Date: Apr 24, 2026

Criminal-Fraud Allegations Do Not Defeat Absolute Immunities in Civil § 1983/§ 1985 Damages Suits; Unbriefed/Unpled Claims Are Lost

I. Introduction

In Sherratt v. Braithwaite (10th Cir. Apr. 23, 2026) (unpublished “Order and Judgment”), the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal with prejudice of a sweeping pro se civil-rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, plus Utah-law libel and Utah constitutional theories, against state judges, prosecutors, attorneys general and assistants, a state court, and county entities.

The dispute traces to Mr. Sherratt’s 2000 Utah convictions for two counts of rape. He alleged that sentencing-related paperwork and docket entries inaccurately labeled his convictions as “rape of a child,” and that a presentence report (PSR) incorrectly described a prior “spousal abuse” conviction. He claimed these inaccuracies were propagated over years by judges and government lawyers in later proceedings and communications (including with the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole), constituting constitutional violations, fraud, and libel.

The central appellate issues were not the truth of the allegations, but whether Mr. Sherratt’s claims could proceed at all in light of (i) threshold defects (official-capacity “personhood,” waiver, pleading), and (ii) absolute immunities (judicial and prosecutorial/advocacy).

II. Summary of the Opinion

Official-capacity § 1983/§ 1985 claims: Affirmed dismissal because state entities and state officials in their official capacities are not “persons” under the statutes; Mr. Sherratt did not meaningfully contest this on appeal and thus waived review.
Judicial defendants: Affirmed dismissal on absolute judicial immunity. The court rejected attempts to pierce immunity by recharacterizing alleged judicial misconduct as “fraud” or invoking criminal-law authorities.
Prosecutors/state advocates: Affirmed dismissal where Mr. Sherratt did not specifically challenge the district court’s holdings of absolute prosecutorial immunity and absolute immunity as state advocates in civil cases; those issues were waived on appeal.
Rule 8 pleading defects: Affirmed dismissal of individual-capacity claims against certain defendants (notably Mr. Gower, Mr. Nolan, and Mr. Shurtleff) because the complaint provided no (or essentially no) factual allegations giving fair notice and plausibly stating a claim.
Procedural complaints: Rejected arguments about default, jury trial, and discovery; Rule 12 dismissal is a legal determination and does not violate the Seventh Amendment.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of review and pro se construction

BV Jordanelle, LLC v. Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co.: Cited for de novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and the requirement that courts accept well-pled facts as true and draw reasonable inferences for the plaintiff.
Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita: Used to treat a Rule 12(c) motion as applying the same standard as Rule 12(b)(6).
Yang v. Archuleta: Reiterated liberal construction of pro se filings, while emphasizing the court may not act as the litigant’s advocate.

2. Waiver doctrines (district court objections; appellate briefing)

United States v. 2121 E. 30th St.: Provided the Tenth Circuit’s “firm-waiver rule” framework (failure to make timely, specific objections to an R&R can waive review). The panel declined to rely on it definitively, exercising discretion instead.
Morales-Fernandez v. INS: Cited for the proposition that applying the firm-waiver rule is discretionary.
Sawyers v. Norton: Anchored the rule that issues not raised in the opening brief are abandoned/waived.
Rivero v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M.: Supported affirmance where the district court gave multiple independent grounds and the appellant failed to challenge them all.
Becker v. Kroll: Supported deeming insufficiently developed arguments waived.

3. Official capacity and “person” requirement under § 1983 / § 1985

Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police: The core authority for the holding that a State, state officials sued in their official capacities, and arms of the State are not “persons” under § 1983.
Small v. Chao and Rode v. Dellarciprete: Cited to extend the “person” logic to § 1985 and to note that “persons” is construed consistently between §§ 1983 and 1985.

4. Municipal liability pleading

Monell v. Department of Social Services and Chilcoat v. San Juan Cnty.: The panel rejected any attempt to recast claims against the Iron County Attorney’s Office as Monell claims, emphasizing the need to plead an unconstitutional policy or custom that directly caused the violation.

