B. Legal Reasoning
1. Trial commencement depends on substance, not merely jury entry
Rule 43(a)(2) generally requires a defendant’s presence at every trial stage, including jury empanelment. Rule 43(c) permits proceedings to continue in specified circumstances after an initially present defendant becomes voluntarily absent or is removed for disruptive behavior.
Asberry argued that he was removed before trial began and therefore did not satisfy the rule’s initial-presence condition. The court rejected his proposed dividing line between preliminary proceedings and the arrival of prospective jurors.
The proceedings addressed potential prejudice from jail clothing, Asberry’s refusal to participate, and his desire to represent himself. These subjects substantially affected how his defense would proceed. Under United States v. Kasali, they were sufficient to mark the beginning of trial for Rule 43 purposes.
Once initial presence was established, the court considered the justification for removal. Asberry refused to change from jail clothing, called several court officers “crooks,” and continued disruptive conduct despite a warning. The panel evaluated that course of conduct collectively. It did not hold that jail clothing or an isolated insult, standing alone, automatically forfeits attendance rights.
The holding is therefore contextual: substantive, defense-related proceedings before jury entry can constitute trial commencement, and continued disruption after warning can justify removal. Merely calling the courtroom to order, without more, was not announced as a universal test.
2. An incorrect indictment label is not necessarily a broadened charge
The operative Second Superseding Indictment added conspiracy as Count One; that was the only difference from the preceding Superseding Indictment. Some references in the charge and verdict form used the earlier indictment’s title.
The decisive fact was undisputed: the jury received the correct charges and elements from the operative indictment, including the conspiracy count. Thus, the documents attributed the charge to the wrong version of the indictment without changing the substance of the charge the jury decided.
This distinction reflects the purpose of constructive-amendment doctrine. The Fifth Amendment prevents trial participants from authorizing conviction beyond the grand jury’s accusations. A mistaken heading or reference does not necessarily create that danger when the actual charging content remains accurate.
The opinion should not be read as excusing every discrepancy between an indictment and jury materials. An error that adds an uncharged offense, broadens an element, or permits an unauthorized theory of conviction would present a different problem. Here, the court found no clear or obvious error because the operative accusations remained intact.
3. Coordinated drug activity supported an inference of agreement
Asberry maintained that the government proved only independent drug activity, a buyer-seller relationship, or his presence during transactions. The court instead emphasized messages coordinating large drug purchases and sales over months, together with substantial quantities of various drugs packaged for distribution at his arrest.
The reasoning was cumulative. Distribution-ready drugs supported the commercial character of the activity; the communications supplied evidence of coordination with others. Together, those facts allowed a reasonable jury to infer an agreement rather than merely coincidental or isolated conduct.
The panel did not announce a categorical rule that repeated purchases or possession of large drug quantities always proves conspiracy. Nor did it separately develop a comprehensive buyer-seller doctrine. It held that this record, viewed favorably to the verdict, permitted the jury’s inference of knowing and voluntary participation.