COVID-Driven Delay in Cross-Examination Does Not Violate the Confrontation Clause; “Would Exist” RICO-Enterprise Instructions Do Not Amend the Indictment

Case: United States v. Michael Forrester, Jr.; Derek Leighton Stanley; Aelix Santiago; Jamie Hern; William Boylston; James Wesley Frazier; Jason Meyerholz
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Recommended for Publication)
Date: August 27, 2026

1. Introduction

This consolidated appeal arises from a large, multi-defendant prosecution targeting members and associates of the Clarksville, Tennessee chapter of the Mongols Motorcycle Club. A federal grand jury returned a 75-count indictment charging RICO conspiracy and a wide range of predicate and related crimes (including murder, kidnapping, robberies, and drug trafficking).

After a lengthy joint trial (38 trial days over more than three months), the jury convicted the appellants on multiple counts, and most received life or near-life sentences. The defendants challenged (among other issues) the sufficiency of the evidence, trial management decisions (including semi-anonymous jurors, expert testimony, severance, and COVID-related delays), the legality of certain jury instructions, and several sentencing determinations.

Key issues with precedential significance

  • Confrontation Clause and trial continuity: whether a three-week COVID-driven mid-trial recess between a witness’s direct testimony and certain defendants’ cross-examination violated the Sixth Amendment.
  • Indictment/instruction alignment in RICO conspiracy: whether a Count 1 instruction requiring the jury to find the enterprise “existed or would exist” constructively amended (or materially varied from) an indictment alleging the enterprise existed “at all relevant times.”
  • Anonymous-jury procedure: whether a district court may raise semi-anonymous juror protections sua sponte and whether the measures employed prejudiced defendants.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed all challenged convictions and sentences. In doing so, it:

  • Rejected sufficiency challenges to the RICO conspiracy, drug and money-laundering conspiracies, VICAR counts, and kidnapping counts.
  • Upheld trial-management rulings including the use of a semi-anonymous jury, admission of expert testimony about outlaw motorcycle gangs and the Mongols generally, denial of mistrial motions stemming from COVID delays, and denial of severance motions.
  • Held that the “existed or would exist” RICO-enterprise instruction did not create a constructive amendment or a material variance from the indictment.
  • Held that the three-week delay before cross-examination did not violate the Confrontation Clause where defendants ultimately received a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine in open court and the court mitigated prejudice through instructions and juror inquiry.
  • Rejected (or found harmless) multiple sentencing-related objections, including claims about oral/written pronouncement discrepancies and supervised-release conditions unlikely ever to be applied due to life sentences.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and how they shaped the decision)

A. Sufficiency review and deference to juries

  • United States v. Woods: supplied the governing sufficiency standard (de novo review; view evidence in the government’s favor; no reweighing credibility).
  • United States v. Spears: reinforced that credibility determinations belong exclusively to the jury—central to rejecting attempts to relitigate witness reliability in the Cole murder counts.

B. RICO “enterprise” breadth and RICO conspiracy timing

  • Boyle v. United States: anchored the expansive concept of an association-in-fact enterprise and its minimal “structural features” (purpose, relationships, longevity), supporting the court’s conclusion that the Clarksville Mongols functioned as an enterprise even before formal national recognition.
  • United States v. Iossifov: provided the Sixth Circuit’s formulation of RICO conspiracy elements, including the agreement to commit at least two racketeering acts.
  • United States v. Rich: supplied the pivotal rule that “an agreement to associate with and participate in a yet-to-be-formed racketeering enterprise” can constitute a completed RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d). The court used Rich both to validate the government’s “would exist” enterprise theory and to uphold the jury instruction on Count 1.

C. Conspiracy participation principles: waiver, late-joiners, and buyer-seller

  • Walker v. United States: used to find waiver where Boylston’s trial counsel conceded key membership facts (foreclosing an appellate argument that he was not part of the enterprise).
  • United States v. Mahar: reiterated that conspirators need not participate in every overt act to be guilty.
  • United States v. Collins (quoting United States v. Cimini): supported the “latecomer” rule—joining an ongoing conspiracy can make a defendant responsible for earlier acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
  • United States v. Wheat: framed the “buyer-seller” limitation on drug conspiracies, which the court found unhelpful to Stanley given evidence of broader coordinated distribution, communications, and payments.

