Private Landlord’s Call to Police Does Not Create § 1983 State Action; FHA/ADA Claims Require Plausible Discriminatory Animus and Retaliatory Nexus

1. Introduction

In Dickerson v. BPP PCV Owners LLC (2d Cir. Mar. 16, 2026) (summary order), the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of federal civil-rights and housing-discrimination claims brought by Gloria D. Dickerson, a pro se tenant residing at Peter Cooper Village in Manhattan, against BPP PCV Owners LLC (“BPP”), the property owner.

The dispute arose from a November 2020 incident in which a building safety officer accused Dickerson—a 72-year-old Black woman at the time—of taking a jewelry box allegedly seen on security footage. The officer called the NYPD; police responded but made no arrest or charges. Dickerson later learned that another individual (a neighbor’s caregiver) had removed the cabinet from the trash room.

The key issues on appeal were whether Dickerson plausibly alleged (i) “state action” to support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, (ii) intentional discrimination or retaliation under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), (iii) disability discrimination under the ADA, and (iv) whether the district court appropriately declined supplemental jurisdiction over state and local claims once federal claims were dismissed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • § 1983: Dismissal affirmed because BPP is a private entity and Dickerson did not plausibly allege a “close nexus” between BPP’s conduct and the State. A private security officer’s decision to call the police did not convert private conduct into state action.
  • FHA discrimination: Dismissal affirmed because the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) did not plausibly allege intentional race-based discrimination; the allegations suggested a mistaken identification based on resemblance to video footage rather than racial animus.
  • FHA retaliation: Dismissal affirmed because the SAC did not allege protected activity (e.g., prior complaints) or a causal connection between protected activity and the challenged conduct.
  • ADA: Dismissal affirmed because the original complaint did not allege the elements of an ADA discrimination claim.
  • Supplemental jurisdiction: Once all federal claims failed, the district court acted within its discretion in declining jurisdiction over remaining state/local claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

The Second Circuit also noted Dickerson’s appellate focus on “elder abuse,” but did not address it as a claim because it was not pleaded below.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Supplemental jurisdiction and dismissal posture

The panel’s discussion of how state-law claims should be treated after federal claims are dismissed relied on Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2006). Kolari stands for the practical point that when a federal court should decline supplemental jurisdiction, the appropriate disposition of state claims is generally dismissal without prejudice—preserving the plaintiff’s ability to pursue them in state court. Here, the district court dismissed federal claims with prejudice but dismissed state/local claims without prejudice, aligning with Kolari.

Pleading review standards and pro se construction

The court reiterated de novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and the obligation to draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, citing Moreira v. Société Générale, S.A., 125 F.4th 371 (2d Cir. 2025). It also emphasized liberal construction of pro se pleadings, citing Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159 (2d Cir. 2024), underscoring that even with generous reading, complaints must still plausibly plead the elements of a recognized legal claim.

§ 1983 “state action” requirement for private actors

The opinion framed the § 1983 inquiry through McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2014), which states that a plaintiff must allege a violation of federal rights committed “under color of state law.” It then applied the “close nexus” formulation from Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass'n, FA, 396 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2005), requiring sufficiently intertwined state involvement to treat private conduct as state conduct.

Critically, the panel relied on Ginsberg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 1999), for the principle that summoning police (or providing information to police) generally does not transform a private party into a state actor. That precedent controlled the key factual theory Dickerson advanced—i.e., that calling the NYPD “state-ified” the officer’s conduct.

FHA coverage and post-acquisition conduct

The panel assumed—without deciding—that the FHA could reach “post-acquisition” conduct (events occurring after the tenant has obtained housing), citing Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 992 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2021) (en banc), which expressly reserved decision on the extent of FHA coverage for such conduct. The assumption allowed the court to bypass a thorny doctrinal boundary and resolve the case on pleading sufficiency: even if the statute applies, this complaint did not plausibly allege intentional discrimination.

FHA retaliation elements

For retaliation, the court applied Gilead Comm. Servs., Inc. v. Town of Cromwell, 112 F.4th 93 (2d Cir. 2024), requiring (1) an adverse action, and (2) a causal connection between protected activity and that adverse action. The panel held the SAC deficient because it omitted allegations of protected activity (such as prior discrimination complaints) and omitted facts supporting causation.