5. Absolute judicial immunity

Mireles v. Waco: Provided the modern statement of absolute judicial immunity and its two narrow exceptions (non-judicial acts; acts taken in complete absence of jurisdiction).
Pierson v. Ray: Reinforced that immunity applies even with allegations of malice or corruption.
Stump v. Sparkman: Confirmed that judicial immunity applies in § 1983 suits.
Braatelien v. United States and McFarland v. State: Distinguished as criminal-prosecution cases; the panel held they do not help a plaintiff seeking civil damages.
Fischer v. United States: Rejected as inapposite because it does not address judicial immunity.
Pulliam v. Allen: Identified as concerning prospective injunctive relief; the panel noted Mr. Sherratt sought damages, not prospective relief. The opinion also referenced that Congress curtailed Pulliam via the Federal Courts Improvement Act (as discussed through an Eighth Circuit case).
Just. Network Inc. v. Craighead Cnty.: Cited for the post-1996 understanding that injunctive relief against judicial officers is typically barred unless statutory exceptions apply.

6. Pleading standards (Rule 8; plausibility)

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly: Cited for Rule 8’s “fair notice” function and the “possibility vs. plausibility” threshold.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Cited for the “plausible on its face” requirement and the need for factual content supporting a reasonable inference of liability.

7. Seventh Amendment and Rule 12 adjudication

Smith v. Kitchen and Christensen v. Ward: Cited to reject the argument that Rule 12 dismissal violates the Seventh Amendment; if the complaint fails as a matter of law, there are no triable facts for a jury.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court treated the appeal as primarily about justiciability and pleading—not historical truth

A key throughline is that Rule 12 adjudication assumes well-pled facts are true (BV Jordanelle, LLC v. Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co.), so Mr. Sherratt’s insistence that his complaint was sworn did not create a factual dispute requiring an oath-based response. The dispositive questions were legal: whether defendants were amenable to suit, whether immunities applied, and whether claims were pled.

2. Official-capacity claims were barred at the threshold

Using Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, the panel affirmed dismissal because the State and arms of the State (and state officials in official capacity) are not “persons” under § 1983; related authority (Small v. Chao, Rode v. Dellarciprete) supported the same result under § 1985. The court additionally held Mr. Sherratt forfeited meaningful review by not arguing the issue in his opening brief (Sawyers v. Norton).

3. Judicial immunity: “fraud” labels and criminal-law analogies do not convert judicial acts into actionable civil damages claims

The panel applied the classic immunity framework: judges are immune from damages for judicial acts unless one of the two narrow Mireles v. Waco exceptions applies. The court found neither exception plausibly implicated by the challenged conduct (entering/signing orders, minutes, docket-related actions, and case-related communications).

Critically, the court refused to treat allegations of “fraud,” “falsification,” or “malice” as immunity-defeating. That proposition is directly foreclosed by Pierson v. Ray and Mireles v. Waco, and the applicability of immunity to § 1983 claims is confirmed by Stump v. Sparkman.

The decision also draws a categorical line between civil damages suits and criminal exposure: authorities like Braatelien v. United States and McFarland v. State—addressing whether judges may be criminally prosecuted—do not undermine absolute immunity in a civil action. Likewise, Fischer v. United States was rejected as irrelevant to immunity.

Finally, Pulliam v. Allen was treated as beside the point because Mr. Sherratt did not seek prospective injunctive relief. The panel underscored (via Just. Network Inc. v. Craighead Cnty.) that even prospective relief is now constrained by statute.

4. Prosecutorial/advocacy immunities were effectively unreviewable because they were not specifically challenged

For multiple attorney defendants, the district court dismissed based on absolute prosecutorial immunity and, for civil advocacy, absolute immunity as state advocates. The Tenth Circuit affirmed because Mr. Sherratt did not advance a targeted appellate argument against those holdings—triggering waiver (Sawyers v. Norton) and alternative-ground affirmance principles (Rivero v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M.).

