Deadly Weapon Enhancements Are Waived When a Mental Health Sentencing Alternative Is Imposed

Case: State v. Perrin (Wash. July 30, 2026)
Court: Supreme Court of Washington (En Banc)
Core Holding: When a sentencing court imposes the mental health sentencing alternative under RCW 9.94A.695, it may waive confinement time that would otherwise be imposed for a deadly weapon enhancement because the enhancement, once found, is part of the “standard range sentence” that RCW 9.94A.695(4) requires the court to waive.

1. Introduction

State v. Perrin addresses a conflict at the intersection of two prominent features of Washington’s felony sentencing scheme: (1) mandatory “Hard Time for Armed Crime” deadly weapon enhancements under RCW 9.94A.533(4), and (2) the Legislature’s newer mental health sentencing alternative (MHSA) under RCW 9.94A.695.

Scott Joseph Perrin was convicted of (among other offenses) second degree assault with a deadly weapon. The sentencing court granted Perrin’s request for an MHSA and imposed 36 months of community custody, but it did not add confinement time for the deadly weapon enhancement. The State appealed, arguing the enhancement statute’s “notwithstanding any other provision of law” language required mandatory confinement.

The key issue before the Washington Supreme Court: Must a court imposing MHSA also impose total confinement time for a deadly weapon enhancement?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that the sentencing judge was not required to impose confinement for the deadly weapon enhancement when imposing an MHSA.

The court’s reasoning centers on a definitional move: once determined, a sentencing enhancement becomes part of the defendant’s “standard range sentence.” Because RCW 9.94A.695(4) commands that, if MHSA is appropriate, “the court shall waive imposition of the sentence within the standard range,” the enhancement—now treated as embedded in the standard range—is waived along with the rest of the standard-range imprisonment.

The court further explained that the enhancement statute’s “notwithstanding” clause does not invariably override every other SRA mechanism, especially where that would undercut other SRA provisions and purposes. The court also indicated that even if ambiguity remained, the rule of lenity would lead to the same result.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • State v. Williams, 171 Wn.2d 474 (2011) (citing State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342 (2003)) and State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444 (2003)
    These cases supply the court’s baseline interpretive framework: de novo review of the SRA and the primacy of legislative intent, starting with statutory text and related statutes.
  • Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1 (2002)
    Central for the “read the words in context” approach. The court uses it to cabin the State’s reliance on the single word “Notwithstanding” in RCW 9.94A.533(4)(e).
  • State ex rel. Peninsula Neigh. Ass'n v. Dep't of Transp., 142 Wn.2d 328 (2000) (citing State v. Bash, 130 Wn.2d 594 (1996))
    Provides the harmonization canon: statutes should be reconciled where possible, presuming the legislature does not intend internal inconsistencies.
  • State v. Lewis, 5 Wn.3d 114 (2025) (citing State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186 (2013)) (quoting City of Seattle v. Winebrenner, 167 Wn.2d 451 (2009))
    Establishes the rule of lenity standard applied as a backstop: ambiguous penal statutes are construed in the defendant’s favor unless legislative intent to the contrary is clearly established.
  • In re Post Sentencing Rev. of Charles, 135 Wn.2d 239 (1998) and State v. Silva-Baltazar, 125 Wn.2d 472 (1994)
    These represent the court’s acknowledgement of doctrinal drift: earlier descriptions sometimes treated enhancements as separate add-ons (Charles) and sometimes as increasing the presumptive/standard sentence (Silva-Baltazar). The court candidly uses this tension to set up why a more recent clarifying precedent matters.
  • State v. Yancey, 193 Wn.2d 26 (2019)
    The pivotal precedent. In determining eligibility for a residential DOSA, Yancey treated the enhancement as “subsumed into” the standard range. Perrin extends that logic: if an enhancement is part of the standard range for eligibility calculations, it is part of the standard range for waiver under MHSA.
  • State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20 (1999), overruled in part by State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 (2017)
    Invoked by the State to emphasize the mandatory nature of weapon enhancements. The court distinguishes these authorities as not addressing the specific question: whether “mandatory” enhancements remain mandatory when the relevant sentencing statute requires waiver of the standard range due to an alternative.
  • State v. McFarland, 189 Wn.2d 47 (2017) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d 322 (2007))
    Used to rebut the State’s “notwithstanding” absolutism. The court relies on the principle that the “notwithstanding” language has not prevented courts from applying other SRA mechanisms where necessary to preserve SRA purposes.
  • Trueblood v. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (W.D. Wash. 2015), vacated and remanded, 822 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2016)
    Not cited as binding authority on SRA interpretation, but used as contextual backdrop for legislative policy: the unsuitability of jails/prisons for people with serious mental illness and the systemic strain on mental health services. The court uses it to corroborate that MHSA’s design is oriented toward treatment in the community rather than reflexive confinement.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The decisive statutory interpretation move: enhancements are part of the “standard range sentence”

The court frames the case as a question of how RCW 9.94A.533(4) (deadly weapon enhancements) interacts with RCW 9.94A.695(4) (MHSA waiver of the standard range). It resolves the interaction by adopting a unitary understanding of the “standard range sentence” once an enhancement is found:

  • RCW 9.94A.533(4) requires “additional times” to be “added to the standard sentence range.”
  • RCW 9.94A.695(4) requires that, if MHSA is appropriate, “the court shall waive imposition of the sentence within the standard range.”
  • Relying on State v. Yancey, the court holds that “once determined, an enhancement becomes part of a person's standard range sentence,” meaning the enhancement is encompassed by the waiver command.

