“Copy Means the Entire Policy”: Colorado § 10-3-1117 Requires Full Policy Production for Potentially Relevant Policies and Imposes a Single $100/Day Penalty Per Claim

I. Introduction

Case: Fogel v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (Nos. 24-1422 & 24-1440)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date: May 21, 2026
Governing law: Colorado disclosure-and-penalty statute for auto liability policies, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1117.

This diversity appeal arose from a bicycle–truck collision in Pueblo, Colorado. After being struck by John Catalano, Carl Fogel sought insurance information from Catalano’s carrier, Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (“Shelter”), invoking Colorado’s statutory scheme that compels prompt disclosure of insurance coverage information to potential claimants.

The core dispute was not merely whether Shelter had to disclose a policy for the truck involved in the collision (it did and did), but whether it also had to produce copies of three additional policies on which Catalano was listed—covering other vehicles—when Fogel requested them and when Shelter itself engaged in a multi-page coverage analysis explaining why those policies purportedly did not apply.

The appeal presented three practical questions that frequently drive pre-suit negotiation and litigation posture:

  • Relevance trigger: What policies are swept into § 10-3-1117(2)(a)’s command to disclose “each known policy … that is or may be relevant to the claim”?
  • Form of production: Does “a copy of the policy” mean the full policy, or can an insurer satisfy the statute with excerpts or “relevant language”?
  • Penalty structure: Does the $100/day penalty accrue once per claim or multiply per request/policy?

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court across the board on liability and the penalty amount, while also holding that Fogel is entitled to appellate fees for successfully defending Shelter’s appeal. The court’s key holdings were:

  1. Full disclosure obligation: Under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1117(2)(a), Shelter was required to produce copies of the non-Ranger policies because they “are or may be relevant” when there is a genuine coverage question during the statutory response period; ultimate non-coverage does not excuse disclosure.
  2. “Copy” means the policy itself: “A copy of the policy” is a duplicate of the policy, not excerpts—especially not excerpts from a different policy form offered on the insurer’s assurance that the policies are “relevantly identical.”
  3. One penalty per claim: § 10-3-1117(3) authorizes a single $100/day penalty per claim (per requesting claimant), not one penalty per separate request or per unproduced policy.
  4. Accrual continued until full production: Shelter’s July 22, 2022 letter analyzing coverage and quoting select language did not comply (or substantially comply), so the penalty accrued until February 23, 2023, when Shelter produced the remaining policy copies in Rule 26 disclosures—yielding $35,600.
  5. Appellate fees: Fogel may recover reasonable appellate fees and costs for defending Shelter’s appeal (but not for his unsuccessful cross-appeal seeking multiple penalties), with calculation remanded.

Although labeled an “ORDER AND JUDGMENT” that is “not binding precedent” (outside law-of-the-case/res judicata/collateral estoppel), the reasoning is designed to be persuasive and is anchored in Colorado intermediate appellate authority.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. State-law interpretive framework (Colorado canons)

  • Sentinel Colo. v. Rodriguez, 577 P.3d 48 (Colo. 2025): Used for the primary rule that Colorado courts start with statutory text and apply plain meaning to effectuate legislative intent; if unambiguous, apply as written.
  • People ex rel. B.C.B., 569 P.3d 74 (Colo. 2025): Cited for harmonizing the statutory scheme, avoiding surplusage, and rejecting interpretations that yield illogical or absurd results.
  • Klinger v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2006), and People v. Jones, 464 P.3d 735 (Colo. 2020): Invoked to emphasize that extratextual aids (including lenity and statutory purpose) are unnecessary when the statute is unambiguous.

2. Federal “predictive” Erie principles (how the Tenth Circuit applies Colorado law)

  • Etherton v. Owners Ins., 829 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2016): Framework for predicting how a state supreme court would rule and relying on intermediate appellate decisions.
  • Wade v. EMCASCO Ins., 483 F.3d 657 (10th Cir. 2007): Identifies additional sources the court may consider when state law is unsettled.
  • McWilliams v. Dinapoli, 40 F.4th 1118 (10th Cir. 2022), and N.H. Ins. v. TSG Ski & Golf, 128 F.4th 1337 (10th Cir. 2025): Reinforce the strong persuasive weight of state intermediate appellate decisions absent convincing evidence the state supreme court would disagree.

