Constructive-Possession Instructions Are Proper in Receiving-Stolen-Property Cases When the Elements Instruction Separately Requires Guilty Knowledge

I. Introduction

In Merriman v. State of Mississippi (Miss. Aug. 20, 2026), the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed Isaac Merrimon’s conviction for receiving stolen property under Mississippi Code Section 97-17-70 (Rev. 2020) and his five-year habitual-offender sentence under Section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2020). The case arose after a red 2003 Ford Mustang reported stolen in Hattiesburg was located hours later in Starkville with Merrimon present near the vehicle. Merrimon claimed he bought the car from the owner for eight dollars and produced only an informal handwritten “piece of paper” not shown to be signed, notarized, or otherwise indicative of a lawful transfer.

On appeal, Merrimon raised three principal issues:

  • whether the trial court erroneously granted a “possession” instruction that allegedly diluted the statutory requirement of “guilty knowledge,”
  • whether the evidence was legally insufficient—particularly as to guilty knowledge and vehicle value, and
  • whether the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

The Court’s opinion is significant for its reaffirmation that a constructive-possession instruction does not lessen the State’s burden in a receiving-stolen-property case when the elements instruction separately and correctly requires proof that the defendant knew (or should have known) the property was stolen. The decision also underscores that valuation-evidence challenges are waived absent a contemporaneous objection.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court held:

  1. No instructional error: Jury Instruction S-2, defining actual and constructive possession (including dominion and control), was a correct statement of Mississippi law. Read together with the elements instruction (S-1), it did not allow conviction without the separate element of guilty knowledge.
  2. Sufficient evidence: Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could find Merrimon knew or should have known the vehicle was stolen, based on the circumstances of possession, the implausibly low claimed purchase price, and the lack of credible proof of sale.
  3. Value issue waived: Merrimon did not object to Kelley Blue Book-based valuation testimony at trial, waiving admissibility arguments on appeal.
  4. Weight-of-the-evidence challenge failed: The verdict was not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to sanction an unconscionable injustice.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards governing jury instructions (discretion; read as a whole)

The Court framed Merrimon’s instructional challenge with a consistent line of Mississippi authority:

  • Brown v. State, 332 So. 3d 1287 (Miss. 2022) (quoting Victory v. State, 83 So. 3d 370 (Miss. 2012)): granting or denying proposed instructions lies within the circuit court’s discretion.
  • Roby v. State, 183 So. 3d 857 (Miss. 2016) (citing Thompson v. State, 119 So. 3d 1007 (Miss. 2013)): appellate review is for abuse of discretion.
  • Watkins v. State, 101 So. 3d 628 (Miss. 2012) (quoting Bailey v. State, 78 So. 3d 308 (Miss. 2012)): instructions must be read as a whole; no single instruction is evaluated in isolation.
  • Windless v. State, 185 So. 3d 956 (Miss. 2015) (citing Harris v. State, 861 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 2003)): if instructions fairly announce the law and create no injustice, there is no reversible error.
  • Jenkins v. State, 371 So. 3d 593 (Miss. 2023): synthesizes these principles and anchors the Court’s method in Merrimon.

These cases collectively drove the Court’s central move: to evaluate S-2 only in conjunction with S-1, which Merrimon conceded properly stated the elements, including guilty knowledge.

2. What “possession” means in receiving-stolen-property cases

Merrimon argued the constructive-possession language (dominion or control) broadened “possession” in a way that effectively allowed conviction for mere possession of stolen property. The Court rejected that argument by relying on longstanding Mississippi precedent on “possession/receipt”:

  • Williams v. State, 595 So. 2d 1299 (Miss. 1992): the law does not demand proof the accused “took the stolen property into his hands”; dominion or control is sufficient though not necessarily exclusive.
  • Davis v. State, 586 So. 2d 817 (Miss. 1991) (citing Daniel v. State, 212 Miss. 223, 54 So. 2d 272 (1951)): physical possession is not required; it is adequate that the property was subject to the defendant’s dominion and control.

On this view, S-2’s dominion-and-control language did not “expand” the law; it tracked it.

3. The independent and essential requirement of guilty knowledge (“gist of the offense”)

To address Merrimon’s concern that the possession instruction decoupled possession from guilty knowledge, the Court emphasized that guilty knowledge remains a separate element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:

  • Lewis v. State, 573 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1990) (quoting In re Int. of W.B., 515 So. 2d 1175 (Miss. 1987); Thompson v. State, 457 So. 2d 953 (Miss. 1984)): “mere possession” (or dominion/control) alone is inadequate to prove receipt or knowledge.
  • Lewis v. State, 573 So. 2d at 715 (quoting Whatley v. State, 490 So. 2d 1220 (Miss. 1986); Van v. State, 477 So. 2d 1350 (Miss. 1985); Thompson v. State, 457 So. 2d 953): guilty knowledge is the “gist of the offense.”

