Criminal Land-Theft Motive Defeats Asylum Nexus to Family or “Male Landowner” Social Groups; Failure to Contest CAT Likelihood Is Dispositive

I. Introduction

In Victor Cerritos Rivas v. Pamela Bondi, the Fourth Circuit denied a petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection. The petitioner, Victor Manuel Cerritos Rivas, alleged fear of harm in El Salvador stemming from a decades-old land-and-cattle seizure: when he was an infant, a man named Raul Morales murdered his father, threatened the family, and took the family’s property. The family relocated within El Salvador and later to the United States.

The central issues were (1) whether feared harm would be “on account of” a protected ground—specifically membership in asserted social groups (family of the father; male landowners)—and (2) whether the petitioner established the elements of CAT protection, including a likelihood of future torture.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court upheld the BIA’s dispositive finding that the “nexus” element for asylum and withholding was not met: the record supported the conclusion that Morales acted from criminal greed to obtain and retain property, not from animus toward the petitioner’s family status or “male landowner” status. The court emphasized its deferential “substantial evidence” review of the BIA’s factual findings.

As to CAT, the court held the claim failed because the BIA had found the petitioner did not meaningfully challenge (and did not show clear error in) the immigration judge’s predictive finding that future torture was not more likely than not; before the Fourth Circuit, the petitioner focused on government acquiescence without challenging the likelihood-of-torture determination, leaving the BIA’s dispositive rationale unaddressed.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Velasquez v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2017)
    Provided the baseline asylum framework: the applicant bears the burden to show persecution (or well-founded fear) “on account of” a protected ground, and that the persecutor is the government or an actor the government is unable or unwilling to control. The opinion uses Velasquez to anchor the statutory requirements and burden allocation.
  • Toledo-Vasquez v. Garland, 27 F.4th 281 (4th Cir. 2022)
    Supplied the “one central reason” articulation of nexus and the “more than incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate” gloss. The court also relied on Toledo-Vasquez for the standard that, because nexus is factual, the reviewing court upholds the agency unless no rational factfinder could agree.
  • Yi Ni v. Holder, 613 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2010)
    Reinforced the relationship between asylum and withholding: withholding has a higher burden (“clear probability”), so failure on asylum typically forecloses withholding when the failure is on a shared element (here, nexus).
  • McDougall v. Bondi, ___ F.4th ___, 2025 WL 2552334 (4th Cir. Sept. 5, 2025)
    Set out CAT’s two key components: (1) likelihood of future torture, and (2) torture by or with consent/acquiescence of government officials. The court’s CAT discussion mirrors this sequencing—likelihood first, acquiescence second—and treats failure on the first as dispositive.
  • Moreno-Osorio v. Garland, 2 F.4th 245 (4th Cir. 2021)
    Anchored the standards of review: substantial evidence for factual findings and de novo for legal conclusions, plus the statutory “conclusive unless compelled” formulation. The court also invoked Moreno-Osorio to emphasize that if the record could plausibly support two outcomes, reversal requires evidence that compels the opposite result.
  • Madrid-Montoya v. Garland, 52 F.4th 175 (4th Cir. 2022)
    This was the most factually and analytically important comparator. The Fourth Circuit used it to support the principle that threats against family members in property-seizure contexts can be about protecting stolen property (a non-protected, criminal motive), not about family membership itself—especially where the persecutor would target family and non-family alike and where threats diminish once the property objective is achieved.
  • Ibarra Chevez v. Garland, 41 F.4th 279 (4th Cir. 2022)
    Cited for the proposition that likelihood of future torture is a factual/predictive determination reviewed for substantial evidence—supporting the court’s deference to the agency’s CAT predictive finding.
  • Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213 (4th Cir. 2021)
    Supplied a family-PSG-specific framing: the operative nexus question is whether family membership is a central reason the petitioner (rather than someone else) was targeted. The court applied this lens to conclude the BIA could reasonably see the targeting as property-driven, not family-driven.
  • Cedillos-Cedillos v. Barr, 962 F.3d 817 (4th Cir. 2020)
    Reinforced that even explicit references to family do not automatically establish nexus; threats can arise from non-protected motives (e.g., silencing witnesses or eliminating obstacles), and could have been directed at any similarly situated person.
  • Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944 (4th Cir. 2015)
    Used (via a footnote example) to illustrate a common nexus pitfall: a threat may mention a relationship, yet the real motive may be to neutralize a witness or obstacle—again, something transferable to non-family individuals.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Nexus as a factual, “central reason” inquiry

The court treated the nexus requirement—whether the feared harm would be “on account of” a protected ground—as a factual question. Under substantial-evidence review, the petitioner needed to show the record compelled the conclusion that his family membership or “male landowner” status was at least one central reason for persecution.