3. The decisive Colorado intermediate authority on “is or may be relevant”

  • Bohanan v. Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance, --- P.3d ----, 2026 WL 304180 (Colo. App. Feb. 5, 2026), cert. filed, No. 2026SC158 (Colo. Mar. 18, 2026):
    • The Tenth Circuit treated Bohanan as the only Colorado appellate decision interpreting § 10-3-1117(2)(a)’s “is or may be relevant” language and followed it as highly persuasive.
    • Bohanan held an insurer cannot avoid disclosure by unilaterally deciding there is no coverage; a policy may be “relevant” during the response window even if later found inapplicable.
    • The Tenth Circuit analogized Shelter’s multi-page coverage explanation to Bohanan’s “time to assess the coverage issue” and “initial confusion,” treating that circumstance as confirming potential relevance.

4. Penalty structure and “no elephants in mouseholes”

  • Stumpf v. Colo. Dep't of Rev., Motor Vehicle Div., 231 P.3d 1 (Colo. App. 2009) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)): Used to support the inference that if the legislature intended multiple penalties, it would have said so; courts should not infer major penalty multipliers from silence.
  • Smith v. Exec. Custom Homes, 230 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2010), and Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807 (Colo. 2004): Cited in the court’s “absurd results” analysis to avoid constructions that would undermine expressed legislative intent or create irrational penalty outcomes.

5. Substantial compliance doctrine

  • Colorow Health Care v. Fischer, 420 P.3d 259 (Colo. 2018): Supplies the factors for substantial compliance—extent of noncompliance, whether statutory purpose was achieved, and whether a good faith effort can be inferred. The court assumed (without deciding) substantial compliance could apply, then held Shelter failed even that lower standard.

6. Fees on appeal

  • Banner Bank v. Smith, 30 F.4th 1232 (10th Cir. 2022): Establishes that in diversity, state law governs fee shifting when fees are part of the cause of action.
  • Town of Erie v. Town of Frederick, 251 P.3d 500 (Colo. App. 2010): Recognizes that a statutory fee award may include reasonable appellate fees.
  • Melssen v. Auto-Owners Ins., 285 P.3d 328 (Colo. App. 2012), and Stuart v. N. Shore Water & Sanitation Dist., 211 P.3d 59 (Colo. App. 2009): Used to limit appellate fee recovery to successful appellate work (here, defending Shelter’s appeal, not pursuing Fogel’s unsuccessful cross-appeal).

7. Additional cited authority on whether the statute is “penal”

  • Weatherill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., --- P.3d ----, 2026 WL 693004 (Colo. App. Mar. 12, 2026): Cited to note (without resolving) that § 10-3-1117 has been held “not penal” for statute-of-limitations purposes—reinforcing the Tenth Circuit’s choice not to opine broadly on the statute’s penal character.

8. Procedural standard-of-review cases

  • Thao v. Grady Cnty. Crim. Just. Auth., 159 F.4th 1214 (10th Cir. 2025), and Pirkheim v. First Unum Life Ins., 229 F.3d 1008 (10th Cir. 2000): Cited for de novo review of summary judgment and inference-drawing in cross-motions.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. What makes a policy “is or may be relevant to the claim”

The court’s reasoning operationalizes “is or may be relevant” as a low-threshold disclosure trigger focused on whether the policy could reasonably matter to the claim during the statutory response period—not on whether coverage is ultimately established.

Two features of the opinion are especially important:

  • Temporal focus: The court emphasizes that relevance is evaluated during the thirty-day response window. If coverage is not “immediately clear” and the insurer must analyze policy language to decide coverage, that circumstance itself supports that the policy “may be relevant.”
  • Anti-unilateral-denial principle: Consistent with Bohanan, the insurer cannot defeat the disclosure duty by concluding on its own that there is no coverage and then withholding the policy. Doing so would negate the statutory function of allowing claimants to independently assess coverage and reduce disputes driven by informational asymmetry.

Applying those principles, the Tenth Circuit found Shelter’s conduct—especially the multi-page July 2022 letter quoting and parsing “intricate policy language”—demonstrated precisely the sort of contested or non-obvious coverage scenario that makes additional policies “may be relevant.”

2. “A copy of the policy” means the entire policy, not excerpts

The opinion treats § 10-3-1117(2)(a)(iv) as textually specific: the insurer must provide “[a] copy of the policy.” The court anchors “copy” in ordinary meaning (“duplicate”) and concludes:

  • Excerpts are not a “copy.”
  • Excerpts from a different policy form (even if purportedly identical) are even further from compliance.

The court buttressed this with a contemporaneous administrative regulation, Colo. Code Regs. § 702-5-5-2-03, § 5(C) (2020), which required insurers to provide a copy of the policy while specifying what the copy need not include (declarations page or application). That regulatory detail made sense only if “copy” meant the policy itself, not a narrative summary or cherry-picked provisions.

