Dees v. Weiser: Federal Habeas Cannot Be Used to Relitigate State Child-Custody Orders; Pro Se Parents Cannot Litigate for Minors and “Hybrid” Habeas/§ 1983 Pleadings Must Be Separated

1. Introduction

Case: Dees v. Weiser, No. 25-1336 (10th Cir. Feb. 13, 2026) (Order and Judgment).
Parties: Petitioner-Appellant Jennifer L. Dees (pro se) vs. multiple state officials (including Colorado Supreme Court Justices), Joseph Stockwell (ex-husband), and John/Jane Does.
Background: The appeal arises from a long-running custody dispute concerning Dees’s minor son, L.D. Stockwell (not the biological father) obtained custody in Colorado state court in 2013. Dees alleges the custody order is void due to lack of jurisdiction, judicial misconduct, and forged filings, and she pursued extraordinary relief in state court without success.

Federal filing: Dees filed an “Emergency Hybrid Motion” combining (i) a request for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking “release” of L.D. from Stockwell’s custody and (ii) requests for injunctive/declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including a TRO and preliminary injunction to stop enforcement/recognition of the custody order.

Key issues on appeal: The Tenth Circuit held it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review most complaints because the district court had not issued a final decision, but it did have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) to review the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. The central merits question became whether Dees showed entitlement to a preliminary injunction.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. While Dees raised additional challenges (including next-friend standing and the viability of habeas relief for her child), the court explained those issues were largely outside its jurisdiction at this stage due to the absence of a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

On the preliminary injunction question, the panel concluded Dees could not demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits because:

  • A pro se parent cannot litigate claims on behalf of a minor child as next friend without counsel.
  • Federal habeas relief is not available to attack state child-custody determinations.
  • To the extent Dees sought to bring her own § 1983 claims, the district court required they be pursued in a separate civil action rather than in a combined (“hybrid”) filing.

Because the likelihood-of-success element failed, the court did not address the other preliminary injunction factors and affirmed. It also granted Dees leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991): Cited for the proposition that courts construe pro se pleadings liberally. Here, it supported the district court’s decision to treat Dees’s “Emergency Motion” as objections to the magistrate judge’s order.
  • In re Noble, 663 F. App'x. 188, 190-91 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam): Used to justify the district court’s insistence that habeas claims and § 1983 civil-rights claims should not proceed as a single “hybrid” pleading, noting differences in filing fees, statutory schemes, and processing standards.
  • Mohamed v. Jones, 100 F.4th 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2024): Cited to reinforce the final-judgment rule—appellate jurisdiction generally attaches only to final district-court orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
  • Citizens United v. Gessler, 773 F.3d 200, 209 (10th Cir. 2014): Provided the standard of review for preliminary-injunction rulings—abuse of discretion, with legal issues reviewed de novo and factual findings for clear error.
  • Prairie Band of Potowatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1246 (10th Cir. 2001): Set out the four-factor test for a preliminary injunction, with “substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits” as the first factor.
  • Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam): Crucial authority for rejecting Dees’s attempt to litigate her child’s claims pro se: “a minor child cannot bring a suit through a parent acting as next friend if the parent is not represented by an attorney.”
  • Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989): Cited for the “in custody” requirement in habeas proceedings. The court referenced it in explaining the limits of habeas jurisdiction (even though the dispute here concerned custody in the family-law sense, not custody for habeas purposes).
  • Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Child.'s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 511-12 (1982): The centerpiece on the habeas point. The Tenth Circuit relied on Lehman’s categorical statement that “federal habeas has never been available to challenge parental rights or child custody,” and its warning that expanding habeas into this area would be “an unprecedented expansion” of federal jurisdiction.
  • Petrella v. Brownback, 787 F.3d 1242, 1257 (10th Cir. 2015): Applied to hold that once Dees failed the likelihood-of-success factor, the court could affirm without analyzing the remaining preliminary injunction elements.
  • Dees v. Hood, No. 24-CV-00848-PAB-NRN, 2025 WL 2416449, at *1-2 (D. Colo. Aug. 21, 2025): Noted in a footnote as an earlier § 1983 action by Dees raising similar constitutional theories against some of the same defendants—contextualizing the district court’s instruction to file any § 1983 claims separately.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Appellate jurisdiction: final-judgment rule vs. injunction exception

The panel first narrowed the scope of review. Because the district court had not “dismiss[ed] or otherwise dispose[d]” of the case, most issues were not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The court nevertheless exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) to review the denial of a preliminary injunction—an established exception allowing interlocutory appeals for certain injunctive orders.

