De Facto Control—Not Ownership—Sustains the §2D1.1(b)(12) Drug-Premises Enhancement for “Trap/Stash” Houses (and Forfeited Sufficiency Claims Receive Only Manifest-Miscarriage Review)

I. Introduction

In United States v. Israel Lee Crumpton (6th Cir. May 22, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit affirmed Israel Lee Crumpton’s drug-trafficking convictions and a sentencing increase under the “drug-house” enhancement, U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(12). The case arose from a Detroit operation using two vacant houses: a “trap house” (point of sale) at 7744 East Palmer and a “stash house” (storage/processing) at 7759 East Palmer.

The appeal presented two core issues: (1) whether the trial evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for drug conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute; and (2) whether the district court properly found that Crumpton “maintained” a drug premises despite disputed ownership and shared access. The decision is especially instructive on how procedural defaults narrow appellate review and how “maintenance” turns on de facto control, not formal title.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed across the board. On sufficiency, the court held Crumpton forfeited a full sufficiency challenge by failing to move for acquittal under Rule 29 at trial; appellate review therefore asked only whether affirmance would be a “manifest miscarriage of justice”, reversible only if the record is “devoid of evidence” of guilt. The panel found ample evidence: controlled buys arranged through a phone found on Crumpton, extensive drug-sale texts, GPS location data, keys to both houses, and coordination with a co-defendant.

On sentencing, the court held the district court did not clearly err in applying §2D1.1(b)(12) based on the East Palmer houses. The panel emphasized that the enhancement is not limited to formal residences and does not require ownership; it is satisfied by actual (de facto) control, which can be shown through keys, repeated presence, coordination of on-site dealing, and other indicia of control over access and activities.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of review and procedural posture

  • United States v. Curry, 170 F.4th 559, 566 (6th Cir. 2026): Cited for the ordinary (preserved) standard—de novo review of evidentiary sufficiency. The court contrasted this baseline with the far more defendant-unfriendly standard triggered by forfeiture.
  • United States v. Taylor, 85 F.4th 386, 388 (6th Cir. 2023): Provides the sentencing-review framework: factual findings for clear error, Guideline interpretations de novo. Taylor also supplies substantive guidance on the drug-premises enhancement (discussed below).
  • United States v. Williams, 612 F.3d 417, 423 (6th Cir. 2010): Establishes that failing to make a timely Rule 29 motion forfeits a typical sufficiency claim.
  • United States v. Damra, 621 F.3d 474, 494 (6th Cir. 2010): Supplies the “manifest miscarriage of justice” lens applied to forfeited sufficiency challenges.
  • United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 697 (6th Cir. 2008): Sharpens the miscarriage standard: reversal only if the record is “devoid of evidence” pointing to guilt. This case drives the practical outcome—once forfeiture occurs, the appellate question becomes whether any inculpatory evidence exists.

2. Conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846

  • United States v. Hall, 20 F.4th 1085, 1106 (6th Cir. 2022): Sets out the elements of a § 846 drug conspiracy: agreement, knowledge/intent, participation.
  • United States v. Campbell, 135 F.4th 376, 390 (6th Cir. 2025): Emphasizes that agreement can be proven by circumstantial evidence supporting a reasonable inference of a common plan.
  • United States v. Mosley, 53 F.4th 947, 957 (6th Cir. 2022): Supports the court’s rejection of Crumpton’s “missing evidence” arguments (no recordings, no DNA, etc.): conspiratorial agreement need not be express or recorded and may be inferred from conduct; also underscores the “steep climb” to overturn conspiracy convictions.
  • United States v. Paige, 470 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2006): Used as an exemplar that the kind of circumstantial evidence present—communications, coordination, and drug-operation indicators—can sustain conspiracy convictions.

3. Possession with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841

  • United States v. Allen, 619 F.3d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2010): Provides the elements: knowing possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
  • United States v. Latimer, 16 F.4th 222, 225–26 (6th Cir. 2021): Central to the constructive-possession analysis. Latimer defines constructive possession as “dominion or control” over contraband or the premises where it is found and recognizes cash as a nexus to drug dealing.
  • United States v. Burris, 999 F.3d 973, 976 (6th Cir. 2021): Rejects the notion that circumstantial evidence must eliminate every innocent hypothesis—critical where the defense highlights shared spaces and nonexclusive access to the houses.
  • United States v. Otero, No. 24-3549, 2025 WL 2662274, at *6 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2025), and United States v. Castro, 960 F.3d 857, 866 (6th Cir. 2020): Used for intent-to-distribute: “distribution quantities” and paraphernalia permit an inference of intent even absent direct observation of hand-to-hand sales.
  • United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 182 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc): Reinforces deference to jury inferences so long as they are reasonable—especially significant under the already-deferential forfeiture posture.