2. Property theft and “criminal greed” as a non-protected motive

The agency found (and the court agreed was permissible) that Morales’s motive was to take and keep land and cattle. That motive, even if violent and reprehensible, is not itself a protected ground. The court emphasized record facts supporting this inference:

  • Moraless allegedly killed to “own everything,” suggesting a generalized criminal pattern rather than group-based animus.
  • Threats and violence were connected to expelling the family and facilitating the property takeover.
  • After the family fled, there were no direct threats to the petitioner, and no renewed contact in the relocation town despite alleged knowledge of their location—supporting the inference that the property objective had been accomplished.

3. Family-based PSG nexus requires more than being within the “zone of harm”

Applying Perez Vasquez v. Garland, Cedillos-Cedillos v. Barr, and Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, the court reasoned that threats to family members can be instrumental—directed at anyone who threatens a criminal scheme—rather than expressive of animus toward the family as such. Here, the BIA could infer the threats were meant to eliminate resistance and prevent later claims against the stolen property.

4. Reliance on Madrid-Montoya’s property-claim logic

The opinion’s key move is analogizing to Madrid-Montoya v. Garland, where threats to a spouse after a property-motivated killing did not necessarily establish family-based nexus because the persecutor’s concern was ownership claims. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit held it was reasonable to view Morales as threatening anyone who might contest his possession—family members included, but not because of their family status.

5. CAT claim fails when the petitioner does not contest the dispositive “likelihood” element

CAT relief requires showing it is “more likely than not” the applicant will be tortured, and that the torture will involve government consent or acquiescence. The IJ made a predictive finding against likelihood; the BIA affirmed, noting the petitioner did not meaningfully challenge it. On petition for review, the petitioner argued primarily about governmental acquiescence, not likelihood. The court treated the unchallenged likelihood determination as dispositive: even perfect proof of acquiescence cannot cure the failure to establish that torture is more likely than not.

C. Impact

  • Property-driven violence remains difficult to fit within protected grounds.
    Even where a family suffers targeted violence, the Fourth Circuit signaled continued skepticism that land theft, retaliation to secure stolen property, or generalized predation establishes nexus without concrete evidence of protected-ground animus.
  • Family PSG claims must separate “who was harmed” from “why they were harmed.”
    This decision reinforces a recurring Fourth Circuit theme: family membership is not enough; applicants must show the persecutor’s motive centrally includes hostility toward the family as such, not merely a desire to remove obstacles or silence potential claimants/witnesses.
  • Litigation strategy lesson for CAT claims.
    The decision underscores that applicants must challenge each dispositive element on appeal (to the BIA and in the court of appeals). Focusing on acquiescence while leaving the likelihood-of-torture finding intact can be fatal.
  • Institutional impact: deference to BIA factfinding on nexus.
    By repeatedly emphasizing the “plausibly could support two results” principle, the opinion fortifies the practical difficulty of overturning nexus determinations under substantial-evidence review.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Nexus”: The required connection between the harm feared and a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or particular social group). It asks: “Is the persecutor doing this because of the protected trait, not merely in the presence of it?”
  • “One central reason”: The protected ground does not have to be the only reason, but it must be a major reason—more than incidental or secondary.
  • “Particular social group (PSG)”: A legally recognized group defined by certain characteristics; here, the agency assumed (without deciding) that “family members of the father” and “male landowners” could qualify, but still denied because motive (nexus) was not shown.
  • “Substantial evidence” review: A very deferential appellate standard. The court does not ask whether it would decide differently; it asks whether the agency’s view is reasonably supported by the record, and reverses only if the record compels the opposite conclusion.
  • CAT “more likely than not”: A probability standard—greater than 50% chance of torture if removed. If an applicant cannot meet this, the claim fails regardless of arguments about government involvement.

V. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision affirms that, even where family members have suffered horrific violence, asylum and withholding still turn on proving a protected-ground motive. When the record supports a non-protected explanation—here, criminal land theft and retaining stolen property—the BIA may find no nexus, and substantial-evidence review makes that finding hard to overturn. The opinion also serves as a procedural warning for CAT litigation: failing to contest the agency’s dispositive likelihood-of-torture finding leaves the claim unable to succeed, even if other CAT elements are argued.