B. Preliminary injunction framework and decisive factor

Applying Prairie Band of Potowatomi Indians v. Pierce, the court treated “substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits” as dispositive. The court found Dees could not satisfy that element for two independent reasons tied to the nature of her requested relief:

  1. Standing/representation barrier for claims asserted on behalf of L.D.: Under Meeker v. Kercher, Dees—as a non-attorney—could not bring her minor child’s claims. Because her request for injunctive relief was “related to the habeas petition she brought on behalf of L.D.,” this defect alone significantly undermined the likelihood of success.
  2. Habeas is categorically unavailable for state child-custody disputes: Relying on Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Child.'s Servs. Agency, the court reiterated that federal habeas cannot be used to challenge parental rights or state custody decisions, even if the challenge is framed as constitutional or as “collateral” defects in the state proceeding. Dees’s attempted distinction—alleging misconduct such as “fabricat[ed] jurisdiction” to conceal trafficking—did not move the legal needle because Lehman did not recognize an exception.

C. Separation of remedies: habeas vs. § 1983

The district court (and the Tenth Circuit, by recounting and not disturbing the point) emphasized a structural rule: habeas relief and civil-rights relief proceed under different regimes. Citing In re Noble, the court treated “hybrid” pleadings as procedurally improper and instructed Dees that any personal § 1983 claims must be brought as a separate civil action. On appeal, Dees did not pursue that track, and the panel noted she “does not press her § 1983 claims on appeal.”

D. No need to analyze irreparable harm, balance of harms, or public interest

Citing Petrella v. Brownback, the court declined to reach the remaining injunction factors once the merits element failed. This reflects a common appellate approach: where one essential prerequisite is absent, further factor-by-factor analysis is unnecessary.

3.3 Impact

Although the decision is expressly “not binding precedent” (except under law-of-the-case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel), it has practical and persuasive significance in three recurring contexts:

  • Child-custody collateral attacks in federal court: The opinion reinforces that litigants cannot repackage state custody disputes as federal habeas claims, even when asserting serious constitutional misconduct. Future district courts in the circuit may cite the decision (for persuasive value) to summarily deny habeas-based efforts to obtain federal “release” orders in family-law custody matters.
  • Pro se litigation limits involving minors: By applying Meeker v. Kercher, the court underscores that the barrier is not merely technical: absent counsel, pro se parents generally cannot litigate a child’s claims in federal court. This tends to channel such disputes either to state court, to representation by counsel, or to claims the parent can assert on her own behalf.
  • Procedural hygiene—no “hybrid” habeas/§ 1983 pleadings: The discussion (anchored in In re Noble) signals that courts will require clearer pleading choices and may sever or reject combined filings, which affects filing fees, screening, and case management. Litigants seeking both prospective relief against state actors and release-like remedies must structure claims properly—or risk delay and denial of urgent relief.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Final judgment” (28 U.S.C. § 1291): Generally, you can appeal only after the district court has finished the case (for example, after dismissal or entry of final judgment). Interim rulings usually are not appealable right away.
  • Interlocutory appeal for injunctions (28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)): An exception allows immediate appeal of orders granting or denying preliminary injunctions, because injunctions can have immediate, serious consequences.
  • “Habeas custody” vs. family-law custody: Habeas corpus is designed to challenge unlawful government restraint (the “in custody” requirement referenced via Maleng v. Cook). A child living with a parent under a state custody order is not “in custody” in the habeas sense that would authorize federal courts to revisit state family-law custody determinations.
  • Next-friend representation of minors: A parent may be a child’s “next friend,” but federal courts generally require that the child be represented by a licensed attorney. Under Meeker v. Kercher, a pro se parent cannot conduct federal litigation on the child’s behalf.
  • § 1983 vs. habeas: Section 1983 is a civil-rights vehicle to seek relief for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Habeas seeks release from unlawful custody. Courts often require these to be brought separately because they operate under different procedural rules and remedies.

5. Conclusion

Dees v. Weiser is a jurisdiction- and remedies-focused decision. The Tenth Circuit limited its review to the preliminary injunction denial, then affirmed because Dees could not show a likelihood of success: she could not litigate her child’s claims pro se, and—under Lehman v. Lycoming Cnty. Child.'s Servs. Agency—federal habeas is not a mechanism to overturn or circumvent state child-custody determinations. The opinion also underscores a procedural boundary: habeas and § 1983 claims should not be fused into a single “hybrid” filing. Even as a nonprecedential order, the decision consolidates well-established doctrines into a clear roadmap for courts confronting similar attempts to federalize state custody disputes through emergency injunctive and habeas requests.