Disciplinary Referrals Alone May Not Provide Title VII Notice of Student-on-Teacher Harassment in Alternative Schools

1. Introduction

Shelly G. Hudson, a teacher with more than a decade of experience in alternative-school settings, worked for one year at Daniel Jenkins Academy (“DJA”), an alternative school within the Charleston County School District serving students with severe behavioral and mental-health challenges. Hudson alleged that students mocked, threatened, and used vulgar language toward her, including race- and sex-based slurs (e.g., “cracker” and “bitch”), culminating in a panic attack, leave, and resignation.

Hudson sued the Charleston County School District, DJA’s principal, and another district employee. Crucially, she did not claim these defendants personally harassed her; instead, she sought to hold them liable for a hostile work environment created by students under Title VII. The key appellate issue was whether the defendants had adequate notice of racially or sexually harassing conduct such that the students’ conduct could be imputed to them for liability purposes.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Applying the Title VII hostile-work-environment framework, the court focused on the “imputation” element: whether the employer and responsible officials knew or should have known of race- or sex-based harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.

The court rejected Hudson’s two notice theories:

• Disciplinary referrals: Although Hudson submitted at least 67 written discipline referrals, the court held that—given DJA’s mission and the prevalence of serious misconduct—those referrals conveyed “poor behavior” and “disciplinary problems,” not necessarily unlawful discriminatory harassment.
• Affidavit asserting frequent oral complaints: The court agreed with the lower courts that Hudson’s later affidavit (claiming she “orally informed” an assistant principal “at least three times a week” about racial/sexual harassment) contradicted her deposition testimony that she did not file a complaint and relied on discipline referrals for notice. Under the Fourth Circuit’s rule against “sham affidavits,” the affidavit could not create a genuine dispute of fact.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Webster v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., 38 F.4th 404 (4th Cir. 2022).

• Role in the decision: Webster provided the controlling framework and the opinion’s central analytic move: the “unique context” of schools—particularly those serving students with substantial behavioral needs—must be accounted for when determining whether student conduct is imputable to a school employer.
• Doctrinal contribution used here: The Fourth Circuit reiterated that imputation requires proof that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action “reasonably calculated to end it.” The court leaned on Webster to justify why ordinary disciplinary communications may not automatically constitute notice of Title VII harassment in a setting where misconduct is expected and pervasive.

EEOC v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658 (4th Cir. 2011).

• Role in the decision: The court invoked Xerxes for the proposition that an employee bears a “significant responsibility” to provide notice; an employer “cannot be expected to correct harassment unless the employee makes a concerted effort” to alert it.
• How it shaped the outcome: That principle supported the court’s conclusion that Hudson’s reliance on generic discipline referrals—without using established harassment-reporting channels or clearly communicating discriminatory harassment—fell short.

Hannah v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 72 F.4th 630 (4th Cir. 2023).

• Role in the decision: Hannah supplied the rule that a litigant cannot defeat summary judgment by submitting an affidavit that contradicts their deposition testimony.
• How it shaped the outcome: The court treated Hudson’s affidavit as a contradiction of her deposition admission that she did not inform officials of unlawful harassment “by any means other than through her student disciplinary referrals,” and therefore disregarded it for purposes of creating a genuine factual dispute.

Hall v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Inc., 155 F.4th 747 (4th Cir. 2025).

• Role in the decision: Cited for the standard of review: summary judgment is reviewed de novo.

Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 2004).

• Role in the decision: Used to confirm that Hudson’s remaining 42 U.S.C. § 1983 discrimination claim is analyzed under the same framework as her Title VII claim—so both claims “rise and fall together.”

Hudson v. Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist. ("Hudson I"), 2024 WL 6471186 (D.S.C. July 22, 2024).
Hudson v. Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist. ("Hudson II"), 2025 WL 1922449 (D.S.C. July 14, 2025).

