Defense-Related Preliminary Proceedings Can Begin Trial Under Rule 43 Before Jury Selection

Case: United States v. Asberry, No. 25-11337
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date: November 6, 2026
Disposition: Affirmed; per curiam opinion.

Precedential status: The opinion is not designated for publication under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5. It applies existing authority rather than announcing a new binding circuit rule.

1. Introduction

In United States v. Asberry, the Fifth Circuit considered three challenges arising from a federal drug prosecution: whether removing a disruptive defendant before prospective jurors entered violated his right to attend trial; whether references to the wrong version of an indictment constructively amended the charges; and whether the evidence established a drug-distribution conspiracy rather than isolated transactions or a buyer-seller relationship.

A jury convicted Fredrick Asberry of one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841, and four substantive counts of possession with intent to distribute under § 841. The Northern District of Texas imposed 222 months’ imprisonment and lifetime supervised release.

The central procedural issue concerned when trial began for purposes of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43. Asberry was present when the court addressed matters directly affecting his defense, but he was removed for disruptive conduct before the prospective jurors entered. The appellate court concluded that those substantive preliminary proceedings were sufficient to commence trial under existing circuit authority.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit rejected all three challenges and affirmed the judgment.

  1. Removal from the courtroom: Asberry was initially present at trial because the court had begun addressing matters bearing a reasonably substantial relationship to his defense. His continued disruption after a warning permitted removal without clear or obvious error.
  2. Indictment references: The jury instructions and verdict form sometimes referred to the “Superseding Indictment” rather than the operative “Second Superseding Indictment.” Nevertheless, they accurately described the operative charges and elements. The mislabeling did not establish a clear or obvious constructive amendment.
  3. Conspiracy evidence: Messages coordinating substantial drug purchases and sales over several months, together with drugs packaged for distribution found upon Asberry’s arrest, supported a reasonable inference of knowing participation in a conspiracy.

The court did not separately analyze the length of imprisonment or lifetime supervision. Its reasoning addressed trial attendance, indictment integrity, and the sufficiency of the conspiracy evidence.

3. Standards of Review

Issue Preservation Review
Removal from trial Not preserved in the district court Plain error
Constructive amendment Not preserved in the district court Plain error
Sufficiency of conspiracy evidence Preserved through a statement construed as a motion for acquittal De novo, viewing the evidence favorably to the verdict

Plain-error review required Asberry to establish an error that was clear or obvious and affected his substantial rights. Even then, correction would remain discretionary and generally appropriate only where the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The court rejected the first two claims because neither established clear or obvious error; it therefore did not need to resolve the remaining requirements.

The sufficiency challenge received independent appellate review, but not a fresh weighing of the evidence. The court accepted the jury’s credibility choices and reasonable inferences and asked whether a reasonable juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

4. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Preservation and appellate review

United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir. 2012)

The court cited this decision for applying plain-error review to unpreserved contentions. It supplied the procedural framework for the attendance and constructive-amendment claims, placing the burden on Asberry to establish more than an arguable mistake.

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)

This Supreme Court decision supplied the plain-error requirements. Its distinction between clear or obvious error and matters subject to reasonable dispute was decisive: the panel found that Asberry’s first two claims failed at that threshold. Its final, discretionary requirement also explains why an unpreserved error does not automatically require reversal.

United States v. Brown, 727 F.3d 329, 335 (5th Cir. 2013)

This authority supported treating the conspiracy-evidence challenge as preserved. At the close of evidence, Asberry asserted that no evidence showed “any kind of agreement” with his alleged co-conspirator. The district court construed that assertion as a motion for acquittal, and the appellate argument raised the same deficiency.

United States v. Chapman, 851 F.3d 363, 376 (5th Cir. 2017)

This decision supplied both de novo review and the requirement to examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Its importance lies in reconciling independent appellate review with respect for the jury’s reasonable factual judgments.

The right to attend trial and removal for disruption

United States v. Kasali, 111 F.4th 637, 645–46 (5th Cir. 2024)

This was the principal authority on when trial began. It recognized the constitutional right to attend stages at which absence might frustrate fairness and held Rule 43 satisfied where, after the courtroom was called to order, a conference before jury selection bore a “reasonably substantial” relationship to the defense.

The panel considered Asberry’s argument materially indistinguishable. Both cases involved preliminary consideration of a defendant’s refusal to participate and potential prejudice from appearing in jail clothing. The comparison directly supported treating Asberry as initially present at trial despite the prospective jurors’ absence.

