Deliberate-Ignorance Instruction Properly Given Where SBA Loan Fraud Evidence Shows Evasive Statements and “Sign, Sign, Sign” Avoidance of Loan Terms

Introduction

In United States v. Barrett Purvis (11th Cir. Aug. 17, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed convictions for wire fraud and money laundering arising from misuse of an SBA Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL). The SBA loan proceeds were contractually restricted to qualifying business “working capital” purposes, but the defendant spent substantial amounts on personal debts and gambling obligations.

The appeal centered on a single, recurring criminal-trial issue: whether the district court properly instructed the jury on deliberate ignorance (willful blindness) as an alternative means of proving the knowledge element. Purvis argued that only “actual knowledge” was in play and that the evidence did not support an inference that he consciously avoided learning the loan’s spending restrictions.

Summary of the Opinion

The court held that a deliberate-ignorance instruction was warranted because the trial evidence could support the inference that Purvis (1) was aware of a high probability that the loan could not be spent on personal expenses—especially gambling debt—and (2) purposely avoided confirming the restrictions.

Two categories of proof were decisive:

  • Evasive and shifting statements to investigators about how the proceeds were spent, which could reflect “consciousness of guilt.”
  • Conduct consistent with purposeful avoidance: delegating the online process to another person, reviewing only parts of the agreement, and electronically signing the documents within 32 seconds (“sign, sign, sign”).

Because the evidence could support either actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance (rather than “only actual knowledge or no knowledge”), the instruction was not error and the convictions were affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Morley

The panel treated United States v. Morley, 99 F.4th 1328 (11th Cir. 2024) as the controlling articulation of the deliberate-ignorance standard: the instruction is proper when the facts support an inference that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the pertinent fact and purposely contrived to avoid confirming it, so as to retain a defense later.

Morley also supplied the crucial limiting principle applied here: courts should not give the instruction when evidence points only to “actual knowledge or no knowledge,” but it is permissible when the proof could support either actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance and the jury is instructed on both. The Purvis panel’s holding is essentially an application of Morley’s “either-or” evidentiary threshold.

United States v. Stone and United States v. Steed

The opinion flagged an internal Eleventh Circuit tension on the standard of review for giving a deliberate-ignorance instruction, citing United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 1993) and United States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008). Stone applies de novo review; Steed applies a more deferential review.

The panel did not resolve the conflict because the outcome was the same under the standard more favorable to the defendant (de novo). Even so, the discussion is practically significant: it signals that litigants should continue to brief both standards in the Eleventh Circuit until the conflict is resolved in a published opinion (or en banc).

United States v. Eley

The panel relied on United States v. Eley, 723 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1984) for the proposition that false or shifting explanations can be considered by a jury as circumstantial evidence of “consciousness of guilt,” with the weight of that evidence left to the jury.

Eley supported the court’s inference that Purvis’s incremental admissions—only conceding the full gambling expenditures after being confronted with records—could indicate he knew (or strongly suspected) the spending was forbidden and was attempting to minimize culpability.

United States v. Calhoon

The court analogized Purvis’s conduct to the “hands-off manager” described in United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518 (11th Cir. 1996), where deliberate ignorance was supported by evidence that the defendant avoided learning specific details of improper Medicare reimbursement requests.

Calhoon served as the bridge from “suspicious behavior” to “purposeful contrivance”: delegating the mechanics of an application or billing process, while remaining willfully detached from key compliance terms, can support giving the instruction.

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning followed a two-step structure consistent with Morley:

  1. High probability awareness. The court found evidence from Purvis’s investigator interviews that a jury could infer he understood—at least at a high-probability level—that spending SBA disaster-loan proceeds on gambling debt and personal expenses was prohibited. His initial portrayal of expenditures as “gift cards, travel, and meals,” followed by reluctant, escalating admissions when confronted with casino-payment documentation, was treated as probative of guilty knowledge (or fear of confirming forbidden use).
  2. Purposeful avoidance. The court then identified evidence that Purvis “closed his eyes” to the restrictions: he enlisted a colleague to manage the online process; he admitted he did not read the agreement “with a fine tooth comb”; and the electronic record showed he opened and signed the agreement in only 32 seconds. The court treated this combination as sufficient for a jury to find deliberate avoidance of learning the loan’s use-of-proceeds restrictions.

Importantly, the panel emphasized the instruction’s limiting language: it does not allow conviction based on “negligence, carelessness or foolishness.” The appellate court viewed the evidence as exceeding mere inattentiveness and as supporting an inference of intentional avoidance.

Impact

  • SBA/EIDL fraud prosecutions. The decision underscores that willful blindness can be proved through a combination of (a) minimal or performative review of loan documents and (b) post hoc evasiveness when confronted. In disaster-loan cases—where terms are standardized and digitally executed—rapid execution and delegated completion can become central evidentiary themes.
  • Jury-instruction strategy. Prosecutors in the Eleventh Circuit can point to Purvis as an example where both actual-knowledge and deliberate-ignorance theories may go to the jury when the defendant claims lack of subjective awareness of contractual restrictions. Defendants, conversely, should expect that conceding non-reading (or “click-through” signing) plus suspicious spending patterns can open the door to the instruction.
  • Standards-of-review uncertainty. By expressly noting the Stone/Steed split and declining to resolve it, the opinion keeps alive an important appellate issue. Practically, panels may continue to affirm if the instruction survives under de novo review, reducing the likelihood that the standard-of-review question affects outcomes absent a closer evidentiary case.
  • Compliance and delegation risk. The reasoning reinforces a broader lesson in white-collar cases: delegating paperwork does not insulate a principal from “knowledge” when the principal signs attestations and then acts inconsistently with core restrictions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Deliberate ignorance / willful blindness: A substitute for actual knowledge. The government must show the defendant suspected the truth (high probability) and intentionally avoided confirming it so they could later claim ignorance.
  • Consciousness of guilt: Behavior suggesting a person knows they did something wrong—e.g., lying, changing stories, or minimizing facts when questioned. It is not direct proof by itself, but juries may treat it as circumstantial evidence of knowledge or intent.
  • “Actual knowledge” vs. “no knowledge” vs. “deliberate ignorance”:
    • Actual knowledge: the defendant truly knew the restriction.
    • No knowledge: the defendant truly did not know and had no reason to suspect.
    • Deliberate ignorance: the defendant strongly suspected and chose not to learn.
    The instruction is improper if the evidence supports only the first or only the second; it is proper if a reasonable jury could find either actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance.

Conclusion

United States v. Barrett Purvis affirms that, in the Eleventh Circuit, a deliberate-ignorance instruction may be given in SBA loan-fraud cases when the record supports both (1) an inference that the defendant suspected the existence of spending restrictions and (2) purposeful steps to avoid confirming them—such as perfunctory “click-through” signing and delegation coupled with evasive, shifting explanations to investigators. While unpublished and not binding precedent, the decision operationalizes Morley’s framework and illustrates how digital contracting behavior and post-investigation statements can jointly justify sending willful blindness to the jury.