Defective Ladder, Not Electrical Shock, as the Labor Law § 240(1) Proximate Cause When the Worker Is Not Propelled

Case: Szczesiak v Ery Tenant LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 00600 (App Div, 1st Dept Feb. 5, 2026)
Court: Appellate Division, First Department
Posture: Plaintiff appealed denial of summary judgment on Labor Law § 240(1) liability.

1. Introduction

This decision addresses a recurring “edge case” under New York’s Labor Law § 240(1): a worker falls from a ladder immediately after an electrical shock. Owners and contractors frequently argue that the shock—not a gravity-related safety failure—caused the fall, or that the worker’s electrical-safety choices render him the sole proximate cause. The First Department in Szczesiak clarifies how § 240(1) applies when (i) the worker is not propelled from the ladder by the shock, and (ii) the ladder is defective and demonstrably fails to provide proper protection by moving/wobbling/shifting.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The First Department reversed the Supreme Court and granted plaintiff summary judgment on Labor Law § 240(1) liability. It held that the statute applied because the ladder was defective and failed to provide proper protection against a gravity-related risk. The court distinguished Court of Appeals cases involving workers propelled off ladders by electrical shocks where ladder inadequacy was not shown. Plaintiff’s alleged failure to turn off all electricity, at most, amounted to comparative negligence, which is not a defense to § 240(1).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

• Cutaia v Board of Mgrs. of the 160/170 Varick Street Condominium, 38 NY3d 1037 (2022)
  • Rule imported: After an electrical shock, a plaintiff seeking § 240(1) protection must show the ladder was defective or “failed to provide proper protection.”
  • Distinction drawn: In Cutaia, the plaintiff was thrown off by the shock, had burn injuries, and did not remember the fall; the record lacked proof the ladder moved/wobbled/was defective. In Szczesiak, the plaintiff testified the shock did not propel him; the ladder moved/wobbled/shifted and was defective.
  • Doctrinal nuance emphasized: The court reiterated (echoing its own earlier discussion) that the law does not “carve out” all elevation-related falls following electrical shocks—context matters, particularly ladder inadequacy.
• Cutaia v Board of Mgrs. of the Varick Street Condominium, 172 AD3d 424 (1st Dept 2019), revd, 38 NY3d 1037 (2022)
  • Used for the proposition that the First Department has consistently resisted any categorical exclusion of shock-followed falls from § 240(1), focusing instead on whether the ladder/device failed as a safety device.
• Nazario v 222 Broadway, LLC, 28 NY3d 1054 (2016)
  • Why defendants relied on it: Court of Appeals found questions of fact where plaintiff was thrown by a shock from an A-frame ladder, and the record did not establish ladder defect or pre-shock movement/wobble.
  • How Szczesiak distinguishes it: Here there was evidence of ladder defect (bent crossbeams, worn rubber feet), corroboration that the ladder moved, and testimony that shock did not throw plaintiff.
• Higgins v TST 375 Hudson, L.L.C., 179 AD3d 508 (1st Dept 2020)
  • Cited as an example of “propelled by electrical force” cases where a defendant expert described arc pressure akin to a “fire hose,” raising a fact issue whether any device could prevent the fall.
  • Szczesiak contrasts that scenario with a mild, brief shock and evidence that rail-equipped devices (Baker scaffold/scissor lift) would have prevented the fall.
• Rosa v 47 E. 34th St. [NY], L.P., 208 AD3d 1075 (1st Dept 2022)
  • Another propelled-by-arc-explosion scenario (severe burns; plaintiff later died), where issues of fact existed as to ladder adequacy and additional devices.
  • Distinguished because Szczesiak involved no severe burn injury, no propulsion, and affirmative proof of ladder defect and movement.
• DelRosario v United Nations Fed. Credit Union, 104 AD3d 515 (1st Dept 2013)
  • Direct analogue: Ladder wobbled/moved when plaintiff pulled away from a live wire; ladder was inadequate to prevent the fall and was the proximate cause.
  • Function in Szczesiak: Serves as the doctrinal bridge: even when electricity is part of the narrative, the decisive § 240(1) inquiry is whether the ladder failed to protect against the gravity-related fall.
• Daniello v J.T. Magen & Co., Inc., 239 AD3d 516 (1st Dept 2025)
  • Supports summary judgment where an A-frame ladder “wiggled” after the plaintiff was “jolted” (there by a falling tile), reinforcing that sudden movement/instability can establish ladder inadequacy.
• Lopez v 18-20 Park 84 Corp., 235 AD3d 591 (1st Dept 2025)
  • Plaintiff’s testimony that a ladder moved “for no apparent reason” can establish inadequacy as a safety device for § 240(1) purposes.
• Nunez v SY Prospect LLC, 226 AD3d 410 (1st Dept 2024)
  • Cited as part of the First Department’s consistent treatment of ladder movement/instability as evidence of § 240(1) failure.
• Rodas-Garcia v NYC United LLC, 225 AD3d 556 (1st Dept 2024)
  • Two uses: (1) even if the ladder appeared stable, that does not bar a § 240(1) claim; (2) missteps like reaching overhead rather than repositioning are, at most, comparative negligence.
• Pinzon v Royal Charter Props., Inc., 211 AD3d 442 (1st Dept 2022)
  • Plaintiff’s pre-use inspection and belief that a ladder was in good order is “irrelevant” to establishing a prima facie § 240(1) case where the ladder ultimately fails to protect.
• Begnoja v Hudson Riv. Park Trust, 238 AD3d 481 (1st Dept 2025)
  • Reaffirms that comparative negligence is not a defense to § 240(1), supporting rejection of “should have shut off more power” as a liability-defeating argument.
• Tuzzolino v Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 160 AD3d 568 (1st Dept 2018)
  • Used to discount defense expert opinions based on late inspections (here, four years later after electrical work was complete), highlighting reliability and foundation problems.
• Rivera v 7132 Fifth Ave. Owner LP, 229 AD3d 401 (1st Dept 2024)
  • Defense expert conjecture is insufficient where the expert did not inspect the ladder and dismisses defect claims without addressing physical evidence.
• Suazo v 501 Madison-Sutton LLC, 235 AD3d 513 (1st Dept 2025)
  • Cited to reject expert theories that are unsupported by record evidence—here, the lateral-force/pulled-down ladder narrative.
• Hernandez v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 241 AD3d 1069 (1st Dept 2025)
  • Used to reinforce that a defense expert’s “would not have changed the outcome” assertion does not raise an issue of fact when contradicted by record testimony and other expert analysis.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in a structured § 240(1) sequence: (1) identify an elevation-related, gravity-driven risk; (2) decide whether the provided device failed to provide proper protection; (3) assess proximate cause; and (4) test whether defendants raise a triable defense (including sole proximate cause).

