Date: May 7, 2026

Denial of Serious Mental Illness as “Untreatable” Condition Justifying Termination Without Less Restrictive Alternatives (In re A.P.)

1. Introduction

In re A.P. (No. 25-798) is a memorandum decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirming the Circuit Court of Cabell County’s order terminating the parental rights of petitioner mother M.S. to her minor child A.P.. The case began with a DHS petition (April 2023) alleging abuse and neglect, grounded in reports of extreme domestic violence and—most prominently—mother’s erratic and paranoid behavior (identity-theft delusions, fear of being harmed, fixation on “cloned” phones, and escalating communications with CPS).

The central appellate issues were whether the circuit court (1) improperly relied on allegedly “outdated and unreliable” psychological evidence, (2) wrongly credited the former CPS worker’s testimony, and (3) failed to consider less restrictive dispositional alternatives before terminating. The Supreme Court rejected each contention and affirmed.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the circuit court did not err in terminating parental rights where the evidentiary record supported findings that the mother continued to deny and minimize serious mental-health concerns, lacked insight into the depth of her condition, and posed an ongoing safety risk to a very young child. Although the mother claimed compliance with services, the Court emphasized that compliance is only one factor; the controlling standard is the child’s best interests. The Court further held that where there is “no reasonable likelihood” of correction, termination may occur without less restrictive alternatives.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011): The Court applied the settled appellate standards in abuse/neglect appeals—review of factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. This framework anchored the Court’s refusal to re-try the case on appeal.
State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 669 n.9, 461 S.E.2d 163, 175 n.9 (1995): Cited for the proposition that an appellate court may not weigh evidence. The mother’s argument essentially asked the Supreme Court to prefer her testimony about improvement over the psychological evaluation and CPS testimony; Guthrie foreclosed that approach.
Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 201 W. Va. 381, 388, 497 S.E.2d 531, 538 (1997): Used to reinforce deference to the trier of fact on credibility determinations. The Court declined to reassess credibility of the mother’s uncorroborated claims of stability and treatment efficacy.
In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 217, 599 S.E.2d 631, 640 (2004)): The Court invoked the key principle that “[f]ailure to acknowledge the existence of the problem . . . results in making the problem untreatable.” This became the doctrinal centerpiece justifying the circuit court’s “no reasonable likelihood” finding.
Syl. Pt. 4, In re B.H., 233 W. Va. 57, 754 S.E.2d 743 (2014): The Court emphasized that improvement-period compliance is not dispositive; the “controlling standard” in disposition remains the best interests of the child. This neutralized the mother’s argument that participation in services should have prevented termination.
Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980), as quoted in Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011): These authorities supply the rule that termination “may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives” when there is no reasonable likelihood that conditions can be substantially corrected. The Court used this line of cases to reject the mother’s “less restrictive alternatives” argument.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) The Court treated the mother’s “stale evidence” argument as an impermissible request to reweigh proof.
The mother attacked the circuit court’s reliance on the Saar Psychological evaluation, calling it “outdated and unreliable.” But the Supreme Court framed the argument as a request for appellate reweighing and substitution of judgment, which is barred by State v. Guthrie. It also noted the mother’s evidentiary posture: her claimed improvement was supported primarily by her own testimony, while the psychological evidence included concerns that she would conceal symptoms and minimize the impact of delusional beliefs.

(b) Credibility and corroboration mattered—especially given the mother’s admissions.
The Court highlighted that the mother admitted she was not truthful during her Prestera evaluation (“I wasn’t revealing all my cards”), and the evaluator warned she would be motivated to conceal her beliefs from CPS and the court. Against that backdrop, the circuit court’s skepticism of uncorroborated testimony was not error, and the Supreme Court would not second-guess the circuit court’s credibility calls under Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C.

(c) The former CPS worker’s testimony was not “early stage” evidence.
The Court rejected the mother’s assertion that the CPS worker only observed early behavior. The worker remained on the case until July 2025 (three months before disposition), listened to the mother’s dispositional testimony, and opined that the mother still failed to acknowledge her issues.

