Consent to “Go In” to Search for a Person Can Encompass Roof Access, Supporting Plain-View Seizure; New Appellate Arguments on Consent Duration Are Waived

I. Introduction

United States v. Coronado (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 2026) arises from officers’ efforts to execute an arrest warrant for Jesus Coronado after an alleged firearm threat and vehicle collision. Officers surveilled a multi-residential property containing a standalone “casita.” After an individual resembling Coronado fled and officers believed he may have entered the casita, the casita’s lessee consented to officers to “go in” and look for him. Before entry, an officer—standing on a neighboring property and atop a concrete fence—spotted a handgun on the casita’s roof. After Coronado was arrested elsewhere, officers retrieved the gun from the roof. Coronado, charged federally as a felon in possession, moved to suppress the gun.

The appeal presented two core Fourth Amendment questions: (1) whether the lessee’s consent to “go in” to search for Coronado included permission to access the roof (thereby supplying “lawful access” for plain-view seizure), and (2) whether Coronado could argue for the first time on appeal that any consent ended once he was arrested off-premises.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of suppression. It held that the district court did not clearly err in finding the roof fell within the scope of the lessee’s consent to “go in” and look for Coronado, because a reasonable person could understand that consent as authorizing a full search of areas where a person could hide—including the roof—and the lessee did not limit or object to that scope. With lawful access established, the court upheld seizure under the plain-view doctrine (with the first two prongs undisputed on appeal).

The court also refused to consider Coronado’s “duration of consent” argument (that consent ended once he was arrested), holding it was waived because it was not raised in the pretrial suppression motion and no good cause was shown.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Standards of review and suppression procedure

  • United States v. Cates: Provided the framework that ultimate Fourth Amendment reasonableness is reviewed de novo, while factual findings are accepted unless clearly erroneous. This underwrote the court’s insistence on deferential review of the district court’s consent-scope finding.
  • United States v. Mullins: Supplied the definition of “clear error,” reinforcing that the appellate court would not reweigh facts absent a firm conviction of mistake.
  • United States v. Pikyavit: Critical on two fronts—(i) it characterizes “scope of consent” as a question of fact reviewed for clear error, and (ii) it emphasizes that the “onus” is on the consenter to delimit scope. The Coronado panel repeatedly used Pikyavit to reject Coronado’s push for de novo review and to support treating broad, unqualified consent as covering logically related search conduct.
  • United States v. Mathews, United States v. Murray, and United States v. Grist: Cited for the proposition that even when a district court resolves a suppression issue without an evidentiary hearing, factual findings are still reviewed for clear error—blunting Coronado’s attempt to change the appellate standard.
  • United States v. Bowen: Distinguished as a § 2255 case where denial without a hearing triggered de novo review of factual findings. The panel refused to import that collateral-review rule into suppression practice.
  • United States v. Glass: Not directly litigated, but cited to note Coronado did not challenge the absence of an evidentiary hearing; Glass frames when hearings are required (only with sufficiently definite contested facts).
  • United States v. Malone: Used to caution against raising issues for the first time at oral argument (the court applied this in discussing Coronado’s attempt to reframe the scope-of-consent inquiry).

2. Consent: scope defined by object and reasonableness

  • Florida v. Jimeno: The central Supreme Court anchor for the rule that the scope of consent is generally defined by the search’s “expressed object.” Coronado applies Jimeno to treat “look for Coronado” as permission to check places where a person could hide.
  • United States v. Kimoana: Reinforced the “totality of the circumstances” approach to scope, supporting the panel’s multi-factor reliance on language, lack of limitation, and the search’s object.
  • United States v. Pena: The opinion’s most instructive scope-of-consent comparator. Pena held that consent to “look in” a motel room for drugs extended to removing a ceiling tile and searching above it. Coronado borrowed Pena’s three-factor mode of analysis (language used, lack of objection/limitations, and object sought) to justify roof access here.
  • United States v. Anderson, United States v. Lyons, and United States v. McRae: These cases supported the proposition that casual, general phrasing (“scout around,” “look in the back,” “look in”) can authorize a “full search” of the relevant area, including non-obvious sub-areas (undercarriage, spare tire, trunk carpeting). Coronado used them to normalize a broad understanding of “go in.”
  • United States v. Torres: Cited for the general proposition that “permission to search contemplates a thorough search,” lending doctrinal weight to reading the consent broadly.
  • United States v. Wald and United States v. Livingston: Cited by Coronado but distinguished. Wald involved a factfinding of expressly limited consent (“a quick look” confined to passenger compartment). Livingston held consent to search for a person did not extend to a duffel bag where a person could not hide. The Coronado panel used these distinctions to frame its key boundary: consent may be broad, but it does not cover (i) expressly excluded areas or (ii) places that cannot contain the search object.
  • United States v. Mains and United States v. Comstock: Mains supplied the rule that consent to search for a person reaches “any area ... large enough to accommodate” a person. Comstock similarly permitted searching all rooms (including a basement) when looking for people. Coronado used these to treat the roof as a plausible hiding place within the consent’s object.

3. Plain view and warrant presumptions

  • United States v. Jones: Provided the baseline that home searches without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, with consent as an established exception—framing why consent mattered to both the roof access and the resulting seizure.
  • Groh v. Ramirez: Cited for the principle that warrantless seizures are presumptively unreasonable, setting up the need for a recognized exception.
  • United States v. Johnson: Supplied the three-prong formulation of the plain-view doctrine, especially the “lawful right of access” requirement that turned on the scope of consent here.
  • United States v. Sanchez: Cited generally to connect consent doctrine to plain-view seizures—supporting the panel’s view that lawful presence/access can arise from consent and then validate plain-view seizure.
  • United States v. Chavez: Mentioned only to note the government did not invoke community caretaking to justify the firearm seizure; the case serves as a contrast route that was not litigated.