1. Elevation-related hazard and device failure. Plaintiff worked from an A-frame ladder with his upper body inside an access panel above him. The ladder’s condition was documented by photographs and described as having bent/curved crossbeams and worn rubber feet. Plaintiff testified that immediately after removing his hand from the wires, the ladder “moved, wobbled, shifted, and fell.” That movement constitutes functional failure as a safety device—i.e., failure to provide proper protection against a gravity-related fall.
2. Defect evidence was not merely subjective. Beyond plaintiff’s testimony, the general contractor’s corporate safety manager testified that a ladder in the photographed condition should be replaced and taken out of service. That admission helped convert ladder condition from a litigated allegation into effectively unrebutted defect evidence.
3. Alternative adequate devices were identified with record support. Plaintiff offered an engineer’s opinion that a Baker scaffold or scissor lift with railings would have prevented the gravity-related harm and that the shock was not so substantial as to throw plaintiff over a guardrail. The general contractor’s project manager and safety manager similarly testified these devices could have been used and would have protected against falling.
4. Defense “sole proximate cause” theory failed on the record. Supreme Court had accepted a fact issue based on a foreman’s affidavit asserting the area remained “live.” The First Department held that, given plaintiff’s testimony that he was instructed not to shut down the whole floor, any failure to fully de-energize was at most comparative negligence—irrelevant to § 240(1) liability. Critically, there was no showing that plaintiff’s electrical conduct was the sole cause in the face of an independently defective, moving ladder.
5. Defense expert proof was treated as speculative and inadequately grounded. The defense expert did not inspect the ladder, inspected the location four years later, failed to meaningfully address the photographed ladder defects, and posited a Newton’s-laws-based lateral-force theory (plaintiff pulled the ladder down as he fell) without record support. Plaintiff’s testimony and the superintendent’s accident report (“felt the ladder move”) directly undermined that theory.
6. Key doctrinal distinction: “propelled by shock” versus “ladder failed after shock.” The court distinguished Nazario, Cutaia, Higgins, and Rosa on a common axis: those cases involved workers thrown from ladders by the electrical event and lacked evidence that the ladder was defective or moved/wobbled before the plaintiff was propelled. Here, plaintiff remained conscious, denied being propelled, described ladder movement as the immediate cause, suffered no burn injury, and the ladder was shown to be defective. Thus, the proximate cause was the ladder’s failure, not the electrical shock.

