CTR-Compliance Delays Are Not § 1981 Contract Impairment; Unpreserved Qualified-Immunity Challenges Reviewed Only for Plain Error — Randle v. PNC Financial (5th Cir. 2025)

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Morris v. Town of Independence, 827 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2016): Set the de novo standard for reviewing summary judgment—applied to Burgess’s appeal.
• Johnson v. PRIDE Industries, Inc., 7 F.4th 392 (5th Cir. 2021): Reaffirmed that all facts and inferences at summary judgment are drawn in favor of the non-movant. The panel nevertheless found no triable fact conflict because the undisputed record showed compliance-related questioning and no contract impairment.
• Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2004): Articulated the three-part prima facie test under § 1981 in the commercial context—(1) protected class; (2) intent to discriminate; (3) discrimination relating to an activity enumerated in § 1981. The court bypassed element (2) and resolved the case at element (3).
• Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 869 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2017): Clarified that § 1981 reaches the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts and enjoyment of all terms and conditions (tracking § 1981(b)), but does not create a general tort for race discrimination untethered to contract rights.
• Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003): Confirmed that § 1981 is not a general cause of action for race discrimination; plaintiffs must show interference with a contractual relationship. Also distinguished contexts where customer-service interactions may or may not amount to contract impairment.
• Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006): Held that § 1981 protects the right “to make and enforce contracts,” requiring a personal contractual relationship and interference therewith.
• Morris v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743 (5th Cir. 2001): Required proof of “loss of an actual, not speculative or prospective contract interest” to establish the deprivation of a § 1981 right.
• Hager v. Brinker Texas, Inc., 102 F.4th 692 (5th Cir. 2024): Expanded on Arguello’s discussion of how context (retail vs. restaurant) can define when a contractual relationship is established and impaired. The Randle panel noted the distinction but found the context immaterial to the outcome.
• Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327 (2020): Imposed a but-for causation requirement for § 1981 claims—applied by the panel to underscore that race must be the but-for cause of the contract impairment.
• Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds: Established that failure to object to a magistrate judge’s report can limit appellate review to plain error.
• Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009): Set out the four-prong plain-error standard, referenced to explain the demanding nature of Randle’s burden on appeal absent objections.

Legal Reasoning

1) The § 1981 claim: No interference with contract and no but-for racial causation

The Fifth Circuit focused on the third element of a § 1981 claim: whether any alleged discrimination interfered with a contractual activity enumerated in § 1981. The panel concluded it did not.

Key factual anchors drove the outcome:

• PNC lacked $28,000 in cash on the day of the first visit; it ordered the funds and invited Burgess back once ready—actions consistent with performing the contract, not blocking it.
• PNC’s policy required two forms of identification. Federal law required a CTR for the transaction (> $10,000), which in turn necessitated answers from the account holder to specific questions. Bank staff asked those questions to complete the CTR.
• The record reflected rising tensions and allegations of racist remarks (which Avina denied). But the court centered on whether the contract was impaired. Once Burgess supplied the required identification and CTR information, the bank paid the funds. That sequence demonstrated completion, not denial, of the contract.
• The bank’s “loss prevention” call and the presence of police did not alter the dispositive fact: Burgess’s withdrawal was completed after compliance, undermining any claim of actual loss of a contract interest.

Applying Morris v. Dillard, Arguello, and Domino’s, the court reiterated that § 1981 liability requires actual impairment of a contract right, not mere disrespect, delay, or friction. Coupled with Comcast’s but-for causation requirement, the panel concluded Burgess’s own resistance to CTR/ID requirements, rather than race, delayed the transaction. No reasonable jury could find that racial bias was the but-for cause of the loss of a legally protected contract right, because there was no such loss—payment followed compliance.

On the summary-judgment record, Burgess’s proffered “police records” and “video surveillance footage” did not create a genuine dispute of material fact. The “footage” consisted of screenshots and had “no probative value,” and the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) report corroborated that the friction arose from CTR questioning, not a contract denial. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Burgess, the bank’s conduct remained consistent with effectuating the withdrawal once CTR and ID steps were satisfied.

Notably, the district court had alternatively reasoned under the burden-shifting framework that Avina articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for pausing the transaction (compliance and de-escalation), and Burgess failed to show pretext. The Fifth Circuit did not need to reach that stage because it resolved the case on the enumerated-right/actual-impairment element.

2) The § 1983 claim: Qualified immunity and the consequences of failing to object

Randle alleged Officer Dixon intentionally struck her with a patrol car door during the incident. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal on qualified-immunity grounds, finding Randle failed to allege a violation of clearly established law. Randle did not file objections to the recommendation.

Under Douglass, failure to object limits appellate review to plain error. Applying Puckett, the panel looked for a clear or obvious district court error that affected substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Randle identified no such error and inadequately briefed other purported issues. The dismissal was therefore affirmed.

The panel thus avoided an on-the-merits qualified-immunity analysis; the affirmation rested on the unpreserved and inadequately briefed posture of the appeal, underscoring the procedural imperative to object to a magistrate judge’s report to preserve de novo review.

Impact and Implications

For banking and retail civil rights litigation under § 1981

• Clarification for banks: Neutral enforcement of CTR and identification policies—even where customer tensions arise—does not, without more, “impair” a contract under § 1981, particularly where the transaction is completed once compliance occurs. Banks may rely on this opinion to argue that compliance-driven pauses or delays, absent but-for racial causation, are not actionable impairments.
• Limits of offensive speech evidence: Even assuming rude or discriminatory comments (contested here) occurred, a § 1981 claim still requires proof that such bias caused an actual loss of a contract right. Mere delay, inconvenience, or unpleasant interactions—without denial or materially altered terms—are insufficient.
• Context signpost (retail vs. continuing service): The panel references Arguello and Hager to remind that in some service contexts (e.g., sit-down restaurants), the “contract” can be ongoing and its benefits broader than a single exchange of funds. But the court expressly states the context is immaterial here because, under any view, there was no actual loss of a contract right: Burgess received the funds upon compliance.
• Evidence at summary judgment: Parties must present admissible, probative evidence. Unauthenticated screenshots or records that do not refute the material facts will not forestall summary judgment. Pro se status does not relax the evidentiary burden.
• But-for causation stays center stage: Following Comcast, plaintiffs must show that race was the but-for cause of the deprivation of a § 1981-protected right—here, the right to make and enforce the bank-depositor contract. A neutrally enforced federal compliance step that is satisfied shortly thereafter and leads to fulfillment of the transaction is a difficult platform on which to prove but-for causation.

For § 1983 qualified-immunity practice

• Preservation is outcome determinative: Failure to object to a magistrate judge’s report recommending qualified immunity triggers plain-error review on appeal. As Randle demonstrates, that posture can be fatal even to potentially fact-intensive claims.
• Clearly established law must be identified with specificity: Plaintiffs must cite controlling or robustly persuasive case law addressing materially similar facts to surmount the “clearly established” prong. Conclusory assertions or generalized excessive-force concepts will not suffice.
• Briefing matters: The court flags “inadequate briefing” as a basis to decline consideration of asserted errors. Appellants should develop arguments with record citations and on-point authority.

Precedential weight

The opinion is unpublished and thus not precedential under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5. Still, it is persuasive authority that reflects the circuit’s steady adherence to Comcast’s causation standard and to the contractual-impairment threshold for § 1981, plus its firm approach to appellate preservation in qualified-immunity disputes.