4. The drug-premises enhancement, U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(12)

  • United States v. Taylor, 85 F.4th 386, 389–90 (6th Cir. 2023): Supplies the three-part test (knowingly open/maintain a place for drug distribution/manufacture) and two key propositions: control need not be exclusive or continuous, and “more than just a casual visitor” can satisfy maintenance.
  • United States v. Florence, 150 F.4th 773, 780, 782–83 (6th Cir. 2025): The opinion’s anchor for the “maintenance” prong when the defendant lacks formal ownership. Florence identifies the “touchstone” as de facto (actual) control and clarifies that appellate review of applying the prong to facts is clear-error review— a highly deferential standard that strongly favors affirmance when the district court points to concrete indicia of control.
  • United States v. Hernandez, 721 F. App'x 479, 485 (6th Cir. 2018): Rejects arguments based on others’ ability to use the premises; the relevant inquiry is the defendant’s relationship to the site during the period of use.
  • United States v. Terry, 83 F.4th 1039, 1044 (6th Cir. 2023): Establishes a “relatively low” evidentiary bar; drug storage and on-site transactions will “usually suffice.”
  • United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 644 (6th Cir. 2010): Though interpreting the analogous “drug premises” statute (18 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)), Russell provides a functional list of “maintenance” indicators: control, duration, supervision, protection, and continuity—factors the panel found mirrored by Crumpton’s keys, regular presence, and coordination.
  • United States v. Barker, No. 24-3492, 2025 WL 707870, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 2025): Offers a fact pattern for “appeared to control access” and “more than just a casual visitor,” including mundane acts (e.g., taking out trash) that demonstrate comfort and control—paralleled by Crumpton’s frequent movement between houses and shoveling snow.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Forfeiture narrowed sufficiency review to an “any evidence” inquiry

The panel’s sufficiency analysis is driven less by the substantive law of conspiracy/possession and more by appellate procedure. Because Crumpton did not file a Rule 29 motion, the court treated the challenge as forfeited and asked only whether the record was “devoid” of incriminating evidence. That framing effectively converts many “weight and credibility” disputes into losing arguments on appeal. Here, text-message coordination, keys, cash, GPS data, and observed trafficking patterns made it impossible to characterize the record as empty.

2. Constructive possession and intent inferred from operational facts

The court accepted constructive possession based on dominion/control over the premises—keys, utility bills, repeated presence—alongside drug-dealing indicia like cash in small bills and trafficking communications. For intent to distribute, the court relied on controlled buys, corroborating messages, and the volume of drugs and paraphernalia in the trap/stash houses.

3. “Maintaining” a drug premises: de facto control shown by access, continuity, and use

On §2D1.1(b)(12), the panel emphasized that formal ownership is not required and that control need not be exclusive. The district court’s fact findings—keys to both houses, frequent presence, GPS evidence placing the dealing phone at the houses most of the time, observed movement between trap and stash houses, coordination with others about “who would be hustling,” and even property-upkeep behavior (snow shoveling)—supported the conclusion that Crumpton exercised de facto control over access and activities. Under Florence’s clear-error standard, those facts comfortably supported the enhancement.

C. Impact

  • Practical warning on preserving sufficiency claims: The decision underscores how failure to file a Rule 29 motion can be outcome-determinative. Once forfeited, sufficiency review becomes so deferential that defendants effectively must show the government offered no meaningful evidence at all.
  • Broader reach of §2D1.1(b)(12) beyond owned “homes”: The case reinforces that vacant or informally used properties (trap/stash houses) qualify as “places” that can be “maintained,” and that indicia of control (keys, bills, recurring presence, coordinating activity) can substitute for a lease or deed.
  • Modern proof patterns: GPS location data and text-message logistics—paired with surveillance observations—continue to be treated as strong circumstantial evidence for both guilt and sentencing enhancements in drug-distribution cases.
  • Shared access is not a safe harbor: The panel’s reliance on Hernandez and Taylor signals that a defendant cannot defeat either constructive possession or “maintenance” merely by showing others also used the premises or phones.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Forfeiture vs. waiver: Forfeiture is the failure to timely assert a right (here, not moving under Rule 29). It limits appellate review. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a right (often barring review entirely).
  • “Manifest miscarriage of justice” / “devoid of evidence” review: A highly deferential standard applied to forfeited sufficiency claims; reversal occurs only when there is essentially no evidence supporting guilt.
  • Constructive possession: Even without drugs in hand, a person “possesses” contraband if they have the power and intention to control it—often shown by control over the place where it is found (keys, access, staying there, controlling activities).
  • U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(12) (“drug-house” enhancement): A two-level Guidelines increase when a defendant knowingly opens or maintains a place for manufacturing or distributing drugs. The focus is functional control and drug-related purpose, not property law formalities.
  • Clear-error review: On factual findings at sentencing, the appellate court affirms unless left with a definite and firm conviction the district court made a mistake—meaning plausible, record-supported findings will stand.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Israel Lee Crumpton affirms convictions and a §2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement on a record built largely from circumstantial, operational evidence: phones, texts, GPS, keys, surveillance, and drug-house searches. Two takeaways dominate. First, failing to preserve a sufficiency claim via Rule 29 can reduce appellate review to a near-insurmountable “any evidence” test. Second, for the drug-premises enhancement, the Sixth Circuit reiterates that de facto control—not ownership, exclusivity, or continuous presence— is the touchstone, and relatively ordinary signs of control over a drug site can justify the enhancement.