D. Attempt and aiding-and-abetting doctrine (Opana/Oxymorphone episode)

  • United States v. Ferguson: defined attempt as intent plus a “substantial step,” enabling the court to hold the attempt complete once the participants took concrete steps toward the drug deal—even though the supplier intended a robbery.
  • United States v. Sadler: supplied the aiding-and-abetting standard (participation as something the defendant wished to bring about and sought to make succeed), used to affirm Santiago’s liability for aiding an attempted possession with intent to distribute.

E. Inconsistent verdicts and the narrowness (and uncertainty) of exceptions

  • United States v. Randolph: recognized two suggested exceptions to the general rule that inconsistent verdicts are unreviewable; this opinion expressed skepticism about the “arbitrariness or irrationality” exception’s coherence with Supreme Court doctrine and noted the Sixth Circuit has not granted relief on it.
  • United States v. Powell: supplied the Supreme Court’s core rationale—juries may act out of mistake, compromise, or lenity; sufficiency review protects against irrationality; thus inconsistent verdicts generally do not warrant reversal.
  • United States v. Lawrence: reiterated the lenity/compromise principle.
  • Harris v. Rivera: used to foreclose claims premised on the unfairness of a codefendant’s acquittal or more lenient treatment.
  • United States v. Ruiz and United States v. Stewart: invoked to reject the “guilty-verdict necessarily excludes guilt on another” exception as inapplicable where the alleged inconsistency is between a guilty and a not-guilty verdict, not two guilty verdicts.

F. Federal kidnapping: “benefit” requirement

  • United States v. Windham: defined the § 1201 “ransom or reward or otherwise” element as any objective the defendant finds beneficial.
  • United States v. Small: emphasized the low threshold—any reason “in any way” beneficial suffices. This underwrote affirmance of the Priess kidnapping convictions because extracting an account to report to the Mother Chapter benefitted the Clarksville chapter’s standing.

G. VICAR purpose element: maintaining/increasing position

  • United States v. Woods: provided the VICAR “animating purpose” standard; applied to affirm that violence against rival clubs (Finley incident) and internal retaliation (Cole murder) could rationally be found to maintain or increase position within the enterprise.

H. Semi-anonymous jury standards and constitutional safeguards

  • United States v. Warman, United States v. Lawson, United States v. Talley, and United States v. Deitz: collectively supplied the Sixth Circuit framework—strong reason to believe protection is needed; precautions to minimize prejudice; and neutral explanation to jurors.
  • Luce v. United States: cited for the district court’s inherent authority to manage trials, supporting the conclusion that the court could raise anonymity sua sponte.
  • Out-of-circuit support: United States v. Shyrock, United States v. Hall, United States v. Bowman, United States v. Branch, and United States v. Edmond were cited to bolster the propriety of sua sponte anonymity consideration.

I. Expert testimony on organized crime/gangs

  • United States v. Gray and United States v. Reynolds: supplied the Rule 702 framework (qualification, relevance, reliability).
  • United States v. Rios: approved expert testimony on the structure and rules of an organized-crime entity and, crucially, endorsed the approach of offering national-gang background testimony while using fact witnesses to link local actors.
  • United States v. Ledbetter: reinforced that “exact approach” and supported the reliability of gang-expert testimony grounded in significant experience.

J. Confrontation Clause and delayed cross-examination

  • Coy v. Iowa, Crawford v. Washington, United States v. Owens, and Davis v. Alaska: framed the Clause’s core protections—face-to-face confrontation and an adequate opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
  • Delaware v. Fensterer: supplied the controlling limitation: the Constitution guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination in whatever manner or timing the defense prefers.
  • United States v. Fox and Pennsylvania v. Ritchie: supported that defendants do not have absolute control over cross-examinations and that broad latitude generally satisfies the Clause.
  • Samia v. United States: invoked to reinforce reliance on jurors following limiting instructions to prevent constitutional harm.
  • Taylor v. Illinois: used (in the historical/timing discussion) to caution against absolute rights to control the time and content of witness testimony.

K. Mistrial and pandemic delays

  • United States v. Perez (as quoted in United States v. Gantley): supplied the “greatest caution” standard for mistrials.
  • United States v. Van Dyke, United States v. Braxton, and United States v. Martin: supported the requirement of “actual prejudice” and broad discretion over scheduling absent manifest abuse.
  • United States v. Smith (Sixth Circuit) and multi-jurisdiction comparator cases including United States v. Smith (Fourth Circuit), United States v. McDonald, and United States v. Thomas: supported affirming denial of mistrials despite lengthy illness-related recesses.

