Defective Service Under Pa. R. Civ. P. 400.1(a) Excuses Unserved Defendants from Removal Unanimity; Judicial Immunity Bars § 1983 Attacks on State-Court Trial Rulings

1. Introduction

David Hatchigian v. John Whelan (3d Cir. Aug. 31, 2026) arises from a vehicle-repair dispute that Hatchigian litigated to judgment in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, where Judge John J. Whelan entered judgment against him after a bifurcated bench and jury trial. After unsuccessful appellate efforts in Pennsylvania’s appellate courts, Hatchigian filed a new action in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas against Judge Whelan, opposing counsel and their firms, and the repair-shop defendants.

The complaint—liberally construed—asserted federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (due process and conspiracy) plus state-law claims (fraud and negligence, including negligent retention/supervision). The action was removed to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The District Court denied remand and recusal, dismissed the case on Rule 12 grounds, and denied injunctive relief and fees. Hatchigian appealed.

The Third Circuit, in a non-precedential per curiam disposition, granted Judge Whelan’s motion for summary affirmance, holding the appeal presented no substantial question.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Removal/remand: The District Court correctly denied remand because unanimity was not required where other defendants had not been properly served, and service was defective under Pa. R. Civ. P. 400.1(a).
• Judicial immunity: Claims against Judge Whelan based on trial-management and evidentiary decisions were barred by judicial immunity; injunctive relief was also unavailable under § 1983’s limitation.
• Conspiracy pleading: Speculation that Judge Whelan conspired with defendants was insufficient to state a claim.
• Negligence against opposing counsel: The complaint failed to plausibly allege any duty owed by opposing counsel to Hatchigian, and failed to state negligent supervision/retention claims.
• Fraud: The fraud allegations lacked specificity as to misrepresentations and justifiable reliance.
• Permanent injunction: Denial affirmed due to failure to plead irreparable injury with specificity.
• Attorney’s fees: A non-lawyer pro se litigant is not entitled to § 1988 fees.
• Recusal: Prior adverse rulings and a “serial litigator” comment did not show bias warranting recusal.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Appellate standards and summary action

• McGovern v. City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2009): cited for plenary review of dismissal orders—framing the Third Circuit’s de novo posture on the legal sufficiency of the pleadings.
• Doeblers' Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812 (3d Cir. 2006): supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for denial of permanent injunctions, reinforcing that equitable relief is reviewed deferentially.
• Green v. America Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003): used to confirm plenary review of remand denials, allowing the panel to independently assess the removal/remand question.
• The panel also invoked Third Circuit summary procedures (3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6) to summarily affirm where no substantial question exists.

Removal unanimity and the unserved-defendant exception

• Balazik v. County of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 1995): recognized the general “rule of unanimity” for removal—typically all properly joined and served defendants must consent.
• Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1985): provided the key exception applied here: defendants not properly served at the time of removal need not consent. The panel used this to reject Hatchigian’s remand argument once the District Court found service defective.

Judicial immunity and limits on injunctive relief under § 1983

• Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978): anchored the absolute judicial immunity rule for judicial acts unless taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” The panel treated the complained-of acts—discovery sanctions decisions, recusal denial, party dismissal, rulings in limine, evidentiary rulings, and objections—as quintessentially judicial.
• Larsen v. Senate of the Commonwealth, 152 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 1998): cited for the proposition that absolute judicial immunity “extends only to claims for damages,” setting up the separate analysis for requested injunctive relief.
• Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 2006): applied the statutory limitation in § 1983 that injunctive relief against a judicial officer for judicial acts is unavailable unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. The panel found no pleaded basis for the exception.

Conspiracy pleading standards

• Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396 (3d Cir. 1991): used to reject conspiracy allegations based on “suspicion and speculation,” emphasizing that conclusory conspiracy assertions do not satisfy pleading requirements.

Negligence elements and attorney duty to non-clients

• Pyeritz v. Commonwealth, 32 A.3d 687 (Pa. 2011): supplied the four-element framework for negligence (duty, breach, causation, damages), against which Hatchigian’s allegations were measured.
• Hatchigian v. Morris, No. 22-3302, 2023 WL 6307747 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2023): referenced as a prior similar failure by Hatchigian to plead that opposing counsel owed him a professional duty—supporting the panel’s view that the pleading defect here was fundamental and repeated.
• Kituskie v. Corbman, 714 A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1998): invoked to illustrate that malpractice-type claims typically require an attorney-client relationship or some other duty basis.
• Smith v. Griffiths, 476 A.2d 22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984): supplied the general Pennsylvania rule that an attorney is liable in negligence only to the client absent “special circumstances.” The panel found none alleged.
• Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470 (3d Cir. 2013): used to reject negligent supervision/retention theories where the complaint did not identify a duty owed to Hatchigian and did not plausibly allege employee acts outside the scope of employment.

Fraud pleading and reliance

• Youndt v. First Nat'l Bank of Port Allegany, 868 A.2d 539 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005): cited for the elements of common law fraud, including misrepresentation and justifiable reliance, both missing from the complaint’s specifics.
• Elia v. Erie Ins. Exch., 581 A.2d 209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990): reinforced that alleging misrepresentations to a third party, without the plaintiff’s own justifiable reliance, is insufficient.

