CSPA Conversion Rule: “Age” in § 1151(f)(2) Means CSPA Statutory Age at Naturalization; NVC Reclassification Is Reviewable Final Agency Action

I. Introduction

Dekovic v. Rubio (10th Cir. Mar. 10, 2026) addresses a recurring and high-stakes question under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA): when a lawful permanent resident (LPR) parent files an F2A petition for a “child” (under 21), and later naturalizes before the visa issues, does the beneficiary’s “age” at the moment of naturalization mean biological age or the CSPA’s statutory age (after applying CSPA’s age-calculation rules)?

Plaintiffs-Appellants Dalila Dekovic (the sponsor, initially an LPR and later a U.S. citizen) and Alejandro Jimenez Ramirez (the beneficiary, born in Mexico) challenged the National Visa Center’s decision to reclassify him from F2A (minor child of an LPR) to F1 (adult unmarried son/daughter of a U.S. citizen) after Dekovic naturalized. The reclassification transformed a “current” and near-term path to a visa into an estimated decades-long wait.

The case also presented an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) threshold issue: whether the NVC’s reclassification decision is “final agency action” reviewable in court, despite the later involvement of consular officers.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Finality: The Tenth Circuit affirmed that the NVC’s reclassification decision is a final agency action under the APA because it is definitive, has immediate legal consequences (especially access to an interview and visa availability), and is otherwise effectively unreviewable.
  • Merits (CSPA): The court reversed the district court, holding that “age” in 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2) means the beneficiary’s CSPA statutory age (as determined under the CSPA’s F2A age rules), not merely chronological age. Therefore, an F2A beneficiary who is a “child” by statutory age on the date of the parent’s naturalization converts to immediate relative, not F1.
  • Disposition: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

1. Sister-circuit CSPA decisions (core merits guidance)

  • Tovar v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2018)
    The opinion frames the case with Tovar’s articulation of the problem: the government’s “labyrinthine” parsing can perversely punish naturalization, converting a near-term visa path into decades of separation. The Tenth Circuit adopts Tovar’s holistic statutory approach and its ultimate rule: if a beneficiary is a minor child under the relevant statutes on the naturalization date and has a valid petition, the beneficiary may obtain the visa as the minor child of a citizen after naturalization.
  • Cuthill v. Blinken, 990 F.3d 272 (2d Cir. 2021)
    Cuthill supplies the structured explanation of the four relevant family preference categories and the mechanics of priority dates and queues. More importantly, it provides a textual roadmap—highlighting the “three antecedent provisions” (the baseline definition of “child,” the F2A provision, and the CSPA age-calculation rule for F2A) and concluding that “age” in § 1151(f)(2) best reads as statutory age for the class of people to whom § 1151(f)(2) applies. The Tenth Circuit closely tracks this logic.
  • Teles de Menezes v. Rubio, 156 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2025)
    The Tenth Circuit relies on Teles de Menezes for a careful statutory “walk-through” and, notably, for identifying “anomalies” created by the government’s reading—penalizing naturalization, punching a “hole” in the CSPA’s protections for the subset moving from F2A to immediate relative, and giving adult children an opt-out benefit that children would not receive. These anomalies reinforce that the government’s reading is discordant with the statutory scheme.
  • United States v. Gelin, 712 F.3d 612 (1st Cir. 2013)
    Cited (via Teles de Menezes) for the interpretive principle that courts should avoid readings that “defeat one of [a statute’s] most important purposes.” Here, the purpose is preventing “aging out” due to administrative delay and avoiding harm from parental naturalization.

