Continuing-Jurisdiction Fishing Decrees: No Unanimous Consent Required; LeBlanc Inapplicable to Negotiated Great Lakes Treaty-Fishing Regulations

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Treaty-fishery allocation and equitable discretion

• Washington v. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658 (1979): The opinion repeatedly treats Fishing Vessel as the foundational Supreme Court authority recognizing that treaty-fishery apportionment and the shaping of remedies is an exercise of equitable discretion. The district court’s earlier assertion—cited here—that it could “allocate a fishery resource in order to effectuate a treaty” derived directly from Fishing Vessel. The Sixth Circuit uses this lineage to validate reviewing the 2023 Decree under abuse-of-discretion review and to confirm the district court’s remedial role.
• United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975): Cited to reinforce abuse-of-discretion review for a district court decree apportioning a treaty fishery.

B. Unilateral state regulation versus negotiated/co-managed regulation

• People v. LeBlanc, 248 N.W.2d 199 (Mich. 1976) and United States v. Michigan, 653 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1981): The 1981 Sixth Circuit decision imported LeBlanc into this litigation for situations where the State seeks to impose unilateral restrictions on treaty fishing—requiring clear and convincing proof of necessity, least-restrictive means, and non-discrimination. In 2025, however, the Sixth Circuit agrees with the district court that LeBlanc does not govern entry of a negotiated multi-sovereign decree (even if one tribe objects), because the decree is not the State acting unilaterally as a regulator.
• United States v. Michigan, 520 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Mich. 1981) and United States v. Michigan, 534 F. Supp. 668 (W.D. Mich. 1982): These earlier district-court decisions are used as historical proof that, when unilateral state regulation fails (including the State’s refusal to meet LeBlanc), the court has stepped in—first by keeping interim rules in place, then by adopting tribal/intertribal regulations over objection—based on continuing jurisdiction and equity.

C. Continuing jurisdiction, equitable power, and modification of decrees

• United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932) and Sys. Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Emp. Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961): Invoked to ground the proposition that courts have inherent power to modify decrees as circumstances require, supporting the institutional, adaptive nature of fishery management orders.
• Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 23 F.3d 1013 (6th Cir. 1994), Waste Mgmt. of Ohio, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 132 F.3d 1142 (6th Cir. 1997), and Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1983): The Sault Tribe relied on these to argue that decrees have “injunctive quality,” requiring injunction-factor analysis. The Sixth Circuit instead uses them to emphasize a different point: such cases speak mainly to enforcement/modification power and fairness procedures in settlement contexts, not to a requirement that traditional injunction factors be met before entry of a decree like the 2023 Decree.

D. Consent decrees and nonconsenting parties

• Loc. No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986): The court distinguishes the consent-decree principle that “the parties’ agreement” supplies authority for entry. Because the 2023 Decree is not a consent decree, Firefighters does not constrain the district court.
• Tenn. Ass'n of Health Maint. Orgs., Inc. v. Grier, 262 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2001): Cited for the proposition that district courts may limit objections if a settlement is “fair, adequate and reasonable,” but, more importantly here, as general support for discretion in managing objection proceedings and not conducting quasi-trials as a matter of right.
• Texas v. New Mexico, 144 S. Ct. 1756 (2024): Noted for the rule that a court cannot dispose of valid claims of nonconsenting intervenors when settlement affects their claims. The Sixth Circuit treats this line as inapposite because the 2023 Decree is not a consent decree requiring unanimity and because the controlling framework is this case’s law-of-the-case decree-allocation standard.

E. Law of the case and standards of review

• Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983); Coal Res., Inc. v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 865 F.2d 761 (6th Cir. 1989); Petition of U.S. Steel Corp., 479 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1973); and Moore v. Mitchell, 848 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 2017): These define and constrain relitigation through the law-of-the-case doctrine and its exceptions. They support the opinion’s move: once the 1985 framework governs how to evaluate new regulations in this litigation, a party cannot reframe the entire enterprise as requiring unanimous consent or injunction-factor analysis absent a recognized exception.
• Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 883 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2018) and Cole v. City of Memphis, 839 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2016): Provide the working definition of abuse-of-discretion review applied to the district court’s approval of the 2023 Decree.

F. Procedure, forfeiture, and post-judgment relief

• Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 49 F.4th 1000 (6th Cir. 2022): Used to hold the injunction-factor argument forfeited because it was not raised below.
• Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 443 (2009), Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992), John B. v. Emkes, 710 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2013), United States v. Junction City Sch. Dist., 14 F.4th 658 (8th Cir. 2021), Jackson v. Los Lunas Cmty. Program, 880 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2018), Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand C.P.A., 272 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2001), and Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 2002): The court rejects the Sault Tribe’s reliance on Horne-type reasoning as procedurally misfit because it resembles a Rule 60(b) attack without a Rule 60(b) motion. The cited Sixth Circuit procedural cases reinforce that proper vehicles matter; appellate reframing cannot substitute for district-court Rule 60(b) practice.
• Powell v. McCormack, 395 US 486 (1969): Cited (via district court history) for the distinction between declaratory relief and further relief such as injunctions, reinforcing that the decree enterprise is not identical to the traditional injunction framework.

G. Remedial tailoring to the underlying federal right

• Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004) and Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977): The Sixth Circuit applies Frew’s rule that a decree must further the objectives of the law on which the complaint is based. It finds that the 2023 Decree furthers the 1836 Treaty’s objectives by structuring co-management, establishing zones, and preventing the return of unilateral state enforcement conflicts. Milliken supports the “tailored to cure the condition” concept—here, the enduring condition is the shared, scarcity-driven fishery that would otherwise devolve into a “racehorse” fishery.

