Crim.R. 33 Motions Must Be Ruled on Sequentially; Mandamus Lies to Compel a Long-Delayed Ruling on Leave, Not on the New-Trial Motion Itself

I. Introduction

State ex rel. Quinn v. Rastatter addresses a recurring problem in postconviction practice: what extraordinary-writ relief is available when a trial court does not timely rule on postjudgment filings. James Quinn, convicted in 2014 in the Clark County Court of Common Pleas, filed (1) a petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23 and (2) a combined filing titled “motion for leave to file motion for new trial instanter and motion for new trial instanter” under Crim.R. 33. He alleged suppression and modification of exculpatory evidence.

By July 2025—more than a year after filing—Quinn had not received rulings, and the State had not yet responded. Quinn sought a writ to compel Judge Douglas Rastatter to rule. While the mandamus action was pending, the judge denied the postconviction petition, leaving the Crim.R. 33 “leave” request and the included “new trial” request still unresolved.

The case presented three key issues:

• Mootness: Whether a later trial-court ruling moots an extraordinary-writ request to compel that ruling.
• Proper sequencing under Crim.R. 33(B): Whether a court may be compelled to rule on a motion for new trial filed together with (and contingent upon) a motion for leave.
• Undue delay: When a trial court’s inaction on a postjudgment motion becomes sufficiently “undue” to justify mandamus relief.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Ohio (per curiam) granted the writ in part and denied it in part:

• Postconviction petition: Denied as moot because the trial judge ruled after the mandamus action was filed.
• Crim.R. 33 motion for leave: Writ granted ordering the judge to rule on the motion for leave to file a motion for new trial, due to undue delay.
• Crim.R. 33 motion for new trial: Writ denied because the rules require the court to address leave first; the new-trial motion is not properly before the court unless leave is granted and a motion is filed within the rule’s timeframe.

The court also granted Quinn’s motion for judicial notice, relying on publicly available trial-court entries to resolve mootness.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is built on a line of extraordinary-writ cases distinguishing mandamus and procedendo, defining mootness, and setting practical benchmarks for “undue delay.”

• State ex rel. Dehler v. Sutula (1995-Ohio-268) (quoting State ex rel. Levin v. Sheffield Lake, 1994-Ohio-385):
  These cases frame the doctrinal point that the “ill” targeted by procedendo is an inferior court’s failure to timely dispose of a pending matter—while acknowledging mandamus can also be used for undue delay. Quinn’s request was “akin” to procedendo, but the court treated mandamus as an acceptable vehicle.
• State ex rel. Culgan v. Collier (2013-Ohio-1762):
  Culgan supplied multiple key propositions: (i) mandamus may lie for undue delay in entering judgment; (ii) Sup.R. 40 does not create an enforceable mandamus right; but (iii) Sup.R. 40’s 120-day target “guides” the undue-delay analysis. Culgan also provided the elements of mandamus that the court applied to Quinn’s claim.
• State ex rel. Roberts v. Hatheway (2021-Ohio-4097) and State ex rel. Jerninghan v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1996-Ohio-117):
  These cases controlled the mootness holding: once the trial court performs the requested act (here, ruling on the postconviction petition), extraordinary relief to compel that act is no longer available.
• State ex rel. Ames v. Summit Cty. Court of Common Pleas (2020-Ohio-354):
  Ames supported the court’s use of judicial notice of trial-court entries to determine mootness—an important procedural move in original actions where the record may be developing in parallel in the trial court.
• State ex rel. Gilreath v. Cuyahoga Job & Family Servs. (2024-Ohio-103):
  Cited to reject Quinn’s apparent attempt (via a judicial-notice motion) to expand the requested relief to other motions filed in 2025. The court tied this to S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(3), insisting that all relief must be set forth in the complaint—reinforcing pleading discipline in original actions.
• State ex rel. Brown v. Luebbers (2013-Ohio-5062):
  Luebbers was central on two points: (i) the elements of procedendo are analogous to mandamus in this context; and (ii) courts with general subject-matter jurisdiction must “eventually rule” on motions or risk an extraordinary writ. The court also noted Luebbers’s reliance on Sup.R. 40’s 120-day benchmark when granting relief for delayed postconviction rulings.
• State v. Hatton (2022-Ohio-3991):
  Hatton drove the sequential-processing rule under Crim.R. 33(B): when more than 120 days have elapsed since verdict, a defendant must first obtain leave by showing, by clear and convincing proof, unavoidable prevention from timely discovering the evidence; only then does the timeline for filing the new-trial motion (within seven days of the leave ruling) begin to run. This precedent made Quinn’s request to compel a ruling on the “new trial” motion premature as a matter of procedure.
• State ex rel. Reynolds v. Basinger (2003-Ohio-3631):
  Quoted (via Culgan) for the broad proposition that mandamus may issue when a trial court refuses or unduly delays rendering judgment—reinforcing that the remedy focuses on compelling action, not outcomes.
• State ex rel. Collins v. Pokorny (1999-Ohio-343) and State ex rel. Bunting v. Haas (2004-Ohio-2055):
  Collins clarified that trial courts generally need not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law when denying a Crim.R. 33 motion for new trial. Bunting, though involving postconviction practice, was used by analogy: even where no findings are required, the court must still rule. Together, these cases underpin the opinion’s practical insistence: regardless of the form of the eventual denial, a ruling must occur.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Mandamus vs. procedendo: form matters less than function

The court emphasized that Quinn’s complaint resembled procedendo (compelling a ruling), citing State ex rel. Dehler v. Sutula and State ex rel. Levin v. Sheffield Lake. Yet it reaffirmed that mandamus may still lie for undue delay (State ex rel. Culgan v. Collier). Practically, this keeps the courthouse door open when a litigant styles the action as mandamus, so long as the relief sought is simply a decision—any decision—rather than a specific outcome.

