Demand-for-Cash Rule: A Bank-Robbery Demand Alone Establishes “Intimidation” Under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)

1. Introduction

Over roughly two weeks in fall 2023, Keith Bernard Miller entered four financial institutions (three credit unions and one bank) and presented tellers with written notes demanding cash, typically with instructions such as “No dye packs” and requests that the note be returned. Two incidents ended without money; two ended with Miller receiving cash and leaving.

After a jury trial in the Southern District of Florida, Miller was convicted of two counts of attempted credit-union robbery by intimidation, one count of credit-union robbery by intimidation, and one count of bank robbery by intimidation, all under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). His consolidated appeal challenged only the sufficiency of the evidence on the “intimidation” element, characterizing his conduct as mere “polite” demands lacking threats and noting that not all tellers felt immediate fear.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It reiterated that “intimidation” in § 2113(a) is judged objectively—whether an ordinary person in the teller’s position could reasonably infer a threat of bodily harm from the defendant’s acts—rather than by the teller’s subjective reaction.

Because Miller undisputedly presented demand notes seeking bank money in each incident, the court held the evidence was sufficient on the intimidation element for all completed and attempted counts, and the district court properly denied Miller’s Rule 29 motion.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is built on two layers: (1) established Eleventh Circuit (and former Fifth Circuit) doctrine defining “intimidation” objectively, and (2) persuasive sister-circuit authority crystallizing a “demand alone” theory of intimidation.

1) Binding Eleventh Circuit / former Fifth Circuit framework

• United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 497 (11th Cir. 2011): Supplied the appellate lens for sufficiency review—de novo review, evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and deference to reasonable jury inferences.
• United States v. Kelley, 412 F.3d 1240, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2005): Provided the core definition used here: intimidation exists when an ordinary person in the teller’s position could reasonably infer a threat of bodily harm. Kelley also underscored the objective nature of the inquiry and the limited role of actual intent to intimidate for completed robbery.
• United States v. Cornillie, 92 F.3d 1108, 1110 (11th Cir. 1996): Reinforced that compliance out of fear supports intimidation and that the standard is objective.
• United States v. Graham, 931 F.2d 1442–43 (11th Cir. 1991): A key factual analogue. Graham held intimidation may exist even without a weapon, force, or verbal threats, and found intimidation where a demand note (including “Thank you.”) was paired with “glares and stares.”
• United States v. Jacquillon, 469 F.2d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 1972): Defined intimidation as “to make fearful or to put into fear,” adopted as binding in the Eleventh Circuit via Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

2) Persuasive sister-circuit authority and the “demand alone” rule

The decisive move in Miller is the court’s express adoption of the Sixth Circuit’s logic that the demand itself carries an “implicit threat” of harm if the teller does not comply.

• United States v. Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398, 402–03 (6th Cir. 2002): The opinion found Gilmore “persuasive” and adopted its reasoning: demands for money “carry with them an implicit threat” because tellers cannot reliably assess the risk in the moment, and the “or else” is understood in the robbery context. Gilmore itself relied on United States v. Robinson, 527 F.2d 1170, 1172 (6th Cir. 1975), emphasizing how ordinary tellers reasonably perceive robbery demands.
• The panel also highlighted the broader consensus reflected in Gilmore’s collection of cases:
  • United States v. Clark, 227 F.3d 771, 773–775 (7th Cir. 2000)
  • United States v. Hopkins, 703 F.2d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 1983)
  • United States v. Henson, 945 F.2d 430, 439 (1st Cir. 1991)
  • United States v. Ketchum, 550 F.3d 363, 367 (4th Cir. 2008)
  • United States v. Smith, 950 F.3d 893, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
  • United States v. Andrews, 337 F. App'x 227, 231 (3d Cir. 2009)
• The court also cited United States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d 312, 315 (5th Cir. 1987) to rebut the notion that intimidation requires an express threat or weapon display.

3) Limiting illustrations: intimidation is not “superfluous”

Responding to Miller’s argument that a demand-alone rule collapses the intimidation element, the court emphasized that § 2113(a) still excludes some conduct:

• United States v. Wagstaff, 865 F.2d 626, 627, 629 (4th Cir. 1989): No intimidation where the defendant took money from an open cash drawer while saying nothing, producing no note, and making no threatening gestures.
• Attempt cases can fail where the defendant has no interaction implying threat:
  • United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 750 (7th Cir. 2008)
  • United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 451–56 (5th Cir. 2004)

4) Attempt doctrine emphasized

• United States v. Jockisch, 857 F.3d 1122, 1129 (11th Cir. 2017): Supplied the general attempt test (specific intent + substantial step).
• United States v. Armstrong, 122 F.4th 1278, 1289–91 (11th Cir. 2024): Confirmed that attempted bank robbery under § 2113(a) includes as an element the use of “force and violence, or by intimidation,” tying attempt liability to proof of intended intimidation.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in four steps.