United States v. Thomas, 724 F.3d 632, 642 (5th Cir. 2013)

The court relied on this decision for the proposition that Rule 43 provides broader protection than the constitutional attendance right alone. Accordingly, it did not undertake a separate constitutional analysis after concluding that the rule’s requirements were satisfied.

United States v. Krout, 56 F.3d 643, 645 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995)

Cited alongside United States v. Thomas, this decision reinforced the relationship between Rule 43 and the constitutional right to be present. Its role was supporting rather than independently resolving the timing question.

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970)

This Supreme Court decision supplied the governing principle for disruptive conduct: a defendant may lose the right to remain present after being warned of removal and continuing disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful behavior. It supported the district court’s response to Asberry’s persistent disruption following a warning.

United States v. Hill, 63 F.4th 335, 347–49 (5th Cir. 2023)

The panel cited this circuit authority alongside Illinois v. Allen in rejecting the removal claim. It provided additional support for the conclusion that the district court’s handling of the disruptive behavior was not clearly or obviously erroneous.

Constructive amendment of an indictment

United States v. Vargas, 6 F.4th 616, 621 (5th Cir. 2021)

This decision supplied the constitutional starting point: a defendant may be tried only on charges presented by a grand jury, and only the grand jury may amend an issued indictment. The principle protects the grand jury’s charging authority, rather than the accuracy of document labels considered in isolation.

United States v. Stanford, 805 F.3d 557, 565 (5th Cir. 2015)

This decision defined constructive amendment as a trial-stage change permitting conviction on a broader basis than the indictment alleged, including proof of an essential element through an alternative statutory basis not charged. That definition directed attention to what the jury was authorized to decide, not merely which indictment title appeared on the paperwork.

United States v. Scher, 601 F.3d 408, 411–12 (5th Cir. 2010)

This decision required consideration of the instructions as a whole and whether they correctly communicated the law applicable to the factual issues. Its treatment of an isolated misstatement amid otherwise correct instructions supported the conclusion that Asberry’s indictment-reference error did not establish a constructive amendment.

Proof of a drug conspiracy

United States v. Booker, 334 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 2003)

This decision identified the three required elements: an agreement to violate narcotics laws, knowledge of that agreement, and voluntary participation. Because Asberry challenged the existence of an agreement, it framed the precise evidentiary question.

United States v. Escajeda, 8 F.4th 423, 427 (5th Cir. 2021)

This decision explained that a drug-conspiracy agreement may be tacit and inferred from circumstantial evidence, presence, association, and other factual indicators. It allowed the panel to evaluate coordinated communications and distribution-related evidence without requiring an express agreement.

The precedent’s general examples included sizeable cash holdings, large drug quantities, and weapons. The Asberry opinion, however, did not identify cash or weapons as evidence in this case.

United States v. Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc)

The panel cited this en banc decision in support of its ultimate sufficiency conclusion. Its role was to reinforce the reasonable-juror assessment applied to the combined evidence, not to introduce an additional conspiracy element.

United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d 276, 285–87 (5th Cir. 2001)

This decision likewise supported the conclusion that the evidence permitted a finding of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. The opinion did not separately describe its facts or undertake an extended comparison, so its stated role is corroborative.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Trial commencement depends on substance, not merely jury entry

Rule 43(a)(2) generally requires a defendant’s presence at every trial stage, including jury empanelment. Rule 43(c) permits proceedings to continue in specified circumstances after an initially present defendant becomes voluntarily absent or is removed for disruptive behavior.

Asberry argued that he was removed before trial began and therefore did not satisfy the rule’s initial-presence condition. The court rejected his proposed dividing line between preliminary proceedings and the arrival of prospective jurors.

The proceedings addressed potential prejudice from jail clothing, Asberry’s refusal to participate, and his desire to represent himself. These subjects substantially affected how his defense would proceed. Under United States v. Kasali, they were sufficient to mark the beginning of trial for Rule 43 purposes.

Once initial presence was established, the court considered the justification for removal. Asberry refused to change from jail clothing, called several court officers “crooks,” and continued disruptive conduct despite a warning. The panel evaluated that course of conduct collectively. It did not hold that jail clothing or an isolated insult, standing alone, automatically forfeits attendance rights.