Injunction standards, attorney’s fees, and recusal

• Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001): cited for the factors relevant to permanent injunctions, including irreparable injury; Hatchigian’s alleged future harm was deemed too unspecific.
• Pitts v. Vaughn, 679 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1982): foreclosed § 1988 attorney’s fees for non-lawyer pro se litigants; the panel applied that categorical rule.
• Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350 (3d Cir. 1990): supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for recusal denials.
• Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994): controlled the recusal analysis: prior adverse rulings almost never show bias, and opinions formed during proceedings do not necessarily establish partiality.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Removal was procedurally proper despite non-consent. The panel accepted the District Court’s finding that service on all defendants was defective under Pa. R. Civ. P. 400.1(a) because it was not made by the Sheriff of Delaware County. Under Lewis v. Rego Co., unserved (or not properly served) defendants are not required to consent to removal. This defeated Hatchigian’s unanimity-based remand theory even though Balazik v. County of Dauphin states unanimity is generally required.
2. § 1983 due process claims functioned as a collateral attack on judicial acts and were immunized. The alleged wrongs were all case-management and evidentiary rulings made in Judge Whelan’s judicial capacity (sanctions/discovery handling, recusal, dismissal of a defendant, motions in limine, admitting witnesses, overruling objections). Under Stump v. Sparkman, these are protected judicial acts unless taken in clear absence of jurisdiction (not plausibly alleged).
3. Injunctive relief against Judge Whelan was statutorily constrained. Even beyond damages immunity, § 1983 limits injunctive relief against judicial officers for judicial acts absent a violated declaratory decree or unavailability of declaratory relief. Applying Azubuko v. Royal, the panel found the complaint did not plead facts invoking the exception.
4. Conspiracy allegations were conclusory. The court treated Hatchigian’s suggestion of a judge-defendant conspiracy as speculation lacking factual support, insufficient under Young v. Kann.
5. Opposing counsel owed no pleaded duty to Hatchigian. The negligence count was dismissed because it did not plausibly allege duty—a threshold element under Pyeritz v. Commonwealth. Pennsylvania’s default rule, per Smith v. Griffiths, is that lawyers owe negligence duties to clients, not adversaries, absent special circumstances. The complaint alleged no attorney-client relationship (cf. Kituskie v. Corbman) and no “special circumstance.”
6. Negligent retention/supervision was not plausibly alleged. Under Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., such claims depend on identifying a duty and typically involve employee acts outside the scope of employment. Hatchigian did not plausibly plead either component.
7. Fraud lacked particularized substance and reliance. The complaint asserted “intentional misrepresentation[s]” to deceive courts but did not specify the statements or plead justifiable reliance—elements emphasized in Youndt v. First Nat'l Bank of Port Allegany. Elia v. Erie Ins. Exch. supported dismissal where misrepresentations are alleged only as to deceiving third parties.
8. Equitable and ancillary relief failed. The permanent injunction request failed for lack of a concrete, specific showing of irreparable injury under Shields v. Zuccarini. The § 1988 fee request failed categorically under Pitts v. Vaughn. The recusal request failed under Liteky v. United States because prior adverse rulings (and a “serial litigator” characterization) did not show disqualifying bias, and the denial was reviewed deferentially under Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp..

C. Impact

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the disposition reinforces several practical, recurring points for litigants in the Third Circuit and Pennsylvania:

• Removal practice: procedural remand arguments based on unanimity can fail where service is defective; plaintiffs must ensure proper service (including Pennsylvania’s sheriff-service requirements in specified contexts) before relying on non-consent.
• Limits on federal “re-litigation” of state trial rulings: § 1983 is not a vehicle for damages against a state judge for judicial rulings; judicial immunity, plus § 1983’s injunctive-relief limitation, sharply constrains such suits.
• Pleading discipline: negligence claims against opposing counsel face a duty barrier; fraud claims require specifics and reliance; conspiracy requires facts, not inference from adverse outcomes.
• Recusal and fees: adverse rulings rarely establish bias; and non-lawyer pro se litigants cannot obtain § 1988 fees in the Third Circuit.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Removal and “unanimity”: a defendant can move a case from state to federal court if federal jurisdiction exists. Usually, all properly served defendants must agree. But if a defendant has not been properly served yet, that defendant’s consent is not required.
• Service of process: the formal method of delivering the complaint. If service does not comply with governing rules (here, a Pennsylvania rule requiring sheriff service in certain circumstances), it can be “defective,” affecting procedural rights like remand arguments.
• Judicial immunity: judges generally cannot be sued for money damages for actions taken as judges (e.g., rulings, evidentiary decisions), even if alleged to be wrong, unless they acted without jurisdiction.
• § 1983 injunctive limitation for judges: even if a plaintiff wants an injunction (not damages), § 1983 usually bars injunctions against judges for judicial acts unless narrow statutory conditions are met.
• Duty in negligence: without a legally recognized duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a negligence claim fails—even if the plaintiff alleges unfairness. Opposing counsel typically owe duties to their clients, not to the adversary.
• Fraud “reliance”: it is not enough to say someone lied; the plaintiff generally must plead what was said, that it was false, and that the plaintiff relied on it to their detriment.
• Permanent injunction: a forward-looking remedy; courts require a concrete showing of imminent, irreparable harm—not vague fears of future disputes.
• Recusal: judges are not disqualified merely because they ruled against a party before; the law distinguishes unfavorable rulings from evidence of personal bias.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision affirms dismissal across the board by applying settled procedural and immunity doctrines: defective service defeated a unanimity-based remand argument; judicial immunity and § 1983’s statutory limits foreclosed claims and injunctive relief against a state judge for judicial acts; and the remaining tort theories failed for lack of duty, specificity, and irreparable harm. While non-precedential, the opinion underscores the narrow pathways for challenging state-court conduct through later civil litigation and the stringent pleading and doctrinal hurdles such claims face in federal court.