1. Define the intimidation inquiry as objective. Using Kelley (quoting Cornillie) and Jacquillon, the panel reaffirmed that intimidation is present if an ordinary teller could reasonably infer a threat of bodily harm—regardless of whether the defendant subjectively intended intimidation (for completed robbery) or whether a teller subjectively felt fear in the moment.
2. Reject a “weapon/explicit threat” requirement. Citing Graham and Higdon, the court made clear that intimidation can exist without force, violence, a weapon, or verbal threats.
3. Adopt a categorical evidentiary inference in the robbery context. The opinion’s key doctrinal move is adopting Gilmore’s premise: a demand for money at a bank counter is inherently coercive because the “or else” is implied, tellers cannot safely test whether the robber is bluffing, and banks train tellers to comply quickly precisely due to the risk of violence. The court supported this with banking protocol realities and a U.S. Department of Justice policing guide noting standardized compliance policies.
4. Apply the new rule to the undisputed facts. Because Miller presented demand notes at each institution, the jury had sufficient evidence of intimidation for all four counts. The panel therefore affirmed the denial of the Rule 29 motion and the convictions.

Notably, the court did not rest its decision on “extra” conduct (e.g., staring, “I can see you doing that,” “I’ll be back,” or reaching behind his back), even though those facts would likely satisfy intimidation under existing Eleventh Circuit cases such as Graham. Instead, it announced a broader evidentiary principle: the demand itself is enough.

C. Impact

• Lower threshold for proving intimidation in the Eleventh Circuit. Prosecutors can now satisfy the intimidation element of § 2113(a) by focusing on the existence of a demand for cash—written or verbal—without needing to prove explicit threats, weapons, or overtly menacing behavior.
• Greater doctrinal uniformity with other circuits. By embracing United States v. Gilmore’s approach, the Eleventh Circuit moves closer to a multi-circuit consensus that robbery demands are inherently intimidating in context.
• Sharper line between robbery-by-intimidation and stealth theft. The opinion’s response to “superfluity” arguments indicates future litigation will concentrate on boundary cases: conduct lacking any demand or communicative act toward a teller (e.g., opportunistic drawer grabs) or attempt cases where no contact occurs (as in United States v. Thornton and United States v. Bellew).
• Attempt prosecutions may become easier where a demand is made. Because attempts require specific intent (per United States v. Jockisch and United States v. Armstrong), the use of a demand note will often function as strong circumstantial proof of both intent to intimidate and a substantial step.
• Defense strategy shifts. After Miller, “polite note/no explicit threat” defenses are significantly weakened. Challenges are more likely to target identity, substantial-step issues in attempt cases, or the absence of any demand/communication.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Intimidation” (objective, not subjective)

Under § 2113(a), intimidation does not require that the teller actually be terrified, nor that the robber explicitly threaten harm. The question is whether a reasonable teller in that situation could infer a threat of bodily harm from what the defendant did. Teller reactions are evidence, but they are not the legal test.

“Implicit threat” and the “or else” logic

An implicit threat is a threat communicated by context rather than words like “I’ll hurt you.” In a bank-counter confrontation, the demand “give me the money” is treated as carrying an understood “or else,” because refusing could trigger violence and the teller cannot safely verify the robber’s limits in real time.

Completed robbery vs. attempted robbery under § 2113(a)

A completed robbery conviction does not require proof that the defendant specifically intended to intimidate; it is enough that the conduct would intimidate a reasonable teller (per United States v. Kelley). By contrast, attempt liability requires specific intent plus a substantial step (per United States v. Jockisch), and United States v. Armstrong confirms that attempted bank robbery must still be “by intimidation” as an element.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Keith Bernard Miller establishes a clear Eleventh Circuit rule: in the bank-robbery context, a demand for cash—whether written or verbal, whether polite or overtly threatening—is itself sufficient evidence for a jury to find “intimidation” under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Rooted in the statute’s objective standard and the practical realities of teller compliance protocols, the decision aligns the Eleventh Circuit with a strong sister-circuit trend and meaningfully narrows the viability of “non-threatening demand” defenses, while leaving room for non-intimidating theft and no-contact attempt scenarios at the margins.