L. Severance and “spillover” prejudice

  • Zafiro v. United States: set the “serious risk” standard; limiting instructions ordinarily cure prejudice.
  • United States v. Gallo: crucially rejected severance demands based solely on inflammatory evidence against other defendants—even involving “gruesome and brutal murders.”
  • United States v. Critton: limited severance based on antagonistic defenses absent jury confusion.

M. Indictment vs. instructions: constructive amendment vs. variance

  • United States v. Combs, United States v. Kuehne, and United States v. Rios: supplied the taxonomy and standards for actual amendment, constructive amendment, and variance, and confirmed de novo review where the claim is mismatch with indictment.
  • United States v. Davis: recognized that the line between constructive amendment and variance can be “blurry, sketchy, and shadowy.”
  • Martin v. Kassulke: provided the key analytic move: when the statute defines a single offense with alternative methods of commission, instruction on an additional method is generally a variance (and reversible only upon prejudice), not a constructive amendment.
  • United States v. Budd: noted that sufficiently prejudicial variances can become constructive amendments in Sixth Amendment terms—but the court found no such prejudice here.

N. Sentencing pronouncement and supervised release conditions

  • United States v. Booker: oral sentence controls over conflicting written judgment.
  • United States v. Shaw (and United States v. Villano): ambiguous oral pronouncements may be clarified by the record, including the written judgment.
  • United States v. Blake and United States v. Harrell: articulated the right to be present at sentencing and the application of plain-error review when not preserved.
  • United States v. Hayden: required oral notice of discretionary “standard conditions” unless properly incorporated by reference—yet the court found harmlessness given life sentences and lack of substantive challenge.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The Clarksville Mongols as a RICO enterprise (and “would exist” as an enterprise)

The court treated the enterprise question as both factual (did the group function as an enterprise by Spring 2015?) and doctrinal (does RICO conspiracy require an already-formed enterprise?). Relying on Boyle v. United States, the panel emphasized that an association-in-fact enterprise can be informal and requires only purpose, relationships, and longevity—features the Clarksville group exhibited through coordinated recruitment, “soft colors,” meetings, dues-like structure, drug trafficking, and violence used to establish dominance.

Critically, the panel embraced United States v. Rich to validate the government’s alternative theory: even if the enterprise were not fully formed at some early moment, an agreement to participate in a yet-to-be-formed enterprise can complete § 1962(d). That same principle later underpinned the court’s rejection of the indictment/instruction mismatch argument.

B. Indictment vs. Count 1 instruction: no constructive amendment, no prejudicial variance

The defendants argued that the instruction—enterprise “existed or would exist as an enterprise during the relevant dates”—departed from the indictment’s “at all relevant times” language. The court’s resolution is structurally important:

  • No constructive amendment: the instruction did not change the charged offense (RICO conspiracy) or risk conviction for a different crime; it simply reflected a correct statement of the conspiracy law recognized in United States v. Rich.
  • No variance (or at least no material, prejudicial variance): the court read the indictment’s “at all relevant times” phrase as modifying that the Clarksville Mongols “operated” in the district, not as a temporal limitation negating the forward-looking nature of a conspiracy charge. The indictment’s repeated emphasis on “Racketeering Conspiracy” and “prospective and/or founding members” further defeated any notice/prejudice claim.

A notable practical point: the panel found defendants’ purported enterprise-timing defense was not viable even on their own reading, because RICO enterprises do not require formal recognition, patching, or internal “formality” beyond what Boyle v. United States requires.

C. Confrontation Clause: delayed cross-examination is not per se unconstitutional

The panel treated the three-week COVID-driven gap between Humiston’s direct testimony and Boylston’s/Meyerholz’s cross as a constitutional question of “opportunity,” not optimality. Under Delaware v. Fensterer, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination—meaning a full and fair chance to probe infirmities—rather than a right to immediate cross-examination or to control trial timing.

The court grounded its holding in (i) the fact that cross-examination ultimately occurred in open court, (ii) the breadth and effectiveness of the cross as reflected in the transcript, (iii) repeated instructions that jurors should keep an open mind and follow the evidentiary process, and (iv) the real-world competing constitutional and institutional considerations (infected defendants’ right to be present and public-health imperatives). The panel also refused to constitutionalize a preference for immediacy based on a thin and contested historical record.

D. Inconsistent verdicts: reaffirming non-reviewability and narrowing “exceptions”

The opinion reiterates that inconsistent verdicts “generally are not reviewable” and treats the supposed exceptions in United States v. Randolph as either inapplicable (the “two guilty verdicts” scenario) or doctrinally unstable when invoked merely to argue juror irrationality in treating a codefendant more leniently. The panel relied on United States v. Powell and Harris v. Rivera to conclude that lenity toward one defendant cannot itself furnish relief to another defendant convicted beyond a reasonable doubt after a fair trial.

