Demolition Debris Transport on Stairs: No § 240(1) Staircase “Safety Device”; Triable Issue Whether a Trash Can Qualifies as a 23-3.3(e) “Bucket” and Whether § 200 Defendants Negate Both Premises-Condition and Means-and-Methods Theories

Introduction

In Chavez v 127 Eckford Bay, LLC (2026 NY Slip Op 02817 [249 AD3d 673] [2d Dept May 6, 2026]), the Appellate Division, Second Department addressed a demolition worker’s fall on a wet, muddy permanent staircase while he transported debris in a broken 40-gallon trash can down from the second floor to the first.

Parties. Plaintiff Jorge Parrales Chavez was a demolition laborer employed by CPJR Improvement Corp. The building owner was 127 Eckford Bay, LLC, and the general contractor was DPC New York, Inc.

Core issues. The appeal centered on (i) whether the fall on a permanent stairway during debris transport constituted an elevation-related hazard covered by Labor Law § 240(1); (ii) whether Industrial Code provisions supported § 241(6) liability—specifically 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) (slipping hazards) and 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(e) (methods for removing debris during hand demolition); and (iii) whether the owner and general contractor were entitled to dismissal of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims where plaintiff alleged both a dangerous premises condition (wet/muddy/debris-strewn stairs) and unsafe means and methods (transporting heavy debris in a defective container down stairs).

Summary of the Opinion

  • Labor Law § 240(1): Dismissal affirmed. The permanent staircase was a normal appurtenance of the building, not a protective device designed to shield the worker from an elevation-related risk.
  • Labor Law § 241(6) – 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d): Dismissal affirmed. The debris on which plaintiff slipped was an integral part of the ongoing demolition work; therefore, the regulation did not apply on these facts.
  • Labor Law § 241(6) – 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(e): Dismissal reversed. Neither side established, as a matter of law, whether the trash can was the equivalent of a “bucket” under the regulation; triable issues also existed regarding alleged defectiveness of the trash can. Plaintiff was not awarded summary judgment; the claim survives for fact-finding.
  • Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence: Dismissal reversed. Because plaintiff’s allegations implicated both a premises condition and the means and methods of the work, defendants were required on summary judgment to negate triable issues under both standards, which they failed to do.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Labor Law § 240(1): gravity-related risk and the role of safety devices

  • Wilinski v 334 E. 92nd Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 18 NY3d 1 (2011) and Misseritti v Mark IV Constr. Co., 86 NY2d 487 (1995): cited for the “reasonably preventable, gravity-related accidents” framework and the statute’s focus on failures to provide adequate protection.
  • Lemus v New York B Realty Corp., 186 AD3d 1351 (2020) and Carlton v City of New York, 161 AD3d 930 (2018): used to reinforce that § 240(1) does not cover every workplace peril merely connected to gravity in a tangential sense.
  • Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599 (2009) (quoting Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494 (1993)): invoked for the principle that the harm must “directly flow” from gravity’s force acting on a person or object and from the inadequacy of an enumerated/protective device.
  • Salazar v Novalex Contr. Corp., 18 NY3d 134 (2011) (quoting Broggy v Rockefeller Group, Inc., 8 NY3d 675 (2007)): cited for the controlling inquiry: whether the task creates an “elevation-related risk” of the kind the listed devices protect against.
  • Verdi v SP Irving Owner, LLC, 227 AD3d 932 (2024); Sullivan v New York Athletic Club of City of N.Y., 162 AD3d 955 (2018); Linkowski v City of New York, 33 AD3d 971 (2006): relied upon to hold that a permanent staircase is generally a building appurtenance, not a § 240(1) “safety device.”

2) Labor Law § 241(6): Industrial Code specificity and applicability

  • Guaman v 178 Ct. St., LLC, 200 AD3d 655 (2021): cited for the rule that § 241(6) liability requires a violation of an applicable, specific Industrial Code provision that proximately causes injury.
  • Moye v Alphonse Hotel Corp., 205 AD3d 907 (2022); Martinez v 281 Broadway Holdings, LLC, 183 AD3d 712 (2020); Castillo v Big Apple Hyundai, 177 AD3d 473 (2019): applied to the “integral to the work” doctrine under 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d), defeating claims where the slipping hazard is the byproduct of ongoing work.
  • Rivas-Pichardo v 292 Fifth Ave. Holdings, LLC, 198 AD3d 826 (2021): used to frame the dispositive factual uncertainty under 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(e): whether the receptacle used is the equivalent of a “bucket” contemplated by the regulation.