That doctrinal separation was critical: S-2 defined possession; S-1 required the State to prove guilty knowledge. Reading the instructions together, the jury could not convict by finding dominion/control alone.

4. How guilty knowledge can be proven circumstantially

The Court evaluated sufficiency by asking whether a rational juror could find guilty knowledge from the circumstances, emphasizing that the State need not rely on possession alone. The opinion built this analysis primarily from:

  • McClain v. State, 625 So. 2d 774 (Miss. 1993) (citing Tubwell v. State, 580 So. 2d 1264 (Miss. 1991); Johnson v. State, 247 So. 2d 697 (Miss. 1971)): unexplained possession of recently stolen property, standing alone, is insufficient to establish guilty knowledge.
  • Whatley v. State, 490 So. 2d 1220 (Miss. 1986): lists multiple ways to prove guilty knowledge, including circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe property was stolen, misrepresentations to law enforcement, disparity between value and price, and post-receipt conduct. The Court’s quotation of Whatley incorporated: Ellett v. State, 364 So. 2d 669 (Miss. 1978); Crowell v. State, 195 Miss. 427, 15 So. 2d 508 (1943); Corn v. State, 250 Miss. 157, 164 So. 2d 777 (1964); and again Van v. State, 477 So. 2d 1350 (Miss. 1985).
  • Wilson v. State, 194 So. 3d 855 (Miss. 2016): guilty knowledge may be proven by showing the defendant stole the property that is the subject of the receiving-stolen-property charge (as contemplated by Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-70(3)(b) (Rev. 2014)).

Applying these authorities, the Court treated the “eight dollars” explanation, the absence of a credible transfer document, and the rapid multi-county appearance of the stolen car in Merrimon’s vicinity as circumstantial proof supporting guilty knowledge.

5. Sufficiency review framework

The opinion applied Mississippi’s standard sufficiency authorities:

  • Sanford v. State, 247 So. 3d 1242 (Miss. 2018) (citing Brooks v. State, 203 So. 3d 1134 (Miss. 2016)): de novo review of sufficiency.
  • Quinn v. State, 408 So. 3d 637 (Miss. 2025) (quoting Body v. State, 318 So. 3d 1104 (Miss. 2021)): whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • Henley v. State, 136 So. 3d 413 (Miss. 2014) (citing Graham v. State, 120 So. 3d 382 (Miss. 2013)): view evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State favorable inferences.

6. Preservation/waiver of evidentiary issues (valuation testimony)

Merrimon’s valuation challenge was rejected as waived because he did not object at trial. The Court relied on:

  • Jackson v. State, 174 So. 3d 232 (Miss. 2015) (quoting Havard v. State, 928 So. 2d 771 (Miss. 2006)): failure to object waives the issue for appeal.
  • Harris v. State, 311 So. 3d 638 (Miss. Ct. App. 2020): similarly treats unobjected-to Kelley Blue Book valuation evidence as waived on appeal.

Importantly, the Court did not decide whether Kelley Blue Book-based valuation testimony would have been admissible over objection; it held only that the challenge was procedurally barred.

7. Weight-of-the-evidence review framework

The Court used established authorities distinguishing weight review from sufficiency review:

  • Abram v. State, 420 So. 3d 881 (Miss. 2025) (citing Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288 (Miss. 2017); quoting Lindsey v. State, 212 So. 3d 44 (Miss. 2017)): verdict disturbed only if allowing it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.

8. Ancillary citation: NCIC context

In recounting the facts, the opinion included a definitional note: McCollum v. State, 372 So. 3d 980 (Miss. 2023), cited to explain that NCIC refers to the National Crime Information Center.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The core instructional holding: defining possession is not redefining the crime

Merrimon’s best appellate point was conceptual: if “possession” is defined broadly as dominion or control, a jury might convict on a reduced mental-state showing—especially where the defendant is simply present in or near a recently stolen car. The Court’s response rested on two steps:

  1. Mississippi law already defines “possession” broadly in this context (dominion/control; not necessarily physical or exclusive), as reflected in Williams v. State and Davis v. State. Thus S-2 was not a novel expansion; it mirrored existing doctrine.
  2. The “possession” definition does not eliminate guilty knowledge because guilty knowledge is a separate element. By requiring jurors to consider the instructions “as a whole” (per Watkins v. State and related cases), the Court concluded that S-1 required proof that Merrimon knew or should have known the vehicle was stolen, and S-2 merely assisted the jury in deciding whether Merrimon “possessed” it.

In practical terms, the Court treated S-2 as a neutral definitional instruction that helps the jury decide whether the “possession/receipt” element is met—without altering the State’s obligation to prove the mens rea unique to receiving stolen property.