4. Waiver of suppression arguments and “issue resolved below” exception

  • United States v. Warwick: The key waiver authority. Warwick holds Rule 12 waiver applies to the failure to include a particular argument in a suppression motion, absent good cause. Coronado uses this to deem the “consent ended upon arrest” theory waived.
  • United States v. Sweet: Provides a limited exception allowing appellate challenge where the district court sua sponte raises and explicitly resolves an issue on the merits. The panel held Sweet did not apply because the district court never decided consent duration.
  • United States v. Carbajal-Iriarte: Cited to underscore that scope-of-consent and duration-of-consent are distinct inquiries. This supported treating Coronado’s new “duration” theory as a new, waived argument rather than a mere elaboration.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why roof access fit within “go in” consent

The panel treated the district court’s conclusion—consent covered the roof—as a factual finding reviewed for clear error, which shaped the entire outcome: the question was not whether the appellate court would have construed the consent narrowly, but whether the district court’s construction lacked record support.

On substance, the court’s reasoning tracked three recurring consent-scope signposts drawn from United States v. Pena:

  1. Language of consent: The lessee said officers could “go in” to look for Coronado. Consistent with United States v. Pena and related “look in/scout around” cases (United States v. Anderson, United States v. Lyons, United States v. McRae), the panel accepted that unqualified, casual wording can imply permission for a thorough search of the premises, not a surgically limited inspection.
  2. No limitation or objection: Relying on United States v. Pikyavit and United States v. Pena, the court emphasized that the lessee did not delimit the search, and her lack of limitation remained relevant even if she was not positioned to observe every movement (Pikyavit allows considering failure to “carefully delimit” even when the consenter is absent).
  3. Object sought (a person): Under Florida v. Jimeno and United States v. Mains, consent to search for a person extends to spaces where a person could be. The roof was treated as such a space—large enough, and plausibly used by a fleeing suspect.

The panel rejected Coronado’s attempt to narrow the search to the interior by pointing to the immediate context (officers asking if Coronado was inside). It countered that broad consent was not self-limiting, and that the consenter bore the burden to impose limits if intended.

2. Plain-view seizure depended on “lawful right of access”

Coronado did not contest on appeal the first two prongs of United States v. Johnson’s plain-view test (lawful vantage point; immediately apparent incriminating character). The appeal thus narrowed to the third prong: whether officers had a lawful right of access to the gun on the roof. Once the panel affirmed the scope-of-consent finding, that “lawful access” element was satisfied, and the seizure stood.

3. The “consent ended upon arrest” theory was waived

The court treated Coronado’s duration argument as a distinct suppression theory that had to be raised before trial under Rule 12. Applying United States v. Warwick, and distinguishing United States v. Sweet, it held:

  • A general challenge to roof scope did not preserve a separate claim that consent terminated when Coronado was arrested elsewhere; and
  • The district court did not decide the duration issue, so Sweet’s “explicitly resolved below” exception did not apply.

C. Impact

  • Broader practical scope for “search-for-a-person” consents: The decision reinforces that consent to search for a person can include non-interior structural areas (like a roof) if they are plausible hiding places. Future litigants should expect courts to treat “premises” holistically when consent is general and the object is mobile.
  • Consent interpretation remains highly fact-bound and deferential on appeal: By reiterating United States v. Pikyavit (scope is fact; clear-error review), Coronado makes reversals difficult unless the record strongly contradicts the district court’s reading of circumstances.
  • Suppression practice warning—develop and preserve distinct theories: The waiver holding signals that defendants must explicitly brief separate consent doctrines (scope vs duration vs voluntariness) in the district court. Raising only “scope” may forfeit later arguments that consent expired, was revoked, or became unreasonable due to changed circumstances.
  • Plain view often rises or falls with lawful access: The case illustrates that even when an officer has a lawful vantage point, plain view still requires a lawful right of access—frequently supplied (or defeated) by consent-scope analysis.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Scope of consent”: When someone permits police to search, the permission has boundaries. Courts ask what a typical reasonable person would understand the permission to cover, given the words used and the circumstances.
  • “Objectively reasonable” test: The court does not focus on the consenter’s private intent or the officer’s subjective beliefs. It asks what an average reasonable person would think the consent meant in context.
  • Plain-view doctrine (three prongs):
    1. Police must be lawfully positioned to see the item.
    2. Its incriminating nature must be immediately apparent.
    3. Police must have a lawful right to access the item’s location to seize it.
    In this case, the fight was over prong (3).
  • “Clear error” review: A deferential appellate standard for factual findings. Even if the appellate judges might have decided differently, they will affirm unless the finding is strongly unsupported by the record.
  • Waiver under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12: Suppression arguments generally must be raised before trial. If a specific theory was not raised, the appellate court may refuse to consider it unless the defendant shows good cause.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Coronado solidifies two practical rules in consent-and-plain-view litigation within the Tenth Circuit’s framework: (1) unqualified consent to “go in” and look for a person may reasonably be construed to authorize access to structural areas like a roof when that area can conceal a person, thereby supplying the “lawful access” needed for a plain-view seizure; and (2) distinct suppression theories—such as whether consent ended after an arrest—must be specifically raised in the district court or they are waived on appeal. The decision’s broader significance lies less in creating a novel doctrine than in concretely extending existing consent principles to roof access and underscoring how preservation rules can be outcome-determinative in Fourth Amendment appeals.