Cyberstalking Restitution Under 18 U.S.C. § 2264 Covers Foreseeable Post-Arrest Safety Costs and Victim Privacy Measures

Introduction

In United States v. Kyle Stevens (3d Cir. Jan. 16, 2026) (not precedential), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a restitution order entered after Kyle Stevens pleaded guilty to cyberstalking (18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)) and making interstate threats (18 U.S.C. § 875(c)). The case arose from a prior relationship between Stevens and the victim at the University of Delaware and a later campaign of threatening online messages sent while Stevens was in Germany.

The appeal focused on a narrow but recurring question in cyberstalking restitution: whether certain victim expenses incurred after the defendant’s arrest, but before sentencing (and slightly beyond), can still qualify as losses “proximately” caused by the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2264. A second question concerned whether restitution may include costs tied to conduct the defendant alleged was unlawful under state law—here, out-of-state vehicle registration chosen to conceal the victim’s Delaware address in public records.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed the restitution order (totaling $37,116.20) and rejected Stevens’s two principal objections:

  • Post-arrest safety expenses (additional rent for a gated-community apartment and a parking spot near the victim’s study buildings) were recoverable because they were a direct and foreseeable consequence of Stevens’s open-ended threats and thus “losses suffered … as a proximate result of the offense” under 18 U.S.C. § 2264(b)(3)(G).
  • Out-of-state vehicle registration costs were also recoverable. Even assuming restitution might raise issues where the expense is incurred through unlawful conduct, the Court held it did not need to reach that broader question because Stevens failed to show the victim’s registration choice violated Delaware law.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Yung, 37 F.4th 70 (3d Cir. 2022):
    • Role in the opinion: The primary Third Circuit authority framing both the standard of review and the meaning of “proximate result” in 18 U.S.C. § 2264(b)(3)(G).
    • Key contribution: “Proximate result” requires that losses be a “direct and foreseeable” result of the crime. The Stevens panel treated this “direct and foreseeable” formulation as controlling.
    • Doctrinal emphasis: The panel also relied on Yung to underscore that § 2264 is “broad,” which supports inclusion of protective measures reasonably undertaken in response to stalking threats.
  • Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014):
    • Role in the opinion: The source of the “direct and foreseeable” articulation used (via Yung) to interpret “proximate result,” even though Paroline addressed a different restitution statute (18 U.S.C. § 2259).
    • Key contribution: The panel cited Paroline for two ideas: (1) proximate cause as a limiting principle tied to foreseeability, and (2) recoverable losses can include “expenses associated with the risks created” by the offense. That second point helps justify restitution for preventive or protective steps, not only costs responding to realized harm.
  • Lagos v. United States, 584 U.S. 577 (2018):
    • Role in the opinion: Used to contrast the breadth of § 2264 with the narrower Mandatory Victims Restitution Act context discussed in Lagos.
    • Key contribution: The panel leveraged Lagos to reinforce that Congress drafted § 2264 expansively—supporting a restitution approach that accommodates victims’ safety-related expenditures.
  • United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2013):
    • Role in the opinion: Cited for the standard of review distinction: legality of a restitution order is reviewed de novo, while “specific awards” are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
    • Key contribution: Framed Stevens’s challenge as primarily a legal one (proximate cause and permissibility), warranting de novo review.
  • United States v. Gonzalez, 647 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2011):
    • Role in the opinion: Raised and then distinguished in connection with Stevens’s argument that restitution should not reimburse costs linked to purportedly unlawful conduct.
    • Key contribution: The panel clarified that Gonzalez is about preventing restitution that exceeds a victim’s actual loss (e.g., accounting for value received), not about invalidating restitution because a reimbursed expense might involve a state-law issue.
  • United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006) (en banc):
    • Role in the opinion: Cited in the Gonzalez discussion to reaffirm a ceiling principle: restitution may not exceed “the full amount of loss.”
    • Key contribution: Reinforced that restitution is compensatory (making victims whole up to the loss), not punitive windfall.

Legal Reasoning

A. Proximate Cause Under § 2264 Includes Foreseeable Post-Arrest Protection Costs

The court’s analysis turned on the statutory phrase “any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 2264(b)(3)(G). Applying United States v. Yung and Paroline v. United States, the panel treated proximate cause as a “direct and foreseeable” relationship between the offense and the loss.

The critical move was recognizing that the victim’s fear and precautionary spending did not become unforeseeable or “break” causation merely because Stevens had been arrested and detained. The panel pointed to the nature of the threats: repeated, graphic, and explicitly open-ended (including threats extending into the victim’s future family life), and threats implying omnipresence and inevitability (“whenever I want”).