B. Harmonization without nullification

The State proposed a “split” sentence: confinement for the enhancement first, then MHSA community custody. The court rejects this as inconsistent with the MHSA statute’s directive to “waive” the standard-range sentence and with the treatment-oriented nature of MHSA. Instead, the court harmonizes by reading the enhancement as living inside the standard range once it is determined—so it can be waived without rewriting either statute.

C. The “notwithstanding” clause is not an interpretive trump card

The State leaned heavily on RCW 9.94A.533(4)(e): “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all deadly weapon enhancements under this section are mandatory….” The court responds that “notwithstanding” must be read in statutory context and notes prior decisions (including State v. McFarland) where “notwithstanding” language did not compel an interpretation that would undermine other SRA provisions.

D. Statutory purpose and legislative backdrop confirm the treatment-forward reading

The court integrates SRA purposes (RCW 9.94A.010), emphasizing public protection, rehabilitation opportunity, frugality, and reduced reoffending. It then situates MHSA historically: it was one of the Criminal Sentencing Task Force’s consensus recommendations, and it was enacted amid ongoing legislative awareness of mental health system constraints (including those highlighted in Trueblood and related materials). The court reasons that, given the record it recites about prison mental health treatment limitations, imposing prison time on a seriously mentally ill person does not advance SRA purposes in the MHSA context.

E. Rule of lenity as a backstop

Even if there were unresolved ambiguity, the court explains that State v. Lewis and State v. Evans require construing ambiguous penal statutes in the defendant’s favor unless legislative intent to punish more harshly is clearly established. The court concludes lenity would independently support the same outcome.

3.3. Impact

  • Operational rule for trial courts: If MHSA is granted under RCW 9.94A.695, courts may waive confinement time that would otherwise attach to a deadly weapon enhancement, because the enhancement is treated as part of the standard range sentence being waived.
  • Broader doctrinal consolidation: The decision strengthens Yancey’s approach by applying it beyond eligibility calculations and into the mechanics of sentencing alternatives: enhancements are not merely “add-ons”; they are integrated into the standard range once found.
  • Limits on “notwithstanding” arguments: Prosecutorial reliance on “notwithstanding any other provision of law” will face a more skeptical, context-driven reading, especially when another SRA provision would be impaired.
  • Expansion of treatment-centered alternatives: Defendants who qualify for MHSA are less likely to be categorically disqualified from meaningful community-based treatment solely due to a weapon finding, potentially increasing MHSA’s practical availability in appropriate cases.
  • Legislative response possibility: If the Legislature intended weapon enhancements to survive MHSA waivers, Perrin effectively invites a clarifying amendment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Sentencing Reform Act (SRA): Washington’s structured felony-sentencing framework that sets presumptive ranges based on offense seriousness and criminal history.
  • Standard range sentence: The presumptive sentencing range (often a months range) produced by the SRA grid and applicable rules. In Perrin, the court treats an enhancement as becoming part of this range once found.
  • Deadly weapon enhancement (RCW 9.94A.533(4)): A statutory increase in punishment when a jury finds the felony involved a deadly weapon; ordinarily must be served in total confinement and consecutively.
  • Mental health sentencing alternative (RCW 9.94A.695): A sentencing option allowing eligible defendants with a serious mental illness diagnosis to receive a treatment-oriented plan (often community custody and conditions), and requiring the court to waive the standard range if the alternative is imposed.
  • “Notwithstanding” clause: A drafting device signaling priority, but in Washington statutory interpretation it is still read in context and not treated as automatically overriding every other statute in all applications.
  • Rule of lenity: If a criminal statute is genuinely ambiguous after applying interpretive tools, courts resolve that ambiguity in favor of the defendant.

5. Conclusion

State v. Perrin establishes a clear rule: when MHSA is imposed, the court waives the standard range sentence, and a deadly weapon enhancement—once found—is part of that standard range and is therefore waived as well.

The opinion’s significance extends beyond MHSA. It solidifies Washington Supreme Court doctrine treating enhancements as integrated into the standard range once determined, constrains absolutist readings of “notwithstanding” clauses within the SRA, and reinforces lenity as a safeguard where sentencing statutes appear to pull in different directions.