3.3 Impact

For § 240(1) litigation involving electricity: Szczesiak reinforces that “electric shock in the narrative” does not itself remove a claim from § 240(1). The decisive question is whether the ladder/device failed to provide proper protection against the gravity-related fall, and whether the worker was propelled such that additional devices might be irrelevant or fact-dependent.

• Strengthening plaintiff proof patterns: Photographs of ladder defects, testimony that the ladder moved/wobbled/shifted, contemporaneous accident reports, and admissions by site safety personnel can be dispositive on summary judgment.
• Narrowing “sole proximate cause” arguments: Allegations that the worker should have de-energized more circuits will often be treated as comparative negligence unless defendants can show (with competent proof) that the worker had appropriate safety devices available, knew to use them, and unreasonably chose not to—while also negating device defect/failure.
• Expert practice implications: Defense experts who do not inspect the ladder and who fail to engage with documented defects risk having opinions characterized as conclusory/speculative, particularly when offered years after the event and contradicted by contemporaneous records.
• Doctrinal clarity on “propulsion”: The opinion supplies a practical dividing line: where the shock propels the worker and ladder defect/movement is absent, courts more readily find fact issues (or at least resist summary judgment); where the worker is not propelled and the ladder is defective/unstable, summary judgment for plaintiff becomes more attainable.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Labor Law § 240(1) (“Scaffold Law”): Imposes strict (often absolute) liability on owners/contractors for failing to provide proper safety devices to protect workers from height-related, gravity-driven risks (e.g., falls from ladders, scaffolds).
• “Gravity-related risk” / “Elevation-related hazard”: The danger created by working at height where gravity can cause a person (or object) to fall and injure someone.
• “Failed to provide proper protection”: A ladder can be “inadequate” under § 240(1) if it moves, wobbles, shifts, collapses, or otherwise does not keep the worker safe from falling—even if it looked stable initially.
• Summary judgment: A ruling without trial when the evidence shows no genuine dispute of material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
• Prima facie case: The initial showing a party must make to win a motion. Here: proof of elevation risk + inadequate safety device + causation.
• Comparative negligence: The plaintiff may have been partly at fault, but under § 240(1) that typically does not reduce or bar liability.
• Sole proximate cause: A narrow defense: defendants must show the worker’s own conduct was the only cause of the accident, typically requiring proof that proper safety devices were available and the worker unreasonably failed to use them. If a defective device contributed, the defense generally collapses.
• Proximate cause: The legal cause sufficiently connected to the injury. Szczesiak identifies the defective/moving ladder—not the shock—as the proximate cause.

5. Conclusion

Szczesiak v Ery Tenant LLC provides an important clarification for § 240(1) cases where an electrical shock precedes a fall: if the worker is not propelled by the shock and the record shows a defective, unstable ladder that moved/wobbled/shifted and failed to protect against a gravity-related fall, § 240(1) liability may be resolved on summary judgment. The decision also underscores that alleged electrical-safety lapses often sound in comparative negligence, not “sole proximate cause,” and that unsupported expert theories—especially those ignoring documented ladder defects—will not defeat a properly supported § 240(1) motion.