Digital Surveillance and Coercive Control Support Abuse-Prevention Relief: A Nonprecedential Vermont Affirmance

Case: Melissa Perrault v. Nicholas Perrault
Court: Supreme Court of Vermont
Case number: 26-AP-168
Date: November 6, 2026
Disposition: Relief-from-abuse order affirmed.

Precedential limitation: The entry order expressly states that decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered precedent before any tribunal. This decision therefore does not establish a new binding rule. Its significance lies in its application of existing stalking, coercive-control, and abuse-prevention statutes to sustained digital surveillance and controlling conduct.

1. Introduction

In Melissa Perrault v. Nicholas Perrault, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a relief-from-abuse, or RFA, order protecting a wife from her husband following their separation. The case illustrates how monitoring technology, restrictions on ordinary activities, and emotionally manipulative conduct can together support findings of abuse without an allegation of physical assault.

The parties had been married for approximately fourteen years and had two minor children. Melissa left the marital home in January 2026, sought an RFA order in April, and subsequently filed for divorce. The family division consolidated the proceedings, although the divorce remained pending.

After a hearing, the family division found that Nicholas had stalked Melissa and engaged in coercive controlling behavior. It also found a danger of further abuse and an immediate danger of emotional harm to the children. Its order temporarily awarded Melissa parental rights and responsibilities and required exchanges for parent-child contact to occur in a police department parking lot.

On appeal, Nicholas challenged the findings of stalking, coercive control, and danger of emotional harm to the children. He did not challenge the temporary parental-rights award or the safeguards governing exchanges. The Supreme Court rejected his arguments, principally because the trial court’s findings and credibility determinations supported its conclusions.

2. Material Facts and Summary of the Decision

A sustained pattern of monitoring and interference

During the year before the separation, Nicholas increasingly monitored Melissa’s whereabouts through a “find my phone” application. He admitted doing so daily or nearly daily and spending considerable time on it. He questioned deviations from her disclosed plans, including why she was driving on a particular road or sitting in a particular parking lot. Melissa told him that the monitoring made her uncomfortable.

The trial court considered this surveillance alongside other restrictions on Melissa’s independence. Nicholas objected to her attending work functions alone, accompanied her even when spouses were not invited, discouraged independent walks and gym visits, and read her messages without consent. Melissa also testified that he would not let her shower alone and interfered with her friendships and family relationships.

When Melissa contemplated leaving, Nicholas speculated about shooting himself. The court found that he knew her former boyfriend had died by suicide and used the statement to influence her decision about ending the relationship.

The tracking device and hotel incident

After the separation, a concerning text exchange led Melissa to stay overnight at a hotel near her workplace rather than at her condominium. She paid with a credit card Nicholas could not access, and the children did not know she was there.

After she checked out, a hotel employee reported that Nicholas had been crouching and hiding outside the main entrance. He then entered the lobby and asked about Melissa, including her room number. Nicholas admitted placing a physical tracking device on her car and going to the hotel. He explained that he suspected another relationship and wanted answers about their marriage.

The trial court rejected his claim that the surveillance was motivated by concern for Melissa’s safety. It instead found a desire to control her and investigate suspected infidelity. Melissa experienced extreme fear, difficulty sleeping, and weight loss. She installed cameras and alarms and changed her routines.

The Supreme Court’s conclusions

  • Stalking: Monitoring or surveilling Melissa and following her to the hotel constituted a sufficient course of conduct, supported by findings of substantial fear and emotional distress.
  • Coercive control: The combined monitoring, restrictions, and manipulation supported a finding that Nicholas unreasonably interfered with Melissa’s free will and personal liberty.
  • Further abuse: Continued monitoring after separation supported the finding that future abuse remained a danger.
  • Children’s emotional safety: The findings supported the trial court’s assessment that potentially erratic conduct or statements created a risk of emotional harm to the children.

3. Statutory Framework and Standards of Review

Requirements for abuse-prevention relief

Under 15 V.S.A. § 1103(c)(1)(A), a court must make protective orders it considers necessary when it finds that the defendant abused the plaintiff and that there is a danger of further abuse. The applicant bears the burden of proving abuse by a preponderance of the evidence under § 1103(b).

The opinion addressed two statutory forms of abuse:

  1. Stalking: Recognized as abuse under 15 V.S.A. § 1101(1)(A)(iv), incorporating the definition in 12 V.S.A. § 5131(6).
  2. Coercive controlling behavior: Recognized under 15 V.S.A. § 1101(1)(B) and defined in § 1101(2).