5. Rule 8 as a backstop: some defendants were dismissed simply because they were not factually connected to misconduct

Even apart from immunity, the court affirmed dismissal as to Mr. Gower, Mr. Nolan, and Mr. Shurtleff because the complaint failed to state what they did and why it was actionable—violating Rule 8’s notice function (Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly) and plausibility requirement (Ashcroft v. Iqbal). A bare assertion that officials denied “redress” did not identify a cognizable constitutional or statutory violation.

6. Jury trial and discovery arguments failed because Rule 12 resolves legal insufficiency

The panel rejected the contention that dismissal deprived Mr. Sherratt of a jury or discovery. If a complaint fails to state a claim, there is no triable issue (Smith v. Kitchen; Christensen v. Ward), and Rule 12 authorizes legal resolution pretrial.

C. Impact

Reinforces the durability of absolute immunity in civil damages litigation: The decision emphasizes that reframing dissatisfaction with judicial/prosecutorial acts as “fraud” or invoking criminal-law concepts does not open a damages remedy under §§ 1983/1985 where absolute immunity applies.
Signals the importance of remedy selection: Plaintiffs challenging alleged ongoing record inaccuracies who seek only damages will face significant barriers; the opinion highlights (even if in dicta) the narrowed path for injunctive relief against judges post-1996.
Elevates appellate discipline: The case is a caution that failing to brief an issue (or to attack each independent ground) results in affirmance on waiver grounds.
Rule 8 remains a gatekeeper even in emotionally compelling narratives: Long procedural histories do not substitute for specific, defendant-by-defendant factual allegations tied to a viable cause of action.
Practical effect in “record-mislabeling” disputes: Claims about inaccurate labels in orders/dockets—when pursued against judges and prosecutors as damages suits—will often be filtered out by immunity and pleading doctrine before merits discovery.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Official-capacity claim: A suit against a government official “in their official capacity” is treated like a suit against the State (or state agency) itself. Under Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, States and arms of the State are not “persons” for § 1983 damages liability.
“Person” under § 1983 / § 1985: These statutes authorize suits against “persons.” The Supreme Court and other cited cases hold that the State and certain state entities do not qualify, which defeats the claim at the outset.
Absolute judicial immunity: Judges are generally immune from civil damages for acts performed as judges (e.g., rulings, orders, docket-related actions), even if allegedly malicious or wrong. Only two narrow exceptions exist: non-judicial acts or acts taken without any jurisdiction (Mireles v. Waco).
Absolute prosecutorial immunity / advocacy immunity: Prosecutors (and certain government advocates) are often absolutely immune from civil damages when performing core advocacy functions closely associated with the judicial process. In this appeal, those rulings stood because they were not specifically challenged.
Rule 8 pleading / plausibility: A complaint must tell each defendant what they did and why it violates a law, with enough factual detail to be plausible (Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly; Ashcroft v. Iqbal). Naming officials without connecting facts is insufficient.
Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c): Pretrial motions that test whether the complaint—assuming its well-pled facts are true—states a legally valid claim. They do not decide whose facts are “more believable”; they decide whether the law provides a remedy on the pleaded facts.
Waiver on appeal: Appellate courts generally do not decide issues not argued in the opening brief (Sawyers v. Norton), and they may affirm if any unchallenged alternative ground supports the judgment (Rivero v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M.).

V. Conclusion

Sherratt v. Braithwaite is a procedural-and-immunity-driven affirmance: the Tenth Circuit held that sweeping civil-rights damages claims attacking long-ago judicial and prosecutorial actions cannot proceed where (i) official-capacity defendants are not “persons” under §§ 1983/1985, (ii) judges are protected by absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts, (iii) immunity rulings not challenged on appeal are waived, and (iv) certain defendants are not plausibly implicated under Rule 8.

Although nonprecedential, the decision consolidates several recurring federal-courts lessons: immunity doctrines remain formidable, “fraud” labels and criminal-law analogies do not convert judicial acts into civil damages liability, and disciplined pleading and briefing are often outcome-determinative in § 1983 litigation.