E. Semi-anonymous jury: limited measures, neutral explanation, adequate voir dire

Applying United States v. Talley, United States v. Warman, and United States v. Deitz, the court upheld the semi-anonymous jury because (i) counsel still knew juror identities, (ii) voir dire was extensive and supported by detailed questionnaires, and (iii) the court gave jurors a neutral explanation focused on preventing media contact, not defendant dangerousness. The panel also held the district court could raise anonymity sua sponte, citing trial-management authority (Luce v. United States) and persuasive sister-circuit precedent.

F. Kidnapping “benefit”: organizational reputational protection qualifies

For the Priess kidnapping, the court applied United States v. Windham and United States v. Small to hold the “otherwise” element satisfied where the abduction served the objective of learning and relaying an account of Chavez’s death to the Mongols’ California leadership—thereby protecting the probationary chapter’s standing and responding to Mother Chapter scrutiny. This underscores that “benefit” may be intangible (status, reputational management, internal discipline), not merely monetary.

3.3. Impact

A. Trial-management precedent for disruptions (including public-health emergencies)

As a published decision, the opinion strengthens Sixth Circuit precedent that significant, non-strategic trial interruptions—even those occurring mid-witness—do not automatically create Confrontation Clause violations or require mistrials, so long as the defendant ultimately receives a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine and the court takes reasonable steps to mitigate prejudice.

B. RICO conspiracy charging/instruction practice

The decision reduces litigation risk for prosecutors and trial courts that instruct juries in RICO conspiracy cases that the enterprise “existed or would exist,” particularly where the alleged enterprise’s emergence overlaps with the conspiracy’s inception. It also signals that defendants will face an uphill battle framing such instructions as constructive amendments where the indictment plainly charges conspiracy and provides forward-looking factual allegations (e.g., “prospective/founding members”).

C. Inconsistent verdict doctrine: limited room for “irrationality” arguments

The opinion’s skepticism toward Randolph’s “arbitrariness or irrationality” language, coupled with its reliance on United States v. Powell and Harris v. Rivera, suggests that future Sixth Circuit panels are unlikely to entertain inconsistent-verdict challenges premised on comparative lenity toward codefendants.

D. Federal kidnapping: breadth of “benefit” and enterprise-related motives

By applying United States v. Small and United States v. Windham to a reputational/organizational motive, the decision may be cited to support federal kidnapping jurisdiction in cases where the “benefit” is maintaining standing, preventing internal sanctions, or managing fallout within a criminal organization.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • RICO “enterprise” (association-in-fact): A group can be an “enterprise” even if it is not a corporation or formal organization. Under Boyle v. United States, it just needs a shared purpose, relationships among members, and enough longevity to pursue the purpose.
  • RICO conspiracy vs. substantive RICO: A conspiracy punishes the agreement itself. Under United States v. Rich, agreeing to join and participate in a future enterprise can complete the conspiracy—even if the enterprise is still forming.
  • Constructive amendment vs. variance: A constructive amendment changes the charged crime (or risks convicting on a different crime) and is “per se” reversible. A variance is a proof/instruction mismatch about facts or methods of commission; it is reversible only if it prejudices notice, fairness, or double-jeopardy protections (as discussed through United States v. Combs and United States v. Kuehne).
  • Confrontation Clause “opportunity” standard: The Sixth Amendment requires an opportunity for effective cross-examination (Delaware v. Fensterer), not necessarily the most advantageous timing or format.
  • Inconsistent verdicts: If a jury convicts on one count but acquits on another in an apparently inconsistent way, appellate courts usually will not reverse because the acquittal could reflect lenity or compromise (United States v. Powell).
  • Kidnapping “for ransom or reward or otherwise”: “Otherwise” is broad; it covers any objective the kidnapper finds beneficial, including non-monetary benefits like protecting status or reputation (United States v. Small; United States v. Windham).

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision is a comprehensive affirmance of convictions arising from a sprawling RICO prosecution, but it is most significant for its clarifications on (1) Confrontation Clause doctrine in the face of major mid-trial delays (especially pandemic-related), (2) the permissibility of “existed or would exist” enterprise instructions in RICO conspiracy cases without triggering indictment-amendment problems, and (3) the continuing near-immunity of inconsistent verdicts from appellate review despite doctrinal “exceptions” that remain, in the court’s view, narrow and uncertain.