Appellate restraint

The Supreme Court reviewed the RFA order for abuse of discretion. It would uphold factual findings supported by the evidence and legal conclusions supported by those findings. It reviewed the facts favorably to the prevailing party and would disturb findings only if clearly erroneous.

This framework was central. Nicholas repeatedly offered alternative explanations for his behavior, but the appellate court was not conducting a new hearing. The trial judge had already assessed the witnesses, rejected his protective explanations, and credited Melissa’s account of the effects on her freedom and safety.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The cited decisions supplied established principles governing protective relief and appellate review. They were not presented as factually identical digital-surveillance cases.

Raynes v. Rogers, 2008 VT 52, 183 Vt. 513

The court relied on Raynes v. Rogers for two propositions. First, abuse-prevention orders provide immediate relief from intrafamily violence and protection against future abuse. This preventive purpose explains why the inquiry extended beyond completed acts to the likelihood of continued surveillance and control.

Second, Raynes v. Rogers supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard: findings must be supported by evidence, and conclusions must be supported by findings. That standard structured the entire appeal. The question was not whether another factfinder might accept Nicholas’s account, but whether the trial court’s decision was sufficiently grounded in the record.

Coates v. Coates, 171 Vt. 519 (2000) (mem.)

Coates v. Coates established the deferential approach to factual findings: the appellate court views them in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, disregards the effect of modifying evidence, and sets them aside only if clearly erroneous.

This principle limited Nicholas’s ability to obtain reversal by emphasizing evidence favorable to his interpretation. His explanations did not displace supported findings that the monitoring was controlling and that Melissa reasonably feared for her safety.

Cabot v. Cabot, 166 Vt. 485 (1997)

The court cited Cabot v. Cabot for the trial court’s responsibility to determine witness credibility and weigh the evidence. It applied that principle directly to the coercive-control challenge.

For example, Nicholas characterized his self-harm statement as intended merely to hurt Melissa. The trial court instead found that it sought to influence her decisions about the relationship. Likewise, it rejected his asserted safety rationale for tracking her. Under Cabot v. Cabot, these supported credibility and evidentiary assessments belonged to the trial court.

Meyncke v. Meyncke, 2009 VT 84, 186 Vt. 571 (mem.)

The court invoked Meyncke v. Meyncke in addressing the risk of emotional harm to the children. That decision explains that disagreement with a court’s reasoning and conclusion does not itself establish an abuse of discretion.

Its role was to distinguish an identifiable judicial error from a request to reassess evidentiary weight. Nicholas disagreed with the trial court’s inference of risk, but the Supreme Court concluded that the findings supported that inference.

5. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Stalking depended on the overall course of conduct

Under 12 V.S.A. § 5131(6), stalking requires purposeful conduct directed at a particular person that the actor knows or should know would cause a reasonable person to fear for personal or family safety, or to suffer substantial emotional distress of the statutorily specified kind.

The statute provides two relevant routes to establishing a “course of conduct”:

  • Two or more acts of following, monitoring, surveillance, threatening, or interference with property over any period, however short.
  • Unauthorized electronic or digital surveillance continuously for at least twelve hours, or on two or more occasions.

The acts need not occur on separate calendar days.

Nicholas argued that installing the physical tracker was only one act and that Melissa knew of and consented to the earlier application-based monitoring. The Supreme Court rejected his attempt to isolate the tracker installation from the surrounding conduct. The trial court had found monitoring or surveillance followed by pursuit to the hotel.

Importantly, the Supreme Court expressly sustained the stalking conclusion under the general multiple-acts provision, § 5131(1)(A)(i). Although it quoted the separate electronic-surveillance provision, it did not separately resolve the claimed authorization of every use of the phone application. The decision therefore should not be read as establishing that all shared-location use between spouses is unlawful, or as defining when authorization is withdrawn.

The court also upheld the required connection between conduct and harm. Melissa’s fear, disrupted sleep, weight loss, security measures, and changed routines supported the trial court’s assessment. Her reactions were considered in the context of sustained monitoring and the hotel incident, rather than as isolated expressions of discomfort.

B. Coercive control concerned cumulative interference with autonomy

Section 1101(2) defines coercive controlling behavior as a pattern that, “in purpose or effect,” unreasonably interferes with free will and personal liberty. The definition includes unreasonable control, regulation, or monitoring of movements, communications, and daily behavior.

The trial court found precisely such a pattern. Surveillance was reinforced by restrictions on independent activities, intrusion into communications, interference with relationships, and pressure surrounding separation. Melissa’s credited testimony established that fear of failing to meet Nicholas’s expectations affected her choices.

