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Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Inv. Servs. of Nev., Inc. v. Triex Texas Holdings, LLC, 659 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. 2023) (per curiam)
Central to the panel’s reasoning. In Triex, a lease default—after a broker touted a “sure-fire” investment—triggered accrual for fraud and fiduciary-duty claims because it put the plaintiff on notice “that something was amiss.” The court emphasized that the discovery rule does not defer accrual until the plaintiff knows the specific nature of each wrongful act or the identity of all wrongdoers. McGrath’s facts were analogous: Booth’s immediate defaults, coupled with known red flags, started the clock.
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KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Housing Finance Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. 1999)
Stands for the proposition that accrual hinges on knowledge of a wrongfully caused injury—not on knowing each participant or every detail. Also informs fraudulent concealment: once the injury is discovered, concealment does not indefinitely suspend limitations. The panel applied this to conclude that McGrath’s knowledge of nonpayment and loss in 2018 defeated tolling.
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Wise v. Anderson, 359 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. 1962), citing Glenn v. Steele, 61 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1933)
Establishes “inquiry notice”: knowledge of facts that would cause a reasonably prudent person to investigate is treated as knowledge of the fraud itself for limitations purposes. The court invoked this doctrine to show that the 2018 defaults, coupled with surrounding facts, obligated an investigation within the four-year period.
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Berry v. Berry, 646 S.W.3d 516 (Tex. 2022)
Articulates the general accrual rule—claims accrue when a legal injury occurs—and frames the narrowness of the discovery rule. The panel cited Berry to reinforce that accrual begins when facts exist authorizing a judicial remedy, regardless of when all damages or actors become known.
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Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1998)
Clarifies that limitations commence when the plaintiff discovers the injury and that it was likely caused by another’s wrongful act, even if the exact identity of the wrongdoer remains unknown. Applied here to reject the contention that McGrath could wait to sue until he learned of Cope’s involvement.
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Agar Corp., Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136 (Tex. 2019)
Conspiracy is derivative and accrues with the primary tort. The panel applied Agar to dispel any theory that the conspiracy claim could accrue later than the underlying fraud merely because a conspirator was identified later.
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Town of Dish v. Atmos Energy Corp., 519 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. 2017)
Reiterates that facts prompting a reasonable inquiry are equivalent to knowledge of the cause of action. The court used this to underscore that McGrath’s allegations pled himself into inquiry notice long before 2023.
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Hooks v. Samson Lone Star, Ltd. P’ship, 457 S.W.3d 52 (Tex. 2015)
While diligence is often a fact question, courts may decide as a matter of law whether reasonable diligence would have uncovered the wrong. The panel used Hooks to justify deciding tolling at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
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PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Partners, 146 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. 2004)
The discovery rule does not postpone accrual until the plaintiff learns “actual causes and possible cures.” The panel echoed this principle in rejecting McGrath’s effort to await clarity about Cope’s role.
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Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2015) and Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. 1996)
Define fraudulent concealment as an estoppel-based doctrine that does not extend limitations indefinitely; tolling ends when a reasonably prudent person would have inquired. The panel applied this to conclude any concealment ended once McGrath knew of the defaults and loss.
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Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. 1983)
An example where fraudulent concealment tolled limitations (physician left a needle in patient and did not disclose). The panel contrasted such facts with McGrath’s actual knowledge of loss in 2018.
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Federal pleading and review standards
The panel cited Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); and Fifth Circuit cases including King-White v. Humble ISD, 803 F.3d 754 (5th Cir. 2015), and Jones v. Alcoa, 339 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2003), to confirm that courts may dismiss on limitations where the complaint negates tolling and pleads itself out of court.
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Choice-of-law authority
Because McGrath did not identify a “true conflict,” the court declined a choice-of-law analysis, citing Schneider Nat’l Transp. v. Ford Motor Co., 280 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 2002) and Flagship Credit Corp. v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 481 F. App’x 907 (5th Cir. 2012).