2. Statutory-interpretation framework (context over isolation)

  • Potts v. Ctr. for Excellence in Higher Ed., 908 F.3d 610 (10th Cir. 2018)
    Provides the Tenth Circuit’s de novo review standard and its method: examine text, context, and the statute as a whole; avoid interpretations that produce an incoherent scheme.
  • King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000))
    Used to justify reading “age” in context: apparent simplicity can dissolve once situated within the overall statutory structure.
  • Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, U.S. 280 (2010)
    Supports the admonition to construe statutes, not isolated provisions—central to rejecting the district court’s “plain and simple” view of “age” divorced from CSPA mechanics.
  • Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)
    Cited (via Potts) for the idea that the “plainness” inquiry includes whether the reading yields a coherent statutory scheme.
  • Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 764 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 2002)
    Supply definitions of ambiguity and support the court’s conclusion that—at minimum—the government’s approach does not establish unambiguous meaning in its favor.
  • Seale v. Peacock, 32 F.4th 1011 (10th Cir. 2022) and Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005)
    Provide the pathway to legislative history and policy considerations when language is ambiguous (or when context demands).

3. APA finality and judicial review (threshold holding)

  • Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)
    The foundational two-part finality test: consummation of decisionmaking and legal consequences. The court applies this test to the NVC reclassification.
  • Custodia Bank v. Fed. Reserve Bd. of Govs., 157 F.4th 1235 (10th Cir. 2025)
    Reinforces that an action can be final even if later effects depend on other decisionmakers; supports treating the NVC classification as final notwithstanding later consular involvement.
  • Prutehi Litekyan: Save Ritidian v. U.S. Dep't of Airforce, 128 F.4th 1089 (9th Cir. 2025)
    Quoted (via Custodia Bank) for the proposition that finality can exist despite downstream decisions by other entities.
  • Cure Land, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 833 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2016)
    Central to rejecting the government’s “not final because maybe revisitable” argument: a definitive rights-determining position is final even if future related proceedings might occur.
  • Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm'n, 772 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2014) and Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984)
    Provide the presumption in favor of judicial review, and a pragmatic, non-formalistic approach to finality.
  • Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)
    Used for the idea that agency behavior can reveal finality even absent formal “accoutrements of finality.”
  • Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310 (10th Cir. 2007)
    Analogy: operational decisions with immediate consequences are final even if later modifications are possible. Supports treating the NVC’s category decision as final.
  • Farrell-Cooper Min. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 864 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2017) and Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993)
    Stand for the principle that an operative initial decision can be final and reviewable even where later administrative processes exist; applied to counter the “wait decades for consular review” theory.
  • Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) and Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1990)
    Invoked to underscore that insulating the NVC’s operative decision from review would undermine the APA’s role in addressing unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed action (“justice delayed is justice denied”).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Reviewability: Why NVC reclassification is “final agency action”

The court isolates the practical function of the NVC decision: it determines the beneficiary’s category and thus whether the priority date is “current” and whether an interview can be scheduled. Because there is no administrative appeal of the NVC classification decision, and because a consular officer cannot adjudicate until an interview is scheduled (which in turn requires visa availability dictated by the NVC classification), the NVC determination has immediate, binding consequences.

Critically, the court rejects the government’s argument that finality must await a consular interview: forcing the beneficiary to wait potentially decades would make judicial review illusory and remedies meaningless. Under Bennett v. Spear and Tenth Circuit finality doctrine, an operative rights-determining decision is final now.

2. Merits: Interpreting “age” in § 1151(f)(2) as statutory (CSPA) age

The interpretive dispute centered on the phrase “the age of the alien on the date of the parent’s naturalization” in 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2). The district court treated “age” as plainly biological. The Tenth Circuit, aligned with Tovar v. Sessions, Cuthill v. Blinken, and Teles de Menezes v. Rubio, treats “age” as a term whose meaning must be derived from the CSPA’s integrated scheme.

The court’s core textual-context move is straightforward: § 1151(f)(2) applies only to petitions “initially filed” as F2A; and Congress supplied an express, specialized mechanism for determining the “age” of F2A beneficiaries in 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1). Therefore, when § 1151(f)(2) asks for “age” on the naturalization date, it most naturally refers to the age concept already governing that beneficiary—i.e., the CSPA-modified statutory age—rather than reverting to biological age at the most consequential moment (conversion).