3. Penalty accrues once per claim, not per request

The court’s penalty analysis is structural: it reads § 10-3-1117(3) in light of § 10-3-1117(2)(a). The key move is recognizing that:

  • § 10-3-1117(2)(a) contemplates one written request triggering an insurer’s duty to provide information “with regard to each known policy … that is or may be relevant.”
  • If claimants need not file multiple requests, penalties should not depend on how many requests a claimant chooses to send.
  • The statute speaks in the singular (“The penalty accrues…”) and does not clearly authorize multiplication.

The court also invoked Colorado’s “absurd results” avoidance: a per-request multiplier would permit gamesmanship (sending many duplicative requests solely to run up penalties), which would be disconnected from the disclosure purpose and could distort insurance markets—an outcome the court deemed inconsistent with legislative intent.

4. No compliance (and no substantial compliance) via the July 2022 letter

Shelter’s alternative argument was that its July 2022 letter stopped the penalty because it provided the “relevant” information. The court rejected this in two layers:

  1. Strict textual failure: The letter did not provide required items, especially “a copy of the policy.”
  2. Even under substantial compliance: Using Colorow Health Care v. Fischer, the court held Shelter’s noncompliance was fundamental (wrong kind of production), undermined statutory transparency purposes, and did not reflect a good faith effort—particularly because producing copies was straightforward and would have avoided a “take our word for it” stance.

C. Impact

1. Practical consequences for Colorado auto claims handling

The decision reinforces a claimant-facing disclosure regime with real financial bite:

  • Broader production set: Insurers should expect to produce policies beyond the vehicle involved when the insured is named on other policies active at the time of loss, especially where any coverage theory (e.g., umbrella/excess, non-owned vehicle coverage, definitional or exclusionary disputes) might be argued.
  • Production must be “policy complete”: Summaries, excerpts, or “key language” letters will not stop the clock if the statute requires the policy itself.
  • Penalty exposure is predictable and continuous: $100/day accrues until the information “required by this section” is actually provided—creating a strong incentive for timely, complete, and documented compliance.

2. Litigation incentives and settlement dynamics

The opinion advances the legislature’s transparency-and-settlement rationale by reducing information asymmetry early in a claim. It also shifts leverage:

  • Claimants gain a clearer pathway to enforce disclosure through a mechanical per-day penalty.
  • Insurers are discouraged from using coverage-position letters as substitutes for mandated document production.

3. Doctrinal footprint and future uncertainty

  • Interplay with Bohanan: The opinion effectively federalizes (in persuasive form) Bohanan’s approach within the Tenth Circuit’s Colorado diversity docket. However, Bohanan is under certiorari petition (No. 2026SC158), and a Colorado Supreme Court ruling could recalibrate “may be relevant.”
  • Outer bounds remain open: Both Bohanan and this decision avoid defining extreme scenarios (e.g., long-expired or tenuously connected policies). Future cases will likely test what “known” and “may be relevant” mean at the margins.
  • Penalty multiplication foreclosed (absent legislative change): Claimants should expect one penalty stream per claim; litigants seeking multipliers will likely need statutory amendment rather than creative request sequencing.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Is or may be relevant”: The policy does not have to ultimately cover the accident. If, at the time of the request, there is a reasonable question whether it could matter, it “may be relevant” and must be disclosed.
  • “A copy of the policy”: The insurer must provide the policy itself (a duplicate of the full policy document), not a summary, not selected pages, and not snippets pasted into a letter.
  • Penalty accrual: After the 30-day period ends, the statute adds $100 per day until complete compliance occurs.
  • Per claim vs. per request: The court read the statute to impose one running daily penalty for the disclosure failure tied to a single claim—not multiple parallel penalties based on how many separate letters a claimant sends.
  • Substantial compliance: Some legal duties can be satisfied “close enough” if the purpose is met. Here, even if that doctrine applies, providing excerpts instead of full policies was not “close enough.”
  • Rule of lenity: A doctrine that can resolve “grievously” ambiguous penal statutes in favor of the party facing punishment. The court did not reach lenity because it found the statutory requirements unambiguous as applied.

V. Conclusion

Fogel v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company solidifies (in persuasive federal appellate form, and in reliance on Bohanan) three consequential rules for Colorado’s § 10-3-1117 disclosure regime:

  1. When coverage is a real question during the statutory response period, policies active at the time of loss—even those tied to other vehicles—can be “is or may be relevant,” requiring disclosure.
  2. “A copy of the policy” means the policy itself; excerpts and assurances do not satisfy the statute and do not stop the penalty clock.
  3. The statute imposes a single $100/day penalty stream per claim, preventing penalty multiplication through multiple requests.

The decision strengthens transparency in pre-suit claims handling, increases the compliance premium for insurers’ disclosure practices, and provides litigants a clearer roadmap for enforcing (and defending) § 10-3-1117 penalties, including appellate fee recovery when enforcement succeeds.