance, and the Regulatory Cure Opportunity

Case: Matter of Blakeman v. New York State Pub. Campaign Fin. Bd., 2026 NY Slip Op 03347 (3d Dep’t May 28, 2026) (reported at 249 AD3d 1459).

1. Introduction

This Third Department decision sits at the intersection of (i) New York’s newly reformed Public Campaign Finance Program and (ii) late-breaking statutory and regulatory changes requiring the Governor and Lieutenant Governor to run as a joint ticket for party designation and, critically for public financing, to jointly submit key program paperwork. Petitioners Bruce A. Blakeman (gubernatorial candidate) and Todd Hood (announced running mate for Lieutenant Governor) challenged a determination of the New York State Public Campaign Finance Board (PCFB) that deemed them ineligible to receive matching funds for the 2026 primary or general election due to failure to timely submit a “joint” application/certification.

The core legal issue was not whether the regulatory scheme demanded joint compliance—it did—but whether PCFB could enforce a strict-disqualification outcome in a transition period when it (a) did not update the required forms to allow joint submission “using” the prescribed form, (b) did not adequately update public-facing training/handbook materials to explain how to comply, and (c) failed to apply its own regulatory “cure” mechanism for incomplete certifications.

Parties and posture

  • Respondents/Petitioners: Bruce A. Blakeman and others (campaign participants seeking Program eligibility).
  • Appellants/Respondents: PCFB and certain State Board of Elections commissioners aligned with PCFB for purposes of appeal.
  • Proceeding: Combined Election Law § 14-209(4) and CPLR article 78 proceeding plus declaratory judgment action.
  • Relief sought: Annulment of PCFB’s ineligibility resolution and an opportunity to cure deficiencies.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court. While the court agreed PCFB rationally regarded petitioners’ submission as incomplete once a joint ticket existed, it held PCFB acted arbitrarily and capriciously by deeming petitioners ineligible—a harsher sanction—under the “unusual circumstances” of this election cycle. Those circumstances included: (1) a regulatory change effective after Blakeman had already filed and received written confirmation of registration and certification; (2) PCFB’s failure to update the prescribed forms to accommodate joint filing as its regulation directed; (3) PCFB’s internal acknowledgment shortly before the deadline that the forms did not align with the new rules, coupled with case-by-case internal workarounds not communicated publicly; (4) outdated handbook/training materials; and (5) PCFB’s failure to provide notice of incompleteness and the one-week cure opportunity required by its own regulations.

The remedy affirmed was limited: petitioners were afforded one week to cure the defects. The court expressly did not dictate the precise mechanics of using existing forms to comply, and encouraged reliance on PCFB’s expertise and its previously identified administrative methods.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standard of review for agency action

  • Matter of Winkler v New York State Educ. Dept., 245 AD3d 1045 (3d Dept 2026): The court invoked this as a contemporary articulation of CPLR 7803(3) review—whether the determination violated lawful procedure, was affected by error of law, or was arbitrary and capricious/abuse of discretion. It situates the case as a classic administrative-law challenge rather than a de novo eligibility determination.
  • Matter of LL 410 E. 78th St. LLC v Division of Hous. & Community Renewal, 44 NY3d 232 (2025), and Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222 (1974): These anchor the familiar definition: agency action is arbitrary and capricious when taken “without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts,” but must be sustained if it has a rational basis even if other outcomes might also be reasonable. Importantly, the court used these cases to separate two questions: (i) whether “incomplete” was a rational characterization (yes), and (ii) whether “ineligible/disqualified” was rational under the transition conditions (no).

2) Election-law “strict compliance” in context

  • Matter of Seawright v Board of Elections in the City of N.Y., 35 NY3d 227 (2020): The court cited Seawright “generally” to underscore that strict-compliance regimes in election administration are not self-justifying; their application must remain rational and tethered to statutory purposes and practical administration. Here, strict compliance became “irrational” because the regulator itself had not supplied the regulated community with workable tools (forms and guidance) consistent with the new obligations.

3) Remedy and cure opportunities

  • Matter of Amato v Sullivan, 211 AD3d 778 (2d Dept 2022) (cited “cf.”): Used as a comparative reference supporting the propriety of affording a corrective opportunity rather than imposing the severest penalty. While not necessarily identical on facts, it reinforces that courts can require election administrators to permit statutorily/regulatorily contemplated cures where the regime provides for them.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The governing framework: statutory program + implementing regulations

The court carefully mapped the compliance steps in the Program:

  • Registration via PCF-21 (9 NYCRR 6221.5[b]).
  • Application/Certification via affidavit on PCF-22 (Election Law § 14-203[1][d]; 9 NYCRR 6221.7), due four months before the primary (here, February 23, 2026).
  • PCFB duties to provide compliance counseling/guidance and training (Election Law § 14-207[3], [3-a]).
  • Cure mechanism for incomplete applications/certifications, with a one-week correction window if the certification is initialed, signed, and notarized (9 NYCRR 6221.7[e][3]).