The statutory reference to purpose or effect is significant: unreasonable interference with autonomy need not be evaluated solely through the actor’s stated intentions. Here, however, the court found both controlling effects and a controlling motivation.

The self-harm statement was similarly assessed in context. The opinion does not establish that every expression of suicidal distress constitutes abuse. The relevant finding was that Nicholas used a statement particularly distressing to Melissa to influence whether she would leave.

C. Post-separation conduct supported the danger of further abuse

A finding of past abuse did not alone complete the statutory inquiry. The court also needed a danger of further abuse. Nicholas’s continued monitoring after the relationship ended supported that conclusion.

The separation had not stopped the behavior; the conduct extended to a concealed physical tracker and following Melissa to a hotel. The court could therefore find an ongoing need for protection rather than treating the abuse as confined to the former shared household.

D. The children’s risk assessment was preventive and fact-specific

The trial court connected the children’s emotional safety to the broader pattern of conduct. It considered Melissa’s deteriorating wellbeing, Nicholas’s difficulty accepting the separation, efforts to involve his parents in discussing support, and the tracking and hotel incident.

The court acknowledged important limits: there was no other evidence of mental-health concerns or post-separation self-harm ideation. Nevertheless, it found that the tracking and pursuit reflected, at minimum, unclear thinking and a potential for irrational behavior. Together, the circumstances supported an inference of possible erratic acts or statements harmful to the children.

The Supreme Court upheld that assessment without treating a suspected mental-health condition as an established diagnosis. Nor did it announce that every instance of abuse against one parent automatically proves danger to children. Its conclusion rested on the particular findings and the deferential review standard.

The appellate issues were also limited. Nicholas challenged the emotional-danger conclusion, but not the temporary allocation of parental rights and responsibilities or the protected exchange arrangements. The opinion did not decide permanent custody in the pending divorce.

6. Potential Impact and Limits

Because the order is expressly nonprecedential, its practical significance must be distinguished from binding legal effect. It nevertheless illustrates several issues relevant to understanding Vermont’s existing statutory protections:

  • Technology can facilitate recognized forms of abuse. Location applications and tracking devices may become instruments of stalking or coercive control when used within a supported pattern of surveillance and interference.
  • Context matters more than technological labels. The court examined frequency, questioning, unwanted pursuit, restrictions, motivation, and effects on the person monitored.
  • Nonphysical conduct can justify protection. The statutory analysis focused on fear, emotional distress, and impaired autonomy, not solely on physical injury.
  • Separation may not eliminate risk. Continued monitoring after a breakup can support the required finding of future danger.
  • Appellate challenges must identify error. Repeating rejected explanations or disputing evidentiary weight ordinarily does not overcome supported trial findings.

The decision should not be extended into a blanket prohibition on consensual location sharing, a criminal conviction for stalking, or a general rule establishing parental unfitness. It affirmed civil protective relief on a specific evidentiary record.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Relief-from-abuse order
A civil protective order intended to stop abuse and reduce the risk of future harm. It may include temporary arrangements concerning children.
Preponderance of the evidence
The applicant must show that abuse more likely than not occurred. This is not the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Course of conduct
A connected sequence of qualifying acts. Multiple acts can occur within a short period and need not fall on different days.
Coercive controlling behavior
An unreasonable pattern that restricts another person’s freedom to make choices or conduct daily life, including through monitoring or regulating movement and communication.
Reasonable-person standard
An objective assessment of whether the conduct would cause the specified fear or distress, considered in its circumstances.
Abuse of discretion
An appellate standard that gives the trial court substantial room to make supported judgments. Disagreement alone is insufficient for reversal.
Clearly erroneous finding
A factual finding sufficiently unsupported or mistaken to justify appellate intervention, rather than merely one on which another factfinder might disagree.
Nonprecedential decision
A decision resolving the parties’ dispute that, under this order’s express notice, cannot be considered precedent before any tribunal.

8. Conclusion

Melissa Perrault v. Nicholas Perrault affirms that sustained monitoring, unwanted pursuit, and interference with personal autonomy can support civil abuse-prevention relief under Vermont’s existing stalking and coercive-control statutes. The result depended on the complete pattern of conduct, its effects, and supported findings of continuing risk.

The decision creates no binding precedent. Its principal instructional value is its fact-specific application of statutory protections to technology-enabled control—and its reminder that appellate courts generally do not reweigh credibility and evidence already assessed by the trial judge.