The court further bolsters this reading with structural coherence:

  • Anti-naturalization penalty: The government’s reading would make a child worse off when a parent naturalizes, conflicting with the family-based scheme’s general preference for citizens and with CSPA’s evident intent not to penalize naturalization.
  • “Hole” in protections: It would protect children against aging out from delay in immediate-relative and F2A categories, but not when moving from one to the other via naturalization—an irrational carve-out.
  • Adult-over-child anomaly: Adults in F2B have an opt-out under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(k)(2), but the government’s interpretation would deny an analogous benefit to children in F2A, contrary to the system’s child-favoring orientation.
  • Textual mismatch: § 1151(f)(2) contemplates conversion from F2A to immediate relative; the government’s F2A-to-F1 move is not cleanly rooted in the statute’s express conversion language, whereas the statutory-age reading avoids inserting an extra, unstated conversion step.

3. Legislative history and purpose (confirmatory force)

Even assuming ambiguity, the court finds the legislative history “overwhelmingly” supports the statutory-age reading, echoing Cuthill v. Blinken. Congress enacted the CSPA unanimously to prevent children from losing benefits due to agency delay, and the House Report specifically contemplated protecting children “when permanent resident parents petition for immigrant visas for their sons and daughters and later naturalize.”

The government offered no countervailing legislative evidence; the court accordingly treated purpose and history as decisive confirmation.

C. Impact

1. Immigration consequences within the Tenth Circuit

  • Conversion rule clarified: In the Tenth Circuit, an F2A beneficiary who is under 21 by CSPA statutory age on the parent’s naturalization date is eligible for conversion to immediate relative under § 1151(f)(2), even if biologically 21+ at that time.
  • Naturalization no longer a trap: The decision eliminates a perverse incentive for LPRs to delay citizenship out of fear of worsening a child’s immigration position.
  • Operational pressure on NVC: NVC classification decisions that materially affect visa availability can be challenged immediately as final agency action, rather than only after a distant consular interview.

2. Administrative law consequences

  • Finality doctrine applied to visa-processing chokepoints: The court treats the NVC’s gatekeeping role (availability/interview scheduling) as producing immediate legal consequences, making review available now. This reasoning may support review in other contexts where an agency’s intermediate step functionally forecloses timely access to later adjudication.
  • Remedy preservation: The opinion emphasizes that delayed review can be tantamount to no review, especially where the harm is time-separated family unity.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Preference categories (Immediate Relative, F1, F2A, F2B)
These are statutory “lines.” Immediate relatives of citizens are not capped (no line), while F1/F2A/F2B are capped and can involve multi-year or multi-decade waits.
Priority date and the Visa Bulletin
The priority date is usually the filing date of the I-130 petition. The State Department’s monthly Visa Bulletin announces which priority dates are “current” (eligible to proceed).
“Aging out”
A beneficiary “ages out” when turning 21, losing the legal status of “child” and falling into a less favorable category with longer waits.
CSPA “statutory age” vs. biological age
For F2A beneficiaries, CSPA does not simply use birthdays. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(1), the beneficiary’s age is calculated as: age when a visa becomes available, minus the time the I-130 was pending (and subject to timely steps to seek residence). This can “freeze” a beneficiary as under 21 for legal purposes even if biologically older.
Final agency action
Under the APA, courts can review agency actions that are definitive and have legal consequences. Here, the NVC’s classification was final because it controlled whether the beneficiary could proceed to an interview at all, and waiting decades for later review would defeat meaningful relief.

V. Conclusion

Dekovic v. Rubio establishes two important rules in the Tenth Circuit: (1) the NVC’s reclassification decision that determines visa availability and interview access is a reviewable final agency action; and (2) for F2A-to-immediate-relative conversions under 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2), “age” means the beneficiary’s CSPA statutory age on the parent’s naturalization date. The opinion aligns the Tenth Circuit with the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits, reinforcing CSPA’s central purpose—preventing children from losing immigration benefits because of administrative delay or because a parent becomes a U.S. citizen.