2) The “joint ticket” change and its implementation gap

The decisive factual-legal tension arose from emergency regulations effective January 7, 2026, particularly 9 NYCRR 6221.26. That section simultaneously:

  • Treats joint Governor/Lieutenant Governor candidates “as a single candidate for the same elective office in an election cycle” (9 NYCRR 6221.26[b]).
  • Provides for one authorized committee controlled by the Governor candidate, while keeping the Lieutenant Governor candidate subject to program rules unless inconsistent (9 NYCRR 6221.26[d][1]).
  • Allows joint or separate registration using PCF-21 (9 NYCRR 6221.26[e][1]).
  • Requires that both candidates “shall jointly submit” the PCF-22 application/certification (9 NYCRR 6221.26[e][2]).

The court’s central critique is administrative: PCFB promulgated a “single form” joint-submission requirement but did not provide forms that could actually accommodate joint filing on that prescribed form, and did not timely update explanatory materials. The record further showed PCFB’s internal recognition of the mismatch and contemplated ad hoc administrative “merging” solutions—yet those workarounds were not conveyed publicly to regulated candidates.

3) Rational to deem “incomplete,” irrational to impose “ineligible” without notice and cure

The Third Department drew a critical distinction:

  • Incompleteness finding was rational: Hood did not file a PCF-21 or PCF-22, nor was he included on Blakeman’s amended PCF-22. Even before the new January 2026 regulations, Hood would have been individually required to register and file.
  • Ineligibility finding was arbitrary and capricious: Once the joint-ticket rules applied (9 NYCRR 6221.26[c][2]), PCFB treated the deficiency as disqualifying without (a) providing a usable joint form, (b) updating guidance, or (c) giving notice and the one-week cure opportunity mandated by 9 NYCRR 6221.7(e)(3).

The opinion also gives weight to reliance interests created by PCFB’s own communications: Blakeman received written confirmation in December 2025 that PCFB had received his filings, registered him, and certified his admission. When later regulatory changes rendered that status incomplete upon formation of a joint ticket, PCFB’s failure to notify petitioners of incompleteness and to permit a cure made disqualification irrational in light of both the agency’s earlier confirmation and its regulatory obligations.

4) Statutory purpose as a constraint on enforcement choices

The court tied its arbitrariness analysis to the Legislature’s stated objectives in Election Law § 14-200 (reducing corruption and its appearance; improving public confidence; encouraging participation). Under the court’s reasoning, an agency’s “strict compliance” enforcement stance becomes suspect when the agency itself has not made compliance realistically achievable during a compressed transition—particularly where the consequence is exclusion from a public-financing system designed to broaden, not narrow, viable participation.

C. Impact

1) Administrative-law takeaways for PCFB and similar agencies

  • Regulatory change management matters: When agencies impose new compliance obligations near deadlines, they must align prescribed forms and public guidance with the new rules, or risk arbitrary-and-capricious findings.
  • “Cure” provisions are enforceable constraints: If regulations require notice and an opportunity to cure, agencies must operationalize them—especially where incompleteness results from changes in law and the agency’s own tooling.
  • Internal workarounds cannot remain internal: The opinion implicitly rejects “case-by-case” internal fixes as a substitute for fair notice to the regulated community when deadlines are imminent.

2) Election-law and public-finance implications

  • Not a general relaxation of compliance: The court emphasized the uniqueness of this election cycle (Footnote 3), limiting the decision’s broader precedential reach and signaling that future cycles—after forms/training updates—may be treated differently.
  • Still, a meaningful precedent on transition fairness: Even with the “unique circumstances” caveat, the decision supplies candidates a litigation template where agencies impose strict penalties while failing to supply practicable means of compliance.
  • Greater emphasis on reliance and procedural regularity: Written confirmations from administering agencies may strengthen claims that later disqualification, without notice and cure, is irrational—particularly where agencies have expressly undertaken compliance-counseling duties by statute.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Arbitrary and capricious” (CPLR 7803[3]): A court does not decide what it would do in the agency’s place. It asks whether the agency’s decision had a reasonable, fact-based rationale and followed required procedures.
  • “Strict compliance” in election administration: Many election rules demand exact adherence. But this decision illustrates that “strict compliance” cannot be applied mechanically where the regulator itself has not provided workable forms, guidance, or the procedural protections built into its own regulations.
  • “Cure period” (9 NYCRR 6221.7[e][3]): A built-in chance to fix defects in an application/certification. Here, the court treated it as a mandatory step PCFB had to offer once it deemed filings incomplete.
  • Joint candidacy as “single candidate” (9 NYCRR 6221.26[b]): For Program purposes, the ticket is treated as one unit, which affects how eligibility documents must be submitted—especially the requirement that both candidates jointly submit the PCF-22 certification.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Blakeman v New York State Pub. Campaign Fin. Bd. establishes a practical rule for New York’s public campaign financing administration during periods of rapid legal change: PCFB may treat nonconforming submissions as incomplete, but it acts arbitrarily and capriciously when it escalates incompleteness into disqualification while failing to (1) provide forms that enable compliance with newly imposed joint-filing requirements, (2) update and communicate guidance and training consistent with those requirements, and (3) extend the regulatory notice-and-cure opportunity its own rules promise.

The decision is explicitly cabined to the “unique” circumstances of the 2026 cycle, but its broader significance is durable: agencies administering election-related benefit programs must pair strict rules with fair implementation—especially when the agency’s own transition choices would otherwise make timely compliance unreasonably opaque.