3) Labor Law § 200 / common-law negligence: dual standards and summary judgment burdens

  • Modugno v Bovis Lend Lease Interiors, Inc., 184 AD3d 820 (2020) and Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343 (1998): cited for the foundational proposition that § 200 codifies the common-law duty to provide a safe workplace.
  • Medina-Arana v Henry St. Prop. Holdings, LLC, 186 AD3d 1666 (2020): used for the “two broad categories” framework: (i) dangerous premises conditions (creation/notice) and (ii) means and methods (supervision/control).
  • Fonck v City of New York, 198 AD3d 874 (2021) (quoting Hansen v Trustees of M.E. Church of Glen Cove, 51 AD3d 725 (2008)), with references to Gasper v Ford Motor Co., 13 NY2d 104 (1963) and Vitale v Astoria Energy II, LLC, 180 AD3d 1104 (2020): cited for limits on § 200 where hazards are inherent in the work or where the employee is hired to repair the very defect.
  • McLean v Studebaker Bros. Co. of New York, 221 NY 475 (1917), and Monahan v New York City Dept. of Educ., 47 AD3d 690 (2008): referenced for the principle that an owner is not generally required to protect a worker from open and obvious conditions readily observable by reasonable use of the senses.
  • Moscati v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 168 AD3d 717 (2019) and Robles v Taconic Mgt. Co., LLC, 173 AD3d 1089 (2019): pivotal to the court’s holding—when both premises-condition and means-and-methods theories are implicated, a summary judgment movant must address both.
  • Rodriguez v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 191 AD3d 1026 (2021) (quoting Reyes v Arco Wentworth Mgt. Corp., 83 AD3d 47 (2011)): quoted for the stringent burden in “mixed” cases: the movant must exonerate itself as a matter of law for all potential concurrent causes under both liability standards.
  • Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 (1985): cited to emphasize that if a movant fails to make a prima facie showing, summary judgment must be denied regardless of the opponent’s papers.

Legal Reasoning

A. Why § 240(1) failed: a permanent stairway is not the protective device contemplated by the statute

The court treated plaintiff’s accident as a slip-and-fall on a permanent staircase—an ordinary building feature—rather than a gravity-device failure. Applying the Runner/Ross framework, the Second Department focused on whether an enumerated (or equivalent) safety device proved inadequate to shield plaintiff from a gravity-related risk. It concluded that the stairway itself was not a safety device and therefore could not be analyzed as “inadequate” within § 240(1)’s purpose. Consistent with Verdi v SP Irving Owner, LLC, Sullivan v New York Athletic Club of City of N.Y., and Linkowski v City of New York, the claim was dismissed.

B. Why 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) failed: the “integral to the work” doctrine

Although 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) addresses slipping hazards caused by substances and conditions creating slick footing, the court held it inapplicable because the hazard identified—demolition debris on the stairs—was an integral byproduct of the demolition work underway. Under Moye v Alphonse Hotel Corp., Martinez v 281 Broadway Holdings, LLC, and Castillo v Big Apple Hyundai, a worker cannot convert ordinary worksite accumulation inherent in the ongoing task into an Industrial Code violation under 23-1.7(d).

C. Why 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(e) survived: unresolved “bucket equivalency” and defective receptacle questions

The court treated 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(e) as potentially applicable because it specifically governs removal of debris when hand demolition is being performed, listing permitted means (chutes, buckets/hoists, or compliant floor openings). The key gap in the summary judgment record was categorical: neither side established whether the 40-gallon trash can used to move debris down the stairs was the equivalent of a “bucket” within the regulation, as highlighted by Rivas-Pichardo v 292 Fifth Ave. Holdings, LLC.

The court also identified triable issues regarding whether the trash can was defective (plaintiff described it as broken and unwieldy). Those factual uncertainties prevented dismissal—and also prevented awarding plaintiff summary judgment—leaving the 23-3.3(e) theory for trial-level resolution.

