Constitutional Challenges Belong Under § 2255, Not Compassionate Release

1. Introduction

This case concerns the boundary between compassionate release and a collateral challenge to a federal conviction or sentence. Darowe Junior Jones, representing himself, sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The United States opposed relief.

Jones was serving a 211-month sentence for firearm and drug offenses. His convictions and sentence had been affirmed on direct appeal, and the district court had denied his earlier motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He subsequently advanced three grounds for compassionate release:

1. His sentence rested on drug quantities attributed to him in the presentence investigation report rather than established by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. His felon-in-possession convictions violated the Second Amendment.
3. His sentence was disproportionately severe compared with sentences imposed on comparable offenders after the First Step Act.

The district court treated the first two grounds as unauthorized successive § 2255 claims and dismissed them for lack of jurisdiction. It considered the sentencing-disparity argument under the compassionate-release statute but rejected it on the merits.

The appeal therefore presented two distinct questions: whether Jones could use compassionate release to advance constitutional attacks ordinarily governed by § 2255, and whether his asserted sentencing disparity justified a discretionary sentence reduction.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit preserved the distinction between those two categories of claims.

• Constitutional challenges: Jones needed a certificate of appealability to challenge the district court’s dismissal of the claims treated as successive § 2255 claims. The court denied a certificate because reasonable jurists could not debate the procedural ruling.
• Sentencing disparities: No certificate was necessary to appeal the denial of the genuine compassionate-release claim. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the court affirmed because the district court had not abused its discretion.

The decisive intervening authority was Fernandez v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1292 (2026). The Supreme Court held that a prisoner collaterally attacking the validity of a conviction must proceed under § 2255 rather than § 3582. The Tenth Circuit had paused Jones’s appeal while that case was pending and applied the resulting decision after lifting the abatement.

On sentencing disparity, Jones’s reliance on cases involving the former practice of “stacking” multiple § 924(c) sentences was misplaced. He had only one § 924(c) conviction and was sentenced after the First Step Act. The former stacking regime therefore had not produced his sentence.

3. Legal Reasoning

A. Substance, Not the Motion’s Label, Determines the Governing Statute

The court classified Jones’s arguments by their substance and requested relief. A prisoner cannot turn a claim of unconstitutional conviction or sentencing into a compassionate-release claim merely by placing it in a motion bearing that label.

Jones’s drug-quantity argument alleged a constitutional sentencing error and sought resentencing. His firearm argument alleged that his convictions were constitutionally invalid. Both sought correction of asserted legal wrongs—the function of § 2255.

By contrast, compassionate release concerns whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances justify reducing a sentence. Drawing on Fernandez v. United States, the court described this authority as focused on “granting mercy rather than righting legal wrongs.” Age, serious illness, and a child left without a guardian illustrated circumstances distinct from claims that a conviction or sentence is unlawful. Those illustrations should not be mistaken for an exhaustive list of permissible compassionate-release grounds.

The distinction also prevents a prisoner from avoiding the restrictions on successive § 2255 motions by seeking a discretionary reduction instead of formally requesting that a conviction be vacated.

B. A Prior § 2255 Motion Made Appellate Authorization Necessary

Jones had already filed a § 2255 motion. Once the constitutional portions of his later filing were properly classified under that statute, he needed authorization from the court of appeals before the district court could entertain them as a second or successive motion.

Because Jones had not obtained authorization, the district court dismissed those portions for lack of jurisdiction. That disposition did not resolve whether his constitutional arguments were substantively correct. It established that they could not be adjudicated through the procedural vehicle he selected.

C. The Certificate-of-Appealability Requirement Followed the Claims’ Substance

Section 2253(c)(1)(B) requires a certificate of appealability to appeal a final order in a § 2255 proceeding. That requirement applied even though Jones had styled his filing as a compassionate-release motion.

The opinion focused on whether reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s procedural characterization and dismissal. After Fernandez v. United States, the answer was no: allegations that a sentence or conviction is unconstitutional belong under § 2255.

A procedural certificate inquiry ordinarily also includes a requirement concerning the debatability of the underlying constitutional claim. Here, the absence of a debatable procedural ruling was sufficient to deny a certificate, so the court did not need to decide the constitutional merits.

D. Later-Decided Authority Did Not Establish That the Claims Were Previously Unavailable

Jones maintained that his constitutional arguments were not ripe when he filed his earlier § 2255 motion. The court rejected that contention on the record presented.

The decisions underlying his drug-quantity argument predated his 2019 sentencing. Although the authority supporting his Second Amendment argument came later, Jones did not explain why he could not previously have challenged the constitutionality of his firearm convictions.

The court thus distinguished an argument’s availability from the later emergence of favorable authority. A litigant’s ability to formulate a constitutional challenge does not necessarily depend on another court first accepting a similar argument.

