Date: Jul 25, 2026

“Different Location” for Abduction Includes Forcing a Victim from a Room to a Getaway Car; Carjacking “Presence” Satisfied by Nearby Accessible Vehicle Under Threat

Introduction

In United States v. Alvis Alexander Briceno-Yajures (11th Cir. July 22, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 105-month sentence imposed after the district court calculated the advisory Guideline range using the robbery guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1, and applied two challenged specific-offense enhancements: (1) a four-level increase for “abduction” under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A), and (2) a two-level increase for “carjacking” under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(5).

Although the conviction of record was for possession of a firearm and ammunition by an illegal alien, the sentencing court relied on the conduct surrounding two armed robberies occurring in Daytona Beach, Florida, to set the offense level under § 2B3.1 and then determine whether the enhancements applied. The central appellate issues were procedural: whether the district court relied on clearly erroneous facts or misapplied the Guidelines when it found (a) the first victim was “abducted” when dragged from a motel room down stairs toward a vehicle, and (b) the second victim was “present” for a carjacking even though she was not physically inside the parking lot at the moment her vehicle was taken.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that the sentence was not procedurally unreasonable and that the district court did not clearly err in applying either enhancement. First, the court concluded that dragging Victim-1 from a motel room down the stairs and attempting to force her into a vehicle constituted forcing her to accompany the offender to a “different location,” supporting the § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) abduction enhancement. Second, the court concluded that the taking of Victim-2’s car occurred “from the person or presence of another” because the vehicle was sufficiently accessible and within her control but for the intimidation of firearms, supporting the § 2B3.1(b)(5) carjacking enhancement. The judgment and sentence were affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007)

The panel framed the appeal through Gall’s procedural-reasonableness lens: a sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court fails to calculate the Guidelines range, fails to consider § 3553(a), relies on clearly erroneous facts, or inadequately explains the sentence. Here, Gall provided the governing standard for identifying procedural error, and the panel used it to reject the claim that disputed presentence facts required more explicit factfinding where the district court implicitly resolved the objections by overruling them after hearing evidence and argument.

United States v. Whatley, 719 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2013)

Whatley was the key interpretive anchor for the abduction enhancement. There, the Eleventh Circuit declined to adopt a categorical rule for when § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) applies to movements “inside a single building,” instead taking a case-by-case approach. Importantly, Whatley held the enhancement inapplicable where victims were moved among rooms within the same bank; the “ordinary meaning of ‘different location’” did not encompass mere room-to-room movement within one building, which the court treated as a single “location.”

In Briceno-Yajures’s case, Whatley functioned as a limiting principle: it distinguished movements that stay within a single location from movements that cross a meaningful spatial boundary. The panel found the facts here on the opposite side of that line—movement from an upstairs motel room down the stairs and toward a street-parked vehicle.

United States v. Kimble, 178 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 1999)

For the carjacking enhancement, the panel relied on Kimble, which interpreted the “from the person or presence of another” language in the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and articulated a practical test: the victim must be sufficiently near the vehicle for it to be within “reach, inspection, or control” and—absent threat or intimidation—able to maintain control over it. Kimble emphasized that “accessible” proximity is the core inquiry; a car parked right outside a location where the victim is being threatened can satisfy “presence.”

The Briceno-Yajures panel imported Kimble’s proximity-and-control reasoning to the Guideline’s carjacking definition (which mirrors the statutory formulation). That linkage allowed the court to affirm the enhancement based on Victim-2’s proximity to her vehicle and the fact that firearm intimidation prevented her from exercising control.

Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural posture and factual resolution at sentencing

The defendant’s procedural challenge depended in part on disputing presentence report facts tied to the enhancements. The panel accepted that the district court did not issue extensive explicit findings, but held that it resolved the disputes implicitly by hearing the objections and then overruling them—thereby adopting the PSR’s enhancement-supporting facts as its basis for the Guidelines calculation.

2) Abduction under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A): “forced to accompany ... to a different location”

The Guidelines define “abducted” as forcing a victim “to accompany an offender to a different location,” and the commentary gives a paradigmatic example: forcing a bank teller from the bank into a getaway car. The panel reasoned that dragging Victim-1 from the motel room, down the stairs, and attempting to force her into the SUV matched the concept captured by the example—movement toward (and attempted placement into) a vehicle to facilitate escape.

Consistent with Whatley, the court treated movement within a single structure differently than movement that relocates the victim beyond the initial site of confinement/assault. Here, the movement from a second-floor motel room to the exterior stairway and the vehicle area constituted movement to a “different location,” making the enhancement appropriate.

3) Carjacking under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(5): taking “from the person or presence” by force or intimidation

The Guideline defines “carjacking” as taking or attempting to take a vehicle “from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation.” Applying Kimble’s test, the panel held the enhancement applied because Victim-2 was sufficiently near her vehicle to retain control of it but for the defendants’ intimidation with firearms. The opinion underscores that “presence” does not require the victim to be in the driver’s seat or touching the car; it is enough that the vehicle is accessible and within the victim’s practical control absent coercion.

Impact

Abduction enhancement clarity in “room-to-vehicle” scenarios: Even under Whatley’s cautious, case-specific approach, moving a victim from an interior room to an exterior area and toward a vehicle is likely to be treated as movement to a “different location,” especially where it facilitates escape.
Carjacking “presence” remains functional, not formalistic: By leaning on Kimble, the opinion reinforces that courts in the Eleventh Circuit will look to practical accessibility and control—so victims threatened near where their car is parked may satisfy the “presence” element even when physically separated by short distance or elevation (e.g., viewing the lot from a nearby vantage point).
Sentencing practice point: The panel’s acceptance of implicit factfinding signals that, when objections are litigated and overruled after evidence and argument, appellate courts may treat the district court as having adopted the PSR facts supporting enhancements, reducing the traction of procedural challenges based solely on the absence of detailed on-the-record findings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Procedural unreasonableness: A sentencing error about process—for example, miscalculating the Guideline range or relying on wrong facts—rather than a claim that the sentence is too long or too short in light of § 3553(a).
Guidelines “enhancement”: A rule that increases the offense level (and typically the advisory sentencing range) when certain aggravating facts are found (e.g., abduction, carjacking).
“Abducted” (U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A)): Not limited to kidnapping in the everyday sense; it is satisfied when a victim is forced to accompany the offender to a “different location,” including movement into or toward a getaway vehicle to facilitate escape.
Carjacking “from the person or presence”: A functional proximity concept: the car must be close enough to be within the victim’s reach, inspection, or control, such that the victim could maintain control absent intimidation or violence.

Conclusion

United States v. Alvis Alexander Briceno-Yajures affirms a Guidelines application that treats (1) forcing a victim from an interior room down stairs toward a vehicle as an “abduction” to a “different location,” and (2) taking a vehicle at gunpoint when the victim is nearby and would otherwise be able to control the car as a “carjacking” from the victim’s “presence.” Even as an unpublished decision, the opinion consolidates two practical sentencing takeaways in the Eleventh Circuit: “different location” is satisfied by meaningful movement toward escape, and “presence” is measured by accessible control rather than physical contact with the vehicle.