D. Why § 200/common-law negligence dismissal was improper: mixed-theory claims require movants to negate both standards

Plaintiff’s account implicated both (1) a potentially dangerous premises condition (wet/muddy stairs with debris) and (2) potentially unsafe means and methods (the procedure and equipment used to transport heavy debris—walking backwards down stairs with a broken container). Under Medina-Arana v Henry St. Prop. Holdings, LLC and Modugno v Bovis Lend Lease Interiors, Inc., liability could turn on notice/creation (premises condition) and/or supervision/control (means and methods).

The Second Department applied Moscati v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. and Robles v Taconic Mgt. Co., LLC to hold that where both theories are in play, a defendant seeking summary judgment must address both. Quoting Rodriguez v Metropolitan Transp. Auth. (which in turn quotes Reyes v Arco Wentworth Mgt. Corp.), the court required exoneration “for all potential concurrent causes.”

Defendants failed to eliminate triable issues as to (i) their authority to supervise the work, (ii) their actual or constructive notice of the stair condition, and (iii) whether the condition was unavoidable and inherent in the demolition. Under Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., that failure was fatal to their motion regardless of plaintiff’s opposition.

Impact

  • Reinforces limits on § 240(1) for staircase falls. The decision adds to Second Department authority that a fall on a permanent stairway during construction activities—without a qualifying safety-device failure—remains outside § 240(1), even if the worker was descending with heavy materials.
  • Sharpens the “integral to the work” defense under 23-1.7(d). By treating demolition debris on the stairs as integral to ongoing demolition, the court confirms that plaintiffs must identify a slipping hazard not merely generated by the work itself (or must proceed under a different, applicable code provision).
  • Meaningful litigation pathway under 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(e). The court’s focus on whether a trash can is the “equivalent of a bucket” signals that debris-transport container choice (and its condition) can be outcome-determinative. Owners/contractors may face trial exposure when debris is hand-removed in improvised receptacles and the record is undeveloped on regulatory equivalency.
  • Summary judgment discipline in mixed § 200 cases. The opinion is a practical reminder that defendants must build a record negating both premises-condition and means-and-methods theories when both are implicated—addressing supervision/control, as well as creation/notice and the “inherent hazard” argument.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Labor Law § 240(1) (“Scaffold Law”)
A worker-protection statute imposing “absolute liability” when a worker is injured because required elevation-safety devices (like certain ladders, scaffolds, hoists, etc.) were missing or inadequate, and that failure caused a gravity-related accident of the kind the statute targets.
Elevation-related risk
A risk stemming from working at height or with objects that can fall or cause harm due to gravity, in a way that safety devices are meant to prevent (not every fall on a site).
Labor Law § 241(6)
Creates a nondelegable duty for owners/contractors to comply with specific Industrial Code rules. A plaintiff must point to a concrete regulation that applies and show the violation proximately caused the injury.
12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d)
An Industrial Code rule aimed at “slipping hazards.” Courts often reject it when the slippery/dirty condition is simply an unavoidable byproduct integral to the work underway.
12 NYCRR 23-3.3(e)
A demolition-specific rule about how debris must be removed during hand demolition (e.g., chutes, buckets/hoists, or compliant floor openings). Here, whether the receptacle used counts as a “bucket” was a disputed, case-critical fact.
Labor Law § 200 / common-law negligence
The general duty to provide a safe workplace. Liability can be based on either (i) a dangerous premises condition (requiring creation or actual/constructive notice), or (ii) unsafe means and methods (requiring authority to supervise/control the work).
Summary judgment / prima facie showing
A pretrial ruling granted only when the moving party shows there is no triable issue of fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the movant fails to make that initial showing, the motion is denied even if the opponent’s response is weak.

Conclusion

Chavez v 127 Eckford Bay, LLC delivers three practical holdings for New York construction litigation: (1) a slip-and-fall on a permanent staircase during debris transport does not, without more, trigger § 240(1); (2) 23-1.7(d) will not apply where the slipping hazard is integral to the ongoing demolition work; but (3) demolition debris-removal practices can still generate § 241(6) exposure under 23-3.3(e) when the receptacle’s regulatory status (bucket equivalency) and condition (defectiveness) are factually disputed.

Equally significant, the decision underscores that in “mixed” Labor Law § 200 cases, defendants seeking summary judgment must negate both premises-condition and means-and-methods theories. Failure to address either side of that liability framework leaves triable issues for a jury.