The holding is therefore contextual: substantive, defense-related proceedings before jury entry can constitute trial commencement, and continued disruption after warning can justify removal. Merely calling the courtroom to order, without more, was not announced as a universal test.

2. An incorrect indictment label is not necessarily a broadened charge

The operative Second Superseding Indictment added conspiracy as Count One; that was the only difference from the preceding Superseding Indictment. Some references in the charge and verdict form used the earlier indictment’s title.

The decisive fact was undisputed: the jury received the correct charges and elements from the operative indictment, including the conspiracy count. Thus, the documents attributed the charge to the wrong version of the indictment without changing the substance of the charge the jury decided.

This distinction reflects the purpose of constructive-amendment doctrine. The Fifth Amendment prevents trial participants from authorizing conviction beyond the grand jury’s accusations. A mistaken heading or reference does not necessarily create that danger when the actual charging content remains accurate.

The opinion should not be read as excusing every discrepancy between an indictment and jury materials. An error that adds an uncharged offense, broadens an element, or permits an unauthorized theory of conviction would present a different problem. Here, the court found no clear or obvious error because the operative accusations remained intact.

3. Coordinated drug activity supported an inference of agreement

Asberry maintained that the government proved only independent drug activity, a buyer-seller relationship, or his presence during transactions. The court instead emphasized messages coordinating large drug purchases and sales over months, together with substantial quantities of various drugs packaged for distribution at his arrest.

The reasoning was cumulative. Distribution-ready drugs supported the commercial character of the activity; the communications supplied evidence of coordination with others. Together, those facts allowed a reasonable jury to infer an agreement rather than merely coincidental or isolated conduct.

The panel did not announce a categorical rule that repeated purchases or possession of large drug quantities always proves conspiracy. Nor did it separately develop a comprehensive buyer-seller doctrine. It held that this record, viewed favorably to the verdict, permitted the jury’s inference of knowing and voluntary participation.

C. Potential Impact

  • Trial management: The opinion illustrates why courts should document the substance of preliminary proceedings, warnings, and continuing disruption before removing a defendant.
  • Preservation: Timely objections remain important. Asberry’s first two claims faced the demanding plain-error standard, while his sufficiently specific acquittal argument preserved ordinary sufficiency review.
  • Charging accuracy: Courts reviewing alleged constructive amendments will examine the actual charges and the instructions as a whole. Even so, accurate identification of the operative indictment avoids uncertainty and unnecessary appellate disputes.
  • Conspiracy prosecutions: Communications showing coordination over time can provide an important link between individual drug possession and a shared criminal undertaking.
  • Limits on future use: Because the opinion is unpublished and rests substantially on existing decisions, its principal value is illustrative. It should not be presented as creating a new binding exception to attendance rights or a new test for conspiracy.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Initially present at trial

The defendant attended proceedings that legally count as the beginning of trial. Here, that occurred during substantive defense-related discussions before prospective jurors entered.

Forfeiture and waiver

Failure to preserve an objection generally results in forfeiture and plain-error review. Separately, Rule 43 describes circumstances in which a defendant’s conduct permits proceedings to continue without the defendant. These are distinct questions: whether absence was permitted, and whether the appellate objection was preserved.

Constructive amendment

A trial effectively changes the grand jury’s charges without formally rewriting the indictment. The concern is that the jury may convict on an unauthorized basis, not simply that a document contains an incorrect label.

Tacit agreement

An understanding shown through conduct rather than an explicit promise. Coordinated messages and transactions may permit an inference that participants knowingly worked together.

Buyer-seller relationship

A drug sale does not, by itself, necessarily demonstrate a shared agreement to conduct a broader distribution venture. The question is whether the surrounding evidence establishes knowing participation in the charged conspiracy.

De novo sufficiency review

The appellate court independently applies the legal standard but does not retry the case. It asks whether the evidence, viewed favorably to the verdict, could support a reasonable finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

6. Conclusion

United States v. Asberry illustrates three established principles: substantive preliminary proceedings can begin trial under Rule 43 before jury selection; incorrect indictment references do not necessarily broaden the charges; and coordinated communications, considered with distribution-related evidence, can support a drug-conspiracy conviction.

The decision’s broader significance lies in its attention to substance and procedural posture. The court examined what occurred before removal, what the jury was actually instructed to decide, and what inferences the evidence reasonably supported. Its unpublished status and reliance on existing authority limit any claim that it establishes new binding law.