• Role in the decision: The Fourth Circuit repeatedly characterized both lower-court opinions as “thorough and well-reasoned” and affirmed largely on their notice analysis.
• Practical importance: The appellate court’s agreement underscores that, in this record, the notice deficiency was dispositive; the court did not need to resolve other hostile-environment elements.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court applied the Fourth Circuit’s hostile-work-environment elements as stated in Webster v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., focusing on the fourth element—imputation. Because the alleged harassers were students (third parties), Hudson needed evidence that defendants: (1) knew or should have known she was experiencing race- or sex-based harassment, and (2) failed to take prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end it.

Two contextual findings drove the notice analysis:

• Institutional context of DJA: DJA served students with “severe behavioral and mental health challenges,” many assigned in lieu of expulsion. In that environment, “disrespect and hostility” and severe misconduct were not anomalous, making it less likely that discipline referrals—standing alone—would signal “unlawful harassment” as opposed to routine (though serious) discipline issues.
• Clarity and channel of reporting: Hudson did not use established school or district avenues for reporting harassment. Under EEOC v. Xerxes Corp., that omission mattered because employers are not expected to divine discriminatory-harassment complaints from communications that reasonably read as ordinary disciplinary reporting in a high-misconduct setting.

The court then foreclosed Hudson’s attempt to create a factual dispute through her later affidavit. Her deposition testimony indicated she had not filed a harassment complaint and had relied on discipline referrals to notify officials “of what was going on.” The later affidavit added a new, stronger factual claim—frequent oral reports that she was being racially and sexually harassed. Applying Hannah v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., the court treated the affidavit as contradictory and therefore insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished, the decision provides a clear application of existing Fourth Circuit doctrine to a recurring scenario: third-party harassment in schools, especially alternative placements where student misconduct is endemic.

• For employees (teachers/staff): The case signals that documenting misconduct through discipline systems may be insufficient to establish Title VII notice unless the employee clearly communicates that the conduct is discriminatory harassment and/or uses recognized reporting pathways.
• For school districts and administrators: The decision reinforces the protective value of maintaining distinct channels for harassment reporting and training staff on how to elevate discipline problems into potential Title VII issues when slurs or protected-class targeting occurs.
• For litigators: The opinion emphasizes careful deposition strategy and consistency. A party’s later effort to “fix” the notice record through an affidavit risks exclusion under the Fourth Circuit’s sham-affidavit rule.
• For future doctrine: The court’s reliance on “context” indicates continued tailoring of imputation analysis to the realities of particular workplaces—here, a school designed for students with intensive behavioral needs—potentially narrowing when generalized reports suffice as harassment notice.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Hostile work environment (Title VII): A workplace becomes unlawfully hostile when unwelcome conduct based on a protected characteristic (here, race or sex) is so severe or pervasive that it changes the conditions of employment.
• Imputation (third-party harassment): When the harasser is not a supervisor or coworker (e.g., a student, customer, patient), the employer is typically liable only if it knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take reasonable steps to stop it.
• Notice: The employer must have enough information to understand that the employee is reporting discriminatory harassment, not merely difficult behavior. In settings where misconduct is expected, the line between “discipline problems” and “Title VII harassment” may require explicit signaling by the employee.
• Summary judgment: A case can be decided without trial if, even viewing evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor, no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
• Sham affidavit rule: A party cannot create a fact issue by filing an affidavit that contradicts their own prior deposition testimony; courts may disregard the later affidavit for purposes of summary judgment.

5. Conclusion

Shelly Hudson v. Charleston County School District affirms that, in the Fourth Circuit, a teacher seeking to impute liability to a school district for student-on-teacher racial or sexual harassment must show clear notice that discriminatory harassment is occurring. In an alternative-school environment where serious misconduct is common, disciplinary referrals may not, by themselves, communicate Title VII harassment. The decision also underscores the force of the Fourth Circuit’s sham affidavit doctrine: litigants cannot defeat summary judgment by contradicting deposition testimony through later affidavits. Together, these principles shape how future plaintiffs must document and report third-party harassment, and how schools assess when student misconduct crosses into actionable Title VII territory.