2. Mootness is strict: once the act is performed, the writ cannot issue

The postconviction portion of the requested writ became moot when Judge Rastatter denied the petition after the mandamus filing. Relying on State ex rel. Roberts v. Hatheway and State ex rel. Jerninghan v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, the court applied a bright-line principle: extraordinary writs do not compel completed acts. The court also used judicial notice of trial-court entries (State ex rel. Ames v. Summit Cty. Court of Common Pleas) to efficiently resolve mootness without further evidentiary proceedings.

3. Crim.R. 33(B) imposes a sequential gatekeeping structure that limits what can be compelled

The opinion’s most concrete procedural clarification is that a motion for leave to file a motion for new trial and a motion for new trial “must be ruled on sequentially.” Because Quinn was convicted long ago (well beyond 120 days), Crim.R. 33(B) requires:

• First: a ruling on leave—whether the defendant has shown by clear and convincing proof that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence sooner; and
• Only if leave is granted: the defendant then must file the motion for new trial within seven days of the leave ruling (as explained in State v. Hatton).

This sequencing mattered because Quinn filed both requests in a single combined document. The court treated that packaging as procedurally irrelevant: the trial court can consider “only” the leave component at the current stage; compelling a ruling on the new-trial motion would contradict the rule’s structure and the Hatton timing mechanism.

4. Undue delay: Sup.R. 40 is nonbinding but strongly persuasive in the extraordinary-writ calculus

The court reiterated that Sup.R. 40(A)(3)’s 120-day guideline does not itself create an enforceable right in mandamus/procedendo (State ex rel. Culgan v. Collier). Still, it “guides” whether delay is undue, and the court has relied on it before (State ex rel. Brown v. Luebbers).

Applying a “totality of the circumstances” approach, the court found undue delay where the motion for leave had been pending for two years and the filing itself was relatively short (six pages excluding exhibits). The judge’s explanation—complex assertions, multiple filings, docket management, ordering the State to respond—did not overcome the length of the delay.

5. The writ compels action, not a particular result

Respondent argued Quinn sought to force the court to grant the motion. The Supreme Court rejected that characterization and clarified its order: Judge Rastatter must rule, but the writ does not direct how to rule. This preserves judicial discretion while enforcing the duty to decide.

C. Impact

• Operational rule for Crim.R. 33 practice: The decision underscores that when the 120-day period has passed, the “leave” question is a procedural gate that must be addressed first, and courts (and litigants) should not treat a simultaneously filed “new trial” request as ripe for decision. Future litigants can expect courts—and reviewing courts in extraordinary-writ actions—to separate the two analytically even if presented in one document.
• Strategic guidance for extraordinary-writ petitions: Petitioners should request relief precisely: compel a ruling on the motion that is actually ripe (here, leave). Overbroad requests risk partial denial, and attempts to expand relief outside the complaint will be rejected under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(3) (State ex rel. Gilreath v. Cuyahoga Job & Family Servs.).
• Judicial administration: Although Sup.R. 40 is not enforceable as a standalone right, the court’s reliance on the 120-day benchmark as a measuring stick signals continuing willingness to treat extended inaction—especially measured in years—as writ-worthy, even when judges cite docket congestion and complexity.
• Mootness discipline: Trial courts can moot extraordinary-writ claims simply by issuing the overdue ruling. For litigants, this means mandamus/procedendo often functions as a catalyst for action rather than a vehicle for merits review.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Mandamus vs. procedendo: Both can be used to force a court to act. Procedendo is tailored to “move the case along” when a court fails to decide; mandamus can also compel performance of a clear legal duty. In this context, the practical question is the same: has the court delayed too long in ruling?
• Mootness: If the judge does the thing you asked the higher court to force (e.g., issues a ruling), there is no longer a live controversy about compelling that act; the request is moot.
• Crim.R. 33(B) “leave” requirement: After 120 days from the verdict, you cannot simply file a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. You must first obtain permission (“leave”) by proving you were “unavoidably prevented” from discovering the evidence earlier—meaning, despite reasonable diligence, you could not have found it in time.
• “Clear and convincing proof”: A heightened evidentiary standard—more than “more likely than not,” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It requires evidence that produces a firm belief or conviction.
• Sup.R. 40’s 120-day guideline: A supervisory target for courts to decide motions promptly. It is not itself a private right to sue, but it is persuasive evidence of what counts as “too long.”

V. Conclusion

State ex rel. Quinn v. Rastatter reinforces two practical limits—and one practical tool—in Ohio postconviction procedure. First, extraordinary-writ relief becomes moot once the trial court rules. Second, Crim.R. 33(B) imposes a strict sequence: courts address leave first, and only after leave is granted does a new-trial motion become properly fileable and ripe. Third, when a motion that is ripe for decision (like a Crim.R. 33 leave motion) languishes far beyond Sup.R. 40’s 120-day benchmark—here, for two years—the Supreme Court will compel a ruling while carefully avoiding any intrusion into how the judge must decide the merits.