“Crime Victim” Under Executive Law § 632-a Is Not Limited to Physically Injured Victims: Psychological Harm and “Subject of the Felonious Conduct” Suffice

1. Introduction

Matter of New York State Off. of Victim Servs. v. Williams (2026 NY Slip Op 04248 [3d Dept July 2, 2026]) addresses who qualifies as a “crime victim” under New York’s “Son of Sam Law,” Executive Law § 632-a, and whether that status depends on the “physical injury” limitation embedded in the Office of Victim Services’ compensation framework under Executive Law § 621(5).

The petitioner, the New York State Office of Victim Services (OVS), acting on behalf of Vanessa Belle, sought to restrain settlement proceeds payable to Robert Williams, who had pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted murder in the first degree after opening fire in a police station. Belle, a police officer present during the attack, alleged psychological and emotional injuries from being placed in immediate danger. The central issue was whether Belle—who was not physically injured and not named as a victim in the counts of conviction—could nonetheless be treated as a “crime victim” for purposes of freezing Williams’s funds pending her civil action.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department reversed Supreme Court, holding that the phrase “the victim of a crime” in Executive Law § 632-a(1)(d)(i) does not incorporate the physical-injury-based definition of “victim” in Executive Law § 621(5). Accordingly, a person may qualify as a “crime victim” under the Son of Sam Law even if the person’s harms are psychological/emotional rather than physical, so long as the person is a victim of the crime—here, a “subject of the felonious conduct.”

Applying that interpretation, the court held Belle was a “crime victim” because she was directly subjected to Williams’s indiscriminate shooting, placed in immediate danger, and alleged resulting psychological and emotional injuries. The court further held OVS met the requirements for a preliminary injunction to preserve the settlement funds (with the statutory 10% exemption), and remitted for issuance of an appropriate injunction.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Waldman v State of New York, 163 AD3d 1114 (3d Dept 2018), lv denied 32 NY3d 910 (2018) and Prindle v Guzy, 179 AD3d 1169 (3d Dept 2020): cited for a functional description of § 632-a’s purpose—enhancing victims’ ability to obtain compensation by preserving funds when a convicted person receives substantial sums “from virtually any source.” These cases frame § 632-a as a victim-compensation/preservation mechanism rather than a narrow benefits statute.
  • New York State Crime Victims Bd. v T.J.M. Prods., 265 AD2d 38 (1st Dept 2000): crucial to the holding. The Third Department relied on the statement that “the victim of a crime” “includes the subject of the felonious conduct.” That formulation supported treating Belle as a victim even though she was not the named victim of the attempted murder counts.
  • Matter of New York State Crime Victims Bd. v Gordon, 66 AD3d 1213 (3d Dept 2009) and People ex rel. Negron v Superintendent, Woodbourne Corr. Facility, 36 NY3d 32 (2020): invoked for core statutory-interpretation principles—legislative intent is best discerned from statutory language and structure.
  • People v Finnegan, 85 NY2d 53 (1995), cert denied 516 US 919 (1995): used for the expressio unius-style inference that when the Legislature explicitly cross-references a definition in one part of a statute but omits a comparable cross-reference elsewhere, the omission is deliberate. This case underpins the court’s conclusion that § 632-a did not silently import § 621(5)’s physical-injury limitation.
  • Matter of New York State Off. of Victim Servs. v Mobayed, 245 AD3d 1085 (3d Dept 2026): cited by comparison (“cf.”) to situate the court’s reading of “crime victim” within recent Son of Sam Law practice in the Third Department, while signaling that the inquiry under § 632-a is not confined to the compensation eligibility criteria in § 621.
  • Matter of Juarez v New York State Off. of Victim Servs., 36 NY3d 485 (2021): cited for the historical purpose of Executive Law article 22 (including § 621)—a public-compensation scheme focused on personal physical injuries and associated hardships. The court uses this to contrast article 22’s compensatory-benefits function with § 632-a’s separate asset-preservation and private-recovery function.
  • Simon & Schuster, Inc. v Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 US 105 (1991): cited for the constitutional and policy backdrop prompting the modern Son of Sam framework. The Third Department references it (along with the Governor’s Approval Memorandum for the 1992 enactment) to emphasize § 632-a’s purpose: preventing convicted persons from retaining substantial funds while victims remain uncompensated.
  • Matter of New York State Crime Victims Bd. v Harris, 68 AD3d 1269 (3d Dept 2009): cited for the proposition that the Legislature “went to great lengths” to create avenues for victim compensation—supporting a broader, not narrower, understanding of “crime victim” in § 632-a.
  • Boice v Burnett, 245 AD2d 980 (3d Dept 1997) and Clemens v Nealon, 202 AD2d 747 (3d Dept 1994): cited by analogy to support the idea that victim status for civil recovery can extend beyond those formally named in criminal charges, reinforcing the “subject of the felonious conduct” concept applied to Belle.
  • Matter of New York State Off. of Victim Servs. v Marshall, 248 AD3d 1478 (3d Dept 2026) and Matter of New York State Off. of Victim Servs. v Alexis, 233 AD3d 1248 (3d Dept 2024), lv denied 43 NY3d 905 (2025): provide the governing test for preliminary injunctions and illustrate how OVS can satisfy the requirements using a conviction plus victim affidavits, and why dissipation of funds constitutes irreparable harm in the § 632-a context.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The key interpretive move: “victim” in § 621(5) does not control “crime victim” in § 632-a(1)(d)(i).
Supreme Court dismissed the petition by importing Executive Law § 621(5)(a), which (as relevant) defines “victim” as a person who suffers “personal physical injury” directly resulting from a crime. The Third Department rejected that approach by focusing on the statutory architecture:

  • Selective cross-references within § 632-a(1)(d): The statute expressly includes “the representative of a crime victim as defined in [Executive Law § 621(6)]” and “a good samaritan as defined in [Executive Law § 621(7)].” Because the Legislature used explicit cross-references when it wanted § 621 definitions to apply, the absence of a cross-reference to § 621(5) was treated as intentional.
  • Purpose-based consistency: Article 22’s physical-injury emphasis reflects a public-benefits program (compensating certain crime-related expenses). The Son of Sam Law, by contrast, is an asset-freezing and private-compensation facilitation mechanism aimed at preventing convicted persons from retaining substantial funds while those harmed go uncompensated. Reading in a physical-injury limitation would, in the court’s view, conflict with that aim.

2) Who is “the victim of a crime” under § 632-a?
The court adopted an inclusive understanding consistent with New York State Crime Victims Bd. v T.J.M. Prods.: a crime victim includes “the subject of the felonious conduct.” On the facts, Belle confronted Williams, observed him reach for a gun, warned others, and dove for cover as he fired indiscriminately—placing her in immediate danger. Even though she was not the named victim in the plea counts, she was directly subjected to the criminal episode and alleged psychological and emotional injuries “directly” resulting from it. That nexus satisfied § 632-a.

3) Preliminary injunction: application of settled standards in the § 632-a setting.
The court applied the traditional three-prong test—(i) probability of success, (ii) irreparable harm, and (iii) balance of equities—citing Matter of New York State Off. of Victim Servs. v Marshall and Matter of New York State Off. of Victim Servs. v Alexis. It found:

  • Probability of success: shown by the conviction plus Belle’s affidavit describing the conduct and losses.
  • Irreparable harm: dissipation of settlement funds would effectively defeat recovery (and potentially affect other victims), aligning with the Son of Sam Law’s preservation function.
  • Balance of equities: favored restraint, especially because 10% ($18,930) is statutorily exempt from restraint under Executive Law § 632-a(3) and CPLR 5205(k).

C. Impact

1) Expanded access to § 632-a for non-physically injured victims.
The decision’s central practical effect is to confirm that § 632-a relief is not limited to persons meeting the physical injury threshold of § 621(5). Victims claiming psychological or emotional harm—if they were “the victim of a crime” and can demonstrate a direct connection to the felonious conduct—may invoke the Son of Sam framework to preserve a convicted person’s funds.

2) More frequent injunction practice where the criminal episode created direct risk.
By emphasizing immediate danger and being a “subject of the felonious conduct,” the opinion provides a litigation pathway for persons exposed to violence (e.g., bystanders, coworkers, responders) to seek preservation of assets, particularly where the convicted person receives windfalls (settlements, inheritances, payouts) unrelated to the crime itself.

3) Statutory-interpretation signal to trial courts.
The Third Department’s cross-reference analysis cautions against importing eligibility restrictions from other parts of the Executive Law into § 632-a absent explicit statutory direction. This may influence how lower courts treat other definitional disputes under § 632-a.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Son of Sam Law” (Executive Law § 632-a): A law designed to help people harmed by a convicted person recover money by allowing courts to temporarily freeze certain funds the convicted person receives, so the money is not spent before victims can sue and obtain judgments.
  • “Crime victim” vs. “victim”: “Victim” in Executive Law § 621(5) is tied to the state’s public compensation program and often requires physical injury. “Crime victim” in § 632-a is a separate concept aimed at facilitating private recovery from a convicted person’s assets; this decision holds it is not restricted to physically injured persons.
  • Cross-reference drafting: When a statute says “as defined in [another section],” it is intentionally importing that definition. If the Legislature cross-references some definitions but not others, courts often infer the omission was deliberate.
  • Preliminary injunction / temporary restraining order (TRO): A TRO is short-term emergency relief; a preliminary injunction is a longer interim order pending final resolution. Both can restrain assets, but a preliminary injunction requires the movant to satisfy the three-prong test.
  • Irreparable harm (in asset cases): Even though money is usually “repairable,” courts treat dissipation of a limited, identifiable fund as irreparable in this context because once spent, a later judgment may be uncollectible—defeating the statute’s preservation purpose.
  • 10% exemption: The Son of Sam framework protects a portion of the funds from restraint, here 10%, reflecting a legislative balance between victim recovery and limiting the harshness of total restraint.

5. Conclusion

Matter of New York State Off. of Victim Servs. v. Williams establishes an important interpretive rule: the Son of Sam Law’s definition of “crime victim” in Executive Law § 632-a(1)(d)(i) is not constrained by the physical-injury definition of “victim” in Executive Law § 621(5). By relying on statutory structure (explicit cross-references), legislative purpose, and the concept that a victim includes the “subject of the felonious conduct,” the Third Department broadened access to § 632-a relief for those alleging direct psychological and emotional harm from serious criminal conduct. The decision strengthens the statute’s asset-preservation function and is likely to shape future injunction applications involving victims who were directly endangered but not physically injured.