2. Sufficiency on guilty knowledge: “possession plus circumstances”

The Court acknowledged that “unexplained possession of recently stolen property” alone is insufficient (McClain v. State), but concluded that the State offered more than mere possession. The Court credited a set of circumstances a juror could view as inconsistent with innocent acquisition, including:

  • the car was reported stolen after being left with keys inside at a Hattiesburg restaurant;
  • it was found hours later several counties away in Starkville;
  • Merrimon claimed he bought it for “eight dollars,” an extreme disparity from testimony valuing it between $1,600 and $3,000;
  • the supposed supporting “paper” was not shown to be a valid bill of sale (unsigned, unnotarized, and not introduced into evidence);
  • the owner denied selling the car or knowing Merrimon.

Under the Quinn v. State/Body v. State rational-juror standard, and viewing evidence favorably to the State (Henley v. State), the Court held a rational juror could infer Merrimon “knew or should have known” the vehicle was stolen.

3. Valuation evidence: waiver as a decisive procedural gate

Merrimon attacked valuation as “speculative” and “hearsay-based” because it relied on Kelley Blue Book. The Court did not weigh those evidentiary critiques on the merits. Instead, it enforced preservation doctrine: absent a contemporaneous objection, admissibility arguments are waived (Jackson v. State). The Court further reinforced that point by citing Harris v. State (Miss. Ct. App. 2020), where the same kind of Kelley Blue Book-based valuation complaint was deemed waived.

The upshot is doctrinally important: even potentially substantial evidentiary disputes (e.g., foundation for valuation opinion) may be unavailable on appeal if counsel fails to object at the moment the evidence is offered.

4. Weight of the evidence: not a second sufficiency appeal

The Court characterized Merrimon’s weight argument as essentially a re-packaged sufficiency claim, and held that—viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict—the State’s proof on theft, value, and guilty knowledge was “ample.” Under Abram v. State and its “unconscionable injustice” threshold, the verdict stood.

C. Impact

1. Jury-instruction practice in receiving-stolen-property prosecutions

The opinion signals that Mississippi trial courts may safely give a constructive-possession instruction (dominion/control) in receiving-stolen-property cases, so long as:

  • the elements instruction accurately requires proof of guilty knowledge, and
  • the instructions, taken together, do not imply that possession alone equals knowledge.

For prosecutors, Merriman provides appellate reinforcement against claims that constructive-possession language necessarily “lessens the burden.” For defense counsel, it highlights that instructional attacks should focus on whether the charge, read as a whole, actually permits conviction without a separate finding on guilty knowledge—not merely that possession is defined broadly.

2. Circumstantial proof of guilty knowledge

Merriman reaffirms a workable evidentiary template: “possession plus circumstances.” The “eight dollars” claim, the lack of credible transfer documentation, and the rapid geographic displacement of the stolen vehicle are the kinds of surrounding facts that can carry the mens rea element to a jury even where there is no direct admission of knowledge.

3. Preservation of valuation and other evidentiary objections

The decision underscores a recurring appellate reality: arguments about evidentiary foundation (including valuation methodology like Kelley Blue Book) are commonly lost through waiver. In future cases, counsel who wish to contest valuation must object contemporaneously and articulate the basis (foundation, hearsay, lack of personal knowledge, improper lay opinion, etc.), or the appellate court may not reach the issue at all.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Receiving stolen property (Miss. Code § 97-17-70): a crime that requires more than having stolen property; the State must prove the defendant possessed/received it and knew or should have known it was stolen.
  • Actual possession vs. constructive possession:
    • Actual = direct physical control (e.g., holding or driving a car).
    • Constructive = not holding it, but having awareness plus the ability and intent to exercise dominion/control over it.
    In this case, the jury was told that either could qualify as “possession.”
  • Guilty knowledge: the key mental-state requirement—often proven circumstantially (implausible purchase price, false explanations, suspicious behavior, lack of legitimate paperwork).
  • Sufficiency of the evidence: asks whether any rational juror could find each element proved beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing evidence favorably to the State.
  • Weight of the evidence: asks whether the verdict is so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence that letting it stand would be an “unconscionable injustice.” It is harder for an appellant to win than a typical sufficiency challenge.
  • Waiver (failure to object): if you do not object when evidence is introduced, you usually cannot complain about it on appeal—even if the point might have had merit.
  • Habitual offender (Miss. Code § 99-19-81): a sentencing enhancement that can increase punishment and, as applied here, resulted in a sentence “without the possibility of parole.”

V. Conclusion

Merriman v. State of Mississippi reinforces two practical rules in Mississippi criminal practice. First, a constructive-possession instruction defining possession as “dominion or control” is not erroneous in a receiving-stolen-property case when the jury is also properly instructed that guilty knowledge is a separate, essential element—courts will read the charge “as a whole.” Second, evidentiary challenges—here, to Kelley Blue Book-based valuation testimony—are often resolved not on substance but on procedure: without a timely objection, the issue is waived.

The broader significance is a reaffirmation of doctrinal structure: “possession” can be broad, but it is not enough; the State must still prove guilty knowledge, typically through the surrounding circumstances that make innocent acquisition implausible.