ADA prima facie elements

The ADA analysis proceeded under Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomedical Scis., 804 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2015), which sets out a basic prima facie framework: qualified individual with a disability, defendant subject to the ADA, and denial of benefits or discrimination by reason of disability. The court affirmed dismissal because Dickerson’s original complaint contained no factual allegations directed to those elements.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) § 1983: the boundary between private disputes and constitutional torts

The court treated the “state action” element as dispositive. Dickerson alleged wrongdoing by a private landlord and its security staff. Without facts showing that the State was responsible for, jointly participated in, or compelled the challenged action, § 1983 does not apply. The officer’s call to police did not supply the missing “close nexus” because law enforcement response to a private report is routine and does not—without more—make the reporter a state actor.

(b) FHA discrimination: pleading intentional discrimination rather than unfairness or mistake

Even assuming FHA applicability to post-acquisition conduct, the panel required plausible allegations of intentional discrimination “because of race.” The SAC’s narrative—an accusation based on security footage and resemblance—did not plausibly support an inference that race, rather than misidentification, drove the accusation. The court thus treated the pleading as describing a harmful incident, but not one that crossed the statutory threshold for race-based housing discrimination.

(c) FHA retaliation: missing protected activity and causation

The court drew a sharp line between assertions made in motion practice and allegations contained in the operative complaint. Although Dickerson previously argued in opposition papers that BPP retaliated for prior complaints, the SAC did not include those facts. Under Gilead Comm. Servs., Inc. v. Town of Cromwell, the absence of pleaded protected activity and causal linkage required dismissal.

(d) ADA: element-by-element pleading remains necessary

The panel affirmed dismissal because the complaint did not allege disability status, qualification, coverage, or discriminatory denial of services because of disability. The reasoning reflects a consistent theme: liberal construction for pro se litigants does not substitute for pleading the essential elements.

(e) Supplemental jurisdiction: federal courts as courts of limited jurisdiction

After federal claims were dismissed, the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Second Circuit found no abuse of discretion, reinforcing the common practice that state and local civil-rights claims (NYSHRL/NYCHRL) ordinarily belong in state court once the federal anchor claims fall at an early stage.

3.3. Impact

  • Reinforcement of the “call-the-police” principle in § 1983 cases: The order underscores that private parties typically do not become state actors merely by reporting suspected wrongdoing and requesting police assistance. This remains a recurring pleading pitfall in landlord-tenant and security-dispute litigation framed as constitutional claims.
  • FHA pleading discipline for tenant “post-acquisition” disputes: By assuming applicability yet dismissing for lack of discriminatory animus, the decision signals that even if post-acquisition FHA claims are viable in theory, plaintiffs must still plead facts supporting an inference of discrimination “because of” protected status—not merely adverse treatment, error, or hostility.
  • Retaliation claims must be anchored in the complaint: The decision highlights that protected activity and causation must be pleaded in the operative complaint; arguments in briefs cannot cure omissions.
  • Strategic consequence for NYSHRL/NYCHRL claims: The affirmance of declining supplemental jurisdiction indicates that plaintiffs with primarily state/local discrimination theories should anticipate litigating in state court if federal claims are weak.

Because this is a Second Circuit summary order, it is expressly non-precedential; its practical influence is chiefly persuasive and instructional rather than binding.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“State action” / “under color of state law” (§ 1983)
Constitutional-rights lawsuits under § 1983 generally target government conduct. A private landlord is not automatically subject to § 1983. The plaintiff must show the private actor’s conduct is fairly attributable to the State (for example, joint action with police beyond a routine report, or state compulsion).
“Close nexus” (attribution to the State)
A demanding connection between the State and the challenged conduct—more than indirect effects or the fact that police were involved after the fact.
FHA “intentional discrimination”
It is not enough to allege unfair treatment. The complaint must support a plausible inference that the adverse action occurred because of race (or another protected characteristic).
FHA retaliation
Retaliation requires (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity (like complaining about discrimination), (2) the defendant took adverse action, and (3) the adverse action was because of the protected activity.
Supplemental jurisdiction
Federal courts may hear related state-law claims when there is a valid federal claim. If the federal claim is dismissed early, courts often dismiss state claims without prejudice so they can be pursued in state court.

5. Conclusion

Dickerson v. BPP PCV Owners LLC reaffirms core gatekeeping doctrines in civil-rights and housing-discrimination litigation: (i) private landlords do not become § 1983 defendants simply by calling the police; (ii) FHA discrimination claims require plausible allegations of race-based intent, not merely accusation or mistake; (iii) FHA retaliation claims must plead protected activity and causation; (iv) ADA claims must allege the statute’s basic elements; and (v) when federal claims fail, federal courts may—and often should—decline supplemental jurisdiction over NYSHRL/NYCHRL and related state/local claims.