E. Recharacterization Did Not Require a New Warning

Jones also argued that the district court should have warned him before treating part of his motion as seeking § 2255 relief. The court explained that the warning rule protects a self-represented litigant whose filing is being converted into a first § 2255 motion. Without notice, that conversion could unexpectedly restrict future collateral review.

Jones had already filed his first § 2255 motion. The protective rationale therefore did not require another warning before the court recognized the substance of his later claims.

F. The Sentencing-Disparity Claim Failed on Its Particular Facts

The court identified three requirements for compassionate release: extraordinary and compelling reasons, consistency with applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements, and support from the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

Jones failed to demonstrate the first requirement through the disparity he asserted. His cited cases involved defendants affected by the former § 924(c) stacking rules. Before the First Step Act, a second § 924(c) count could trigger a mandatory consecutive 25-year sentence even when the defendant’s first conviction had not previously become final. The Act restricted that enhanced penalty to a violation committed after an earlier § 924(c) conviction became final.

Jones had one § 924(c) conviction and was sentenced after the Act. He therefore did not share the sentencing feature that made the cited comparisons relevant. The court found no abuse of discretion in rejecting his claim.

This was a record-specific conclusion. The opinion did not hold that sentencing disparities can never support compassionate release, nor did it announce a categorical rule resolving every claim based on nonretroactive sentencing changes.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. The Controlling Boundary Between Compassionate Release and Collateral Review

Fernandez v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2731 (2025), and 146 S. Ct. 1292 (2026)

The earlier citation concerned the Supreme Court’s grant of review; the later citation supplied the controlling decision. The question concerned whether extraordinary and compelling reasons could include grounds also supporting relief under § 2255. As applied here, the Supreme Court’s answer foreclosed using compassionate release to attack a conviction’s validity. Its distinction between mercy and correction of legal error supplied the central rationale for rejecting Jones’s constitutional claims.

United States v. Wesley, 60 F.4th 1277 (10th Cir. 2023)

This decision already established in the Tenth Circuit that a compassionate-release motion may not rest on claims specifically governed by § 2255. It also required a certificate of appealability when a purported § 3582 motion was dismissed as an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion. It supported both the district court’s classification and the appellate review framework, subsequently reinforced by the Supreme Court.

United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2006)

This case supplied the rule that the relief sought, not the pleading’s title, determines whether a filing is a § 2255 motion. It also explained why first-motion recharacterization protections do not apply when a prisoner has already filed a § 2255 motion. Both propositions directly answered Jones’s procedural objections.

United States v. Harper, 545 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008)

This decision required appellate authorization before a district court could hear a successive § 2255 motion. It further established that dismissal of an unauthorized motion is a final order in a § 2255 proceeding requiring a certificate of appealability. Its treatment of a motion nominally filed under another procedural rule reinforced the substance-over-label approach.

B. Authorities Underlying the Constitutional Arguments

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)

This decision generally requires a fact increasing the statutory maximum punishment, other than a prior conviction, to be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones invoked it to challenge the use of drug quantities in sentencing. Its relevance here was to identify his argument as a constitutional sentencing challenge—not to establish that his sentence actually violated the rule.

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013)

This decision applies the jury-finding requirement to facts increasing a statutory mandatory minimum. Together with the preceding authority, it showed that Jones sought resentencing for alleged Sixth Amendment error. These decisions do not mean that every fact affecting an advisory Guidelines calculation must be found by a jury; the Tenth Circuit did not decide whether Jones’s sentencing facts implicated a statutory threshold.

Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023), vacated and remanded, 144 S. Ct. 2706 (2024)

Jones invoked this Second Amendment authority to argue that his felon-in-possession convictions were invalid. The Tenth Circuit did not assess whether its reasoning supported his individual circumstances. Instead, the nature of the argument established that he was collaterally attacking his convictions. The opinion expressly recorded the cited judgment’s vacatur and remand; it should not be treated as an undisturbed controlling authority.

Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011)

This case supported the distinction between the ability to raise an argument and the existence of a favorable later decision. It undermined Jones’s contention that his constitutional challenges could not have been presented during his earlier collateral proceeding.

C. Appellate and Recharacterization Standards

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000)

This decision supplied the reasonable-jurist standard for a certificate of appealability following a procedural dismissal. The Tenth Circuit applied its procedural component and concluded that the classification of Jones’s constitutional arguments was not reasonably debatable.

Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003)

This decision requires notice, warnings, and an opportunity to withdraw or amend before a court recharacterizes a self-represented litigant’s filing as a first § 2255 motion. Jones relied on it, but the court distinguished his circumstances because he had already filed such a motion.

Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 555 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2009)

The court cited this decision when observing that Jones repeated his district-court merits arguments verbatim on appeal. Its relevance was practical: an appellate submission must engage the decision under review. Repeating constitutional arguments did not explain why the district court’s procedural characterization was wrong. The court nevertheless analyzed the claims rather than resting its disposition solely on deficient briefing.

United States v. Jones, 802 F. App'x 325 (10th Cir. 2020)

This earlier decision affirmed Jones’s convictions and sentence. It established the procedural background, rather than supplying the governing compassionate-release rule.

D. Compassionate Release and Sentencing Comparisons

United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932 (10th Cir. 2021)

This decision supplied the three-part compassionate-release framework: extraordinary and compelling reasons, consistency with applicable policy statements, and consideration of relevant § 3553(a) factors.

United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027 (10th Cir. 2021)

This case established abuse-of-discretion review of compassionate-release denials. An incorrect legal conclusion or clearly erroneous factual finding can constitute an abuse. Jones demonstrated neither in the district court’s treatment of his asserted stacking disparity.

United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821 (10th Cir. 2021)

The opinion cited this decision for district courts’ authority to identify extraordinary and compelling reasons, while noting its partial abrogation on other grounds. Jones also relied on its treatment of disparities associated with former § 924(c) stacking. The factual distinction was decisive: unlike the defendant there, Jones had not received stacked sentences under the former regime.

Rutherford v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1320 (2026)

This decision supplied the opinion’s explanation of the First Step Act’s changes to § 924(c). It also appeared in the qualification concerning partial abrogation of the preceding circuit authority. The order did not comprehensively describe that abrogation, and its narrow disposition should not be expanded into a broader account of that decision’s holdings.

United States v. Owens, 996 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2021)

Jones cited this case as an example of a compassionate-release request relying partly on disparities created by former § 924(c) stacking. The court distinguished it because Jones lacked the relevant stacked-sentence history.

United States v. Redd, 444 F. Supp. 3d 717 (E.D. Va. 2020)

This decision served the same comparative role. It illustrated a sentencing-disparity theory connected to the old stacking regime, but did not establish that any defendant with a § 924(c) conviction was similarly situated.

5. Potential Impact

Preserving Separate Statutory Routes

The order reinforces that compassionate release is not an alternative route around the procedural limits of collateral review. Courts assessing mixed motions should classify each argument separately rather than assume that every claim shares the filing’s statutory label.

Requiring Meaningful Sentencing Comparisons

A disparity argument requires a factual connection between the applicant’s sentence and the sentencing practice invoked. Sharing a statutory offense with successful applicants is not enough when their relief depended on a feature absent from the applicant’s case.

Clarifying Appellate Practice

The decision illustrates how one order can generate different appellate requirements. The successive-motion dismissal required a certificate; the compassionate-release denial did not. It also emphasizes the need to challenge the district court’s actual reasoning rather than simply repeat the original merits arguments.

Limits of the Decision

The court did not decide whether Jones’s drug sentence violated the Constitution, whether his firearm convictions survived a properly presented Second Amendment challenge, or whether every nonretroactive sentencing change is excluded from compassionate-release consideration. Its persuasive value lies in its procedural analysis and its fact-specific rejection of the asserted disparity.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

Compassionate release

A statutory mechanism permitting a court to reduce a prison sentence when the required extraordinary and compelling circumstances and other statutory conditions are satisfied.

Collateral attack

A challenge to a conviction or sentence outside the ordinary direct appeal, usually asserting that the judgment is legally invalid.

Second or successive § 2255 motion

A further collateral motion subject to special restrictions, including appellate authorization before the district court may consider it.

Certificate of appealability

A threshold permission required for certain collateral-review appeals. It is not itself a ruling that the prisoner should receive relief.

Jurisdictional dismissal

A ruling that the court lacks authority to hear the claim in its present procedural posture—not a decision rejecting the claim’s substantive merits.

Sentence stacking

The imposition of consecutive penalties for multiple counts. Here, the relevant issue was the former enhanced 25-year penalty for an additional § 924(c) count.

Abuse of discretion

A review standard under which an appellate court checks for legally or factually flawed decision-making rather than simply substituting its preferred result.

Persuasive rather than binding authority

A decision courts may consider for the strength of its reasoning but generally need not follow as precedent, subject here to the order’s stated preclusion-related exceptions.

7. Conclusion

United States v. Jones applies a clear division of labor: § 2255 addresses alleged legal invalidity, while compassionate release addresses qualifying reasons for discretionary sentence reduction. Jones could not bypass successive-motion requirements by presenting constitutional claims as extraordinary and compelling circumstances.

His separate disparity claim failed because the former § 924(c) stacking regime had not affected his sentence. The resulting disposition—denial of a certificate and dismissal of part of the appeal, coupled with affirmance of the compassionate-release denial—underscores both the importance of choosing the correct procedural vehicle and the need for genuinely comparable sentencing evidence.