(d) The doctrinal pivot: denial of the problem renders it “untreatable.”
The Court treated the mother’s insistence that she had no diagnosis (and that domestic violence was the only issue) as legally significant: it supported the finding that she could not substantially correct conditions because she would not acknowledge the behavioral health needs identified by the parental fitness evaluation. The Court expressly anchored this in In re Timber M. (quoting In re Charity H.).

(e) Service participation did not override best interests or “no reasonable likelihood.”
Even assuming participation in therapy, medication management, parenting education, and visitation, the Supreme Court relied on Syl. Pt. 4, In re B.H. to stress that compliance is only one factor. The circuit court’s focus on child safety, ongoing risk from untreated or unacknowledged mental illness, and instability (including visit problems) fell within the best-interests standard.

(f) Less restrictive alternatives were not required after the “no reasonable likelihood” finding.
Once the circuit court found no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction, termination could be ordered without intermediate dispositions under In re R.J.M. as incorporated by In re Kristin Y. The Supreme Court treated the denial-driven lack of insight as evidencing persistent conditions that could not be corrected in a timeframe consistent with the child’s needs.

(g) Procedural rigor on appeal: record and pinpoint citations.
The decision also reflects strict enforcement of appellate rules where the petitioner failed to include key materials (e.g., adjudicatory transcript/order) and failed to provide record pinpoint citations to provider documents, implicating W. Va. R. App. P. 10(c)(7). While the Court did not dismiss the appeal, it limited its review to adequately supported arguments and the record before it.

3.3. Impact

This decision reinforces several practical rules likely to shape future abuse-and-neglect litigation in West Virginia:

Denial/minimization as dispositive evidence of non-correctability. Where a parent persistently rejects a diagnosed condition central to the case plan, courts may treat that rejection itself as supporting a finding of “no reasonable likelihood” of correction, even when the parent technically “participates” in services.
Psychological evaluations retain probative force when the risk is chronic and the denial persists. Labeling an evaluation “stale” may fail if the record shows continued symptom-patterns (or continued denial) consistent with the evaluation’s risk narrative—particularly when the evaluator cautions about concealment and poor insight.
Compliance is not rehabilitation. The case underscores that attendance and participation are not equivalent to meaningful remediation, especially when best interests and safety concerns remain.
Appellate outcomes are heavily shaped by the appendix record. Self-representation does not relax the need for transcripts, orders, and pinpoint record citations; failure to supply them narrows appellate review and can be fatal to nuanced evidentiary challenges.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Improvement period: A court-ordered window during which a parent is offered services (therapy, classes, visitation, drug screening, etc.) to try to correct conditions of abuse/neglect. Completing tasks is important, but the key question remains whether the underlying safety problems are actually corrected.
Disposition / dispositional hearing: The phase where the court decides the child’s permanent legal outcome (return home, guardianship, termination, etc.) after considering the evidence of correction, risk, and best interests.
“No reasonable likelihood that conditions can be substantially corrected”: A statutory/decisional-law threshold that permits termination when the parent cannot fix the core problems in a timeframe consistent with the child’s welfare. Here, persistent denial of serious mental illness was treated as a key driver of non-correctability.
Less restrictive alternatives: Options short of termination (e.g., extended improvement period, guardianship, custody to a relative). Under In re R.J.M./In re Kristin Y., courts need not attempt these alternatives once “no reasonable likelihood” is found.
Clear error vs. de novo review: “Clear error” means the appellate court defers to the trial judge’s factual findings unless they are plainly wrong. “De novo” means the appellate court independently reviews legal conclusions. Abuse-and-neglect appeals are often decided on deference to fact-finding and credibility.

5. Conclusion

In re A.P. consolidates a familiar but sharpened principle: when a parent refuses to acknowledge the core condition driving abuse/neglect— particularly a serious mental-health condition identified by evaluators—courts may deem the problem effectively “untreatable,” supporting a finding of no reasonable likelihood of correction. In that posture, termination may be ordered without less restrictive alternatives, and service participation alone will not outweigh best interests and safety. The decision also stands as a cautionary appellate lesson: incomplete records and unsupported citations significantly constrain review, especially for self-represented litigants.