From that factual premise, the court derived two doctrinal conclusions:

  • Foreseeability of lingering fear: A victim’s fear may reasonably persist after arrest, particularly where threats are indefinite and the defendant has a history of harassment involving the same victim.
  • Reasonableness is not hindsight necessity: The statute does not limit restitution to expenses a court later deems strictly “necessary” in an objective sense (e.g., because detention lowered immediate risk). The question is whether the victim’s chosen protective steps were a direct and foreseeable result of the offense.

The panel also rejected the defendant’s proposed “mitigation” framework—arguing the victim should have broken her lease or moved sooner. The court’s response was categorical: § 2264 does not impose a victim duty to mitigate losses, nor does it demand judicial minimization through alternative hypothetical choices. The opinion reinforced that restitution’s focus is on compensating losses proximately caused by the offense, not second-guessing victims’ safety planning.

Finally, the court emphasized an important timing point: before sentencing, the victim could not know whether Stevens would be incarcerated for years or receive a lesser sanction. Given that uncertainty and the scope of the threats, contracting for safety-related rent and parking expenses before sentencing was foreseeable and recoverable. The panel also addressed concerns about “liability in perpetuity” by noting the order covered only expenses incurred before sentencing and for less than a year afterward.

B. Restitution for Out-of-State Registration: The Court Avoids the Hard Question

Stevens conceded proximate cause for the out-of-state registration expense: the victim did it to avoid listing her Delaware address in public records. His argument instead invoked a normative bar: restitution should not reimburse an expense incurred through allegedly unlawful behavior.

The panel acknowledged the argument as “interesting” but expressly declined to resolve it because Stevens did not establish an underlying Delaware-law violation. The court read the Delaware statute (21 Del. C. § 2102(a)) to apply to “every owner” who must register within 60 days after “taking up residence” in Delaware, and noted the motor vehicle code does not define “residence.”

Stevens attempted to import definitions from Delaware’s tax code (30 Del. C. § 1103(2)). The panel rejected that move on two grounds:

  • Cross-code definition mismatch: The tax code contains its own definitions, and Stevens cited no authority extending them to the motor vehicle code.
  • Even tax materials undermine his position: Delaware tax instructions identify an exception for full-time students who maintain legal residence elsewhere unless they intend to make Delaware their permanent residence.

With no showing that the victim was actually subject to Delaware’s registration requirement, reimbursement did not amount to compensating an act that violates state law—and the restitution component was affirmed.

Impact

Although labeled “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion reflects and applies a set of practical guideposts likely to influence § 2264 restitution disputes:

  • Post-arrest losses can be proximately caused: The decision reinforces that cyberstalking harms do not necessarily end at arrest. Safety-driven expenditures made while the case is pending—especially before sentencing outcomes are known—may remain foreseeable.
  • Protective measures are not judged by hindsight necessity: Courts may treat reasonable protective responses as foreseeable risk costs, consistent with § 2264’s breadth (as framed through United States v. Yung, Paroline v. United States, and Lagos v. United States).
  • No implied mitigation duty: The court’s rejection of a “break the lease” alternative signals skepticism toward defense arguments seeking to re-engineer victim choices as a way to reduce restitution.
  • State-law illegality defenses face a threshold hurdle: Before a court reaches the harder question of whether restitution may reimburse an expense linked to unlawful conduct, a defendant must first demonstrate that the conduct is in fact unlawful under the relevant state law.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Restitution
A monetary order requiring the defendant to reimburse the victim for certain losses caused by the crime. It is distinct from imprisonment and is aimed at making the victim whole (up to the proven loss).
“Full amount of the victim’s losses” (18 U.S.C. § 2264)
For cyberstalking, Congress authorized a broad set of compensable losses, including categories beyond direct out-of-pocket damage, so long as the loss is proximately caused by the offense.
Proximate result / proximate cause
A limiting principle: the loss must be close enough to the crime to be fairly attributed to it. In this case, the court used the “direct and foreseeable” test—if the loss was a predictable consequence of the stalking and threats, it qualifies.
Foreseeability vs. hindsight
Foreseeability asks what consequences are predictable at the time of the offense and its aftermath. Hindsight asks what turned out to be necessary after later developments (like detention or sentencing). The court emphasized the statute’s focus on foreseeability, not hindsight necessity.
Standard of review (de novo vs. abuse of discretion)
“De novo” means the appellate court decides the legal issue anew without deferring to the district court. “Abuse of discretion” is more deferential and applies to certain fact-bound award determinations. Here, the legality/proximate-cause question was reviewed de novo.

Conclusion

United States v. Kyle Stevens affirms a broad, foreseeability-based approach to cyberstalking restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2264: safety and privacy expenses—including those incurred after arrest and in anticipation of uncertain sentencing outcomes—may be compensable when they are a direct and foreseeable response to the risks created by the offender’s threats. The decision also illustrates that challenges premised on alleged state-law illegality of a victim’s protective step will fail absent a concrete showing that state law was actually violated.