H. Evidence hearings and fairness proceedings

• United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1990) and Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977): Used to support the proposition that an objector may “air” objections without entitlement to a full evidentiary trial; a district court may tailor proceedings to what is necessary for an informed decision.

I. Mootness

• Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992), McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997), Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011), Kingdomware Tech., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162 (2016), Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), Ohio v. EPA, 969 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2020), and Roe v. Snyder, 2018 WL 8343834 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 2018): These cases frame the conclusion that the 2000 Decree extension challenge is moot because no effective relief remains, and the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception does not apply given the 2023 Decree’s 24-year term.

J. Related jurisdictional ruling

• United States v. Michigan, No. 23-1944, 2025 WL 764613 (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 2025): The opinion references the dismissal of the Coalition’s separate appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Coalition was never a party. This underscores the importance of party status in appellate review of decree entry.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The “non-consent” problem is resolved by characterizing the decree correctly

A central move is categorical: the 2023 Decree is not a consent decree. Therefore, the court declines to import consent-decree axioms (including the notion that agreement is the source of authority) from Loc. No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986). Instead, authority is derived from (i) the district court’s expressly retained continuing jurisdiction dating to the 1979 Decree, and (ii) the district court’s inherent equitable power to fashion ongoing resource-management remedies implementing federal treaty rights.

B. Law of the case: the 1985 framework controls review of new Great Lakes fishing rules

The Sixth Circuit treats United States v. Michigan, 12 Indian L. Rep. 3079 (W.D. Mich. 1985) as the operative law-of-the-case rule for reviewing proposed fishing regulations. That decision articulated a structured, multi-factor (fifteen-factor) inquiry centered on: fairness to reserved treaty rights and preservation of the resource. By anchoring the standard here, the panel reframes the appellate question as whether the district court abused its discretion in applying the established factors—not whether the decree resembles an injunction or whether all parties consent.

C. Historical practice matters: prior exercises of power over objection

The panel supports its authority holding with concrete history: the district court previously approved regulations over objection (including state objections in United States v. Michigan, 534 F. Supp. 668 (W.D. Mich. 1982)), asserted its capacity to proceed with allocation over objection (1983–84 proceedings), and entered the 1985 Decree over Bay Mills’s later-withdrawn consent in United States v. Michigan, 12 Indian L. Rep. 3079 (W.D. Mich. 1985). This history is used to rebut the Sault Tribe’s claim that unanimous consent is a jurisdictional prerequisite.

D. Why LeBlanc does not govern the decree

The Sixth Circuit preserves the role of People v. LeBlanc, 248 N.W.2d 199 (Mich. 1976)—but confines it to the scenario that originally triggered its adoption in this litigation: unilateral state regulation restricting treaty fishing. Because the 2023 Decree is “the product of negotiation” and a co-management framework rather than unilateral state action, the rigorous LeBlanc conservation/least-restrictive/non-discrimination test is not the measure for entry of the decree.

E. Procedure and process: hearing, objections, and an offered evidentiary expansion

The court rejects the demand for a trial, stressing that the Sault Tribe had extensive opportunities to present objections, argue them at a two-day hearing, and submit proposed findings. Critically, the district court invited the parties to request live expert testimony on key technical topics; no party did. That record supports the conclusion that the process was adequate and that insisting on a full trial would be a delay tactic incompatible with ongoing resource governance.

F. Treaty-right objectives and remedial “tailoring”

Applying Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004), the court concludes the decree furthers the objectives of the law underlying the complaint: protecting 1836 Treaty fishing rights and structuring their exercise in a shared, scarce fishery. The reasoning emphasizes that the “problem” is durable and structural (shared resource, multiple user groups), so continuing judicial management remains proper and is not an overreach into sovereign governance under the logic associated with Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 443 (2009) and Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).

G. Mootness: expired extension orders and lack of effective relief

The panel applies standard Article III mootness doctrine to dismiss the challenge to the extension of the 2000 Decree. Once the 2023 Decree entered and the extension terminated by its terms, appellate relief could not change the parties’ legal interests, and the “capable of repetition” exception was deemed implausible given the new decree’s 24-year duration.

3.3. Impact

• Institutional litigation durability: The decision reinforces that long-running treaty-resource cases can be governed by judicially administered regulatory frameworks under continuing jurisdiction and equity, even when a sovereign party objects to a successor decree.
• Reduced veto power in multi-sovereign negotiations: A single party’s refusal to stipulate does not necessarily force either regulatory collapse or a return to unilateral state regulation subject to LeBlanc; courts may choose a negotiated/co-managed framework if it satisfies the established multi-factor standard.
• Clarified doctrinal boundary for LeBlanc: The ruling narrows the practical reach of LeBlanc in this setting to truly unilateral state restrictions, not to judicially entered, multi-sovereign regulatory regimes.
• Procedure in decree approval: The decision signals that robust objection practice and targeted hearings (with optional evidentiary expansion) can be sufficient for due process; a full “trial” is not the default mechanism for decree entry in this case’s framework.
• Appellate posture and party status: Alongside the related dismissal in United States v. Michigan, No. 23-1944, 2025 WL 764613 (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 2025), the case underscores that amici and nonparties face steep limits in seeking appellate review of decree content.